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included	in	square	brackets	on	first	appearance	(such	as	Central	Leading	Group	for	
Finance	and	Economy	[中央财经领导小组]).	
3. For	Chinese	terms	and	names	(except	extremely	well-known	terms/names)	that	are	
not	convenient	to	be	translated	into	English,	Pinyin	is	used	for	transliteration	of	
Chinese	words	and	the	Chinese	characters	are	followed	directly	after	the	pinyin	in	
square	brackets	as	well	(such	as	Lü	Fuyuan	[吕福源]).	
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Abstract	
This	 thesis	 examines	 the	 international	 political	 economy	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	from	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	perspective.	The	literature	review	identifies	
the	limitations	in	the	existing	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	the	research	
gap	 of	 the	 Comparative	 Political	 Economy	 (CPE)	 and	 International	 Political	 Economy	 (IPE)	
approaches	to	exchange	rate	politics.	The	author	develops	a	three-level	game	framework	for	
China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	based	on	revision	and	synthesis	of	the	existing	CPE	and	
IPE	 approaches.	 Specifically,	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 refers	 to	 the	 Chinese	
leadership’s	negotiations	with	the	international	bargainers	(mainly	the	U.S.	government	and	
the	 IMF)	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	 negotiations	 between	 central	 government’s	
ministries	(People’s	Bank	of	China	and	Ministry	of	Commerce)	at	the	central	governmental	
level	(level	II)	and	negotiations	with	the	domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	
the	local	level	(level	III).	
	 The	main	argument	of	the	thesis	is	that	the	three-level	game	framework	provides	a	
richer	portrait	of	the	dynamism	and	complexity	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	The	
three-level	 game	 framework	 is	 applied	 empirically	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	between	2003	and	2013.	The	empirical	studies	have	four	major	
findings.	 First,	 the	 level	 I	 game	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	before	the	2005	exchange	rate	reform.	Second,	the	level	II	game	determined	
the	limited	scope	of	the	initial	reform	and	the	subsequent	gradual	RMB	appreciation.	Third,	
the	 level	 III	 game	 provided	 the	most	 important	 sources	 for	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	
returning	to	the	de	facto	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime	during	the	global	financial	crisis.	
Lastly,	the	level	I	game	once	again	played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	the	2010	exchange	rate	
reform,	but	the	level	II	game	was	important	as	well,	in	which	the	Chinese	leadership	reached	
the	 consensus	 to	 allow	 the	 RMB	 to	 appreciate	 against	 the	 dollar	 in	 a	 gradual	 and	 steady	
manner	to	improve	the	confidence	and	promote	the	international	use	of	RMB.	
	 This	 thesis	 provides	 original	 and	 systematic	 research	 on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	 in	the	Hu-Wen	era	to	the	academic	 literature.	 It	makes	a	modest	theoretical	
contribution	to	the	existing	body	of	CPE	and	IPE	literature	by	developing	the	three-level	game	
framework	to	explain	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	More	importantly,	this	research	
sheds	 light	 on	 the	 international	 political	 economy	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	
based	on	documentary	analysis	and	primary	data	from	interviews	and	questionnaire	surveys.	
Overall,	this	is	a	timely	and	rigorous	study	on	the	role	that	international	and	domestic	politics	
play	in	forging	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
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Chapter	1	Introduction	
	
	“Addressing	imbalances	 in	the	global	economy	is	a	shared	responsibility	among	the	major	
economic	 regions	of	 the	world.	…	Treasury	 is	 actively	engaged	with	 several	 economies	 to	
promote	the	adoption	of	flexible,	market-based	exchange	[rate]	policies	and	to	help	facilitate	
broader	adjustment.	Most	notable	among	these	is	China.”	
–	John	W.	Snow,	US	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	(2003-2006)1	
“Reform	of	the	renminbi’s	exchange	rate	is	a	matter	of	China’s	own	sovereignty.”	
–	Wen	Jiabao,	China	Premier	of	the	State	Council	(2003-2013)2	
	
1.1	Background	
China	is	an	emerging	great	power,	at	least	in	terms	of	economic	power	–	indeed,	some	might	
say	that	it	is	already	risen.	China’s	economy	has	experienced	double-digit	growth	on	average	
since	Deng	Xiaoping’s	reform	and	opening	up	policy	in	the	late	1970s;	has	become	one	of	the	
most	 important	 global	manufacturing	 centres	 since	 the	 1990s;	 is	 now	 the	world’s	 second	
largest	 economy;	 and	 its	 Gross	 Domestic	 Product	 (GDP)	 share	 of	 the	 global	 total	 has	
																																																						
1	John	W.	Snow,	“Statement	of	Secretary	John	W.	Snow	on	the	FOREX	Report”,	17	May	2005,	retrieved	from	
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2449.aspx	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
2	“Wen	Jiabao:	exchange	rate	reform	is	China’s	sovereignty	and	unyielding	to	external	pressure	[温家宝：汇率
改革是中国主权	不屈从外界压力]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	16	May	2005,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-05/16/content_2963828.htm	(accessed	14/09/2016);	also	see	
Mure	Dickie,	“Currency	reform	seen	as	question	of	sovereignty”,	Financial	Times,	22	May	2005,	retrieved	from	
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2f8d790-fa54-11d9-b092-00000e2511c8.html#axzz4BYuojsRh	(accessed	
14/09/2016).	
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continued	to	grow,	rising	from	5%	to	nearly	16%	in	the	period	from	1994	to	2013	(see	Figure	
1.1).3	
	
Figure	1.1:	China’s	GDP	share	of	world	total,	from	1994	to	2013	
Source:	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	World	Economic	Outlook	Database	
The	rise	of	China’s	economy	has	had	considerable	impacts	on	the	global	economy	in	
the	twenty-first	century.	At	the	very	least,	the	world	economy	has	been	riven	by	increasingly	
large	imbalances:	the	current	account	deficits	on	the	one	side,	with	the	United	States	(US)	
economy	as	the	most	prominent	case,	and	the	current	account	surpluses	on	the	other	side,	
with	China	being	the	polar	opposite.4	China	has	run	persistent	current	account	surpluses	since	
1994.	It	can	be	seen	from	Figure	1.2	that	China’s	trade	surplus	with	the	rest	of	world	increased	
																																																						
3	IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	available	from	
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx.	
4	Keith	Cowling,	Stephen	P.	Dunn	and	Philip	R.	Tomlinson	(2011)	“Global	imbalances	and	modern	capitalism:	a	
structural	approach	to	understanding	the	present	economic	crisis”,	Journal	of	Post	Keynesian	Economics,	
Vol.33,	No.4,	pp.575-596.	
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dramatically	after	China	acceded	 to	 the	World	Trade	Organization	 (WTO)	 in	2001.	China’s	
international	 trade	 imbalance	was	 a	 critically	 important	 contributor	 to	 global	 imbalances,	
which	were	widely	considered	as	one	of	the	main	causes	of	the	global	financial	crisis.5	
	
Figure	1.2:	China’s	current	account	balance,	from	1994	to	2013	
Source:	IMF,	World	Economic	Outlook	Database	
There	is	a	growing	body	of	literature	that	studies	the	causes	and	solutions	of	global	
imbalances,	and	particularly	 the	US-China	 imbalance.	A	considerable	part	of	 the	 literature	
emphasizes	the	way	in	which	the	Chinese	surplus	may	have	helped	aid	restructuring	of	the	
US	economy	through	the	mechanisms	by	which	the	surplus	was	recycled	into	the	US	credit	
																																																						
5	See,	for	example,	Maurice	Obstfeld	and	Kenneth	S.	Rogoff	(2009)	Global	Imbalances	and	the	Financial	Crisis:	
Products	of	Common	Causes,	London:	Centre	for	Economic	Policy	Research;	Claudio	Borio	and	Piti	Disyatat	
(2011)	“Global	imbalances	and	the	financial	crisis:	link	or	no	link?”,	Bank	for	International	Settlements	Working	
Papers	No.346,	retrieved	from	http://www.bis.org/publ/work346.pdf	(accessed	14/09/2016);	Ben	Bernanke	
(2009)	“Financial	Reform	to	Address	Systemic	Risk”,	Remarks	at	the	Council	on	Foreign	Relations,	retrieved	
from	https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm	(accessed	14/09/2016);	
Paul	Krugman	(2009)	“The	Chinese	disconnect”,	New	York	Times,	22	October	2009,	retrieved	from	
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/opinion/23krugman.html?_r=0	(accessed	14/09/2016);	Ming	Wan	
(2014)	The	China	Model	and	Global	Political	Economy,	Routledge.	
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Un
it:
	U
S	
do
lla
r	i
n	
bi
lli
on
s
China's	current	account	balance
20	
	
system	to	sustain	domestic	US	consumption.6	Specifically,	the	causal	mechanism	of	the	US-
China	 imbalance	 is	 that	 the	exchange	 rate	and	other	economic	policies	 followed	by	Asian	
countries,	 especially	 China,	 generated	 large	 amounts	 of	 current	 account	 surpluses.	 This	
helped	boost	consumption	and	credit	expansion	in	the	core	capitalist	countries,	especially	the	
US,	 with	 persistent	 trade	 deficits,	 by	 reducing	 the	 world	 interest	 rates	 and/or	 by	 simply	
allowing	 the	 US	 to	 borrow	 cheaply	 abroad,	 which	 are	 conducive	 to	 asset	 bubbles	 and,	
ultimately,	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.7	
Other	studies	are	more	narrowly	focused	on	China,	and	attribute	the	global	imbalance	
to	China’s	competitive	trade	and	currency	policy.	China	has	often	been	criticized	for	being	a	
neo-mercantilist	country	that	manipulates	its	currency	to	boost	its	exports.8	More	specifically,	
China	has	run	persistent	current	account	surpluses	in	part	because	the	Chinese	government	
has	maintained	 the	 RMB	 (or	 renminbi,	 often	 called	 the	 yuan,	 the	 official	 currency	 of	 the	
People’s	 Republic	 of	 China)	 at	 competitive	 (many	 analysts	 argue,	 undervalued)	 exchange	
rates	 against	 the	 US	 dollar.	 Furthermore,	 China’s	 central	 bank	 has	 engaged	 in	 massive	
sterilized	 intervention,	 by	 selling	 the	 RMB	 and	 buying	 the	 dollar,	 in	 the	 foreign	 exchange	
market.	The	corresponding	result	 is	 the	continuous	expansion	of	China’s	 foreign	exchange	
																																																						
6	The	author	thanks	Kerry	Brown	and	Chris	Rogers	for	their	suggestion	of	this	point.	For	more	in-depth	
theoretical	and	empirical	discussions	of	the	Sino-American	imbalance,	please	see	Zhaohui	Wang	(2017)	“The	
economic	rise	of	China	as	rule-taker,	rule-maker	or	rule-breaker?”,	Asian	Survey,	forthcoming	in	2017;	Gyu	
Cheol	Lee	(2014)	The	Political	Economy	of	the	Sino-American	Imbalance,	University	of	York	PhD	thesis,	
retrieved	from	http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/7132/7/Gyu%20Cheol%20Lee%20-PhD.pdf	(accessed	
25/01/2017);	Gamble,	Andrew	(2009)	The	Spectre	at	the	Feast:	Capitalist	Crisis	and	the	Politics	of	Recession,	
Palgrave	Macmillan;	Hung,	Ho-fung	(2008)	“Rise	of	China	and	the	global	overaccumulation	crisis”,	Review	of	
International	Political	Economy,	Vol.15,	No.2,	pp.149-179.	
7	Zhaohui	Wang	(2017)	“The	economic	rise	of	China	as	rule-taker,	rule-maker	or	rule-breaker?”,	Asian	Survey,	
forthcoming	in	2017.	
8	See,	for	example,	Anthony	J	Makin	(2009)	“Is	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	a	form	of	trade	protection?”,	
Business	Economics,	Vol.44,	No.2,	pp.80-86;	Paul	F.	Cwik	(2011)	“The	new	neo-mercantilism:	currency	
manipulation	as	a	form	of	protectionism”,	Economic	Affairs,	Vol.31,	No.3,	pp.7-11;	Dani	Rodrik	(2013)	“The	
new	mercantilist	challenge”,	Project	Syndicate,	retrieved	from	https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-mercantilism-by-dani-rodrik	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
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reserves	(see	Figure	1.3),	with	an	around	18-fold	increase	in	the	first	decade	of	the	twenty-
first	century.9	
	
Figure	1.3:	China’s	foreign	reserves,	from	1994	to	2013	
Source:	IMF,	International	Financial	Statistics	
The	large	amounts	of	China’s	current	account	surplus	and	foreign	reserves	imply	that	
the	RMB	exchange	rate	is	away	from	the	equilibrium	level.	The	RMB	exchange	rate,	therefore,	
has	been	under	increasing	scrutiny	in	the	new	millennium,	not	only	in	academia	but	also	in	
policy	 circles.	 Large	 amounts	 of	 studies	 by	 economists	 with	 different	 approaches	 and	
estimation	models	have	been	conducted	to	measure	whether	the	RMB	is	undervalued,	and	if	
so,	by	how	much.	However,	economists	have	produced	controversial	and	inconclusive	results	
on	the	RMB	equilibrium	exchange	rate.10	The	lack	of	consensus	among	economists	is	largely	
																																																						
9	IMF	International	Financial	Statistics,	available	from	http://data.imf.org/?sk=dac5755f-a3bb-438a-b64f-
67c687e2cfd5&ss=1390030323199.	
10	See	Chapter	2	Section	2.1	for	more	details.	
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attributed	to	the	influence	of	such	factors	as	different	methodologies	used,	economic	models	
created,	and	explanatory	variables	included	in	different	studies.	
Moreover,	 the	 competing	 results	 of	 economics	 studies	 have	 contributed	 to	 vexed	
international	debates	and	bargaining	between	the	Western	and	Chinese	political	leaders.	The	
two	 quotations	 in	 the	 epigraph	 demonstrate	 that	 the	Western	 and	 Chinese	 leaders	 hold	
different	views	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate.	On	the	one	hand,	John	W.	Snow,	US	Secretary	of	
the	Treasury,	regarded	China’s	rigid	exchange	rate	regime	as	the	cause	of	global	imbalances	
and	stressed	that	China	should	share	the	responsibility	for	addressing	global	imbalances.	On	
the	other	hand,	Wen	Jiabao,	China’s	Premier,	defended	exchange	rate	policy	as	an	issue	of	
sovereignty	and	emphasised	that	China	had	the	right	to	choose	the	exchange	rate	regime	that	
was	 best	 suited	 to	 China’s	 economic	 development.	 Furthermore,	 Kroeber	 points	 out	 that	
Western	officials	“view	an	exchange	rate	simply	as	a	price”	while	Chinese	leaders	“see	the	
exchange	 rate	 –	 and	 prices	 and	 market	 mechanisms	 in	 general	 –	 as	 tools	 in	 a	 broader	
development	strategy”.11	
This	thesis	is	mainly	focused	on	the	study	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	It	is	
an	 important	 field	as	exchange	rate	 is	a	major	economic	variable	that	regulates	trade	and	
capital	flows	across	countries	in	an	increasingly	deregulated	global	economy.	As	Walter	notes,	
“the	 level	and	the	stability	of	the	exchange	rate	can	have	significant	consequences	on	the	
material	well-being	of	individuals	and	firms,	especially	when	they	live	or	operate	in	countries	
with	a	high	level	of	economic	and	financial	integration	into	the	world	economy,	or	when	these	
																																																						
11	Arthur	Kroeber	(2011)	“The	renminbi:	the	political	economy	of	a	currency”,	Foreign	Policy,	7	September	
2011,	retrieved	from	http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/07-renminbi-kroeber	(accessed	
14/09/2016).	
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actors	 are	 strongly	 involved	 in	 international	 trade	 or	 finance.” 12 	More	 importantly,	 as	
mentioned	 before,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 value	 and	 regime,	 because	 of	 the	 country’s	
enormous	trade	and	capital	flows,	has	had	considerable	impacts	on	the	global	economy	and	
has	 caught	 the	 attention	 of	 global	 commodity	 and	 financial	 markets	 and	 policymakers.	
Therefore,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	nature	and	mechanism	of	China’s	exchange	rate	
policymaking.	
	
1.2	Research	questions	and	main	arguments	
Figure	1.4	delineates	the	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar	from	1994	to	2013.	After	
China	unified	the	dual	exchange	rates	in	1994,	China	adopted	a	de	facto	fixed	exchange	rate	
regime,	which	pegged	 the	RMB	to	 the	dollar	after	1995.	The	dollar-pegged	exchange	 rate	
regime	lasted	for	ten	years	from	1995	to	2005	and	then	China	began	to	appreciate	the	RMB	
in	a	graduate	manner.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	continuously	appreciated	against	the	dollar	for	
three	years	from	July	2005	to	July	2008.	After	July	2008	China	returned	to	the	dollar-pegged	
exchange	rate	regime	for	two	years.	China	continued	to	appreciate	the	RMB	from	June	2010	
to	 2013.	 In	 short,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 from	 1994	 to	 2013	 can	 generally	 be	
summarized	as	two	phases	of	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime	(from	1995	to	July	2005	
and	from	July	2008	to	June	2010),	three	turning	points	(July	2005,	July	2008	and	June	2010),	
and	two	phases	of	gradual	appreciation	(from	July	2005	to	July	2008	and	from	June	2010	to	
2013).	
																																																						
12	Stefanie	Walter	(2014)	“Private	actor	exchange	rate	policy	preferences”,	in	Thomas	Oatley	and	W.	Kindred	
Winecoff	(ed.)	Handbook	of	the	International	Political	Economy	of	Monetary	Relations,	Edward	Elgar	
Publishing,	p.169.	
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Figure	1.4:	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar,	from	1994	to	2013	
Source:	IMF,	International	Financial	Statistics	Database	
	 The	time-scale	 in	 this	 research	 is	 the	Hu-Wen	period,	 that	 is,	 from	2003	to	2013.13	
With	China’s	increasing	integration	into	the	world	economy	and	China’s	growing	impact	on	
the	global	political	economy,	China’s	currency	practice	has	been	the	central	and	contentious	
issue	in	the	2000s.	There	is	no	denying	that	China’s	non-devaluation	policy	during	the	1997-
1998	Asian	Financial	Crisis	is	of	great	importance,	but	this	thesis	is	mainly	focused	on	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	in	the	Hu-Wen	period,	mainly	for	the	reason	that	it	is	during	this	
period	that	China’s	imbalance	with	the	rest	of	the	world	deteriorates	and	there	is	a	heated	
debate	 over	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 policy.	 This	 thesis	 explores	 the	 following	 research	
questions:	
																																																						
13	Hu	Jintao	and	Wen	Jiabao	(Hu-Wen	Administration)	officially	succeeded	Jiang	Zemin,	Li	Peng	and	Zhu	Rongji	
(Jiang-Li-Zhu	Administration)	in	March	2003.	Xi	Jinping	and	Li	Keqiang	(Xi-Li	Administration)	officially	
succeeded	Hu	Jintao	and	Wen	Jiabao	in	March	2013.	
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What	factors	determine	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	from	2003	to	2013?	
In	particular,	what	accounts	for	the	two	phases	of	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	
regime?	What	are	 the	key	causes	of	 the	 three	 turning	points	of	exchange	 rate	
policy	change?	How	to	explain	 the	gradual,	 rather	 than	one-off,	pattern	of	 the	
RMB	appreciation?	Additionally,	why	have	some	policy	preferences	prevailed	in	
policymaking	at	the	expense	of	others	during	different	periods	of	time?	
	 The	 thesis	 therefore	 seeks	 to	enhance	our	understanding	of	China’s	exchange	 rate	
policymaking	in	the	twenty-first	century.	The	author	proposes	an	IPE	approach	to	bridge	the	
international	politics	and	domestic	politics	to	explain	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	It	
is	argued	that	Chinese	leaders	sat	at	the	juncture	of	the	international	system	and	the	state-
society	when	making	exchange	rate	policy.	China’s	central	decision	makers	strove	to	reconcile	
international	 pressures,	 domestic	ministerial	 interests	 and	domestic	 interest	 groups	when	
making	RMB	exchange	rate	policies.	More	specifically,	the	international	influences	played	an	
agenda-setting	role	in	both	the	2005	and	the	2010	RMB	exchange	rate	reforms.	However,	the	
international	 influences	were	 strongly	mitigated	 by	 China’s	 domestic	 politics.	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	China’s	ministerial	politics,	in	which	the	Ministry	of	Commerce	(MOFCOM)	was	more	
politically	powerful	than	the	People’s	Bank	of	China	(PBOC),	determined	the	gradual	nature	
of	exchange	rate	reform	from	2005	to	2007.	On	the	other	hand,	China’s	interest	group	politics	
provided	the	most	important	sources	for	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	from	2008	to	2010.	To	
address	 the	 above	 questions	 and	 support	 the	 main	 arguments,	 the	 author	 begins	 by	
examining	the	existing	literature.	The	next	section	depicts	the	state	of	the	art	in	research	on	
the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
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1.3	State	of	the	field	
As	mentioned	 before,	 there	 have	 been	 large	 amounts	 of	 Economics	 studies	 on	 the	 RMB	
exchange	 rate.	 However,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 economists	 to	 arrive	 at	 any	 firm	 and	 robust	
conclusion	about	the	equilibrium	RMB	exchange	rate	and	precise	level	of	RMB	exchange	rate	
misalignment.	 Chapter	2	 Section	2.1	will	 specifically	 show	 that	 existing	 Economics	 studies	
have	 yielded	 a	 very	 wide	 range	 of	 estimates.	 Moreover,	 the	 major	 shortcoming	 of	 the	
Economics	 studies	on	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 is	 that	economists	generally	assume	a	pure	
economic	world	in	which	only	the	price	and	market	mechanism	take	effect,	but	neglect	the	
political	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 state,	 institutions	 and	 political	 leaders.	 The	 inconclusive	
Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	are	unsatisfactory.	Therefore,	there	have	been	
numerous	attempts	by	scholars	of	political	economy	to	interpret	the	nature,	or	explain	the	
mechanism,	 of	 exchange	 rate	 politics	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	behaviour.	
	 On	 the	one	hand,	 the	Comparative	Political	Economy	 (CPE)	 literature	has	provided	
more	 nuanced	 explanations	 by	 examining	 the	 domestic	 interests	 and	 institutions	 that	
influences	exchange	rate	policymaking.	However,	as	will	be	analysed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	
2	Parts	2.2.1	and	2.2.2,	most	of	the	existing	CPE	studies	are	western-centric	and	have	their	
limitations	 when	 applied	 to	 explain	 China’s	 case.	 The	 assumptions	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	
politics	models	in	liberal	market	economies	with	democratic	politics	do	not	hold	in	China,	as	
China’s	 institutions,	 characterized	 by	 one-party	 rule	 and	 party-state	 system,	 are	
fundamentally	different	from	Western	liberal	democracies.	
	 Moreover,	limited	work	is	dedicated	to	figuring	out	the	political	structure	of	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 the	 interests	 and	 positions	 of	 policy	 elites	 and	 economic	
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ministries	and	examining	how	the	preferences	of	the	key	institutional	actors	are	aggregated.	
The	 black	 box	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 filled	 with	 the	 interplay	 of	 China’s	
domestic	 political	 powers	 and	 societal	 interests,	 remains	 unopened.	 Therefore,	 there	 is	 a	
need	 for	 a	more	 “indigenous”	 investigation	 into	China’s	 political	 structure	 and	process	 of	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	Lastly,	 the	CPE	 literature	focuses	on	the	domestic	 factors	but	
ignores	 the	 international	 dimension,	which	 undeniably	 affects	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 of	 an	
open	economy,	especially	a	large	open	economy	like	China,	in	the	era	of	globalization.	
	 On	the	other	hand,	the	International	Political	Economy	(IPE)	literature,	particularly	the	
international-domestic	interactions	approach,	should	have	bridged	the	international	politics	
and	 domestic	 politics	 to	 offer	 better	 explanations	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	
However,	to	the	best	of	the	author’s	knowledge,	limited	studies	of	this	kind	have	been	done	
in	the	existing	literature	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy,	which	will	be	discussed	in	detail	in	
Chapter	2	Part	2.2.4.	Chinese	leaders	sit	at	the	juncture	of	the	international	system	and	the	
state-society	 when	 making	 exchange	 rate	 policy.	 One	 cannot	 fully	 understand	 China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 without	 reference	 to	 interactions	 between	 international	 and	
domestic	levels.	
	 Therefore,	 the	 literature	 review,	 the	 second	chapter	of	 the	 thesis,	will	 identify	 the	
limitations	in	the	existing	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	the	research	gap	
of	the	CPE	and	IPE	approaches	to	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	“The	persistence	of	the	
Communist	 Party	 in	 China	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 striking	 feathers	 of	 the	 Chinese	 economic	
reform.”14	Before	proceeding	to	develop	a	theoretical	framework	for	China’s	exchange	rate	
policymaking,	 the	 researcher	will	 engage	 in	a	brief	discussion	about	 the	nature	of	China’s	
																																																						
14	Ronald	Coase	and	Ning	Wang	(2012)	How	China	Became	Capitalist,	Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.174.	
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politics	 in	 the	 Hu-Wen	 era,	 which	 is	 the	 important	 institutional	 foundation	 of	 China’s	
economic	policymaking.	
	
1.4	The	nature	of	China’s	politics		
Hu	Jintao	succeeded	Jiang	Zemin	as	the	CCP	general	secretary	at	the	first	Plenary	Session	of	
the	 16th	 CCP	 Central	 Committee	 in	 November	 2002.	 The	 number	 of	 Politburo	 Standing	
Committee	(PSC)	membership	increased	from	seven	in	the	era	of	Jiang	to	nine	in	the	era	of	
Hu.	 Hu	 Jintao	was	 “elected”	 as	 the	 PRC	 president	 and	Wen	 Jiabao	was	 appointed	 as	 the	
premier	of	the	State	Council	at	the	1st	Plenary	Session	of	the	10th	National	People’s	Congress	
(NPC)	in	March	2003.	There	were	both	continuities	and	changes	between	the	era	of	Jiang	and	
that	of	Hu-Wen.	It	 is	essential	to	examine	Jiang’s	legacy,	and	then	to	discuss	the	nature	of	
China’s	politics	in	the	Hu-Wen	era.	
	
1.4.1	Jiang	Zemin’s	legacy	
Jiang	Zemin’s	most	important	economic	legacy	was	to	ensure	the	reform	and	opening	up	after	
Deng	Xiaoping’s	 southern	 tour	 in	1992.	 Jiang	was	 consistently	dedicated	 to	 reforming	 the	
central	planning	 system	and	 creating	a	 competitive	market	within	China.	At	 the	14th	CCP	
National	Congress	in	October	1992,	Jiang	delivered	a	report	entitled	“Accelerating	the	pace	
of	 reform	and	opening	up	and	 the	modernization	construction	 to	win	 the	great	victory	of	
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socialism	with	 Chinese	 characteristics”.15	It	was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	Chinese	 leadership	
declared	 that	 the	 target	 of	 China’s	 economic	 reform	 was	 to	 establish	 a	 socialist	 market	
economy.	At	the	third	Plenary	Session	of	the	14th	CCP	Central	Committee	in	November	1993	
the	Party	passed	the	“Decision	of	the	CCP	Central	Committee	on	some	issues	concerning	the	
improvement	 of	 the	 socialist	 market	 economy”,	 which	 allowed	 the	 market	 to	 play	 a	
fundamental	role	in	resource	allocation	under	the	macroeconomic	management.16	The	mid-
1990s	witnessed	a	series	of	economic	reforms,	 including	reforms	of	enterprise	system,	tax	
sharing	system,	 financial	 system,	 foreign	 trade	system	and	 foreign	exchange	management	
system.	In	particular,	Jiang	Zemin	and	Zhu	Rongji	pushed	forward	a	large-scale	privatization	
to	reorganize	the	state-owned	enterprises	in	1997	and	1998.	China	experienced	a	dramatic	
transition	 from	 central	 planning	 to	market	 economy	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 China’s	 economy	
changed	accordingly	in	the	1990s.	As	Coase	and	Wang	noted,	
“The	 role	 of	 the	 Chinese	 state	 in	 the	 economy	 has	 become	 progressively	 less	
significant,	no	matter	what	measurement	is	used.	Before	the	economic	reforms,	
the	Chinese	people	had	little	economic	freedom	and	the	state	controlled	every	
aspect	of	the	economy,	from	production,	to	retail,	and	even	consumption.	Today	
[2012],	 private	 entrepreneurship	 is	 the	 primary	 driving	 force	 of	 the	 Chinese	
economy.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 state	 sector	 in	 the	 economy	 has	 fallen	 significantly	
relative	to	the	non-state	sector.”17	
																																																						
15	“Historic	junction:	establishing	the	socialist	market	economy	[历史节点：建立社会主义市场经济体制]”,	
People’s	Daily,	11	October	2007,	retrieved	from	http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104740/8150356.html	
(accessed	14/09/2016).	
16	“30	most	influential	events	in	the	30	years	of	China’s	reform	and	opening	up	[中国改革开放 30年最具影响
力的 30件大事]”,	retrieved	from	http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/41038/6757582.html	(accessed	
14/09/2016).	
17	Ronald	Coase	and	Ning	Wang	(2012)	How	China	Became	Capitalist,	Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.175.	
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	 Jiang’s	report	at	the	15th	CCP	National	Congress	in	September	1997	responded	
to	the	changing	nature	of	China’s	economy.	Jiang	declared	that	China’s	basic	economic	
system	for	the	primary	stage	of	socialism	was	to	maintain	public	ownership	as	the	main	
form	and	to	allow	the	development	of	multiple	forms	of	ownership.18	Furthermore,	the	
second	Plenary	 Session	of	NPC	passed	 the	PRC	Constitutional	Amendment	 in	March	
1999,	which	explicitly	stated	that	the	non-public	sector	was	an	important	component	
of	China’s	socialist	market	economy.19	Last	but	not	least,	Jiang’s	commitment	to	reform	
and	opening	up	finally	helped	China	to	join	the	WTO	in	2001.	Premier	Zhu	Rongji	was	
also	the	key	supporter	for	China’s	access	to	the	WTO.	
	 The	 infrastructure	 conditions	 the	 superstructure.	 Jiang’s	 most	 important	
political	 legacy	was	probably	 the	“Three	Represents”	 [三个代表]	 Theory,	which	was	
closely	related	to	the	changing	nature	of	China’s	economy.		Jiang	put	forward	“Three	
Represents”	when	he	visited	Guangdong	province	in	early	2000.	More	specifically,	the	
“Three	Represents”	requires	the	CCP	to	“always	represent	the	development	trend	of	
China’s	advanced	productive	forces,	the	orientation	of	China’s	advanced	culture,	and	
the	 fundamental	 interests	 of	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 the	 Chinese	 people”.20	
Jiang’s	“Three	Represents”	Theory	was	widely	interpreted,	both	at	home	and	abroad,	
as	 an	 official	 justification	 to	 expand	 party	membership	 to	 include	 elites	 of	 all	 social	
circles,	 which	 marked	 the	 CCP’s	 transition	 from	 a	 proletarian	 revolutionary	 Party	
																																																						
18	“Jiang	Zemin’s	Report	at	the	15th	CCP	National	Congress	[江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上
的报告]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-
04/29/content_1447509.htm	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
19	“National	People’s	Congress	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	PRC	Constitutional	Amendment	(1999)	[中华
人民共和国宪法修正案（1999年）]”,	retrieved	from	http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-
12/10/content_7075.htm	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
20	“Jiang	Zemin	put	forward	the	“Three	Represents”	Theory	in	2000	[2000年江泽民提出“三个代表”重要思
想]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	7	April	2000,	retrieved	from	http://www.hq.xinhuanet.com/focus/2008-
04/07/content_12896263.htm	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
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towards	an	elite	governing	Party.	According	to	Brown,	Jiang’s	“Three	Represent”	was	
“one	such	theoretical	contribution,	leading	to	the	admission	that	entrepreneurs	were	
also	 productive	 elements	 in	 society”	 and	 also	 “a	 partial	 admission	 that	 the	 social	
makeup	 of	 China	 was	 becoming	more	 complex”.21	Miller	 also	 remarked	 that	 “Jiang	
Zemin’s	 ‘three	 represents’	 thus	 reflected	 the	Party	 leadership’s	decision	 to	pursue	a	
strategy	of	political	co-option	with	regard	to	the	entrepreneurial,	managerial,	technical,	
and	professional	elites	who	were	emerging	in	Chinese	society	as	a	consequence	of	the	
economic	 reforms.”22	In	 a	nutshell,	 Jiang’s	 “Three	Represents”	 forms	 the	 theoretical	
basis	of	China’s	elite-coalition	governance	in	the	twenty-first	century.	
	 In	addition	to	the	changing	nature	of	China’s	economy,	China’s	entry	into	the	
WTO	also	brought	about	important	political	implications.	WTO	is	certainly	one	of	the	
key	 institutions	 to	promote	 the	Western	norms	of	 neoliberal	 global	 trade.	Although	
there	is	a	heated	debate	over	the	relationship	between	the	world	liberal	order	and	the	
rise	of	China	in	the	twenty-first	century23,	two	implications	of	China’s	entry	into	WTO	
after	 the	 15-year-long	 negotiations	 should	 be	 clear.	 First,	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	
recognized	 the	 key	 principles	 and	 values	 of	 WTO	 agreements.	 As	 Brown	 notes,	
“politically,	the	final	acceptance	into	the	WTO	fold	marked	a	moment	in	which	China	
signalled	a	full	commitment	to	accepting	international	norms,	working	within	them,	and	
																																																						
21	Kerry	Brown	(2009)	Friends	and	Enemies:	The	Past,	Present	and	Future	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China,	
Anthem	Press,	p.107.	
22	Allice	Miller	(2011)	“Dilemmas	of	globalization	and	governance”,	in	Roderick	MacFarquhar	(ed.)	The	Politics	
of	China:	Sixty	Years	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	Cambridge	University	Press,	p.570.	
23	See,	for	example,	John	Ikenberry	(2008)	“The	rise	of	China	and	the	future	of	the	West:	can	the	liberal	system	
survive?”,	Foreign	Affairs,	Vol.87,	No.1,	pp.23-37;	Shaun	Breslin	(2010)	“China’s	emerging	global	role:	
dissatisfied	responsible	great	power”,	Politics,	Vol.30,	No.1,	pp.52-62;	Hung	Ho-fung	(2012)	“Is	China	saving	
global	capitalism	from	the	global	crisis?”,	Protosociology:	An	International	Journal	of	Interdisciplinary,	Vol.29,	
pp.159-179;	Shaun	Breslin	(2013)	“China	and	the	global	order:	signalling	threat	or	friendship?”,	International	
Affairs,	Vol.89,	No.3,	pp.615-634.	
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attempting	to	regularize	at	least	some	of	its	economy	with	the	rules	established	largely	
in	the	West,	in	North	American	and	Europe.”24	Second,	the	increasing	scale	of	China’s	
engagement	 with	 the	 world	 economy	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 meant	 that	
international	interests	were	much	more	entangled	in	China’s	domestic	politics.	Special	
attention	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 the	more	 international-domestic	 interactions	 in	 China’s	
economic	policy	making.	
	
1.4.2	China’s	politics	in	the	Hu-Wen	era	
China’s	politics	was	more	characterized	by	collective	leadership	in	the	Hu-Wen	era	than	ever	
before.	 “After	 the	 passing	 of	 strongmen	 like	Mao	 Zedong	 and	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 the	 young	
generation	of	leaders	usually	does	not	have	a	strong	base	of	legitimacy	to	enable	individual	
leaders	to	stand	above	different	bureaucracies	and	departments.”25	Hu	and	Wen	were	also	
widely	considered	to	be	relatively	lacking	in	political	power	than	Jiang	Zemin	and	Zhu	Rongji.26	
Therefore,	 Hu	 did	 not	 enjoy	 as	 much	 political	 capital	 as	 his	 predecessors	 and	 “seemed	
purposefully	 and	 consistently	 advertised	 simply	 as	 primus	 inter	 pares”. 27 	Brown,	 in	 his	
biography	 Hu	 Jintao:	 China’s	 Silent	 Ruler,	 argues	 that	 Hu	 presented	 “a	 non-ego	 style	 of	
leadership”	and	“Hu’s	reasons	for	keeping	a	very	low	profile	had	very	good	intentions”.28	This	
																																																						
24	Kerry	Brown	(2013)	Contemporary	China,	Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.53.	
25	Yongnian	Zheng	and	Gang	Chen	(2015)	“The	Chinese	Communist	Party:	an	institutional	perspective”,	in	
David	S.G.	Goodman	(ed.)	Handbook	of	the	Politics	of	China,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	p.67.	
26	See,	for	example,	Shiping	Zheng	(2005)	“The	new	era	in	Chinese	elite	politics”,	Issues	and	Studies,	Vol.41,	
No.1,	pp.190-203;	Allice	Miller	(2008)	“Institutionalization	and	the	changing	dynamics	of	Chinese	leadership	
politics”,	in	Cheng	Li	(ed.)	China’s	Changing	Political	Landscape:	Prospects	for	Democracy,	Brookings	Institution	
Press.	
27	Allice	Miller	(2011)	“Dilemmas	of	globalization	and	governance”,	in	Roderick	MacFarquhar	(ed.)	The	Politics	
of	China:	Sixty	Years	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	Cambridge	University	Press,	p.534.	
28	Kerry	Brown	(2012)	Hu	Jintao:	China’s	Silent	Leader,	World	Scientific,	p.xxv.	
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part	will	further	argue	that	the	fundamental	reason	for	Hu’s	leadership	style	was	rooted	in	
China’s	changing	political-socioeconomic	landscapes.	
	 With	the	continuous	reform	and	opening	up	in	the	era	of	Jiang,	China’s	economy	is	
much	more	complex	and	China	has	an	increasingly	pluralist	society	in	the	twenty-first	century.	
Many	different	interests,	including	international	and	domestic,	should	be	taken	into	account	
when	 making	 economic	 policies.	 There	 was	 correspondingly	 greater	 pluralization	 and	
institutionalization	 of	 economic	 policymaking	 under	 Hu	 and	 Wen. 29 	“The	 complexity	 of	
market	 and	 political	 administration	 leads	 to	 a	more	 sophisticated	 approach	 to	 economic	
policy	 formulation	 and	 implementation,	 requiring	 more	 professionalism	 in	 economic	
policymaking.”30	Inputs	 into	 policy	 deliberations	mainly	 come	 from	 government	 agencies.	
Therefore,	bureaucratic	politics	plays	an	important	role	in	China’s	economic	policy	making.	
The	 policy	 outcomes	 cannot	 be	 well	 understood	 without	 “looking	 at	 the	 interactions	 of	
officials	in	different,	and	often	competing,	government	agencies	who	are	mostly	motivated	
by	their	organization’s	interests”.31	
	 With	 an	 increasingly	 complex	 array	 of	 interests,	 Hu	 and	Wen	 could	 only	 exercise	
effective	governance	by	maintaining	a	politics	of	consensus	at	the	top.	Chinese	politics	in	the	
Hu-Wen	 era	 was	 best	 characterized	 by	 “consensus-building	 collective	 leadership”	 in	 the	
																																																						
29	See,	for	example,	Shiping	Zheng	(2005)	“The	new	era	in	Chinese	elite	politics”,	Issues	and	Studies,	Vol.41,	
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words	of	Miller.32	More	 specifically,	Miller	 suggests	 that	 “leadership	 conflict	 and	 factional	
competition	continued	in	the	Hu	era,	but	they	now	appeared	circumscribed	by	still	informal	
but	 increasingly	binding	norms	and	by	pressures	 for	a	politics	of	consensus.”33	Brown	also	
sheds	light	on	Hu’s	special	efforts	to	maintain	consensus-building	collective	leadership:	
“Hu	 spoke,	 as	 always,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 collective	 leadership,	 a	man	who	 delivered	
consensus.	He	never	placed	himself	in	the	position	of	supreme	leader,	avoiding	
the	 accusations	 of	 arrogance	 and	 hubris	 that	 had	 been	 levelled	 at	 the	 more	
extroverted,	publicity-fond	Jiang	Zemin.”34	
	 After	Hu’s	retirement,	Brown	also	looks	back	at	the	Hu-Wen	era	and	describes	them	
as	“great	consensus	builder”	and	“faithful	implementer”:	
“Mr	 Hu	 was	 the	 great	 consensus	 builder,	 almost	 pathologically	 tedious	 in	 his	
public	 statements,	but	 someone	amorphous	enough	 in	 their	public	persona	 to	
never	side	too	obviously	with	any	group	 in	the	party	against	another	so	that	 it	
risked	causing	schism.	Mr	Wen	performed	the	function	of	faithful	implementer,	
the	reassuringly	human	face	of	the	modern	Chinese	elite,	holding	the	banner	of	
reform	up	towards	the	end	in	ways	which	granted	hope,	even	though	they	lacked	
practical	details.”35	
	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 instructive	to	note	that	the	extent	of	pluralism	in	China’s	politics	
was	not	fixed	and	institutionalised	in	Hu-Wen	era;	instead,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	extent	of	
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pluralism	was	largely	managed	by	the	top	leaders.36	As	mentioned,	the	space	for	pluralism	in	
terms	of	economic	policy	making	that	required	technical	expertise	and	professionalism	was	
extended	 in	 the	 Hu-Wen	 administration,	 depending	 on	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 China’s	
economy	and	society	and	the	top	leaders’	perspective	of	the	nature	of	the	problems	to	be	
solved.	The	relative	rise	of	PBOC	in	China’s	bureaucracy	politics	was	a	prime	example.	The	
institutional	rise	of	PBOC	was	largely	attributed	to	its	“specialized	resources	and	capacities	–	
information,	monetary	expertise,	and	a	range	of	policy	instruments	–	that	have	substantially	
boosted	its	role	as	an	inflation-fight	central	bank”.37	By	contrast,	the	space	for	pluralism	in	
terms	of	“high-politics	issues”	such	as	sovereignty	and	human	rights	was	heavily	constrained.	
As	Brown	comments	on	Hu’s	hard	line	on	Tibet,	Xinjiang	and	Taiwan,	“the	bottom	line	was	
that	going	soft	on	these	would	have	been	political	suicide.”38	Therefore,	“it	would	be	wrong	
to	see	Hu	as	a	man	without	power	constrained	in	a	system	where	he	has	been	swamped	by	
the	interests	and	influence	of	other	powerful	figures	around	him.”39	Hu’s	managed	pluralism	
showed	he	was	still	the	most	important	figure	in	China’s	politics	and	Hu-Wen’s	consensus-
building	 collective	 leadership	 was	 adapted	 to	 China’s	 changing	 political-socioeconomic	
landscapes	after	Jiang.	
	 So	far,	this	part	of	the	chapter	has	outlined	the	general	leadership	style	under	the	Hu-
Wen	era,	but	it	has	not	examined	Hu	and	Wen’s	specific	policies	in	practice.	Hu	and	Wen	faced	
challenges	in	governing	a	society	that	was	not	only	much	more	complex	but	also	increasingly	
unequal	after	they	took	office.	China’s	Gini	Coefficient	was	above	0.4,	the	international	alert	
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line	of	Gini	coefficient	 in	the	2000s.40	After	the	 leadership	transition	 in	2002,	Hu	and	Wen	
explicitly	showed	their	shifted	priority	to	sustainable	development	and	social	development.	
Liew	and	Wu	recognize	that	“there	is	without	doubt	a	fundamental	shift	in	emphasis	between	
the	 Jiang	 Zemin-Zhu	 Rongji	 and	 the	 Hu	 Jintao-Wen	 Jiabao	 leadership.	 While	 the	 former	
leadership	 was	 deeply	 concerned	 with	 engaging	 the	 global	 economy,	 the	 latter	 is	 more	
concerned	with	poverty	 and	 income	 inequality,	 especially	 in	 the	 countryside	 and	western	
China.”41	For	instance,	the	first	two	public	visits	by	Hu	Jintao	as	general	secretary	were	not	to	
the	modern	and	prosperous	cities	of	Shanghai	or	Shenzhen	but	rather	to	Xibaipo	[西柏坡],	a	
village	 in	 Hebei,	 and	 Inner	 Mongolia.	 Particularly,	 Hu	 Jintao	 put	 forward	 the	 “scientific	
development	outlook”	 [科学发展观]	 in	 the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	 the	16th	CCP	Central	
Committee	 in	 2003,	 which	 aimed	 to	 address	 the	 problems	 including	 the	 widening	 gap	
between	urban	and	rural	development,	the	uneven	development	among	China’s	regions,	the	
pursuit	of	economic	growth	at	the	sacrifice	of	environmental	sustainability,	and	the	imbalance	
between	export-driven	growth	and	domestic	consumption.42	
	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 rhetoric	 is	 not	 equal	 to	practice	 in	most	
instances	in	China.	The	exchange	rate	reform	may	be	one	of	the	most	useful	lenses	to	examine	
the	extent	 to	which	Hu’s	proposal	of	 scientific	development	outlook	and	Wen’s	economic	
restructuring	and	rebalancing	were	translated	into	concrete	measures.	In	order	to	maintain	
an	undervalued	RMB	exchange	 rate,	 China	had	 to	 sacrifice	 the	welfare	of	 the	majority	of	
																																																						
40	See,	for	example,	Barry	Naughton	(2007)	The	Chinese	Economy:	Transitions	and	Growth,	MIF	Press,	p.217;	
“China’s	Gini	coefficient	close	to	0.47	[中国基尼系数已逼近 0.47]”,	People’s	Daily,	12	October	2005,	retrieved	
from	http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/3759688.html	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
41	Leong	Liew	and	Harry	Wu	(2007)	The	Making	of	China’s	Exchange	Rate	Policy:	From	Plan	to	WTO	Entry,	
Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	p.206	
42	“Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	16th	CCP	Central	Committee	articulated	scientific	development	outlook	[十六
届三中全会明确阐述科学发展观]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	4	August	2012,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-08/04/c_112623819.htm	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
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ordinary	Chinese	and	“provided	extensive	subsidies	to	global	consumers	and	foreign	direct	
investors,	notably	 from	the	US	and	 its	allies”.43	Effective	exchange	rate	 reform	could	have	
contributed	to	economic	rebalancing	by	making	exports	more	expensive	and	imports	cheaper,	
thereby	alleviating	the	export	surge	and	stimulating	the	domestic	consumption.44	The	thesis	
will	empirically	examine	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	in	depth	and	the	last	chapter	will	draw	
a	conclusion	on	the	relationship	between	China’s	politics	and	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	
in	the	Hu-Wen	era.	Before	that,	the	researcher	develops	a	theoretical	framework	for	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	to	guide	the	subsequent	empirical	studies.	
	
1.5	Theoretical	framework	
This	section	now	develops	a	theoretical	framework	for	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	
based	on	revision	and	synthesis	of	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	approaches.	The	thesis	extends	
Putnam’s	 two-level	 game	 and	develops	 a	 three-level	 framework	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking.	In	the	three-level	game	framework,	China’s	central	decision	makers	strive	to	
reconcile	international	pressures,	domestic	ministerial	interests	and	domestic	interest	groups	
when	making	exchange	rate	policy.45	
	 More	specifically,	the	level	I	game	examines	the	international	 influences	on	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	The	US	government	(Congress,	Treasury	and	president)	and	the	
IMF	are	the	main	actors	in	the	international	system	that	exert	external	pressure	on	China’s	
																																																						
43	Di	Dongsheng	(2013)	“The	renminbi’s	rise	and	Chinese	politics”,	in	Alan	Wheatley	(ed.)	The	Power	of	
Currencies	and	Currencies	of	Power,	The	International	Institute	for	Strategic	Studies	(IISS),	p.124.	
44	Nicholas	R.	Lardy	(2012)	Sustaining	China’s	Economic	Growth	After	the	Global	Financial	Crisis,	Peterson	
Institute	for	International	Economics.	
45	See	Chapter	3	for	more	details.	
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exchange	rate	policy.	They	have	generally	urged	China	to	appreciate	the	RMB	at	a	fast	pace	
and	to	move	as	soon	as	possible	to	greater	flexibility.	
The	level	II	game	involves	two	most	important	ministries	with	regard	to	exchange	rate	
policymaking	within	China’s	central	government	–	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM.	They	have	
clear	but	competing	preferences	over	the	level	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	the	stability	of	
the	currency.	The	PBOC	favours	relatively	appreciated	RMB	to	curb	imported	inflation	and	
more	flexibility	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	to	acquire	more	monetary	policy	autonomy,	while	
the	MOFCOM	has	a	vested	interest	in	a	depreciated	and	fixed	RMB	exchange	rate	to	promote	
the	 competitiveness	 of	 China’s	 export	 sectors.	 The	 relative	 power	 and	 bargaining	 game	
between	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	are	expected	to	exert	significant	influences	on	the	RMB	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	
	 The	level	III	game	refers	to	the	interactions	between	Chinese	central	government	and	
local	 interest	 groups	 and	 local	 governments	 or	 bureaucracies.	 Industry	 associations	 and	
private	firms,	could	communicate	their	preferences	to	 local	governments	or	bureaucracies	
such	as	the	local	branches	of	MOFCOM	to	impose	influences	on	exchange	rate	policy.	Lower-
level	officials	may	speak	on	behalf	of	these	interest	groups	for	the	reason	that	their	political	
careers	mostly	depend	on	the	success	of	their	local	economy,	to	which	the	local	industries	
make	 a	 considerable	 contribution.	 The	 policymakers	 in	 the	 central	 government	 cannot	
neglect	the	interests	of	local	export	enterprises	and	the	voices	of	local	governments	in	the	
coastal	regions,	given	the	importance	of	exports	to	China’s	economy.	
	 One	may	come	up	with	such	a	question:	why	it	is	a	three-level	game	and	not	a	two-
level	 one?	 A	 two-level	 game	 conceptualizes	 the	 policymaking	 process	 as	 negotiations	
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between	the	international	and	the	domestic.46	A	three-level	game	further	distinguishes	the	
domestic	games,	assuming	that	the	difference	between	the	two	domestic	games	is	so	great	
that	it	is	better	conceived	of	as	two	separate	negotiations,	rather	than	two	parts	of	the	same	
domestic	game.	This	assumption	is	analytically	plausible,	but	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.	The	
explanatory	power	of	 the	adapted	three-level	game	framework	will	be	empirically	applied	
through	an	examination	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	between	2003	and	2013.	
	 To	summarize,	the	three-level	game	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	examines	
the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 negotiations	 with	 the	 international	 bargainers	 (mainly	 the	 US	
government	and	the	IMF)	at	the	international	level	(level	I),	negotiations	between	the	central	
government’s	ministries	(PBOC	and	MOFCOM)	at	the	central	governmental	level	(level	II)	and	
negotiations	with	the	domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	
III).	 The	 applicability	 of	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 will	 be	 examined	 in	 subsequent	
empirical	studies.	
	
1.6	Empirical	studies	
The	 explanatory	 power	 of	 the	 adapted	 three-level	 game	 framework	 cannot	 be	 taken	 for	
granted	 unless	 empirically	 applied	 through	 an	 examination	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	between	2003	and	2013.	It	is	necessary	to	divide	the	empirical	studies	into	four	
periods	of	time	according	to	the	three	turning	points	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy:	 first	
from	2003	to	July	2005,	second	from	July	2005	to	July	2008,	third	from	July	2008	to	June	2010	
																																																						
46	Robert	D.	Putnam	(1998)	“Diplomacy	and	domestic	politics:	the	logic	of	two-level	games”,	International	
Organization,	Vol.42,	No.3,	pp.427-460.	
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and	 finally	 from	 June	 2010	 to	 2013.	 Empirical	 studies	 will	 explore	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	in	the	four	periods	of	time	respectively.	
	
1.6.1	Origins	of	the	20005	exchange	rate	reform,	from	2003	to	July	2005	
China’s	exchange	 rate	policy	was	not	a	key	 issue	 in	 the	 international	 society	before	2003,	
though	China	had	pegged	the	RMB	to	the	US	dollar	after	1995.	However,	the	year	of	2003	
witnessed	the	sudden	emergence	of	bills	and	resolutions	 (ten	 in	 total)	 in	 the	US	Congress	
targeting	China’s	currency	manipulation	and	undervaluation.	On	the	one	hand,	China’s	trade	
surplus	 rose	rapidly	after	2003.	On	the	other	hand,	a	 large	number	of	manufacturing	 jobs	
began	to	be	lost	in	the	US.	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	became	subject	to	sustained	American	
pressure.	
The	Congress’s	concern	imposed	unprecedented	pressure	on	the	US	administration	to	
engage	with	the	Chinese	authorities	to	address	the	RMB	exchange	rate	issue.	An	analysis	of	
the	Treasury’s	Reports	 to	Congress	on	 International	 Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies	
demonstrated	that	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	became	Treasury’s	main	concern	after	late	
2003.	 The	 Reports	 reiterated	 that	 China’s	 fixed	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	 no	 longer	
appropriate	 and	proposed	a	more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	based	on	market	mechanisms.47	
Instead	of	labelling	China	as	a	currency	manipulator,	the	Treasury	officials	actively	engaged	
																																																						
47	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies”,	
April	2004,	retrieved	from	http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Treasury_ReportToCongressOnInternationalEconomicAndExchangeRatePolicies-
2003H2_2004%20Apr%2015.pdf	(accessed	14/09/2016),	pp.10-11;	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	
Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies”,	December	2004,	retrieved	from		
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Treasury_ReportToCongressOnInternationalEconomicAndExchangeRatePolicies-
2004H1_2004%20Dec%203.pdf	(accessed	14/09/2016),	pp.9-11.	
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with	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	 to	 hasten	 and	 facilitate	 the	move	 to	 a	 flexible	market-based	
exchange	rate	regime.	The	Treasury	also	worked	with	China	to	 identify	and	overcome	the	
impediments	to	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility.	With	regard	to	the	US	president,	a	similar	
trend	could	be	 identified	that	President	Bush	stressed	the	desirability	of	 flexible	exchange	
rates	but	avoided	the	direct	accusation	of	Beijing’s	currency	manipulation.	The	IMF	was	even	
more	cautious	and	prudent.	In	the	2004	Article	IV	Consultation	Report,	the	IMF	staff	held	the	
view	 that	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 find	 persuasive	 evidence	 that	 the	 RMB	 was	 substantially	
undervalued,	though	they	also	proposed	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	for	China.48	
	 In	 terms	 of	 China’s	 domestic	 politics,	 the	 PBOC	 was	 the	 key	 ministry	 leading	 the	
change	 for	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform.	 Zhou	Xiaochuan	 [周小川],	 the	Governor	of	 PBOC,	
made	consistent	efforts	to	advocate	that	exchange	rate	flexibility	would	provide	the	Chinese	
authorities	 with	 additional	 tools	 to	 control	 excessive	 monetary	 supply	 and	 inflationary	
pressure.	 However,	 PBOC’s	 promotion	 of	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 encountered	 strong	
opposition	from	the	MOFCOM.	MOFCOM’s	officials	argued	that	the	stability	of	RMB	exchange	
rate	was	crucial	for	China’s	export	and	manufacturing	industries	and	that	dramatic	changes	
would	 lead	to	the	bankruptcy	of	many	export	enterprises	and	economic	slowdown,	which	
could	 further	undermine	 social	 stability.	Particularly,	 after	Bo	Xilai	 [薄熙来]	 succeeded	Lü	
Fuyuan	[吕福源]	as	the	Minister	of	Commerce	in	late	February	2004,	the	MOFCOM	under	Bo	
made	a	 loud	voice	 to	underline	 the	 importance	of	exchange	 rate	stability	and	 took	a	 firm	
stand	against	the	exchange	rate	reform.	Therefore,	the	exchange	rate	reform	was	delayed	in	
2004.	
																																																						
48	International	Monetary	Fund,	“People’s	Republic	of	China:	2004	Article	IV	Consultation	Report”,	5	November	
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	 The	Congress	set	off	another	wave	of	targeting	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	first	
half	of	2005.	There	were	in	total	twelve	bills	concerning	China’s	currency	in	2005,	eleven	of	
which	were	introduced	before	21	July	2005.	There	was	a	significant	escalation	of	the	currency	
dispute	between	Washington	and	Beijing	as	three	bills	included	a	27.5	percent	duty	penalty	
imposed	on	all	China’s	products	exported	to	the	US	if	China	did	not	revalue	its	currency.49	The	
Bush	administration	became	 increasingly	 critical	of	China’s	delayed	move,	which	 could	be	
seen	from	the	blunter	words	of	Treasury	Secretary’s	statements	and	Treasury’s	Reports.	The	
IMF	also	adopted	an	increasingly	tough	stance	toward	China’s	currency.	In	a	nutshell,	the	re-
emergence	 of	 external	 pressure	 on	 RMB	 undervaluation	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2005	 brought	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 to	 a	 focal	 point	within	 the	 international	 community.	 China’s	
leaders	were	under	so	immense	pressure	from	both	the	US	government	and	the	IMF	that	the	
old	exchange	rate	regime	was	seemingly	unsustainable.	
	 The	Chinese	top	leaders	sat	at	the	juncture	of	international	and	domestic	politics	of	
the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	Internationally,	the	intense	criticism	and	pressure	rendered	
the	RMB	exchange	rate	an	inevitable	issue.	Domestically,	the	PBOC	advocated	a	more	flexible	
exchange	rate	for	more	monetary	autonomy,	while	the	MOFCOM,	with	more	political	clout,	
maintained	that	exchange	rate	stability	was	crucial	for	China’s	growth	and	employment.	The	
Chinese	leadership	swung	back	and	forth,	striving	to	reconcile	the	interests	of	all	parties,	in	
formulating	the	exchange	rate	reform	policy.	Change	eventually	came	on	21	July	2005.	The	
																																																						
49	For	more	detail,	see	“S.14	-	Fair	Wage,	Competition,	and	Investment	Act	of	2005”,	24	January	2005,	
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PBOC	 announced	 that	 China	would	 implement	 a	managed	 floating	 exchange	 rate	 regime	
based	on	market	demand	and	supply	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies.	Furthermore,	
the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 against	 the	 dollar	 was	 revalued	 from	 8.28	 to	 8.11,	 with	 a	 2.1%	
appreciation.	The	daily	trading	price	of	the	dollar	against	the	RMB	in	the	inter-bank	foreign	
exchange	market	will	be	allowed	to	float	within	a	band	of	±0.3	percent	around	the	central	
parity	published	by	the	PBOC.50	
	 This	 policy	 outcome	was	 interpreted	 as	 a	 compromise	 between	 international	 and	
domestic	bargainers.	The	international	pressure	did	play	an	agenda-setting	role,	which	means	
that	 it	 made	 China’s	 leaders	 unable	 to	 avoid	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 issue.	 The	 growing	
external	 pressure	 on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 issue	 forced	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	 to	 put	
exchange	rate	reform	on	a	task	list	in	2005.	The	two	key	ministries	with	influence	in	the	State	
Council	and	 the	CLGFE	were	divided	 internally	 concerning	 the	possibility	of	exchange	 rate	
policy	change.	However,	the	MOFCOM	was	more	influential	over	the	central	government’s	
decision-making	 than	 the	 PBOC.	 As	 a	 result,	 PBOC’s	 wish	 for	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 was	
granted,	but	the	MOFCOM	won	key	ground	as	well.	The	initial	RMB	appreciation	was	limited	
to	2.1	percent	against	the	dollar	and	the	pace	of	subsequent	RMB	appreciation	was	to	be	
relatively	stable	and	slow.	
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1.6.2	Gradual	development	of	exchange	rate	reform,	from	July	2005	to	2007	
After	China	announced	the	exchange	rate	reform	on	21	July	2005,	Congress’s	pressure	on	
China’s	 currency	 waned	 gradually.	 There	 were	 two	 bills	 after	 PBOC’s	 announcement	 of	
exchange	rate	reform	in	July	2005	and	only	one	bill	in	2006	targeting	the	RMB	issue.	However,	
the	 Treasury	 kept	 a	 close	 eye	 on	 the	 subsequent	 development	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
reform.	 The	 Treasury’s	 Reports	 recognized	 that	 China’s	 new	 exchange	 rate	 mechanism	
remained	a	 tightly	managed	currency	peg	against	 the	dollar,	as	 the	 initial	adjustment	was	
small,	the	subsequent	movements	of	the	RMB	were	limited	and	the	currency	basket	seemed	
not	to	play	a	significant	role.51	The	US	administration	monitored	closely	the	progress	made	
on	China’s	exchange	rate	regime	and	continued	the	intensive	engagement	with	China	in	2006.	
With	regard	to	the	IMF,	a	trend	can	be	identified	whereby	less	pressure	was	placed	on	China’s	
exchange	rate	policy	 in	2006.	 In	one	word,	though	the	Treasury	was	not	satisfied	with	the	
pace	of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	and	maintained	 the	engagements	with	 the	Chinese	
leadership,	international	pressure	from	the	Congress	and	the	IMF	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
generally	decreased	from	July	2005	to	2016.	The	pathway	of	China’s	post-2005	exchange	rate	
reform	was	largely	determined	by	China’s	domestic	politics.	
	 The	 Chinese	 leadership	 took	 a	 very	 cautious	 approach	 toward	 the	 exchange	 rate	
reform.	Both	 the	PBOC	and	 the	MOFCOM	closely	monitored	 the	 impact	of	 exchange	 rate	
reform	on	export	enterprises	in	the	second	half	of	2005.	As	the	initial	revaluation	was	limited	
and	the	subsequent	appreciation	was	gradual,	China’s	exports	maintained	the	momentum	
after	 July	 2005.	 The	MOFCOM,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Bo	 Xilai,	 continued	 to	 be	 a	 vocal	
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opponent	 of	 fast	 RMB	 appreciation.	 The	 MOFCOM	 was	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 the	
several	export	 industries	such	as	textile	and	apparel	 industries	that	were	sensitive	to	RMB	
appreciation.	Bo	particularly	stressed	that	“RMB	appreciation	has	substantially	lowered	the	
profit	 of	 export-oriented	 enterprises,	 especially	 labour-intensive	 ones,	 whose	 profit	 was	
already	very	low.”52	Faced	with	the	strong	and	consistent	resistance	from	the	MOFCOM,	the	
total	RMB	appreciation	was	still	small	and	the	exchange	rate	flexibility	was	also	limited	after	
July	2005.	The	RMB	appreciated	3.2%	in	total,	from	8.07	to	7.81,	against	the	dollar	in	2006.	
Except	for	the	initial	2.1%	revaluation,	the	RMB	appreciated	3.7%	in	total	against	the	dollar	
from	July	2005	to	the	end	of	2006.	
	 As	mentioned,	 the	 PBOC	was	 politically	 weaker	 and	 less	 influential	 in	 China’s	 top	
leadership	compared	with	the	MOFCOM.	The	limited	nature	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	
produced	little	change	in	the	economic	fundamentals	that	had	induced	the	PBOC	to	favour	
additional	 flexibility	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 preservation	 of	 a	 gradually	 and	 continuously	
appreciated	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 ultimately	 eroded	 PBOC’s	monetary	 policy	 autonomy,	 in	
circumstances	 whereby	 China	 ran	 persistent	 current	 account	 surpluses.	 The	 PBOC	 faced	
increasing	 policy	 dilemma	 in	 simultaneously	 maintaining	 the	 gradually	 appreciated	 RMB	
exchange	rates	and	controlling	the	domestic	money	supply.	
	 With	the	gradual	appreciation	and	 limited	flexibility	of	RMB	exchange	rate,	China’s	
current	account	surplus	continued	to	grow	rapidly	in	2006.	The	Congress	set	off	another	wave	
of	targeting	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	 in	the	first	half	of	2007,	which	was	similar	to	the	
2005	case.	There	were	five	bills	in	2007,	all	of	which	were	introduced	in	the	first	half	of	the	
year.	With	growing	pressure	from	the	Congress,	Treasury’s	stance	on	China’s	exchange	rate	
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policy	became	 tougher,	which	 could	be	 seen	 from	 the	blunter	 language	of	 the	 Treasury’s	
Reports.	With	regard	to	the	IMF,	one	could	identify	the	same	trend	of	more	severe	pressure.	
It	 became	 clear	 that	 the	 IMF	was	 under	 growing	 American	 pressure	 to	 declare	 the	 RMB	
“fundamentally	misaligned”,	which	worsened	China’s	relationship	with	the	IMF	substantially	
in	2007.53	Finally,	Beijing	took	the	unusual	step	of	voting	against	the	adoption	of	the	2007	
Decision	on	Bilateral	Surveillance	and	withdrew	from	the	bilateral	surveillance	process	during	
2007-08.	
	 Domestically,	the	priorities	of	MOFCOM	shifted	significantly	 in	2007.	The	MOFCOM	
used	 to	 be	 a	 vocal	 opponent	 of	 RMB	 appreciation.	 However,	 the	MOFCOM	 softened	 its	
resistance	to	RMB	appreciation	 in	2007,	as	 its	main	task	changed	from	maintaining	export	
growth	 to	 reducing	excessive	 trade	surplus.	Chinese	exporters	 faced	unprecedented	 trade	
frictions	 in	 2006,	 which	 put	 enormous	 pressure	 on	 the	 MOFCOM	 to	 settle	 those	 trade	
disputes	 and	 preserve	 the	 interests	 of	 export	 industries.	 MOFCOM’s	 shifted	 priority	 on	
balance	of	international	payments	provided	political	space	for	PBOC’s	advocate	of	exchange	
rate	reform.	The	PBOC	faced	increasing	and	enormous	inflationary	pressure	in	2007,	and	all	
the	major	monetary	 tools,	 including	 open	market	 operations,	 required	 reserve	 ratio,	 and	
interest	rate,	were	used	to	fight	inflation.	Senior	officials	of	the	PBOC	actively	proposed	that	
RMB	appreciation	would	help	to	reduce	both	domestic	inflation	and	current	account	surplus.	
	 On	18	May	2007,	the	Chinese	leadership	took	the	first	major	step	to	make	the	RMB	a	
more	flexible	currency	by	loosening	its	daily	trading	limits.	The	PBOC	announced	that	“as	of	
21	May	2007,	the	RMB-dollar	trading	band	in	the	inter-bank	spot	foreign	exchange	market	
																																																						
53	See,	for	example,	Andrew	Walter	(2014)	“China’s	engagement	with	international	macroeconomic	policy	
surveillance”,	in	Eric	Helleiner	and	Jonathan	Kirshner	(ed.)	The	Great	Wall	of	Money:	Power	and	Politics	in	
China’s	International	Monetary	Relations,	Cornell	University	Press,	p.136;	Rosemary	Foot	and	Andrew	Walter	
(2011)	China,	the	United	States,	and	Global	Order,	pp.113-116,	Cambridge	University	Press.	
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will	 be	 expanded	 from	 0.3%	 to	 0.5%,	 namely,	 the	 daily	 RMB-dollar	 trading	 band	may	 be	
floated	 within	 the	 0.5%	 range	 of	 the	 middle	 price	 of	 the	 dollar	 against	 the	 RMB.” 54	
Furthermore,	the	severe	situation	of	inflationary	cycle	and	PBOC’s	firm	suggestion	produced	
a	clear	shift	in	exchange	rate	strategy	in	the	late	2007.	China’s	top	leadership	accepted	PBOC’s	
basic	argument	to	regard	inflation	as	the	most	severe	problem	to	tackle	and	to	use	currency	
appreciation	as	a	tool	to	fight	inflation.	The	RMB	began	to	appreciate	in	a	faster	pace	in	late	
2007.	The	RMB	appreciated	6.9%	against	the	dollar	from	7.807	to	7.305	in	the	year	of	2007;	
it	appreciated	2.8%	against	the	dollar	from	7.511	to	7.305	in	the	fourth	quarter,	account	for	
40%	of	the	total	appreciation	in	2007.	The	widened	RMB-dollar	trading	band	allowed	more	
exchange	rate	flexibility	and	the	rate	of	RMB	appreciation	sped	up	considerably	in	the	fourth	
quarter	of	2007.	
	
1.6.3	Acceleration	and	stagnation	of	exchange	rate	reform,	from	2008	to	July	2010	
The	accelerated	RMB	appreciation	continued	 in	 the	 first	half	of	2008.	The	substantial	and	
faster	RMB	appreciation	happened	in	the	period	from	October	2007	to	July	2008,	when	the	
Chinese	leadership	concentrated	their	attention	and	spared	no	effort	to	fight	inflation.	More	
specifically,	the	RMB	appreciated	9.8%,	from	7.51	to	6.84,	against	the	dollar	in	the	ten	months,	
which	was	even	larger	than	the	previous	total	RMB	appreciation	(8.0%,	from	8.11	to	7.51)	for	
more	than	two	years.	
																																																						
54	PBOC,	“Announcement	of	the	People’s	Bank	of	China	on	expanding	the	floating	range	of	RMB-dollar	trading	
price	in	the	inter-bank	spot	foreign	exchange	market	[中国人民银行关于扩大银行间即期外汇市场人民币兑
美元交易价浮动幅度的公告]”,	18	May	2007,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/bangongting/135485/135491/135597/999532/index.html	(accessed	14/09/2016).	
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	 In	the	period	from	July	2005	to	2007,	there	was	little	pressure	from	export	interest	
groups	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	The	main	reason	was	that	China’s	exports	still	
grew	 fast	 and	 there	was	no	 sharp	decline	 in	exports	as	opponents	of	RMB	exchange	 rate	
reform	had	feared.	However,	exporters	became	strongly	opposed	to	the	RMB	appreciation	in	
early	2008,	as	the	pace	of	appreciation	had	accelerated.	Chinese	exporters	grew	hostile	to	
exchange	 rate	 appreciation	 in	 2008.	 Since	 the	 MOFCOM	 gave	 priority	 to	 trade	 surplus	
reduction	and	its	stance	towards	RMB	appreciation	had	changed	in	2007,	the	only	alternative	
for	the	exporters	at	this	juncture	was	to	mobilize	resources	to	lobby	against	the	rapid	RMB	
appreciation	and	seek	policy	adjustment.	
	 Based	on	questionnaire	surveys	and	semi-structured	interviews,	the	researcher	took	
a	case	study	on	the	Fujian	province	and	illustrated	the	three	main	methods	of	export	lobbying:	
guanxi-based	 lobbying	 through	 local	 governments,	 guanxi-based	 lobbying	 through	 local	
offices	of	central	governmental	agencies,	and	lobbying	through	trade	associations.	
	 Before	we	proceed	 to	 the	empirical	 findings,	 it	 is	necessary	 for	us	 to	make	a	clear	
definition	of	“guanxi”	herein,	which	has	diverse	meanings	in	the	context	of	China’s	society.	A	
considerable	 amount	 of	 literature	 has	 been	 published	 to	 identify	 the	 broad	meanings	 of	
guanxi	 and	 to	 emphasize	 the	 important	 roles	 of	 guanxi	 in	 China’s	 political,	 economic	 and	
social	fields.	For	instance,	Yang	understands	guanxi	in	her	comprehensive	study	on	everyday	
social	relationships	in	contemporary	China	in	the	following	way:	
“The	 word	 guanxi	 (pronounced	 guan-shee)	 means	 literally	 ‘a	 relationship’	
between	 objects,	 forces,	 or	 persons.	When	 it	 is	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 relationships	
between	 people,	 not	 only	 can	 it	 be	 applied	 to	 husband-wife,	 kinship	 and	
friendship	 relations,	 it	 can	 also	 have	 the	 sense	 of	 ‘social	 connections,’	 dyadic	
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relationships	that	are	based	implicitly	(rather	than	explicitly)	on	mutual	interest	
and	benefit.	Once	guanxi	is	established	between	two	people,	each	can	ask	a	favor	
of	the	other	with	the	expectation	that	the	debt	incurred	will	be	repaid	sometime	
in	the	future.”55	
Moreover,	Guo	defines	the	broad	meanings	of	guanxi	from	four	dimensions:	“instrumental,	
etiquette,	moral	and	emotional”.56	More	specifically,		
“The	 instrumental	 dimension	 primarily	 involves	 self-interested	motivation:	 the	
desire	 for	 repayment	 of	 favours	 and	 for	 achieving	 personal	 advantage.	 The	
etiquette	dimension	 involves	the	use	of	social	 rituals	 to	establish	and	maintain	
harmonious	 human	 relations	with	 one's	 acquaintances,	 coworkers,	 colleagues,	
superiors	or	subordinates.	The	moral	dimension	is	established	and	maintained	by	
following	a	 traditional	 system	of	ethics	 that	morally	obligates	oneself	 to	 those	
within	one’s	guanxi	network.	The	emotional	dimension	is	evident	when	friendship	
plays	a	central	role	in	regulating	interpersonal	relationships.”57	
	 Since	guanxi	is	seemingly	ubiquitous	in	China’s	society,	guanxi	has	played	important	
roles	in	China’s	political	economy.	As	to	the	role	of	guanxi	in	China’s	politics,	Dittmer	argues	
that	guanxi	is	“the	central	term	in	our	conceptualization	of	informal	politics”58;	Guo	argues	
that	 “the	 volatility	 of	 Chinese	 politics	 encouraged	 the	 political	 elite	 to	 rely	 on	 personal	
relationships	to	get	things	done	and	promoted	a	culture	of	mutual	dependence	and	moral	
obligation	among	the	elite	and	between	the	elite	and	their	subordinate”59.	On	the	other	hand,	
																																																						
55	Mayfair	Mei-hui	Yang	(1994)	Gifts,	Favors,	and	Banquets:	The	Art	of	Social	Relationships	in	China,	Cornell	
University	Press,	pp.1-2.	
56	Xuezhi	Guo	(2001)	“Dimensions	of	guanxi	in	Chinese	elite	politics”,	The	China	Journal,	No.46,	p.72.	
57	Ibid,	p.72.	
58	Lowell	Dittmer	(1995)	“Chinese	informal	politics”,	The	China	Journal,	No.34,	p.10.	
59	Xuezhi	Guo	(2001)	“Dimensions	of	guanxi	in	Chinese	elite	politics”,	The	China	Journal,	No.46,	p.70.		
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there	 is	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 guanxi’s	 important	 role	 in	 China’s	 socio-
economic	environment.	To	name	a	few,	Xin	and	Pearce	view	guanxi	as	“substitutes	for	formal	
institutional	support”,	in	the	context	of	China’s	underdeveloped	legal	framework.60	Deng	and	
Kennedy	 conducted	 surveys	 to	 investigate	 companies’	 lobbying	 strategies	 and	 how	 they	
engage	with	officials	in	the	policy	process.	Their	results	show	that	
“Companies	do	engage	in	trust-building,	for	example,	by	hosting	banquets,	and	
almost	70	per	cent	of	respondents	agree	with	the	statement	that	‘guanxi	is	the	
key	 to	 influencing	public	policy’.	On	 the	other	hand,	80	per	cent	of	companies	
agree	that	‘good	guanxi	with	local	government	is	more	important	than	with	the	
central	government’.”61	
	 Therefore,	it	can	be	seen	that	guanxi	has	broad	meanings	in	the	Chinese	society	and	
important	roles	in	China’s	political	economy.	The	thesis	takes	the	instrumental	dimension	of	
guanxi	 and	more	 narrowly	 defines	 guanxi	 as	 interpersonal	 connections	 and	 relationships,	
which	 aims	 to	 secure	 favours	 in	 personal	 or	 business	 relations.	 It	 is	 proper	 to	 borrow	
Kennedy’s	description	of	guanxi	to	elaborate	my	definition	here:	
“Officials	provide	entrepreneurs	access	to	scarce	goods,	credit,	government	and	
overseas	markets,	 and	 protection	 from	 onerous	 regulations.	 Entrepreneurs,	 in	
return,	 provide	 officials	 with	 payoffs	 and	 gifts,	 employment,	 and	 business	
partnerships.”62	
																																																						
60	Katherine	K.	Xin	and	Jone	L.	Pearce	(1996)	“Guanxi:	Connections	as	substitutes	for	formal	institutional	
support”,	Academy	of	Management	Journal,	Vol.39,	No.6,	pp.1641-1658.	
61	Guosheng	Deng	and	Scott	Kennedy	(2010)	“Big	business	and	industry	association	lobbying	in	China:	The	
paradox	of	contrasting	styles”,	The	China	Journal,	No.63,	p.110.	
62	Scott	Kennedy	(2009)	The	Business	of	Lobbying	in	China,	Harvard	University	Press,	p.10.	
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In	 this	 sense,	 guanxi-based	 lobbying	 refers	 to	 companies’	 strategies	 and	 tactics	 that	
entrepreneurs	make	use	of	their	connections	and	relationships	with	officials	if	they	seek	to	
influence	public	policy.	There	is	a	case	for	arguing	that	guanxi	is	not	something	that	is	specific	
or	unique	to	China.	Informal	relationships	are	important	in	any	political,	economic	or	cultural	
setting,	 and	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 exerting	 influence	 that	 is	 not	 possible	 through	 formal	
institutions	and	 structures.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 clear	 from	my	 research	 in	 Fujian	 that	 those	
Chinese	actors	actually	involved	in	the	process	of	trying	to	influence	policy	think	that	guanxi	
is	both	distinctive	and	important;	hence	the	focus	on	its	role	and	significance	in	this	thesis.	
	 The	case	study	of	Fujian	province	has	three	main	findings	that	shed	light	on	the	three	
main	methods	of	export	lobbying.	First,	exporters	made	use	of	their	guanxi	and	focused	their	
lobbying	efforts	on	the	 local	governments	where	they	were	concentrated.	Firms	discussed	
their	problems	with	municipal	government	officials	and	pressed	them	to	persuade	Beijing	to	
stop	appreciating	the	currency.	Second,	exporters	could	make	use	of	their	guanxi	to	discuss	
their	 difficulties	 with	 the	 local	 officials	 of	 central	 government	 agencies,	 particular	 the	
MOFCOM,	and	pressed	 them	to	 influence	central	 government’s	exchange	 rate	policy.	The	
local	officials	of	MOFCOM	serve	as	middlemen	to	pass	along	the	concerns	of	China’s	export	
enterprises	to	the	MOFCOM	and	further	to	the	State	Council.	Third,	trade	associations	for	
labour-intensive	enterprises	began	to	lobby	for	slower	RMB	appreciation	and	repeal	of	cuts	
to	export	 rebates	 in	 the	early	2008.	They	asserted	 that	 if	 the	 central	 government	did	not	
intervene,	 large	amounts	of	 labour-intensive	enterprises	would	go	bankrupt,	 thousands	of	
workers	would	be	laid	off,	and	social	stability	would	therefore	be	threatened.	
	 The	central	argument	is	that	the	exporters’	lobbying	imposed	enormous	pressure	on	
the	 central	 government’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 in	 2008.	 Faced	with	 pressure	 from	
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businesses,	China’s	central	government	faced	considerable	pressure	to	raise	export	rebate	
rates	and	maintain	the	stability	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate.	As	a	result,	the	top	leadership	held	
several	 internal	meetings	to	discuss	the	 issues	and	decided	to	tour	the	key	manufacturing	
centres	 in	 the	 coastal	 provinces.	 The	 top	 leadership	 conducted	 intensive	 research	 and	
investigation	 in	early	 July	2008.	 Then	Chinese	 leaders	were	 convinced	 that	China’s	 export	
situation	was	severe	and	prompt	counter-measures	should	be	taken.	They	finally	decided	to	
roll	out	rescue	policies	in	late	July.	The	market-oriented	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	beginning	
from	21	July	2005	was	halted	in	the	second	half	of	2008,	and	China	returned	to	the	de-facto	
dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime	in	the	turbulent	times	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	
	
1.6.4	Resumption	of	exchange	rate	reform,	from	July	2010	to	2013	
While	Congress’s	influence	on	the	RMB	issue	generally	diminished	over	time	after	the	global	
financial	crisis,	international	criticism	and	pressure	from	the	US	administration	and	the	IMF	
still	played	an	important	role	of	agenda-setting	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2010.	
Particularly,	 the	 RMB	 issue	 intensified	 in	 early	 2010.	 The	 US	 administration	 became	
increasingly	critical	of	China’s	currency	undervaluation	and	took	action	to	demand	Beijing	to	
make	policy	changes.	President	Obama	and	Treasury	Secretary	Geithner	made	use	of	both	
bilateral	and	multilateral	channels	to	press	China	on	the	RMB	issue.	Similar	to	the	case	in	2005,	
international	 criticism	 and	 pressure	 from	 the	US	 administration	 and	 the	 IMF	on	 the	 RMB	
undervaluation	gained	momentum	in	the	first	half	of	2010,	which	rendered	China’s	leaders	
impossible	to	avoid	the	RMB	exchange	rate	issue.	
	 The	Chinese	leadership	stood	firm	against	the	external	pressure	as	they	did	in	2005.	
Chinese	leaders	did	not	wish	to	show	any	sign	of	weakness	under	international	pressure.	They	
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consistently	opposed	the	international	criticism	that	the	RMB	was	substantially	undervalued	
and	stated	that	wrongful	accusations	and	pressure	would	not	help	solve	the	RMB	issue.	More	
importantly,	 there	was	much	 less	 internal	 controversy	within	Chinese	 central	 government	
with	regard	to	the	exchange	rate	policy	in	2010.	Both	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	held	the	
position	 that	 a	 stable	 exchange	 rate	was	 necessary	 in	 turbulent	 times	 and	 that	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	alone	was	not	responsible	for	the	trade	imbalance.	On	the	one	hand,	the	PBOC	
reiterated	the	necessity	of	exchange	rate	stability	in	2010,	which	was	different	from	the	active	
advocate	of	exchange	rate	reform	in	2005.	On	the	other	hand,	the	MOFCOM	withdrew	its	
opposition	to	exchange	rate	reform	and	stressed	the	proper	pace	of	proceeding,	which	was	
also	different	from	the	powerful	resistance	in	2005.	With	less	internal	controversy	within	the	
central	government	(between	PBOC	and	MOFCOM),	Chinese	leaders	were	more	consistent	in	
the	exchange	rate	policy	in	2010.	They	did	not	swing	back	and	forth	and	make	the	exchange	
rate	reform	unexpected.	Instead,	the	Chinese	leaders,	including	the	heads	of	MOFCOM	and	
PBOC,	agreed	on	the	general	direction	of	market-oriented	exchange	reform	in	2010.	They	also	
signalled	the	readiness	to	resume	the	exchange	rate	reform	on	various	occasions	in	the	first	
half	of	2010.	
	 However,	 it	 remained	 questionable	 why	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	in	2010	was	different	from	that	in	2005.	The	thesis	further	explores	the	origins	
and	 developments	 of	 China’s	 RMB	 internationalization	 strategy.	 Starting	 from	 mid-2009,	
China	promoted	RMB	internationalization	as	an	effort	to	diversify	the	international	monetary	
system,	thereby	reducing	the	reliance	on	the	dollar.	It	argues	that,	with	the	development	of	
RMB	internationalization	and	an	increasing	openness	of	capital	account,	a	flexible	exchange	
rate	 was	 the	 feasible	 choice	 to	 preserve	 the	 independence	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 Chinese	
monetary	policy,	which	produced	the	Chinese	leadership’s	consensus	on	the	second	round	of	
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RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	As	the	stability	and	predictability	of	RMB	exchange	rate	was	one	
of	the	most	important	attributes	in	improving	the	confidence	and	promoting	the	international	
use	of	RMB,	 it	determined	 the	pathway	of	gradual	and	steady	appreciation	 in	 the	 second	
round	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	
	 Change	eventually	came	on	19	June	2010.	Approved	by	the	State	Council,	the	PBOC	
announced	a	further	reform	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	regime	based	on	the	measures	taken	
in	 2005.63	Continued	 emphasis	was	 placed	 on	 reflecting	market	 supply	 and	 demand	with	
reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies	and	the	exchange	rate	floating	bands	remained	the	same	
as	previously	announced	in	the	inter-bank	foreign	exchange	market.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	
appreciated	gradually	and	steadily	against	the	dollar	after	PBOC’s	announcement.	The	second	
round	of	exchange	rate	reform	policy	could	be	interpreted	as	a	hybrid	outcome	of	both	the	
external	 influences	 from	 the	 Western	 countries	 and	 the	 internal	 needs	 of	 RMB	
internationalization.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 international	 criticism	 and	 pressure	 from	 the	 US	
administration	 and	 the	 IMF	 still	 played	 an	 important	 role	 of	 agenda-setting	 in	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2010.	On	the	other	hand,	Chinese	central	government	reached	
the	consensus	that	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	was	necessary	for	further	internationalizing	
its	currency.	
	
																																																						
63	PBOC,	“To	further	promote	the	reform	of	RMB	exchange	rate	formation	mechanism	and	enhance	the	RMB	
exchange	rate	flexibility	[进一步推进人民币汇率形成机制改革，增强人民币汇率弹性]”,	19	June	2010,	
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1.7	Research	methodology	
This	 thesis	mainly	employs	 four	qualitative	 research	methods:	documentary	analysis,	 case	
study,	 interviews	 and	 questionnaire	 surveys.	 The	 empirical	 studies	 used	 extensive	
documentary	analysis	of	secondary	data	to	examine	the	level	I	and	level	II	games	of	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	The	thesis	conducted	a	typical	case	study	in	Fujian	province	to	
explore	the	interest	group	politics	(level	III	game)	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	The	
researcher	also	collected	primary	data	through	interviews	and	questionnaires	to	complement	
the	documentary	analysis.	
	
1.7.1	Documentary	analysis	
In	the	study	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	it	seems	essential	to	conduct	empirical	
research	 based	 on	 documentary	 analysis.	 The	 basis	 of	 primary	 sources	 derives	 from:	 (1)	
publicly	available	official	documents	(i.e.	official	reports,	publications,	statements,	speeches	
from	 related	 organizations/ministries/agencies)	 and	 (2)	 relevant	 information	 in	 various	
published	forms	(i.e.	official	declarations	and	press	statements	as	well	as	media	reports	and	
commentaries	via	newspapers	and	magazines).	
	 Documentary	 sources	 offer	 a	 prime	 opportunity	 for	 political	 scientists	 to	 develop	
novel	accounts	and	interpretations	of	significant	events	and	policies.	As	Burnham,	Lutz,	Grant	
and	Layton-Henry	note:	
“Documents,	of	course,	do	not	speak	for	themselves	but	only	acquire	significant	
meaning	 when	 situated	 within	 a	 context	 set	 by	 vigorous	 analytical	 and	
methodological	 assumptions.	 To	 enable	 other	 scholars	 to	 judge	 the	 worth	 of	
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research	produced	from	documentary	sources	it	is	therefore	necessary	to	state	
the	working	assumptions	that	have	guided	the	selection	of	the	material.	This	is	
particularly	important	given	the	range	and	diversity	of	documentary	sources	now	
available	to	the	researcher.”64	
	 In	the	following	I	will	specify	the	selection	of	documents	to	examine	the	level	I	and	
level	 II	 games	of	China’s	exchange	 rate	policymaking.	First,	 the	 level	 I	 game	examines	 the	
international	 influences	 from	 the	 US	 government	 and	 the	 IMF	 on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking.	The	bills	and	resolutions	of	the	US	Congress	are	available	to	the	public	since	
January	1995	through	THOMAS	Library	of	Congress	and	Congress.gov.65	Congress.gov	is	the	
official	website	for	US	federal	legislative	information	and	THOMAS	Library	of	Congress	is	the	
database	of	Congress.gov.	THOMAS	Library	of	Congress	offers	search	engines	that	facilitate	
researchers	to	get	access	to	all	the	RMB-related	bills	and	resolutions.	The	US	Department	of	
the	Treasury	has	published	the	semiannual	Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	
Exchange	Rate	Policies	since	1989.	The	Reports	review	the	macroeconomic	and	exchange	rate	
policies	of	the	world’s	major	economies.	More	importantly,	the	Reports	consider	whether	the	
major	US	trading	partners	manipulate	the	exchange	rate	between	their	currency	and	the	US	
dollar.	 All	 the	 Reports	 are	 available	 through	 the	 Treasury	 Resource	 Center. 66 	The	 US	
presidents’	 speeches	 and	 remarks	 are	 available	 through	 the	 official	website	 of	 the	White	
House.67	The	White	House	website	also	publishes	statements	and	press	releases	of	the	US	
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67	The	White	House,	“Speeches	and	Remarks”,	available	from	https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/speeches-and-remarks	(accessed	15/09/2016).	
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administration,	including	the	President,	the	Treasury	secretary	and	other	senior	government	
officials.68	With	regard	to	the	IMF,	it	publishes	the	Article	IV	Staff	Reports	on	People’s	Republic	
of	China	(PRC)	that	include	IMF’s	position	on	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	every	year.69	The	
IMF	 also	 publishes	 a	 large	 number	 of	 working	 papers,	 press	 briefing	 transcripts,	 and	
conference	transcripts,	which	are	also	available	through	the	website	of	PRC	and	the	IMF.70	
	 Second,	 the	 level	 II	 game	 involves	 the	 two	 most	 important	 ministries	 (PBOC	 and	
MOFCOM)	within	China’s	central	government.	The	stance	of	PBOC	and	MOFCOM	towards	the	
RMB	exchange	rate	policy	can	be	examined	by	the	statements	and	speeches	of	PBOC’s	and	
MOFCOM’s	 senior	 officials,	 including	 PBOC’s	 Governor	 &	 Deputy	 Governors	 and	 the	
MOFCOM’s	Minister	 &	 Vice	Ministers.	 The	 official	 websites	 of	 PBOC	 and	MOFCOM	 offer	
search	engines	that	help	researchers	to	get	access	to	those	data.71	Furthermore,	the	PBOC	
has	published	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Reports	[货币政策执行报告]	every	quarter	
since	 2001,	 which	 provides	 crucial	 empirical	 sources	 to	 analyse	 PBOC’s	 positions	 and	
operations	of	monetary	and	exchange	rate	policies.72	
	 Third,	the	researcher	mainly	consults	sources	from	the	Xinhua	News	Agency	and	the	
People’s	Daily,	the	two	most	important	Party	mouthpieces,	for	official	statements,	briefs	for	
important	Party	meetings73	and	top	leadership	speeches,	which	shed	light	on	the	top	leaders’	
																																																						
68	The	White	House,	“Statements	and	Releases”,	available	from	https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-and-releases	(accessed	15/09/2016).	
69	International	Monetary	Fund,	“People’s	Republic	of	China:	Article	IV	Consultation	Reports”,	available	from	
http://www.imf.org/external/country/chn/index.htm?type=56	(accessed	15/09/2016).	
70	People’s	Republic	of	China	and	the	IMF,	available	from	
http://www.imf.org/external/country/CHN/index.htm?type=9998#56	(accessed	15/09/2016).	
71	People’s	Bank	of	China,	available	from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/	(accessed	15/09/2016);	Ministry	of	
Commerce	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	available	from	http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/	(accessed	
15/09/2016).	
72	PBOC,	“Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Reports	[货币政策执行报告]”,	available	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/index.html.	
73	Two	Party	conferences,	the	CCP	Central	Committee	Conference	[中共中央政治局会议]	and	the	Central	
Economic	Work	Conference	[中央经济工作会议],	are	of	crucial	importance.	See	CCP	Central	Committee	
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deliberations	 and	 decisions	 of	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 In	 addition	 to	 consulting	 the	
scholarly	works	written	in	English,	the	author	made	use	of	materials	in	Chinese.	The	Chinese	
journal	 database,	 China	 National	 Knowledge	 Infrastructure	 [中国知网 ] 74 ,	 was	 used	
intensively	 throughout	 the	research	process,	providing	a	rich	resource	base	beyond	a	sole	
reliance	on	English	language	literature.	
	
1.7.2	Case	study	supplemented	by	questionnaires	and	interviews	
The	level	III	game	involves	the	interest	group	politics	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
Access	to	credible	sources	often	makes	things	difficult	for	researchers	in	the	study	of	China’s	
interest	groups.	Lobbying	 is	normally	not	reported	 in	Chinese	newspapers	and	periodicals.	
Meanwhile,	there	are	no	records	or	documents	on	business	lobbying	in	the	Chinese	statistics	
system	and	other	government	statistics.	Therefore,	the	researcher	conducted	a	case	study	
supplemented	by	interviews	and	questionnaire	surveys.	
	 According	to	Gerring,	a	case	study	is	best	defined	as	“an	intensive	study	of	a	single	
unit	for	the	purpose	of	understanding	a	larger	class	of	(similar)	units”.75	The	strength	of	case	
study	is	that	“it	allows	the	researcher	to	use	a	variety	of	sources,	a	variety	of	types	of	data	
and	a	variety	of	research	methods	as	part	of	the	investigation”.76	Furthermore,	“the	typical	
																																																						
Conference,	available	from	http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/zzjhy/	(accessed	15/09/2016)	and	People’s	
Central	Economic	Work	Conference,	available	from	
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/222/2322/index.html	(accessed	15/09/2016).	
74	China	National	Knowledge	Infrastructure	(CNKI),	available	from	http://www.cnki.net/.	
75	John	Gerring	(2004)	“What	is	a	case	study	and	what	is	it	good	for?”,	American	Political	Science	Review,	
Vol.98,	No.2,	pp.342.	
76	Martyn	Denscombe	(2003)	“The	Good	Research	Guide:	for	small-scale	social	research	projects”,	Open	
University	Press,	p.31.	
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case	study	focuses	on	a	case	that	exemplifies	a	stable,	cross-case	relationship.”77	Given	the	
size	 and	 diversity	 of	 China,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 find	 a	 single	 provincial	 case	 study	 that	 is	
representative	of	the	country	as	a	whole;	no	such	“typical”	province	exists.	Fujian	is	chosen	
as	the	case	study	focus	for	this	thesis	as	it	is	representative	not	of	China	as	a	whole,	but	of	
those	 coastal	 provinces	 that	 have	 been	most	 significant	 in	 driving	 the	 growth	 of	 Chinese	
exports	 in	 the	 post-Mao	 era.	 Indeed,	 as	 growth	 in	 Fujian	 has	 become	 overwhelmingly	
dependent	on	exports,	it	has	thus	also	become	heavily	sensitive	to	exchange	rate	changes	in	
the	twenty-first	century.	This	was	particularly	the	case	when	exporters	in	Fujian	were	affected	
by	the	accelerated	RMB	appreciation	in	2008.	
	 The	researcher	distributed	98	questionnaires	 to	export	entrepreneurs	 in	 the	Fujian	
province	 and	 63	 valid	 responses	 were	 collected	 for	 analysis.	 The	 questionnaires	 mainly	
collected	the	following	information:	(1)	whether	the	business	was	affected	by	RMB	exchange	
rate	fluctuations,	(2)	in	which	years	the	enterprise	was	significantly	affected	by	RMB	exchange	
rate	 fluctuations,	 (3)	 what	 measures	 were	 taken	 in	 times	 of	 volatile	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
fluctuations,	 and	most	 importantly,	 (4)	 how	difficult	 and	 effective	 did	 exporters	 find	 it	 to	
communicate	 with	 local	 governments	 and	 industry	 associations	 in	 times	 of	 volatile	 RMB	
exchange	rate	fluctuations.	The	questionnaires	provided	a	quick	and	affordable	means	for	the	
researcher	to	obtain	the	general	information	and	opinions	of	the	local	exporters	in	the	Fujian	
province.	
	 The	 researcher	 also	 arranged	 22	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 export	
entrepreneurs,	association	representatives	and	local	government	officials	at	different	levels.	
The	 interviews	 aimed	 to	 further	 explore	 the	 interactions	 between	 exporters,	 industry	
																																																						
77	Jason	Seawright	and	John	Gerring	(2008)	“Case	selection	techniques	in	case	study	research:	a	menu	of	
qualitative	and	quantitative	options”,	Political	Research	Quarterly,	Vol.61,	No.2,	pp.299.	
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associations	 and	 local	 government	 officials	 when	 the	 business	 of	 export	 enterprises	 was	
negatively	 impacted	by	RMB	appreciation.	 Interviews	 typically	 lasted	1–2	hours	and	many	
sources	were	interviewed	multiple	times.	In	order	to	protect	the	anonymity	of	sources,	they	
are	cited	in	the	footnotes	as	“interviews	with	dates”.	
	 Overall,	this	typical	case	study	with	questionnaires	and	interviews	sheds	light	on	how	
interest	 group	 lobbying	 influenced	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 in	 2008.	 The	
questionnaires	and	interviews	first	aimed	to	find	out	whether	exporters	 in	Fujian	province	
really	preferred	an	undervalued	and	fixed	exchange	rate.	Then	the	researcher	sought	to	find	
evidence	of	interest	group	lobbying.	Interest	groups	should	communicate	their	preferences	
to	 the	 local	 industry	associations	and	government	officials	 in	difficult	 times	of	accelerated	
RMB	appreciation.	Furthermore,	the	interviews	examined	whether	local	politicians	advocated	
on	behalf	of	their	constituents’	preferences.	Last,	if	the	final	decision	taken	by	the	top	leader	
reflected	 the	 considerations	 of	 the	 government	 officials,	 industry	 associations	 and	 export	
enterprises	at	the	local	level,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	empirical	research	provided	support	
for	the	level	III	game	in	2008.	
	 The	 questionnaires	 and	 interviews	 supplement	 each	 other.	 There	 are	 two	 obvious	
advantages	of	questionnaires.	First,	the	information	can	be	collected	in	a	short	period	of	time	
and	in	a	relatively	cost	effective	way.	Second,	the	results	of	the	questionnaires	can	be	quickly	
and	easily	quantified	for	analysis.	However,	questionnaires	have	limitations,	as	they	mainly	
ask	closed	questions.	“The	disadvantage	of	closed	questions	is	that	participants	are	forced	to	
choose	one	of	 the	predetermined	answers	rather	 than	create	their	own	answer.	This	may	
result	in	their	not	being	able	to	convey	their	true	feelings.”78	Interviews	to	a	large	extent	fill	
																																																						
78	Peter	Burnham,	Karin	Gilland	Lutz,	Wyn	Grant	and	Zig	Layton-Henry	(2008)	Research	Methods	in	Politics,	
Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.119	
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in	the	gap	by	gathering	more	in-depth	insights	on	the	opinions,	attitudes	and	actions	of	the	
respondents.	In	a	nutshell,	the	methodological	triangulation	of	questionnaires	and	interviews	
in	the	case	study	gives	this	research	a	firm	grounding	in	advancing	our	understanding	on	the	
inner	mechanisms	of	the	interest	group	politics	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
	
1.7.3	Elite/expert	interviewing	
The	 researcher	 used	 interviews	 as	 a	 complementary	 research	 method	 to	 documentary	
analysis.	 Decision	 making	 in	 China’s	 high-level	 politics	 remains	 an	 enigma	 to	 outsiders	
because	of	its	opaqueness	and	complexity.	Interviews	with	well-informed	individuals	on	their	
knowledge	and	opinions	on	this	area	thus	provided	unique	and	vital	resources	that	at	least	
compensated	the	lack	of	open	information.	
	 However,	access	was	the	main	challenge	for	elite/expert	interviews	in	Beijing.	It	was	
rather	difficult	for	a	doctoral	researcher	to	get	access	to	the	key	decision-makers	of	China’s	
exchange	rate	policy	or	even	the	heads	of	the	government	departments	(the	PBOC	Governor	
and	 the	MOFCOM	Minister).	 Instead,	 it	 was	 more	 realistic	 to	 get	 access	 to	 the	 (former)	
members	of	the	Monetary	Policy	Department	(MPD)	[货币政策司],	especially	those	who	are	
distinguished	 professors	 at	 China’s	 universities	 and	 research	 councils	 (such	 as	 Peking	
University,	Renmin	University	of	China,	and	Chinese	Academy	of	Social	Sciences).	The	MPD	is	
PBOC’s	 consultative	 body	 for	 the	 making	 of	 monetary	 policy	 and	 exchange	 rate	 policy.	
Similarly,	the	researcher	also	interviewed	some	officials	of	Comprehensive	Department	and	
Policy	Research	Department	under	the	MOFCOM.	I	also	conducted	interviews	with	Chinese	
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officials	at	the	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	(NDRC)	and	the	Ministry	of	
Foreign	Affairs	(MFA).	
	 The	elite/expert	interviews	provided	unique,	first-hand	empirical	evidence	of	how	the	
political	bargaining	in	the	top-level	policy	consultation	and	decision	process	influenced	the	
trajectory	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform.	As	Burnham,	Lutz,	Grant	and	Layton-Henry	note:	
“Elite	 interviewers	must	 be	 prepared	 to	 explore	 the	 world	 of	 the	 respondent	
sympathetically	without	being	captured	by	it.	They	must	have	a	research	design	
that	 is	 flexible	 and	 open	 to	 new	 ideas	 and	 interpretations,	 while	 still	 being	
informed	 by	 an	 overarching	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 a	 central	 research	
question.”79	
	 During	 the	author’s	 field	 research	 in	Beijing,	 a	 total	 of	 13	 face-to-face	elite/expert	
interviews	were	conducted.	Most	of	the	elite	interviews	lasted	around	one	hour	and	some	
expert	 interviews	 were	 longer.	 A	 semi-structured	 and	 open-ended	 question	 format	 (see	
Appendix	D)	was	used	for	all	the	interviews.	Similarly,	in	order	to	protect	the	anonymity	of	
sources,	the	details	of	all	respondents	are	kept	confidential	and	they	are	cited	in	the	footnotes	
as	“interviews	with	dates”.	
	 To	summarize,	elite/expert	interviews	(semi-structured	and	open-ended	format)	were	
employed	in	this	research	as	supplementary	albeit	important	sources	of	information	in	order	
to	compensate	the	limitations	of	documentary	analysis.	The	elite/expert	interviews	remain	
to	be	one	of	the	best	ways	to	obtain	information	about	the	decision-makers	and	the	decision-
making	process.	
																																																						
79	Peter	Burnham,	Karin	Gilland	Lutz,	Wyn	Grant	and	Zig	Layton-Henry	(2008)	Research	Methods	in	Politics,	
Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.247.	
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1.8	Contributions	
Thus	far,	this	chapter	has	presented	the	research	background,	research	questions,	state	of	
the	field,	theoretical	framework,	empirical	studies,	and	research	methods.	This	dissertation	
aims	to	provide	three	main	contributions.	
	 First	and	foremost,	it	provides	original	and	systematic	research	on	China’s	exchange	
rate	policymaking	 in	the	Hu-Wen	era	to	the	academic	 literature.	Though	there	 is	a	heated	
debate	over	the	RMB	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	twenty-first	century,	little	systematic	work	
has	 been	 done	 to	 explain	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	 most	 important	
contribution	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 provide	 substantial	 empirical	 evidence	 based	 on	
documentary	analysis	and	primary	data	from	interviews	and	questionnaire	surveys.	Careful	
analysis	of	official	documents	and	media	 reports	and	commentaries	are	 supplemented	by	
elite/expert	interviews	to	obtain	information	about	the	decision-makers	and	provide	insight	
into	 the	 decision-making	 process	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy.	 Moreover,	 the	
methodological	 triangulation	of	questionnaires	and	 interviews	 in	 the	 case	 study	gives	 this	
research	a	firm	grounding	in	advancing	our	understanding	on	the	inner	mechanisms	of	the	
interest	group	politics	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	Therefore,	the	empirical	study	
provides	 a	 richer	 portrait	 of	 the	 dynamism	 and	 complexity	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	in	the	Hu-Wen	era.	
	 Second,	the	thesis	makes	a	modest	theoretical	contribution	to	the	existing	body	of	
CPE	 and	 IPE	 literature	 by	 developing	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 to	 explain	 China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 pioneers	 in	 IPE,	 Strange	 promotes	 the	
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development	of	the	 IPE	discipline	to	overcome	the	“mutual	neglect	between	International	
Economics	and	International	Relations”.80	The	thesis	provides	a	good	example	to	support	the	
IPE	approach	that	bridges	the	international	politics	and	domestic	politics	to	explain	economic	
policy	making.	
	 Third,	and	 related	 to	 the	previous	 two	contributions,	 the	 thesis	also	builds	bridges	
between	researchers	and	policymakers.	Stone	notes	that	“there	is	a	lack	of	dialogue	between	
researchers	and	policy-makers	and	that	 inadequate	or	 insufficient	use	 is	made	of	research	
findings.” 81 	The	 author	 overcomes	 the	 problem	 by	 linking	 the	 research	 to	 a	 theoretical	
framework	 that	 guides	 the	entire	empirical	 investigation.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 insight	of	
perceptions,	 experiences,	 attitudes	 and	 actions	 gained	 from	 the	 elite/expert	 interviews	 is	
conducive	 to	 verifying	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 theoretical	
framework	would	 help	 the	 practical	 policy-makers,	 in	 both	Western	 countries	 and	 China,	
understand	 the	mechanism	of	China’s	exchange	 rate	policymaking.	Overall,	 the	 thesis	 is	a	
timely	and	rigorous	study	of	the	role	that	international	and	domestic	politics	play	in	forging	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 which	 promotes	 mutual	 understanding	 of	 both	
researchers	and	policymakers.	
1.9	Outline	of	the	thesis	
This	 thesis	 consists	 of	 seven	 chapters,	 including	 this	 introduction	 and	 a	 conclusion.	 The	
introduction	 establishes	 the	 background	 for	 this	 research	 and	 formulates	 the	 research	
questions.	The	research	is	dedicated	to	explaining	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	the	
																																																						
80	Susan	Strange	(1970)	“International	economics	and	international	relations:	a	case	of	mutual	neglect”,	
International	Affairs,	Vol.46,	No.2,	pp.304-315	
81	Diane	Stone	(2002)	“Using	knowledge:	the	dilemmas	of	‘bridging	research	and	policy’”,	Compare:	A	Journal	
of	Comparative	and	International	Education,	Vol.32,	No.3,	pp.288.	
65	
	
Hu-Wen	era.	It	then	briefly	reviews	the	state	of	the	field	and	identifies	the	gaps	in	the	existing	
literature	 that	 this	 research	 is	 going	 to	 fill.	 Based	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 synthesized	
theoretical	 framework,	 it	 elaborates	 on	 the	 empirical	 studies	 and	 the	 research	 methods	
conducted	in	this	research.	The	rest	of	this	thesis	is	structured	as	follows.	
	 The	next	chapter	(Chapter	2)	first	examines	the	existing	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	
exchange	rate	and	the	CPE	and	IPE	studies	on	exchange	rate	politics.	It	shows	that	the	existing	
Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	are	inconclusive	and	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	
theoretical	 approaches	 have	 limitations	 when	 applied	 to	 China’s	 case.	 It	 also	 develops	 a	
theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	based	on	revision	and	synthesis	
of	 the	existing	 IPE	approaches	 to	exchange	 rate	politics.	 Specifically,	 the	 three-level	game	
framework	examines	the	Chinese	leadership’s	negotiations	with	the	international	bargainers	
at	the	international	level	(level	I),	negotiations	between	central	government’s	ministries	at	
the	central	governmental	level	(level	II)	and	negotiations	with	the	domestic	interest	groups	
and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	III).	It	argues	that	the	Chinese	top	leadership	
strives	 to	 reconcile	 international	 pressures,	 domestic	 ministerial	 interests	 and	 domestic	
interest	groups	when	making	exchange	rate	policy.	
	 Chapters	 3,	 4,	 5	 and	 6	 are	 in-depth	 empirical	 studies	 that	 serve	 to	 validate	 the	
applicability	 of	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework.	 The	 empirical	 studies	 have	 four	 major	
findings.	 First,	 the	 level	 I	 game	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	before	the	2005	exchange	rate	reform.	Second,	the	level	II	game	determined	
the	limited	scope	of	the	initial	reform	and	the	subsequent	gradual	RMB	appreciation.	Third,	
the	 level	 III	 game	 provided	 the	most	 important	 sources	 for	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	
returning	to	the	de	facto	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime	during	the	global	financial	crisis.	
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Lastly,	the	level	I	game	once	again	played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	the	2010	exchange	rate	
reform,	but	the	level	II	game	was	important	as	well,	in	which	the	Chinese	leadership	reached	
the	 consensus	 to	 allow	 the	 RMB	 to	 appreciate	 against	 the	 dollar	 in	 a	 gradual	 and	 steady	
manner	to	improve	the	confidence	and	promote	the	international	use	of	RMB.	
	 The	 concluding	 chapter	 summarises	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 the	 empirical	
findings	of	the	thesis,	and	then	relates	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	to	the	wider	context	of	
China’s	politics.	The	empirical	studies	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	from	2003	to	2013	have	
suggested	 that	 the	Hu-Wen	administration’s	 governance	was	 characterized	by	 consensus-
building	collective	leadership	and	they	placed	priority	on	economic	growth	and	social	stability.		
The	conclusion	also	delineates	the	implications	of	the	study	for	future	research.	
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Chapter	2	Literature	Review	and	Theoretical	Framework	
	
This	chapter	examines	the	existing	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	the	CPE	
and	 IPE	 studies	 on	 exchange	 rate	 politics.	 The	 three	 techniques	 to	 measure	 the	 RMB	
equilibrium	exchange	rate	in	the	Economics	studies	have	produced	inconclusive	results.	The	
chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 Economics	 analysis	 are	 inherently	 problematic	 as	 the	 economists	
neglect	the	important	political	factors	such	as	state,	institutions	and	political	leaders.	Since	
upward	or	downward	shifts	in	a	country’s	exchange	rate	and	choices	of	exchange	rate	regime	
create	both	domestic	and	international	winners	and	losers,	the	study	of	the	RMB	exchange	
rate	policy	calls	for	interdisciplinary	approaches	that	combine	studies	of	Economics,	Politics	
and	International	Relations	(IR).	The	chapter	then	turns	to	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	literature.	
It	 critically	 examines	 the	 four	 theoretical	 approaches	 to	 politics	 of	 exchange	 rate	 and	
identifies	the	respective	limitations	of	the	existing	studies	on	China’s	exchange	rate	politics.	
	 This	 chapter	 further	 develops	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	based	on	revision	and	synthesis	of	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	approaches	to	fill	
the	 research	 gap.	 It	 will	 first	 argue	 that	 two-level	 game	 framework	would	 be	 suitable	 to	
explain	exchange	rate	policymaking.	Then	more	specific	and	context-derived	elements,	such	
as	external	and	domestic	actors	with	different	preferences	and	interests	as	well	as	China’s	
political	and	socio-economic	structures,	will	be	added	into	the	theoretical	framework.	It	sheds	
light	 on	 the	 interactive	 dynamics	 of	 international	 politics	 and	 domestic	 politics	 in	 the	
formulation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	Finally	the	chapter	extends	Putnam’s	two-level	
game	to	a	three-level	game	and	develops	a	theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	
policymaking.	 The	 three-level	 game	 framework	 examines	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	
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negotiations	with	the	international	bargainers	at	the	international	level	(level	I),	negotiations	
between	 central	 government’s	 ministries	 at	 the	 central	 governmental	 level	 (level	 II)	 and	
negotiations	with	the	domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	
III).	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 Chinese	 top	 leadership	 strives	 to	 reconcile	 international	 pressures,	
domestic	 ministerial	 interests	 and	 domestic	 interest	 groups	 when	 making	 exchange	 rate	
policy	decisions.	
	
2.1	Inconclusive	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
Economists	have	sought	to	measure	whether	the	RMB	is	undervalued,	and	if	so,	by	how	much.	
With	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 being	 a	 contentious	 issue	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century,	 large	
numbers	of	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	have	been	done	and	a	complete	
delineation	of	the	existing	literature	seems	elusive.	Nevertheless,	despite	the	difficulties,	it	
remains	possible	to	identify	that	economists	have	developed	their	estimation	models	mainly	
based	on	three	techniques	to	measure	the	RMB	equilibrium	exchange	rate:		Purchasing	Power	
Parity	 approach,	 Fundamental	 Equilibrium	 Exchange	 Rate	 approach,	 and	 Behaviour	
Equilibrium	Exchange	Rate	approach.	
	
2.1.1	The	Purchasing	Power	Parity	approach	
The	 first	 one	 of	 these	 techniques	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 exchange	 rate	 that	 would	 lead	 to	
purchasing	power	parity	(PPP),	which	means	that	exchange	rate	should	move	to	the	rate	that	
would	equalise	the	prices	of	an	identical	basket	of	goods	and	services	in	any	two	countries.	
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The	Big	Mac	index	invented	by	The	Economist	follows	this	idea,	even	though	the	price	index	
used	to	establish	PPP	contains	only	one	good	–	the	burger.82	More	rigorous	studies	of	PPP	
approach	on	exchange	 rate	 are	based	on	 the	Balassa-Samuelson	hypothesis.	 The	Balassa-
Samuelson	effect	describes	the	phenomenon	that	the	tradable	sectors’	productivity	increase	
will	raise	the	wage	rates	in	both	the	tradable	and	non-tradable	sectors,	which	further	increase	
the	 price	 of	 non-tradable	 goods	 and	 services	 and	 result	 in	 the	 appreciation	 of	 the	 real	
exchange	rate.83	
	 Since	 China’s	 economy	 has	 grown	 rapidly	 in	 the	 recent	 decades,	 it	 is	 especially	
relevant	to	determine	whether	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect	is	valid	for	China’s	case	and	to	
further	 estimate	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 misalignment.	 However,	 there	 exist	 competing	
results	with	regard	to	the	validity	of	 the	Balassa-Samuelson	hypothesis	 in	China’s	case.	To	
name	but	a	few,	Coudert	and	Couharde	evidence	a	lack	of	Balassa	effect	in	China.	They	find	a	
large	 gap	 between	 the	 prediction	made	 with	 a	 Balassa-Samuelson	model	 and	 the	 actual	
behaviour	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate,	so	they	turn	to	use	other	method	(see	FEER	approach	
below)	 to	 calculate	 the	RMB	equilibrium	exchange	 rate.84	Cheung,	Chin	and	Fujii	 find	 that	
there	is	little	statistically	significant	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	RMB	is	undervalued	when	
sampling	uncertainty	and	serial	correlation	are	accounted	for.85	Ju,	Lin	and	Liu	demonstrate	
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that	 China	 does	 not	 follow	 the	 prediction	 of	 the	 Balassa-Samuelson	 eﬀect.	 Their	 model	
suggests	that	the	existence	of	excess	labour	supply	depresses	the	wage	rise,	and	the	increases	
in	the	wage	rates	and	prices	of	non-tradable	goods	and	services	are	very	small	 in	China.86	
Conversely,	Yan	and	Kakkar	construct	sectoral	total	factor	productivities	for	the	tradable	and	
non-tradable	sectors	from	1980	to	2003,	and	confirm	the	validity	of	the	Balassa-Samuelson	
effect	in	determining	the	long-run	movements	of	the	RMB	real	exchange	rate	against	the	US	
dollar.87	Moreover,	they	find	that	although	the	RMB	has	been	undervalued	against	the	dollar	
in	the	recent	years,	the	misalignment	is	relatively	small	and	statistically	insignificant.88	
	 Thus	it	can	be	seen	that	economists	are	difficult	to	reach	firm	conclusions	concerning	
the	validity	of	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect	in	China	and	the	level	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
misalignment	using	the	PPP	approach.	Instead,	many	other	economists	utilize	the	concept	of	
equilibrium	exchange	rate	to	study	the	RMB	exchange	rate.	
	
2.1.2	The	Fundamental	Equilibrium	Exchange	Rate	approach	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 PPP	 approach,	 the	 second	 technique	 is	 the	 Fundamental	 Equilibrium	
Exchange	Rate	approach.	The	concept	of	 fundamental	equilibrium	exchange	rate	 (FEER)	 is	
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“based	on	the	notion	of	macroeconomic	balance,	which	has	both	an	 internal	and	external	
dimension”.89	More	specifically,	FEER	facilitates	the	economy	to	operate	at	full	employment	
and	 low	 inflation	 (internal	 balance)	 and	 a	 sustainable	 current	 account	 position	 (external	
balance).	For	instance,	Goldstein	adopts	the	macroeconomic	balance	approach,	which	“views	
the	equilibrium	exchange	rate	as	the	rate	that	produces	equilibrium	in	the	country’s	balance	
of	payments”.90	He	finds	that	the	RMB	was	“significantly	undervalued	on	the	order	of	15	to	
25	 percent”	 and	 criticizes	 that	 China	 manipulated	 its	 currency	 against	 the	 IMF’s	 rule	 of	
game.91	The	subsequent	estimated	undervaluation	by	Goldstein	and	Lardy	in	2006	was	20	to	
40	percent,	which	was	larger	than	that	in	2004.92	Goldstein	and	Lardy	(2007)	go	further,	to	
propose	a	35	to	60	percent	real	appreciation	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	to	eliminate	China’s	
current	 account	 surplus. 93 	Anderson	 follows	 Goldstein’s	 approach	 to	 find	 that	 RMB	
undervaluation	was	about	15	to	20	percent	and	the	adjustment	would	require	a	revaluation	
of	 18	 to	 25	 percent.94	Coudert	 and	 Couharde	 use	 the	 FEER	method	 to	 calculate	 the	 real	
effective	exchange	rate	consistent	with	sustainable	current	accounts	and	find	that	the	RMB	
real	 exchange	 rate	was	 highly	 undervalued	 (10-33%)	between	2002	 and	2005	 in	 effective	
terms	and	even	more	(35%)	against	the	US	dollar.95	
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	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 estimations	 using	 the	 FEER	 approach	 have	 produced	 more	
consistent	 results	 than	 those	 using	 the	 PPP	 approach.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	
economists	using	the	FEER	approach	generally	come	to	the	conclusion	of	RMB	undervaluation,	
for	the	reason	that	the	FEER	approach	is	based	on	ideal	macroeconomic	balance	while	China’s	
external	imbalance	has	generally	deteriorated	in	the	new	millennium.	China’s	trade	surplus	
and	foreign	reserves	have	both	soared	at	accelerating	rates	before	the	outbreak	of	the	2008	
global	financial	crisis.	Therefore,	the	FEER	approach	is	criticized	as	being	self-explanatory,	and	
the	corresponding	result	is	quite	predictable.	Furthermore,	the	FEER	approach	seems	to	be	
problematic	when	 applied	 to	 the	US	dollar	 exchange	 rate,	 as	 the	US	had	 run	persistently	
current	account	deficits	in	the	last	few	decades.	Therefore,	some	other	economists	make	use	
of	the	Behavioural	Equilibrium	Exchange	Rate	approach	to	measure	the	RMB	misalignment.	
	
2.1.3	The	Behavioural	Equilibrium	Exchange	Rate	approach	
To	eliminate	the	problem	that	the	FEER	approach	is	too	self-explanatory,	other	economists	
tend	to	estimate	the	RMB	equilibrium	exchange	rate	by	using	the	Behavioural	Equilibrium	
Exchange	Rate	approach,	which	does	not	rely	on	any	theory	of	exchange	rate	determination.96	
The	 behavioural	 equilibrium	 exchange	 rate	 (BEER)	 examines	 “the	 deviation	 between	 the	
actual	exchange	rate	and	the	value	given	by	the	estimated	equilibrium	relationship”97,	and	
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the	 analysis	 “typically	 examines	 the	 departure	 of	 the	 country’s	 observed	 real	 effective	
exchange	rate	at	the	 latest	date	available	 from	the	equation-predicted	BEER	to	determine	
whether	the	country	is	under-	or	overvalued”98.	
	 To	cite	but	a	few,	Funke	and	Rahn	find	that	after	an	overvaluation	up	to	mid-1996,	the	
RMB	 has	 been	 constantly	 undervalued	 against	 the	 US	 dollar.	 The	 peak	 undervaluation	
exceeded	15%,	and	at	 the	end	of	 the	observed	period	 the	RMB	was	undervalued	by	11%	
against	the	US	dollar.99	MacDonald	and	Dias	select	the	sample	period	from	1988	Q1	to	2006	
Q1	and	find	that	the	RMB	was	undervalued	on	an	order	of	27.3%	to	46.6%.100	Chen	(2007)	
uses	time	series	data	from	1994	Q1	to	2006	Q2	and	finds	that	the	RMB	real	exchange	rate	
was	undervalued	during	most	of	the	sample	period,	but	this	misalignment	tended	to	become	
smaller	and	smaller.101	Wang,	Hui	and	Soofi	find	that	the	RMB	fluctuated	around	its	long-run	
equilibrium	 rate	 within	 a	 narrow	 band,	 which	 implies	 that	 the	 currency	 was	 consistently	
undervalued.102	Chen,	Deng	and	Kemme	select	the	sample	period	from	1997	to	2007Q3	and	
find	 that	 the	 RMB	 fluctuated	 moderately	 around	 its	 long	 run	 equilibrium	 value	 with	
undervaluation	up	to	4%	and	overvaluation	up	to	6%	at	various	points.103	Cui	examines	the	
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period	of	1997	to	2012	and	finds	the	significant	undervaluation	of	the	RMB	by	up	to	20%	and	
the	trend	of	the	RMB	approaching	to	its	equilibrium	exchange	rate	since	2007	except	for	the	
period	of	crisis.104	We	can	see	that	it	 is	difficult	for	the	BEER	approach,	rather	like	the	PPP	
approach,	 to	 reach	 any	 firm	 conclusion	 about	 the	 precise	 level	 of	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
misalignment.	
	
2.1.4	Summary	and	discussions	
As	we	can	see,	three	major	techniques	and	a	large	variety	of	estimation	models	have	been	
applied	to	answer	whether	and	the	extent	to	which	the	RMB	is	undervalued	in	the	existing	
Economics	studies.	With	regard	to	the	first	question,	a	fair	degree	of	agreed	answer	is	“yes”	
though	a	small	number	of	studies	disagree,	whereas	as	to	the	second	question,	no	consensus	
has	been	reached	because	the	existing	Economics	studies	have	yielded	a	very	wide	range	of	
estimates.	Table	2.1	shows	some	selected	economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate.	
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Table	2.1:	Selected	Economics	studies	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
Author	 Year	 Approach	 Results	
Coudert	et	al	 2005,	2007	 PPP	 A	lack	of	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect	
Cheung	et	al	 2005,	2007,	
2009,	2010	
PPP	 Little	statistically	significant	evidence	to	support	the	RMB	
undervaluation	
Yan	et	al	 2011	 PPP	 Confirmation	of	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect,	significant	
overvaluation	during	1984-87,	significant	undervaluation	
during	1989-91	and	no	indication	of	a	statistically	
significant	misalignment	in	the	most	recent	years		
Ju	et	al	 2011	 PPP	 A	lack	of	the	Balassa-Samuelson	effect	
Goldstein	 2004	 FEER	 Significantly	undervalued	on	an	order	of	15%	to	25%	
Anderson	 2005	 FEER	 RMB	undervaluation	was	about	15%	to	20%	and	the	
adjustment	would	require	a	revaluation	of	18%	to	25%	
Goldstein	et	al	 2006	 FEER	 Significantly	undervalued	on	an	order	of	20%	to	40%	
Goldstein	et	al	 2007	 FEER	 A	35%	to	60%	real	appreciation	of	the	renminbi	is	
required	to	eliminate	China’s	current	account	surplus	
Coudert	et	al	 2005,	2007	 FEER	 Highly	undervalued	(10%-33%)	between	2002	and	2005	
in	effective	terms	and	even	more	(35%)	against	the	US	
dollar	
Funke	at	al	 2005	 BEER	 The	RMB	was	overvalued	until	the	mid-1996,	followed	by	
undervaluation	which	peaked	at	15%,	and	the	RMB	was	
undervalued	by	11%	at	2002	
MacDonald	et	
al	
2007	 BEER	 The	RMB	was	undervalued	on	an	order	of	27.3%	to	46.6%	
Chen	 2007	 BEER	 The	RMB	were	undervalued	during	most	part	of	sample	
period	from	1994	Q1	to	2006	Q2,	but	the	misalignment	
had	a	trend	to	become	smaller	and	smaller	
Wang	et	al	 2007	 BEER	 The	RMB	fluctuated	around	its	equilibrium	rate	within	a	
narrow	band	and	were	consistently	undervalued	
Chen	et	al	 2008	 BEER	 The	RMB	fluctuated	with	undervaluation	up	to	4%	and	
overvaluation	up	to	6%	from	1997	to	2007Q3	
Cui	 2013	 BEER	 Significant	undervaluation	of	the	RMB	by	up	to	20%	and	
the	trend	of	the	RMB	approaching	to	its	equilibrium	
exchange	rate	since	2007	except	for	the	period	of	crisis	
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	 The	existing	approaches	to	the	RMB	exchange	rate	within	the	literature	of	Economics	
studies	are	not	without	merit,	especially	insofar	as	they	draw	attention	to	the	causes	of	the	
global	economic	imbalance	and	to	the	possible	methods	to	address	it.	Their	explanatory	utility	
nonetheless	remains	circumscribed	owing	to	the	lack	of	consensus	among	economists	on	the	
RMB	equilibrium	exchange	rate	and	the	estimation	of	misalignment.	The	IMF	working	paper	
by	Dunaway	and	Li	indicates	that	the	wide	variation	in	these	estimates	is	attributed	to	“the	
influence	of	such	factors	as	the	different	methodologies	used,	explanatory	variables	included,	
subjective	 judgments	of	 the	various	 researchers	 in	deriving	 their	 results,	 and	 instability	 in	
underlying	economic	relationships,	especially	in	a	rapidly	developing	economy	like	China”.105	
	 However,	if	we	think	outside	the	box,	the	major	shortcoming	of	the	Economics	studies	
on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	 is	 that	economists	generally	assume	a	pure	economic	world	 in	
which	only	the	price	and	market	mechanism	take	effect,	but	neglect	political	factors	such	as	
state,	 institutions	 and	 political	 leaders.	 As	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 is	 known	 to	 be	
formulated	and	implemented	by	leaders	in	the	Chinese	central	government,	more	in	depth	
examination	 on	 China’s	 domestic	 politics	 would	 be	 conducive	 to	 understanding	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	Moreover,	the	competing	results	of	existing	Economics	studies	
have	 further	 stoked	 debates	 and	 bargaining	 in	 international	 politics	 as	 well	 as	 China’s	
domestic	 politics.	 Without	 referring	 to	 international	 influences	 as	 well	 as	 the	 leaders,	
structures	and	processes	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	it	would	not	be	possible	to	
gain	a	deep	and	thorough	understanding	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate.106	
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(accessed	16/09/2016).	
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	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 worthwhile	 examining	 the	 political	 factors	 that	 push	 the	 US	
government	to	pressure	China	and	the	factors	in	Chinese	politics	that	impel	Chinese	leaders	
to	resist	American	pressure.	Compared	with	the	Western	counterparts,	China’s	leaders	hold	
a	very	different	view	on	the	exchange	rate.	The	orthodox	view	of	the	Western	politicians	and	
mainstream	 economists	 is	 that	 China’s	 external	 imbalance	 has	 explicated	 that	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	is	far	away	from	the	equilibrium	and	that	policy	changes	should	be	made	to	
address	the	RMB	misalignment.107	However,	the	Chinese	side	does	not	simply	attribute	the	
external	 imbalance	 to	 exchange	 rate	 misalignment.	 The	 Chinese	 leadership	 regards	 the	
exchange	rate	as	one	component	in	the	toolkit	of	development	strategy,	in	which	the	priority	
is	not	 to	create	a	market	economy	or	 to	achieve	market	equilibrium	but	 to	make	China	a	
wealthy	and	powerful	 country.108	The	next	 section	will	 turn	 to	 the	CPE	and	 IPE	studies	on	
China’s	exchange	rate	politics.	
	
2.2	Critical	review	of	CPE	and	IPE	studies	on	exchange	rate	politics	
The	opposite	views	of	the	Western	and	Chinese	officials	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	shed	light	
upon	the	nature	of	the	real	world.	In	the	words	of	Gilpin,	one	of	the	pioneers	in	the	field	of	
IPE:	
																																																						
and	Jingchun	Zhang	(2005)	“The	political	economy	of	exchange	rate:	A	study	based	on	Sino-US	exchange	rate	
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Pacific	Studies	[当代亚太],	Vol.9,	pp.3-20;	Xiaohui	Liu	(2013)	“Review	of	new	political	economy	studies	of	
exchange	rate	system	choice	[汇率制度选择的新政治经济学研究综述]”,	The	Journal	of	World	Economy	[世
界经济],	Vol.2,	pp.137-160.	
107	Arthur	Kroeber	(2011)	“The	renminbi:	the	political	economy	of	a	currency”,	Foreign	policy,	retrieved	from	
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/09/07-renminbi-kroeber	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
108	Ibid	
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“The	 parallel	 existence	 and	 mutual	 interaction	 of	 ‘state’	 and	 ‘market’	 in	 the	
modern	world	create	‘political	economy.’	…	In	the	absence	of	the	state,	the	price	
mechanism	 and	 market	 forces	 would	 determine	 the	 outcome	 of	 economic	
activities;	this	would	be	the	pure	world	of	the	economist.	In	the	absence	of	the	
market,	the	state	or	its	equivalent	would	allocate	economic	resources;	this	would	
be	the	pure	world	of	political	scientist.”109	
	 The	world	in	reality	is	neither	a	pure	world	of	economists	nor	one	of	political	scientists.	
Instead,	it	is	more	proper	to	define	it	as	a	global	political	economy	with	“the	reciprocal	and	
dynamic	 interaction	…	of	 the	pursuit	of	wealth	and	the	pursuit	of	power”.110	By	pursuit	of	
wealth,	Gilpin	had	in	mind	the	realm	of	economics:	the	role	of	price	and	market	mechanism,	
which	are	among	the	principal	concerns	of	mainstream	economists.	By	pursuit	of	power,	he	
had	in	mind	the	realm	of	politics:	the	role	of	state	and	government	intervention,	which	are	
among	the	main	concerns	of	political	scientists.	The	state	and	market	interact	to	influence	
the	distribution	of	power	and	wealth	in	international	relations.	The	scholars	of	CPE	and	IPE	
have	provided	more	nuanced	explanations	for	exchange	rate	policymaking.	Four	theoretical	
approaches	could	be	identified	within	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	literature	for	exchange	rate	
politics:	 the	 domestic	 interests	 approach,	 the	 domestic	 institutions	 approach,	 the	
international	influences	approach,	and	the	international-domestic	interactions	approach.	This	
section	will	offer	a	critical	review	of	the	existing	studies	of	the	four	approaches.	
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2.2.1	The	domestic	interests	approach	
The	first	theoretical	perspective,	the	domestic	interests	approach,	is	by	far	the	most	common.	
Three	 models	 of	 exchange	 rate	 politics	 have	 been	 developed	 within	 this	 approach:	 the	
electoral	model,	the	partisan	model	and	the	sectoral	model.	
	 The	 electoral	 and	partisan	models	 emphasize	 the	 interests	 of	 political	 leaders	 and	
parties	in	democratic	regimes.	Both	models	are	resonated	with	the	theory	of	political	business	
cycle.111	They	assume	that	government’s	exchange	rate	policy	reflects	the	administration’s	
desire	for	monetary	policy	autonomy	in	order	to	manage	the	domestic	economy,	either	for	
office-seeking	or	 for	partisan	preferences.	More	 specifically,	 Tufte	elaborates	 that	elected	
politicians	 may	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 adopt	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	 regimes	 before	 universal	
suffrages,	 which	 help	 them	 to	 carry	 out	 expansionary	 macroeconomic	 policies	 to	 boost	
economic	growth	and	reduce	unemployment	at	the	time	of	elections.112	By	contrast,	Oatley	
finds	that	leftist	parties	are	less	inclined	to	maintain	a	fixed	exchange	rate,	because	they	are	
more	 willing	 to	 tolerate	 inflation	 and	 more	 inclined	 to	 pursue	 looser	 macroeconomic	
policies.113	
	 The	sectoral	model	takes	into	account	the	various	effects	that	exchange	rate	policy	
imposes	upon	domestic	sectors	and	suggests	that	 interest	groups	of	different	sectors	hold	
different	preferences	over	exchange	rate	 level	and	flexibility.	The	sectoral	model	also	sees	
																																																						
111	See,	for	example,	William	Nordhaus	(1975)	“The	political	business	cycle”,	The	Review	of	Economic	Studies,	
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and	Kenneth	Rogoff	(ed.)	NBER	Macroeconomics	Annual	2000,	Volume	15,	MIT	Press,	pp.75-138,	retrieved	
from	http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11055.pdf	(accessed	16/09/2016);	Hector	Schamis	and	Christopher	Way	
(2003)	“Political	cycles	and	exchange	rate-based	stabilization”,	World	Politics,	Vol.56,	No.1,	pp.43-78.	
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the	 relative	 power	 among	 the	 various	 socio-economic	 interest	 groups	 as	 a	 key	 factor	
influencing	exchange	rate	policy.	On	this	basis,	the	sectoral	model	is	also	termed	the	interest	
group	 model.	 The	 sector	 model	 suggests	 that	 different	 domestic	 sectors	 have	 different	
preferred	degrees	of	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	levels	of	exchange	rate.	More	specifically,	
domestically	 based	 groups	 favour	 floating	 exchange	 rates,	 while	 internationally	 oriented	
economic	 groups	 prefer	 fixed	 ones;	 tradable	 producers	 favour	 a	 relatively	 depreciated	
currency,	whereas	producers	of	non-tradable	goods	and	services	as	well	as	overseas	investors	
prefer	a	relatively	appreciated	one.114	
	 The	three	models	of	exchange	rate	politics	within	the	domestic	interests	approach	are	
simple	 but	 provide	 useful	 insights	 because	 they	 have	 respectively	 identified	 plausible	
explanatory	variables	and	elaborated	the	causal	mechanisms.	The	domestic	interest	approach	
could	 be	 appropriate	 to	 explain	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 of	 liberal	 market	 economies	 with	
democratic	 politics.	 However,	 the	 three	 models	 have	 their	 respective	 limitations	 when	
directly	applied	to	explain	China’s	case.	
	 First,	 there	 is	 no	 universal	 suffrage	 and	 electoral	 campaign	 in	 China,	 which	 is	 an	
authoritarian	 state	 with	 no	 democracy	 in	 the	 top-level	 politics.	 Second,	 the	 Chinese	
Communist	Party	 (CCP)	has	been	 the	single	dominant	 ruling	party	 in	contemporary	China,	
which	is	distinct	from	the	two-party	or	multi-party	systems	characterized	by	competitions	of	
leftist,	(centrist,)	and	rightist	parties.	Most	observers	and	analysts	cannot	see	any	sign	that	
the	CCP	would	initialize	the	democratization	or	hand	out	the	ruling	power	in	the	foreseeable	
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future.115	Coase	and	Wang	note	that	“with	more	than	80	million	members	(at	the	end	of	2011),	
from	every	 profession,	 including	 a	 rising	 percentage	 of	 private	 entrepreneurs	 and	 college	
graduates,	the	Party	appears	as	strong	as	it	has	ever	been.”116	In	this	sense,	the	electoral	and	
partisan	models	seem	not	to	be	suitable	for	China’s	case.	
	 Furthermore,	although	China	uses	markets	extensively,	how	much	political	space	 is	
available	for	interest	groups	to	lobby	for	their	favourable	policies	remains	controversial.	For	
instance,	Liew	and	Wu	hold	that	China’s	civil	 society	 is	still	very	weak	and	there	 is	 limited	
political	space	that	allows	interest	groups	to	lobby	for	their	preferred	policy	outcomes.117	In	
contrast,	Steinberg	and	Shih	argue	that	the	preferences	of	powerful	interest	groups	provide	
the	 most	 convincing	 explanation	 for	 China’s	 undervalued	 exchange	 rates. 118 	The	 role	 of	
interest	groups	lobbying	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	making	remains	rather	inconclusive,	
which	questions	the	applicability	of	interest	group	model	to	China.	
	 Moreover,	 even	 if	 interest	 groups	 are	 really	 able	 to	 assert	 influences	 on	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	policymaking,	the	assumption	that	exchange	rate	policy	would	directly	reflect	
the	preferences	of	the	strongest	(or	stronger)	sectors	and	interest	groups	could	be	simplistic.	
It	requires	more	in-depth	analysis	of	the	political	leaders	and	institutions	involved	in	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	More	specifically,	 though	China	 is	an	authoritarian	state,	 it	 is	
worth	noting	that	this	does	not	mean	that	China’s	political	apparatus	is	a	monolithic	entity	
with	 a	 single	 set	 of	 policy	 objectives.	 The	 parochial	 interests	 are	 actually	 voiced	 and	
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represented	by	the	key	institutional	actors	in	the	party-state	system.	One	prominent	example	
is	the	MOFCOM,	whose	goal	is	to	further	the	interests	of	China’s	export	sectors	in	the	Chinese	
government.	Therefore,	the	sectoral	model	could	be	revised	and	incorporated	into	a	more	
specific	and	endemic	 framework	 to	explain	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	as	will	be	
elaborated	subsequently	in	more	detail.	
	
2.2.2	The	domestic	institutions	approach	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 domestic	 interests	 approach,	 the	 domestic	 institutions	 approach	
emphasizes	 institutional	 and	 structural	 impacts	 upon	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	
Institutions	matter	because	they	structure	the	way	preferences	are	aggregated	and	decisions	
are	made.	Specifically,	political	institutions	create	rules	for	decision	making,	define	priorities	
of	 agenda	and	advantage	 certain	 groups	while	disadvantaging	others.	A	number	of	 cross-
sectional	studies	have	generated	 findings	on	how	political	 institutions	affect	 the	exchange	
rate	policy.	
	 First,	the	nature	of	government	and	condition	of	socio-political	environment	are	found	
to	have	influences	on	the	choice	of	exchange	rate	regime.	Weak	and	unstable	governments	
generally	prefer	a	floating	exchange	rate	regime	with	less	pressure	to	defend	the	exchange	
rate	value	and	more	monetary	policy	autonomy	to	pursue	other	macroeconomic	objectives	
such	as	 low-inflation	or	 low-unemployment;	while	stronger	governments	 in	a	stable	socio-
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political	environment	are	more	likely	to	adopt	fixed	exchange	rate	regimes,	since	they	are	less	
concerned	about	the	speculative	attacks	on	currency	and	the	potential	regime	collapse.119	
	 Furthermore,	the	electoral	system	and	legislative	institutions	also	affect	the	choice	of	
exchange	rate	regime.	Leblang	finds	that	“floating	exchange	rate	regimes	are	more	likely	in	
democratic	 than	 in	 nondemocratic	 polities	 and	 that	 democratic	 polities	with	majoritarian	
electoral	 systems	 are	more	 likely	 to	 fix	 their	 exchange	 rates	 than	 those	 with	 systems	 of	
proportional	representation.”120	Moreover,	Bernhard	and	Leblang	note	that	 in	the	systems	
where	“opposition	parties	are	excluded	from	the	legislative	policy	process	…	politicians	in	the	
governing	 party(ies)	 have	 strong	 incentives	 not	 to	 risk	 their	 position	 in	 office”	 and	prefer	
floating	exchange	rate	arrangements.121	
	 Though	 the	 domestic	 institutions	 approach	 provides	 generalized	 findings	 on	 the	
relationship	 between	 political	 institutions	 and	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 choice,	 it	 also	 has	
weaknesses.	Similar	to	the	domestic	interests	approach,	the	domestic	institutions	approach	
is	western-centric	and	not	suitable	 for	China’s	case.	The	strong-weak	government	and	the	
electoral	system	analyses	could	not	explain	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	owing	to	the	
fact	that,	as	discussed,	China	has	been	a	political	authoritarian	state	with	no	elections	in	the	
top-level	 politics.	 The	 legislative	 institutions	 analysis	 cannot	 explain	 China’s	 case	 either,	
because	of	the	political	weakness	of	NPC	in	China.	Although	it	claims	to	be	the	top	legislative	
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body	that	enjoys	the	highest	authority	de	jure,	NPC	acts	de	facto	as	a	symbolic	rubber-stamp	
for	the	CCP.	In	a	nutshell,	China’s	institutions,	characterized	by	one-party	rule	and	party-state	
system122,	 are	 fundamentally	 different	 from	Western	 liberal	 democracies.	 This	 requires	 a	
more	“indigenous”	investigation	into	China’s	political	structure	and	process	of	exchange	rate	
policymaking.	
	 However,	 limited	work	 is	 dedicated	 to	 this	 important	 field.	 Liew	and	Wu	made	an	
original	contribution	 in	figuring	out	the	political	 institutions	and	elites	of	China’s	exchange	
rate	 policymaking,	 which	 is	 useful	 but	 out	 of	 date	 effectively.	 Liew	 traces	 the	 historical	
evolution	of	the	institutional	structure	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	as	well	as	the	
leadership	transitions	in	the	structure.123	He	also	analyses	the	roles	and	responsibilities	of	the	
key	economic	ministries	and	their	respective	interests	and	positions	they	pursue	on	the	RMB	
exchange	 rate	 policy. 124 	The	 results	 of	 the	 analyses	 are	 applied	 to	 explain	 the	 RMB	
devaluation	policy	in	1989,	the	no-devaluation	policy	during	the	Asian	financial	crisis,	and	the	
reform	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	regime	after	2005.125	Moreover,	Bell	and	Feng	examine	the	
institutional	rise	of	China’s	central	bank	and	argue	that	the	rising	authority	of	PBOC	explains	
the	 shift	 to	 the	partial	 liberalization	of	China’s	exchange	 rate	 regime	 in	2005.126	Steinberg	
argues	 that	 “the	 combination	of	 a	powerful	manufacturing	 sector,	 state-controlled	 labour	
system,	and	state-controlled	 financial	 system	helps	explains	why	China	has	maintained	an	
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undervalued	exchange	rate.”127	Though	the	existing	limited	work	figures	out	the	interests	and	
positions	of	policy	elites	and	economic	ministries,	it	has	not	examined	in	an	in-depth	way	how	
the	preferences	of	the	key	institutional	actors	are	aggregated	in	the	institutional	structure.	
The	 black	 box,	 filled	 with	 the	 interplay	 of	 China’s	 domestic	 political	 powers,	 remains	
unopened.	One	of	 the	major	 contributions	 of	 this	 thesis	will	 be	 to	 use	 process-tracing	 to	
provide	careful	analysis	on	how	the	interactions	of	China’s	key	economic	ministries	influence	
the	RMB	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
	 Last	but	not	least,	both	the	domestic	institutions	approach	and	the	domestic	interests	
approach	focus	on	the	domestic	factors	but	ignore	the	international	dimension,	which	affects	
exchange	rate	policy	of	an	open	economy	in	the	era	of	globalization.	In	the	perspective	of	the	
third	 theoretical	 approach,	 one	 cannot	 fully	 understand	 a	 country’s	 domestic	 political	
economy	without	reference	to	its	structural	position	and	international	relations	in	the	global	
political	economy.	
	
2.2.3	The	international	influences	approach	
Contrary	 to	 the	 previous	 domestic	 politics	 approaches	 based	 on	 unit-level	 or	 state-level	
perspectives,	 the	 third	 theoretical	 approach	 –	 the	 international	 influences	 approach	 –	
attaches	 importance	 to	 the	 role	 of	 international	 influences	 on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking.	 It	 is	an	 IPE	approach	as	 it	 is	concerned	with	the	ways	 in	which	 international	
political	forces	affect	countries’	exchange	rate	policy	and	shape	their	economic	interactions.	
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The	international	influences	in	the	existing	studies	mainly	refer	to	international	criticisms	of	
China’s	exchange	rate	practices	and	international	pressure	on	China	to	revalue	its	currency.	
	 With	regard	to	the	relationship	between	international	pressure	and	China’s	exchange	
rate	policy,	there	have	been	divisive	debates	among	scholars	and	analysts.	On	one	side	of	the	
spectrum	is	the	argument	that	the	increasing	US	criticism	of	China’s	currency	practices	gives	
rise	 to	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 in	 2005	 and	 the	 subsequent	 RMB	 appreciation.	 For	
example,	 Li	uses	 the	 “variable	 coefficient–panel	data	model”	 to	 find	 that	 the	US	played	a	
leading	role	in	the	RMB	appreciation	and	the	Congress	bills	aimed	at	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
were	the	direct	fuse	in	the	revaluation.128	Chao	and	Tung	argue	that	in	addition	to	economic	
and	 domestic	 factors,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	 influenced	 by	 American	 political	
pressure	 and	 that	 this	 pressure	 led	 to	 reform	 of	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 regime	 and	 the	
widening	of	the	floating	band	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate.	129	Zhu,	Zhao	and	Wang	establish	the	
“political	cycle	spillover	effect	model”	and	find	that	the	American	political	cycle	had	short-
term	 impacts	on	 the	RMB	exchange	rate.130	More	specifically,	empirical	evidence	suggests	
that	 the	 RMB	 appreciation	 rate	 was	 significantly	 reduced	 in	 the	 first	 year	 after	 the	 US	
presidential	 election,	 but	 significantly	 enhanced	 in	 the	 first	 year	 after	 the	 mid-term	
election.131	
	 On	the	other	side	of	the	spectrum	is	the	argument	that	external	pressure	is	unlikely	to	
yield	any	major	change	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	For	instance,	Liu	and	Zhou	explore	the	
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人民币升值的政治经济学分析]”,	World	Economics	and	Politics	[世界经济与政治],	Vol.9,	pp.136-155.	
129	Wen-chih	Chao	and	Chen-yuan	Tung	(2013)	“Does	China	really	say	no?	The	impact	of	international	political	
pressure	on	China’s	exchange	rate	policy”,	Issues	and	Studies,	Vol.49,	No.2,	pp.1-34.	
130	Mengnan	Zhu,	Qian	Zhao	and	Yuguang	Wang	(2015)	“Political	incentives	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	changes	
-	based	on	the	investigation	of	US	political	cycle	spillover	effects	[人民币汇率变动的政治诱因	——基于美国
政治周期外溢效应的考察]”,	Management	World	[管理世界],	Vol.4,	pp.38-51.	
131	Ibid.	
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impact	of	political	pressure	from	the	US	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	find	that	the	overall	
result	was	not	significant.132	Liu	and	Pauwels	find	little	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	external	
pressure	had	any	influence	on	the	daily	changes	of	the	CNY/USD	spot	exchange	rate,	which	
means	 the	 pace	 of	 the	 RMB	 appreciation	 was	 unlikely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 political	
pressure.133	Hu	and	Liu	find	that	external	political	pressure	did	not	have	a	significant	influence	
on	the	daily	returns	of	RMB/USD	exchange	rate,	but	had	statistically	significant	impacts	on	
the	conditional	volatility	of	RMB	exchange	rate.134	
	 In	addition,	some	findings	show	mixed	results.	Zhang	 investigates	the	 impact	of	US	
political	pressure	from	three	aspects	and	finds	that	“the	political	pressure	from	Congress	and	
the	US	public	media	alone	have	little	impact	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	in	the	short	run,	while	
the	political	pressure	from	US	lobbyists	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	appreciation	of	RMB	
exchange	 rate.”135	Xiao	and	Pan	build	a	 game	model	of	 the	domestic	 and	 foreign	 interest	
groups	to	analyse	the	effect	of	external	pressure	on	the	appreciation	of	RMB	exchange	rate.	
They	have	two	major	findings:	(1)	the	pressure	from	the	US	legislative	bodies	had	significant	
impacts	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	whereas	the	pressure	from	the	US	executive	authority	did	
																																																						
132	Tao	Liu	and	Jizhong	Zhou	(2011)	“Do	external	pressures	promote	the	RMB	appreciation?	An	investigation	
based	on	the	events	of	American	pressure	between	2005	and	2010	[外部压力是否推动了人民币升值——基
于 2005~2010年美国施压事件效果的考察]”,	Journal	of	Financial	Research	[金融研究],	Vol.377,	No.11,	
pp.32-46.	
133	Li-Gang	Liu	and	Laurent	L.	Pauwels	(2012)	“Do	external	political	pressures	affect	the	Renminbi	exchange	
rate?”,	Journal	of	International	Money	and	Finance,	Vol.31,	No.6,	pp.1800-1818.	
134	Zaiyong	Hu	and	Shuguang	Liu	(2013)	“Do	external	political	pressures	affect	the	RMB	exchange	rate	against	
dollar?	[外部政治压力影响人民币对美元汇率吗?]”,	Monetary	Theory	and	Practice	[货币理论与政策],	
Vol.12,	pp.26-34.	
135	Wenjie	Zhang	(2013)	“The	impact	of	US	political	pressure	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate”,	LUX:	A	Journal	of	
Transdisciplinary	Writing	and	Research	from	Claremont	Graduate	University,	Vol.3,	Iss.1,	Article	21,	p.1,	
retrieved	from	http://scholarship.claremont.edu/lux/vol3/iss1/21/	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
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not;	(2)	the	external	pressure	could	promote	the	RMB	appreciation	in	the	short	run	but	not	
in	the	long	run.136	
	 Existing	studies	on	RMB	exchange	rate	within	the	international	influences	approach	
are	not	without	merit,	especially	insofar	as	they	draw	attention	to	the	role	of	international	
influences	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 their	 explanatory	 utility	 nonetheless	
remains	circumscribed	owing	to	their	competing	results,	just	like	the	Economics	studies.	More	
importantly,	because	China,	unlike	 Japan	 in	 the	1980s,	 is	a	more	 independent	geopolitical	
power,	it	has	more	capacity	to	resist	bowing	to	the	international	pressure	on	the	exchange	
rate.	International	influences	do	play	a	role	in	the	exchange	rate	policymaking	of	China	as	an	
open	economy,	but	 the	exchange	rate	decision	of	China	as	a	 large	economy	 is	undeniably	
influenced	 by	 China’s	 domestic	 political	 economy.	 Therefore,	 it	 calls	 for	 a	 synthesized	
perspective	to	study	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	which	combines	the	IPE	and	CPE	
approaches.	The	fourth	theoretical	approach	focused	on	international-domestic	interactions	
will	be	discussed	in	detail	as	follows.	
	
2.2.4	The	international-domestic	interactions	approach	
As	 a	 synthesized	 perspective	 of	 the	 previous	 three	 theoretical	 approaches,	 the	 fourth	
approach	attaches	importance	to	the	international-domestic	entanglements,	which	is	heavily	
indebted	to	the	theoretical	turn	of	IR	studies	in	the	1990s.	The	IR	theories	in	the	1970s	and	
early	1980s	gave	analytical	priority	 to	 systemic	variables	 such	as	 international	 system	and	
																																																						
136	Wen	Xiao	and	Jiadong	Pan	(2013)	“The	shocks	and	effects	of	external	pressure	on	RMB	appreciation:	An	
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international	 institutions	 whereas	 downplayed	 unit-level	 variables.	 To	 cite	 but	 a	 few	 big	
names,	Gourevitch	introduces	the	notion	of	“the	second	image	reversed”	to	emphasize	the	
international	 sources	 of	 domestic	 politics	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 international	 systems	 are	
causes	 instead	 of	 consequences	 of	 domestic	 politics.137 	Waltz,	 the	 founder	 of	 structural	
realism	theory,	analyses	how	the	anarchic	structure	of	international	system	explains	states’	
behaviours	and	interactions	therein.138	In	particular,	he	builds	his	systemic	theory	based	on	
the	 assumption	 that	 states	 are	 rational	 and	 unitary	 actors	 only	 with	 different	 military	
capabilities	 and	 he	 overall	 neglects	 the	 domestic	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 unit	 level. 139	
Keohane	and	Nye,	 the	 founders	of	 liberal	 institutionalism	theory,	develop	the	concepts	of	
“complex	 interdependence”	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 roles	 that	 international	 institutions	 play	 in	
helping	the	rational	self-interested	states	to	obtain	the	collective	benefits.140	
	 With	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	increasing	globalization	of	the	world	economy,	
IR	scholars	paid	more	attention	to	the	heterogeneity	of	states	and	examined	the	interactions	
between	systemic	and	domestic	variables.	The	late	1980s	and	1990s	saw	a	theoretical	turn	to	
combination	of	international-domestic	interaction	analysis.	Putnam	first	introduced	the	two-
level	 game	 as	 a	metaphor	 for	 international-domestic	 interactions.141	The	 two-level	 games	
approach	 “recognizes	 that	 central	 decision-makers	 strive	 to	 reconcile	 domestic	 and	
international	imperatives	simultaneously”.142	Garrett	and	Lange	recognize	the	“increasingly	
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138	Kenneth	Waltz	(1979)	Theory	of	International	Politics,	New	York:	McGraw-Hill.	
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140	Robert	Keohane	and	Joseph	Nye	(1977)	Power	and	Interdependence:	World	Politics	in	Transition,	Boston:	
Little,	Brown;	Robert	Keohane	(1984)	After	Hegemony:	Cooperation	and	Discord	in	the	World	Political	
Economy,	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.	
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anachronistic”	 IPE-CPE	 divide	 and	 propose	 to	 “bridge	 this	 divide	 by	 using	 an	 open-polity	
model	 to	 analyse	 the	 mediating	 effects	 of	 domestic	 institutions	 between	 internationally	
driven	 changes	 in	 the	 preferences	 of	 actors	 in	 the	 private	 sphere	 and	 public	 policy	
outcomes”. 143 	Keohane	 and	 Milner	 edit	 a	 volume	 on	 “internationalization	 and	 domestic	
politics”	 and	 generally	 propose	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 internationalization,	 as	 the	
central	explanatory	variable,	affects	policy	preferences	of	actors,	 their	national	policy	and	
further	 political	 institutions	 within	 countries. 144 	Milner	 also	 suggests	 that	 states	 are	 not	
unitary	actors	and	that	both	international	and	domestic	explanations	are	required	for	foreign	
policy	making.145	
	 The	 theory	 of	 neoclassical	 realism	 emerged	 in	 the	 late	 1990s	 and	 became	 a	
mainstream	IR	theory	for	foreign	policy	explanation	in	the	2000s.	As	Rose	coined	the	term:	
“Neoclassical	realism	argues	that	the	scope	and	ambition	of	a	country’s	foreign	
policy	is	driven	first	and	foremost	by	the	country’s	relative	material	power.	Yet	it	
contends	that	the	impact	of	power	capabilities	on	foreign	policy	is	 indirect	and	
complex,	 because	 systemic	 pressures	 must	 be	 translated	 through	 intervening	
unit-level	variables	such	as	decision-makers’	perceptions	and	state	structure.”146	
	 Neoclassical	 realism	 focuses	 on	 the	 interaction	 between	 international	 system	 and	
internal	 dynamics	 of	 states.	 More	 importantly,	 neoclassical	 realists	 take	 relative	 power	
distribution	as	the	independent	variable	to	explain	state	behaviour,	while	at	the	same	time,	
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they	 emphasize	 the	 process	 whereby	 such	 intervening	 variables	 as	 the	 perceptions	 of	
decision-makers,	a	country’s	state	apparatus	and	 its	relations	to	the	society	shape	specific	
policy	response	to	international	structural	pressure.147	Neoclassical	realism	could	be	one	of	
the	 most	 sophisticated	 and	 explanatory	 theories	 within	 the	 international-domestic	
interactions	approach.	
	 Exchange	rate	policy,	as	a	salient	component	of	foreign	economic	policies,	should	have	
benefited	from	the	insights	of	international-domestic	interactions	approach.	However,	to	the	
author’s	best	knowledge,	limited	studies	of	this	kind	have	been	done	in	the	existing	literature	
on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy. 148 	Perhaps	 the	 reason	 for	 this	 anomaly	 is	 that	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policy	is	seen	more	as	an	economic	policy	than	a	foreign	policy	in	academia.	As	
mentioned	before,	the	focus	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	has	been	to	measure	whether	and	to	
what	extent	the	RMB	is	undervalued,	but	the	economists	have	generated	inconclusive	results.	
Therefore,	the	research	gap	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	making	is	prominent,	and	political	
scientists	are	expected	to	fill	it	up.	It	is	not	uncommon	to	see	such	news	as	China’s	contest	
with	 the	US	on	 the	currency	 issue	and	China’s	 concerns	with	 the	negative	effects	of	RMB	
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appreciation	upon	its	export	sectors,	therefore	it	is	hard	to	argue	against	that	Chinese	leaders	
sit	at	the	juncture	of	the	international	system	and	the	state	when	making	exchange	rate	policy.	
One	 cannot	 fully	 understand	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 without	 reference	 to	
interactions	between	international	and	domestic	levels.	
	
2.2.5	Summary	and	discussions	
This	section	has	provided	a	critical	review	of	CPE	and	IPE	studies	on	exchange	rate	politics.	In	
broad	terms,	the	existing	theoretical	literature	on	exchange	rate	politics	can	be	divided	into	
four	main	approaches:	the	domestic	interests	approach,	the	domestic	institutions	approach,	
the	international	influences	approach	and	the	international-domestic	interactions	approach.	
Though	the	domestic	interests	and	domestic	institutions	approaches	within	the	CPE	literature	
help	 us	 to	 understand	 the	 various	 formation	 mechanisms	 of	 exchange	 rate	 policy,	 their	
explanatory	 utility	 remains	 circumscribed	 owing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 existing	 studies	 are	
western-centric	and	inapplicable	to	China’s	domestic	political	and	socio-economic	structures.	
Special	 consideration	 should	be	 given	 to	China’s	 political	 institutions	 characterized	by	 the	
party-state	system	and	the	policy	elites	and	economic	ministries	within	the	political	structure.	
Furthermore,	the	international	influences	approach	within	the	IPE	literature	suggests	that	the	
international	 dimension	 should	 be	 well	 incorporated	 into	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	
analysis.	The	international-domestic	 interactions	approach,	as	a	synthesized	perspective	of	
the	 CPE	 and	 IPE	 approaches,	 should	 have	 offered	more	 nuanced	 explanations	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	Nevertheless,	limited	studies	of	this	kind	have	been	done	and	
the	research	gap	is	expected	to	be	filled	up.	
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	 Additionally,	it	is	worth	pointing	out	that	the	delineation	of	the	CPE	and	IPE	literature,	
just	 like	 the	 Economics	 studies,	 on	 exchange	 rate	 politics	 is	 not	 exhaustive.	 For	 instance,	
Kettell	establishes	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	the	“Open	Marxist	approach”	that	views	
exchange	rate	policymaking	as:	
“a	 component	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 governing	 strategy	 that	 is	 made	 by	 the	 core	
executive	 with	 a	 view	 to	 containing	 class	 struggle,	 to	 providing	 favourable	
conditions	 for	 capital	 accumulation,	 and	 to	 ensuring	 a	 sufficient	 degree	 of	
governing	autonomy	for	the	pursuit	of	high	political	aims.”149	
More	importantly,	the	executive	makes	use	of	the	governing	strategy	of	“depoliticisation”	to:	
“ease	pressure	on	the	governing	authorities	by	fragmenting	and	redirecting	class	
dissatisfaction	over	economic	conditions	and	policymaking	away	from	the	state	
and	into	less	threatening	channels”150	
thereby	enhancing	credibility	for	key	economic	policy	decisions.	However,	Kettell	only	applies	
his	theoretical	framework	to	Britain’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	three	key	episodes	–	the	
return	to	the	gold	standard	in	1925,	membership	of	the	European	Exchange	Rate	Mechanism	
from	1990	to	1992,	and	the	possibility	of	joining	the	Single	European	Currency.151	He	does	not	
mention	 other	 country’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 and	 whether	 the	 Open	 Marxist	
approach	 is	 appropriate	 to	 explain	 China’s	 case.	 While	 the	 open	 Marxist	 depoliticized	
approach	may	well	have	 salience	 in	 the	contexts	of	other	political	economies,	 it	does	not	
seem	to	fit	with	the	aims	or	tools	of	the	Chinese	party-state	elite.	The	lack	of	independence	
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of	China’s	central	bank	should	be	emphasised	here.	As	discussed	in	detail	in	this	thesis,	the	
PBOC	is	not	a	genuinely	independent	institution	as	the	central	banks	in	the	US	and	European	
countries.	The	PBOC	is	under	the	guidance	and	supervision	of	the	State	Council.	While	there	
are	accounts	 that	 recognize	PBOC’s	 rising	authority	 in	China’s	party-state	 system,	 the	 fact	
remains	that	the	PBOC	operates	under	the	leadership	of	the	State	Council	and	PBOC’s	policies,	
including	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 without	 doubt,	 ultimately	 serve	 the	 goals	 of	 China’s	
macroeconomic	management.152	Therefore,	the	governing	strategy	of	“depoliticisation”	that	
emphasizes	giving	power	to	the	central	bank	and	enhancing	the	government’s	responsibility	
and	accountability	does	not	make	real	sense	in	China.	In	contrast,	the	Chinese	leadership	tries	
to	emphasize,	not	deny,	that	the	macroeconomic	management	is	under	the	Party’s	control,	
rather	than	handing	power	to	the	market.	As	Bell	and	Feng	argues,	
“The	party	elite	sees	the	financial	section	as	one	of	its	central	concerns	in	relation	
to	political	stability	and	economic	growth	and	is	therefore	an	extremely	sensitive	
area	over	which	the	Party	has	traditionally	been	reluctant	to	relinquish	power.”153	
As	a	result,	the	PBOC’s	institutional	rise	within	China’s	party-state	system,	at	best,	means	that	
the	Party	is	trying	to	promote	the	idea	of	a	meritocratic	and	skilled	state	bureaucracy	with	
different	skill	sets	in	different	agencies	performing	functional	tasks.	However,	the	thesis	will	
further	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 central	 bank	 independence	 is	 not	 visible	 in	 China’s	 political	
system,	 and	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 was	 a	 highly-politicised	 issue	 rather	 than	 a	
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governing	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation.	 Therefore,	 the	 use	 of	 Kettell’s	 Open	 Marxist	
depoliticized	approach	to	explain	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	is	questionable.154	
	 To	summarize,	the	above	examination	has	shown	that	the	existing	Economics	studies	
on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 are	 inconclusive	 and	 the	 existing	 CPE	 and	 IPE	 theoretical	
approaches	 have	 limitations	 when	 applied	 to	 China’s	 case.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 critical	
review	of	the	CPE	 literature	suggests	that	special	consideration	should	be	given	to	China’s	
political	 institutions	 characterized	 by	 the	 party-state	 system	 and	 the	 policy	 elites	 and	
economic	 ministries	 within	 the	 political	 structure.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 international	
influences	approach	within	the	IPE	literature	suggests	that	the	international	dimension	should	
be	well	incorporated	into	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	analysis.	Therefore,	one	of	the	main	
contributions	of	this	chapter	is	to	identify	the	research	gap	in	the	existing	studies	of	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	A	more	illuminating	analytical	framework	derived	from	revision	
and	synthesis	of	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	theoretical	approaches	will	offer	better	explanations	
of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	 next	 section	 will	 develop	 a	 three-level	 game	
framework,	 which	 forms	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 the	 subsequent	 chapters	 to	 empirically	
examine	the	international	political	economy	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	between	
2003	and	2013.	
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China	economic	imbalance.	For	example,	see	Zhaohui	Wang	(2017)	“The	economic	rise	of	China	as	rule-taker,	
rule-maker	or	rule-breaker?”,	Asian	Survey,	forthcoming;	Gyu	Cheol	Lee	(2014)	The	Political	Economy	of	the	
Sino-American	Imbalance,	University	of	York	PhD	thesis,	retrieved	from	
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/7132/7/Gyu%20Cheol%20Lee%20-PhD.pdf	(accessed	25/01/2017).	However,	
the	Open	Marxist	approach	sees	the	executive	as	a	monolithic	entity	with	a	single	set	of	policy	objectives.	The	
thesis	will	demonstrate	that	it	is	not	true	for	China’s	case.	It	is	more	useful	to	closely	examined	China’s	political	
structure	and	the	key	institutional	actors	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
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2.3	Theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	
This	section	develops	a	theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	based	
on	revision	and	synthesis	of	the	existing	CPE	and	IPE	approaches	to	exchange	rate	politics.	It	
will	 first	argue	that	two-level	game	framework	would	be	suitable	to	explain	exchange	rate	
policymaking.	 Then	more	 specific	 and	 endemic	 elements,	 such	 as	 external	 and	 domestic	
actors	with	different	preferences	and	interests	as	well	as	China’s	political	and	socio-economic	
structures,	 will	 be	 added	 into	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	 The	 analysis	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	
interactive	 dynamics	 of	 international	 politics	 and	 domestic	 politics	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	
China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	Finally	the	chapter	extends	Putnam’s	two-level	game	to	a	three-
level	game	and	develops	a	theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	The	
three-level	 game	 framework	 examines	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 negotiations	 with	 the	
international	 bargainers	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	 negotiations	 between	 central	
government’s	ministries	at	the	central	governmental	level	(level	II)	and	negotiations	with	the	
domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	III).	It	argues	that	the	
Chinese	 top	 leadership	 strives	 to	 reconcile	 international	 pressures,	 domestic	 ministerial	
interests	and	domestic	interest	groups	when	making	exchange	rate	policy.	
	
2.3.1	Two-level	game	in	comparison	to	neoclassical	realism	
As	mentioned	in	the	literature	review,	two-level	game	and	neoclassical	realism	are	the	two	
important	 theories	 in	 the	 international-domestic	 interactions	 approach	 to	 exchange	 rate	
politics.	In	this	part,	I	will	examine	these	two	theories	in	more	depth	and	argue	that	two-level	
game	is	more	applicable	to	explaining	exchange	rate	policymaking	than	neoclassical	realism.	
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	 The	most	salient	feature	of	neoclassical	realism	is	that	it	gives	analytical	priority	to	the	
international	structure,	which	ultimately	determines	the	range	of	acceptable	foreign	policies.	
As	Rose	explains	the	basic	tenet	of	neoclassical	realism:	
“the	scope	and	ambition	of	a	country’s	foreign	policy	is	driven	first	and	foremost	
by	 its	 place	 in	 the	 international	 system	and	 specifically	 by	 its	 relative	material	
power	capabilities	…	[T]he	impact	of	such	power	capabilities	on	foreign	policy	is	
indirect	 and	 complex,	 because	 systemic	 pressures	must	 be	 translated	 through	
intervening	variables	at	the	unit-level.”155	
	 It	could	be	seen	that,	according	to	neoclassical	realists,	the	structure	of	international	
system	determines	the	basic	contour	of	a	country’s	foreign	policy	and	the	domestic	factors	
play	 a	 secondary	 role	 (see	 Figure	 2.1).	 This	 approach	 is	 plausible	 in	 traditional	 IR	 studies,	
where	security	studies	dominate	in	foreign	policy	analysis	and	survival	is	seen	as	the	primary	
motivation	of	all	states	in	the	anarchic	international	system,	but	this	premise	is	questionable	
in	the	study	of	IPE	issues	with	strong	domestic	implications,	in	part	because	it	neglects	the	
fact	 that	 domestic	 survival	 of	 politicians	 could	 be	 as	 important	 to	 decision	making	 as	 the	
survival	of	the	state	itself	–	if	not	more	so.	This	qualification	seems	to	apply	in	the	case	of	
exchange	rate	policy	making.	
	
	
																																																						
155	Gideon	Rose	(1998)	“Neoclassical	realism	and	theories	of	foreign	policy”,	World	Politics,	Vol.51,	No.1,	p.146.	
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Figure	2.1:	Neoclassical	realist	framework	for	foreign	policy	making	
	 As	discussed,	upward	or	downward	shifts	in	a	country’s	exchange	rate	and	choices	of	
exchange	rate	regimes	create	both	domestic	and	international	winners	and	losers.	Since	the	
first	and	foremost	objective	for	politicians	is	to	stay	in	power156,	exchange	rate	policy	adopted	
by	any	top	leader	will	try	to	ensure	that	s/he	will	lead	her/his	nation	at	home	and	on	the	world	
stage.	On	the	one	hand,	for	most	leaders	making	exchange	rate	policies,	the	implications	for	
their	domestic	support	and	power	base	are	very	immediate	considerations,	so	their	exchange	
rate	policies	tend	to	be	framed	with	the	regime’s	continuity	–	and	often	their	personal	survival	
–	 in	mind.	On	the	other,	the	 international	 forces	prompting	a	policy	revision	are	relatively	
remote.	 Those	 disadvantaged	 in	 international	 trade	 are	 not	 very	 likely	 to	 form	 a	 serious	
retaliatory	 coalition	 or	 launch	 a	 tightly	 directed	 currency	 war	 against	 an	 exchange	 rate	
“offender”.	The	international	institutions	with	responsibility	in	this	arena,	notably	the	IMF,	
seem	 incapable	 of	 exercising	 firm	 surveillance	 over	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policies	 of	 its	
members.157	This	applies	to	not	only	small	countries	as	price	takers	in	the	global	economy	but	
also	large	countries	especially	like	China.158	
																																																						
156	Bruce	Bueno	de	Mesquita,	Alastair	Smith,	Randolph	M.	Siverson	and	James	D.	Morrow	(2005)	The	Logic	of	
Political	Survival,	Cambridge	MA:	The	MIT	Press;	also	see	Kerry	Brown	(2016)	“A	response	to	Francis	
Fukuyama’s	‘reflections	on	Chinese	governance’”,	Journal	of	Chinese	Governance,	Vol.1,	No.3,	pp.392-404.	
157	Michael	Mussa	(2008)	IMF	surveillance	over	China’s	exchange	rate	policy,	in	Morris	Goldstein	and	Nicholas	
Lardy	(ed.),	Debating	China’s	Exchange	Rate	Policy,	Washington:	Peterson	Institute	for	International	
Economics,	pp.279-335	
158	Henning	C.	Randall	(2006)	“The	exchange-rate	weapon	and	macroeconomic	conflict”,	in	David	M.	Andrews	
(ed.)	International	Monetary	Power,	Cornell	University	Press,	pp.117-138.	
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	 Therefore,	 the	 claim	 by	 neoclassical	 realists	 about	 the	 ultimate	 influence	 of	
international	 structure	 or	 external	 factors	 seems	 exaggerated	 or	 too	 determining	 for	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	Compared	with	neoclassical	 realism,	a	two-level	game	theory	
that	presumes	no	analytical	priority	is	more	suitable	to	explain	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
The	two-level	game	approach	begins	by	assuming	that	the	policy	decision	makers	are	typically	
trying	to	do	two	things,	that	is,	they	seek	to	manipulate	international	and	domestic	politics	
simultaneously.	Putnam	describes	the	two-level	game	in	the	following	way:	
“At	the	national	level,	domestic	groups	pursue	their	interests	by	pressuring	the	
government	 to	 adopt	 favorable	 policies,	 and	 politicians	 seek	 power	 by	
constructing	coalitions	among	those	groups.	At	the	international	 level,	national	
governments	 seek	 to	maximize	 their	own	ability	 to	 satisfy	domestic	pressures,	
while	minimizing	the	adverse	consequences	of	foreign	developments.	Neither	of	
the	 two	 games	 can	 be	 ignored	 by	 central	 decision-makers,	 so	 long	 as	 their	
countries	remain	interdependent,	yet	sovereign.”	159	
	 This	is	particularly	true	for	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking,	for	two	reasons.	First,	
China	is	a	largely	geopolitically	independent	state	that	has	a	greater	degree	of	freedom	in	the	
international	 system;	or	 at	 the	 very	 least,	more	autonomy	and	 freedom	 than	many	other	
states.	Second,	China’s	domestic	considerations	could	at	times	have	greater	roles	in	directing	
the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 especially	 when	 the	 international	
environment	 is	 relatively	stable.	Therefore,	 I	 suggest	 the	position	that	 the	two-level	game	
framework,	in	which	“central	decision-makers	strive	to	reconcile	domestic	and	international	
																																																						
159	Robert	D	Putnam	(1998)	“Diplomacy	and	domestic	politics:	the	logic	of	two-level	games”,	International	
organization,	Vol.42.	No.3,	p.434.	
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imperatives	simultaneously”160,	could	be	better	suited	to	explain	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
I	 make	 the	 following	 assumption	 in	 the	 two-level	 game	 framework	 for	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking:	in	theory,	though	the	structure	of	international	system	has	an	impact,	the	unit-
level	variables	play	important	influences	on	policy	decision	as	well	(see	Figure	2.2).	In	practice,	
this	theoretical	framework	calls	for	operationalization	to	define	the	variables	of	international	
structure	and	domestic	politics	into	measurable	factors	and	invites	further	empirical	studies	
to	determine	under	what	 circumstances	what	 factor(s)	mattered	 in	China’s	exchange	 rate	
policymaking.	
	
Figure	2.2:	Two-level	game	framework	for	exchange	rate	policymaking	
	
2.3.2	Conceptualizing	the	external	influences	on	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	
Based	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 the	 two-level	 game	 framework,	 this	 part	 will	 operationalize	 the	
variable	 of	 international	 structure	 by	 examining	 the	 international	 influences	 on	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	and	the	next	section	will	deal	with	the	domestic	variables.	
	 Influenced	by	the	mainstream	tenets	of	neoliberalism,	government	officials	of	the	US	
and	other	major	developed	economies	as	well	as	 the	 IMF,	generally	ascribe	the	economic	
																																																						
160	Ibid,	p.460.	
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imbalance	 to	 price	 distortion,	which	 is	misalignment	 of	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate.	Western	
politicians	assert	that	large	amounts	of	China’s	current	account	surplus	and	foreign	reserves	
indicate	the	RMB	exchange	rate	is	far	away	from	its	equilibrium	level.	Therefore,	officials	of	
Western	governments	have	consistently	pressured	China	to	appreciate	the	RMB	at	a	fast	pace	
and	to	move	as	soon	as	possible	to	greater	flexibility.	It	will	first	elaborate	the	reason	for	the	
US-centric	approach	to	examine	the	external	influences	and	then	specifically	explore	the	main	
actors	in	the	international	system	that	influence	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
	 Though	Japan	was	the	first	country	to	criticize	China’s	currency	undervaluation	in	2002,	
the	US	was	subsequently	the	prominent	force	pressuring	China	on	its	exchange	rate	policy.	
Yang,	Yin	and	He	described	the	background	of	the	Chinese	currency	debate:	
“The	current	bashing	of	China’s	currency	has	gone	beyond	the	United	States.	At	
the	early	stages	of	the	current	debate,	Japan’s	Vice	Minister	for	Finance	Haruhiko	
Kuroda	accused	China	of	exporting	deflation	to	 its	neighbors	 [in	2002].	 Japan’s	
Finance	 Minister	 Masajuro	 Shiokawa	 argued	 that	 ‘the	 fact	 that	 the	 (RMB’s)	
exchange	 rate	 is	 extremely	 low	 vis-á-vis	 the	U.S.	 dollar	may	 be	 a	 problem’	 [in	
August	 2003].	 Similarly,	 some	 European	 Union	 government	 officials	 also	 urge	
China	to	gradually	loosen	the	Chinese	RMB’s	peg	to	the	dollar.”161	
	 If	we	examine	China’s	bilateral	trade	data	with	the	US,	the	European	Union	(EU)	and	
Japan	(see	Figure	2.3),	it	is	not	difficult	to	understand	the	context.	China’s	trade	surplus	with	
Japan	 rose	 quickly	 from	 0.13	 billion	 dollars	 in	 2000	 to	 2.27	 billion	 dollars	 in	 2001,	which	
produced	Japan’s	criticism	of	China’s	currency	undervaluation	in	2002.	However,	the	situation	
																																																						
161	Jiawen	Yang,	Haiyan	Yin,	and	Hui	He	(2007)	“The	Chinese	currency:	background	and	the	current	debate”,	
International	Journal	of	Public	Administration,	Vol.30,	No.2,	p.127.	
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changed	considerably	after	2002,	as	China	ran	a	persistent	trade	deficit	with	Japan	from	2002	
to	2013.	In	contrast,	China’s	trade	surplus	with	the	US	and	the	EU	increased	dramatically	after	
2003.	Then	America	took	over	Japan’s	criticism	of	China’s	currency.	Though	attention	should	
also	be	paid	to	the	EU’s	pressure	on	China’s	exchange	rate	policy,	there	are	two	reasons	to	
focus	on	 the	US	 side.	First,	 the	US	was	 the	most	 important	 source	of	pressure	on	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policy,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 opinion	 of	 many	 Chinese	 researchers.	 For	 example,	
Changyong	Yang	from	the	NDRC	Research	Institute	of	Foreign	Economic	Relations	published	
a	research	article,	which	claimed	that	
“America	is	the	main	force	to	put	pressure	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate,	and	the	
Congress,	government	and	interest	groups	are	the	troika	of	the	pressure.”162	
Second,	many	Chinese	government	officials	and	analysts	held	the	opinion	that	the	EU	 just	
followed	the	US	(though	in	fact	that	was	not	always	the	case).	For	instance,	Jinbin	Wang,	a	
professor	of	Economics	from	Renmin	University	of	China,	commented	that	
“It	was	a	mistake	for	the	EU	to	follow	the	US	to	put	pressure	on	the	RMB,	and	the	
EU	and	the	US	should	not	use	their	economic	difficulties	as	an	excuse	to	demand	
China	bear	the	cost	of	creating	their	domestic	employment.”163	
Similarly,	Wenxing	Niu,	a	famous	Chinese	financial	commentator,	made	the	following	remarks:	
“The	Europe	echoed	the	US’s	criticism	on	China’s	currency,	as	the	Europe	and	the	
US	shared	the	common	interests.	Japan	did	not	follow	suit,	because	Japan	had	a	
																																																						
162	Changyong	Yang	(2012)	“Research	on	China’s	coping	strategy	for	pressure	on	the	RMB	[中国应对人民币汇
率压力的策略研究]”,	Macroeconomics	[宏观经济研究],	No.2,	pp.9-16.	
163	See	Shaohua	Sun,	“The	EU	to	follow	the	US	to	pressure	on	RMB	[欧盟跟风美国施压人民币]”,	Economic	
Information	Daily	[经济参考报],	20	September	2010,	retrieved	from	
http://dz.jjckb.cn/www/pages/webpage2009/html/2010-09/20/content_17388.htm?div=-1	(accessed	
11/02/2017).	
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large	trade	surplus	with	China,	but	Japan	would	go	along	with	the	US	in	other	ways,	
such	as	conducting	military	exercise	and	making	troubles	in	the	Diaoyu	Island.”164	
	 Therefore,	even	though	the	EU	did	not	necessarily	follow	the	US	in	practice,	it	is	widely	
perceived	 in	 China	 that	 the	 US	 was	 the	 most	 important	 source	 of	 pressure	 on	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policy	and	Europe	was	very	much	in	a	secondary	position.	The	fact	that	this	
thesis	is	rather	US-centric	is	therefore	a	consequence	of	the	way	that	the	relative	importance	
of	different	external	actors	has	been	perceived	within	Chinese	academic	and	policy	circles.	
	
Figure	2.3:	China’s	trade	with	the	US,	the	EU	and	Japan,	from	2000	to	2013	
Source:	IMF,	Direction	of	Trade	Statistics	Database 
	 First,	the	US	Congress	has	particular	concerns	with	China’s	undervalued	currency	and	
the	US	trade	deficit	with	China,	which	deteriorates	the	business	and	employment	of	the	US.	
																																																						
164	See	Wenxing	Niu,	“RMB	appreciation	as	the	biggest	political	issue	in	Europe	and	America	[人民币升值：欧
美当下最大政治]”,	Xinhua,	28	September	2010,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-
09/28/c_12614402.htm	(accessed	11/02/2017).	
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After	2003,	both	senators	and	representatives	proposed	that	the	US	should	press	China	to	
abandon	the	unfair	exchange	rate	policy	and	to	allow	a	substantial	appreciation	of	the	RMB,	
thereby	 generating	 a	 long	 list	 of	 bills	 and	 resolutions	 targeting	 on	 the	 RMB	 issue	 in	 the	
following	years	(see	Appendix	A).165	
	 Second,	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 the	 Treasury	 submits	 reports	 to	 Congress	 on	
International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies	on	a	semi-annual	basis.166	The	Treasury	
analyses	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policies	 of	 America’s	 major	 trading	 partners,	 and	 considers	
whether	countries	manipulate	exchange	rate	between	their	currency	and	the	US	dollar	for	
the	 purposes	 of	 preventing	 effective	 balance	 of	 payments	 adjustments	 or	 gaining	 unfair	
competitive	advantage	in	international	trade.	In	the	last	two	decades,	though	the	Treasury	
has	never	determined	China	as	a	currency	manipulator,	 it	expressed	 its	concerns	with	the	
issues	 of	 China’s	 trade	 imbalance	 and	 exchange	 rate	 in	 varying	 degrees	 during	 different	
periods	of	time.	Furthermore,	the	Treasury	Secretary	and	the	US	president	can	raise	the	RMB	
issue	and	impose	pressure	on	China	through	bilateral	and	multilateral	channels.	For	instance,	
the	Treasury	Secretary	invites	Chinese	Finance	Minister	and	Central	Bank	Governors	of	both	
countries	to	hold	the	US-China	Joint	Economic	Committee	every	year,	as	a	way	to	engage	with	
China	to	promote	the	adoption	of	a	market-based	exchange	rate.	
	 Finally,	 the	 IMF,	as	a	transnational	 liberal	regime,	undertakes	the	duty	to	“exercise	
firm	 surveillance	 over	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policies	 of	 members,	 and	 shall	 adopt	 specific	
																																																						
165	For	the	full	database	of	the	US	Congress	bills	and	resolutions,	see	Thomas	Library	of	Congress,	available	
from	http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html	(accessed	16/09/2016);	Also,	see	Gary	Hufbauer	and	Claire	
Brunel	(2008)	“The	US	Congress	and	the	Chinese	renminbi”,	in	Morris	Goldstein	and	Nicholas	Lardy	(ed.)	
Debating	China’s	Exchange	Rate	Policy,	Washington:	Peterson	Institute	for	International	Economics,	pp.219-
238.	
166	For	the	full	list	of	Reports	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies,	see	US	Department	of	the	
Treasury	Resource	Centre,	available	from	http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-
rate-policies/Pages/index.aspx	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
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principles	for	the	guidance	of	all	members	with	respect	to	those	policies”.167		The	IMF	also	
holds	bilateral	discussions	with	China	and	issues	a	staff	report	for	the	Article	IV	Consultation	
usually	every	year.168	Though	the	IMF	does	not	severely	criticize	the	RMB	undervaluation,	it	
has	always	emphasized	the	need	to	allow	greater	flexibility	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate.169		The	
IMF	has	also	argued	that	 the	price	distortion	 jeopardizes	China’s	own	economy	by	 relying	
unduly	 on	 large	 scale	 investment	 in	 export	manufacturing	while	 depressing	 the	 domestic	
consumer	market,	thereby	proposing	China	to	embrace	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility.170	
	 To	summarize,	the	US	government	(Congress,	Treasury	and	president)	and	the	IMF	are	
the	main	actors	in	the	international	system	in	the	theoretical	framework	of	China’s	exchange	
rate	policy	(see	Figure	2.4).	Considering	that	China’s	economic	relations	with	the	US	are	vital	
to	the	Chinese	economy	and	China’s	commitments	to	the	international	institutions	in	the	new	
millennium,	these	external	factors	are	supposed	to	exert	influences	on	China’s	exchange	rate	
policymaking.	
																																																						
167	IMF,	Articles	of	Agreement	of	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	retrieved	from	
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/#a4s3	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
168	For	the	full	list	of	the	Article	IV	Consultation	Reports	between	IMF	and	China,	available	from	
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/aiv/index.aspx?listby=c	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
169	See,	for	example,	People’s	Republic	of	China:	Article	IV	Consultation	Report	(2004,	2005,	2006),	retrieved	
from	http://www.imf.org/external/country/CHN/index.htm?type=9998#56	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
170	See,	for	example,	People’s	Republic	of	China:	IMF	Article	IV	Consultation	Report	(2006),	retrieved	from	
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06394.pdf	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
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Figure	2.4:	International	influences	on	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	
	
2.3.3	Opening	the	black	box:	the	domestic	sources	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	
Since	 the	western-centric	 CPE	 approaches	 have	 their	 limitations	when	 directly	 applied	 to	
explain	 China’s	 case,	 this	 part	 specifically	 examines	 the	 domestic	 institutions	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	and	explains	the	key	institutional	actors	as	well	as	interest	groups	
in	the	political	and	social-economic	structures.	
	 First,	I	will	sketch	the	political	structure	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	policymaking.	As	
mentioned	before,	the	power	structure	in	China’s	politics	is	characterized	by	one-party	rule	
and	the	party-state	system.171	The	CCP	is	embedded	into	the	leadership,	the	executive	and	
																																																						
171	See,	for	example,	Kenneth	Lieberthal	and	Michel	Oksenberg	(1988)	Policy	Making	in	China:	Leaders,	
Structures,	and	Processes,	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press;	Carol	Lee	Hamrin	(1992)	“The	Party	
leadership	system”,	in	Kenneth	Lieberthal	and	David	Lampton	(ed.)	Bureaucracy,	Politics,	and	Decision	Making	
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other	 wider	 institutional	 bodies	 in	 China’s	 political	 structure.	 According	 to	 the	 CCP	
Constitution,	 the	Central	Committee	 [中央委员会]	 is	 the	Party’s	supreme	decision-making	
body,	but	in	practice,	the	policy	decisions	of	the	Central	Committee	are	determined	by	the	
Politburo	[中央政治局],	especially	the	Politburo	Standing	Committee	(PSC)	[中央政治局常
务委员会]	with	a	significantly	smaller	number	of	the	Politburo	members.	Therefore,	the	PSC	
acts	as	the	de	facto	top	leadership	body,	making	key	decisions	in	all	major	policy	spheres.	The	
PSC	members	in	the	Hu-Wen	era	were	as	follows:	
	 	
																																																						
in	Post-Mao	China,	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	pp.95-124;	Shiping	Zheng	(1997)	Party	vs.	State	in	
Post-1949	China:	The	Institutional	Dilemma,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
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Table	2.2:	The	Fifteenth	Central	Committee	PSC	
Hu	Jintao	 CCP	general	secretary,	PRC	president	
Wen	Jiabao	 State	Council	premier	
Wu	Bangguo	[吴邦国]	 NPC	chairman	
Jia	Qinglin	[贾庆林]	
Chinese	 People’s	 Political	 Consultative	 Conference	 (CPPCC)	
chairman	
Zeng	Qinghong	[曾庆红]	 PRC	vice	president	
Huang	Ju	[黄菊]	 State	Council	vice	premier	
Wu	Guanzheng	[吴官正]	
Central	 Discipline	 Inspection	 Commission	 [中央纪律检查委员会]	
secretary	
Li	Changchun	[李长春]	
Central	Commission	for	Guiding	Cultural	and	Ethical	Progress	[中央
精神文明建设指导委员会]	secretary	
Luo	Gan	[罗干]	
Central	 Political	 and	 Legal	 Affairs	 Commission	 [中央政法委员会]	
secretary	
Table	2.3:	The	Sixteenth	Central	Committee	PSC	
Hu	Jintao	 CCP	general	secretary,	PRC	president	
Wen	Jiabao	 State	Council	premier	
Wu	Bangguo	 NPC	chairman	
Jia	Qinglin	 CPPCC	chairman	
Li	Changchun	
Central	 Commission	 for	 Guiding	 Cultural	 and	 Ethical	 Progress	
secretary	
Xi	Jinping	 PRC	vice	president	
Li	Keqiang	 State	Council	vice	premier		
He	Guoqiang	[贺国强]	 Central	Discipline	Inspection	Commission	secretary	
Zhou	Yongkang	[周永康]	 Central	Political	and	Legal	Affairs	Commission	secretary	
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	 The	 PSC’s	 decisions	 are	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 information	 and	 recommendations	
provided	by	a	number	of	research	and	advisory	bodies	called	Central	Leading	Groups	[中央
领导小组].172	The	 Central	 Leading	 Groups	 are	 “ad	 hoc	 supraministerial	 coordinating	 and	
consulting	bodies	formed	to	build	consensus	on	issues	that	cut	across	the	Party,	government	
and	military	 system	when	 the	 existing	 bureaucratic	 structure	 is	 unable	 to	 do	 so.”173	The	
corresponding	group	for	exchange	rate	policy	is	the	Central	Leading	Group	for	Finance	and	
Economy	(CLGFE)	[中央财经领导小组].	The	CLGFE,	led	by	either	the	CCP	General	Secretary	
or	the	Premier	(both	of	them	are	PSC	members),	is	actually	a	joint	organ	of	the	Politburo	and	
the	 State	 Council.	 The	 Politburo	 and	 the	 PSC	 normally	 rubber-stamp	 CFELG’s	 decisions	
because	the	senior	members	of	the	PSC	are	always	also	leaders	of	the	CFELG	and	the	State	
Council.	
	 During	the	period	from	2003	to	2013,	Hu	Jintao	 left	control	of	the	economy	to	the	
nation’s	premier,	Wen	Jiabao.	Wen	was	both	the	chair	of	CLGFE	and	the	premier	of	the	State	
Council.	The	key	decisions	of	financial	and	economic	policies	ultimately	rested	on	the	CLGFE,	
and	Wen	was	 intuitively	 the	 final	 decision	maker.	 However,	many	 observers	 and	 political	
analysts	have	suggested	that	Wen	was	not	as	dominant	in	the	bureaucracy	as	his	predecessor	
Zhu	 Rongji	 and	 that	 there	 was	 greater	 pluralization	 and	 institutionalization	 of	 economic	
policymaking	under	Wen.174	Both	the	CLGFE	and	the	State	Council	meetings	served	as	a	forum	
for	policy	debates	and	deliberations	among	the	top	ministerial	leaders.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
																																																						
172	Stephen	Bell	and	Hui	Feng	(2013)	The	Rise	of	the	People’s	Bank	of	China:	The	Politics	of	Institutional	Change,	
Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	p.49.	
173	Zheng	Yongnian	and	Chen	Gang	(2015)	“The	Chinese	Communist	Party:	an	institutional	perspective”,	in	
David	S.G.	Goodman	(ed.)	Handbook	of	the	Politics	of	China,	Edward	Elgar,	p.67.	
174	See,	for	example,	Andrew	Mertha	(2009)	“Fragmented	authoritarianism	2.0”:	Political	pluralization	in	the	
Chinese	policy	process,	The	China	Quarterly,	Vol.200,	pp.995-1012;	Jingtao	Yi	(2011)	The	political	economy	of	
China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	the	Hu-Wen	era,	China:	An	International	Journal,	Vol.9,	No.01,	pp.164-
177;	Heejin	Han	(2013)	China’s	policymaking	in	transition:	A	hydropower	development	case,	The	Journal	of	
Environment	&	Development,	Vol.22,	No.3,	pp.313-336.	
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State	Council	is	the	highest	executive	organ	in	China’s	political	structure.	The	State	Council	
supervises	and	coordinates	a	number	of	ministries	and	commissions.175	On	the	other	hand,	
members	of	CLGFE	typically	include	heads	of	key	ministries	in	the	State	Council,	particularly	
PBOC,	MOFCOM,	NDRC,	and	Ministry	of	Finance	(MOF).	Therefore,	the	Party	leaders	and	the	
top	bureaucrats	could	express	their	views	and	preferred	policies	in	the	CLGFE	and	the	State	
Council	meetings.	The	State	Council	meetings	are	more	frequent	than	the	CLGFE	meetings,	
and	their	functions	of	policy	debates	and	deliberations	overlap	from	time	to	time.	
	 With	regard	to	exchange	rate	policy,	the	final	key	decisions	are	made	by	Wen,	and	
sources	 of	 policy	 inputs	 for	 policy	 deliberations	 and	 decisions	 are	 usually	 from	 PBOC,	
MOFCOM,	 NDRC	 and	 MOF.	 The	 PBOC	 and	 the	 MOFCOM	 are	 the	 two	 most	 important	
ministries,	 as	 they	 have	 clear	 but	 competing	 preferences	 over	 exchange	 rate	 level	 and	
flexibility,	whereas	the	NDRC	and	the	MOF	do	not	have	as	clear	preferences.	I	will	elaborate	
the	four	ministries’	positions	on	exchange	rate	policy	in	more	detail	as	follows.	
	 The	PBOC	is	perceived	as	an	advocate	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	Though	the	PBOC	
makes	monetary	and	exchange	rate	policy	announcements,	it	is	not	a	genuinely	independent	
institution	as	the	central	banks	in	the	US	and	European	countries	are.	The	PBOC	is	under	the	
guidance	and	supervision	of	the	State	Council.	As	the	central	bank,	the	PBOC	has	the	main	
duty	 to	 maintain	 the	 steady	 price	 of	 the	 RMB.	 Therefore,	 the	 PBOC	 favours	 a	 relatively	
appreciated	RMB	 to	 curb	 imported	 inflation	and	more	exchange	 rate	 flexibility	 to	acquire	
more	monetary	policy	autonomy.	On	the	other	hand,	the	MOFCOM	is	an	executive	agency	of	
the	State	Council	with	the	main	duty	to	foster	China’s	international	economic	relations.	The	
																																																						
175	For	the	organizational	structure	of	the	State	Council,	see	State	Council	Organization	Chart	for	more	details,	
available	from	http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/03/content_281474985533579.htm	(accessed	
31/01/2017).	
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MOFCOM	 has	 become	 an	 opponent	 of	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 and	 represents	 the	
interests	of	those	who	have	a	vested	interest	in	a	depreciated	and	fixed	RMB	exchange	rate	
to	maintain	the	competitiveness	of	export	sectors.176	Both	of	these	two	ministries	have	their	
subordinate	 departments	 that	 conduct	 research	 and	 provide	 input	 for	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking,	including	the	State	Administration	of	Foreign	Exchange	(SAFE)	[国家外汇管理
局]	and	the	MPD	supervised	by	the	PBOC	as	well	as	the	Policy	Research	Department	(PRD)	
[政策研究室]	and	the	local	branches	supervised	by	the	MOFCOM.	
	 The	NDRC	is	one	of	the	most	 influential	ministries	within	the	State	Council.	NDRC’s	
primary	interest	in	exchange	rate	policy	is	predictability	of	the	economic	environment,	with	
a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	regime	potentially	complicating	that	predictability.	However,	
because	 the	 NDRC	 has	 such	 a	 broad	 mandate	 to	 coordinate	 economic	 and	 social	
development177,	 including	maintain	macroeconomic	stability	and	pushing	forward	strategic	
economic	restructuring,	the	NDRC	tends	to	take	policy	positions	that	are	closely	in	line	with	
the	consensus	of	China’s	top	leadership	as	a	whole.178	With	regard	to	MOF,	its	preference	on	
exchange	rate	reform	is	more	or	less	self-conflict.	On	the	one	hand,	the	MOF	does	not	favour	
RMB	 undervaluation,	 because	 the	 rising	 tax	 rebate	 with	 the	 surging	 export	 places	 heavy	
																																																						
176	There	is	no	denying	of	a	counter-argument	that	the	MOFCOM	is	charged	with	both	internal	and	external	
trade.	However,	the	MOFCOM	is	much	more	concerned	with	exports,	considering	the	importance	of	exports	to	
China’s	economy	and	the	importance	of	economic	growth	to	CCP’s	legitimacy	and	China’s	socio-economic	
stability.	There	are	also	studies	suggesting	that	exporters’	growing	leverage	in	the	central	government’s	policy-
making	process	secured	the	priority	and	favour	given	to	enhancing	China’s	export	competitiveness.	See,	for	
example,	Stephen	B.	Kaplan	(2006)	“The	political	obstacles	to	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	in	China”,	World	
Development,	Vol.34,	No.7,	pp.1182-1200;	Ho-fung	Hung	(2011)	“Global	crisis,	China,	and	the	strange	demise	
of	the	East	Asian	model”,	Swiss	Journal	of	Sociology,	Vol.37,	Iss.2,	pp.305-320;	Ho-fung	Hung	(2015)	The	China	
Boom:	Why	China	Will	Not	Rule	the	World,	Columbia:	Columbia	University	Press.	
177	NDRC,	Main	Functions	of	the	NDRC,	retrieved	from	http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
178	Each	year	at	the	National	People’s	Congress,	the	NDRC	presents	a	work	report	alongside	the	Premier’s	
government	work	report.	To	take	the	year	of	2005	for	example,	Ma	Kai	(the	NDRC	Chairman)	hewed	closely	to	
the	formulation	that	Wen	Jiabao	had	previously	institutionalized,	claiming	to	constantly	improve	the	RMB	
exchange	rate	formation	mechanism	and	keep	the	RMB	exchange	rate	stable	at	a	rational	and	balanced	level.	
The	NDRC	supported	PBOC’s	advocate	of	exchange	rate	reform,	but	in	the	meanwhile	it	repeated	MOFCOM’s	
stress	of	stable	exchange	rate.	
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burdens	on	it.	On	the	other	hand,	as	the	holder	of	US	Treasury	securities,	the	MOF	does	not	
favour	RMB	appreciation	that	will	lower	the	value	of	dollar-denominated	debts.	Furthermore,	
Liew	 and	 Wu	 mentioned	 that	 the	 MOF	 would	 like	 to	 reduce	 its	 loans	 to	 sub-national	
governments,	but	“appreciation	of	the	renminbi	will	very	likely	lower	the	chances	of	it	being	
successful”.179	The	reason	was	that	“renminbi	appreciation	lowers	prices	and	increases	real	
interest	 rates,	 and	 most	 of	 the	 poor	 countries	 struggling	 to	 repay	 MOF	 loans	 rely	 on	
agriculture,	which	will	be	affected	adversely	by	a	higher	renminbi.”180	
	 Therefore,	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	have	clear	but	competing	preferences	on	the	
RMB	exchange	rate	policy.	They	are	the	two	most	important	ministries	that	provide	policy	
inputs	for	CLGFE’s	exchange	rate	decision-making.	It	is	plausible	to	assume	that	the	relative	
power	 and	 bargaining	 game	 between	 the	 PBOC	 and	 the	MOFCOM	are	 expected	 to	 exert	
significant	 influences	 on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 Therefore,	 it	 would	 be	
instructive	to	compare	the	political	resources	of	these	two	institutional	actors,	such	as	their	
administrative	 rankings	 and	 representation	 in	 important	 decision-making	 bodies.	 Such	
comparisons	might	yield	suggestions	as	to	how	the	relative	political	clout	of	these	two	key	
ministries	could	influence	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	choice.	Empirical	studies	will	be	done	
in	the	next	few	chapters.	
	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 though	 the	political	 space	 for	 interest	 groups	 lobbying	 in	China	
remains	 controversial,	 as	 a	working	 hypothesis	 it	 is	 plausible	 to	 assume	 that	 their	 voices	
would	not	be	neglected	completely	in	the	process	of	exchange	rate	policy	making.	Firstly,	the	
symbiotic	 relationship	 between	 state-owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs)	 and	 government	 could	
																																																						
179	Leong	H.	Liew	and	Harry	X.	Wu	(2007)	The	Making	of	China’s	Exchange	Rate	Policy:	From	Plan	to	WTO	Entry,	
Edward	Elgar,	p.205.	
180	Ibid.	
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provide	 substantial	political	 resources	 for	SOEs	 to	 lobby	 for	 their	 favourite	policies.181	The	
formal	channels	of	interest	representation	and	informal	patronage	networks	enable	SOEs	to	
impose	 direct	 influences	 upon	 top-level	 policy	 deliberation	 and	 decision.	 For	 instance,	
Secondly,	industry	associations	and	private	firms,	could	communicate	their	preferences	to	the	
local	 governments	 or	 bureaucracies	 such	 as	 the	 local	 branches	 of	 MOFCOM	 to	 impose	
influences	on	exchange	 rate	policy.	Partly,	 the	 reason	 is	 that	 the	 lower-level	officials	may	
speak	on	behalf	of	these	interest	groups	because	their	political	careers	are	dependent	on	the	
success	 of	 their	 local	 economy,	 to	 which	 the	 local	 industries	 make	 a	 considerable	
contribution.	Perhaps	more	importantly,	given	the	importance	of	exports	to	China’s	economy	
and	the	dominance	of	urban-industrial	elites	from	coastal	regions182,	the	interests	and	voices	
of	the	local	enterprises	in	the	export-oriented	coastal	regions	could	not	be	neglected	in	the	
process	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	This	could	be	particularly	true	when	China’s	
export	sectors	faced	enormous	difficulties	in	the	year	of	2008.183	
	 To	summarize,	this	section	develops	an	endemic	theoretical	framework	to	open	the	
black	box	of	China’s	domestic	exchange	rate	politics	(see	Figure	2.5).	China’s	exchange	rate	
policy	is	determined	by	an	economic	policy	executive	(CLGFE),	comprised	of	the	heads	of	the	
Party	 (PSC)	and	the	Government	(State	Council).	Two	key	ministries	 (PBOC	and	MOFCOM)	
																																																						
181	This	is	particularly	true	for	those	SOE	heads	who	also	sit	in	the	Central	Committee.	Furthermore,	the	CCP	
issued	a	cadre	exchange	policy	that	encouraged	circulation	of	leaders	among	SOEs,	party	organizations	and	
government	departments	in	2006.	See	CCP	Central	Committee,	“Party	and	Government	Cadres	Exchange	
Regulations	[党政领导干部交流工作规定]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	6	August	2006,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/06/content_4926453.htm	(accessed	16/09/2016).	
182	Ho-fung	Hung	(2011)	“Global	crisis,	China,	and	the	strange	demise	of	the	East	Asian	model”,	Swiss	Journal	of	
Sociology,	Vol.37,	No.2,	p.310.	
183	For	instance,	China’s	textile	industry	was	hit	hard	by	the	RMB	appreciation	in	early	2008;	see	“Textile	
Industry	Faces	Imminent	Danger	[纺织业生存告急]”,	retrieved	from	
http://finance.sina.com.cn/blank/cjsd_fzy.shtml	(accessed	16/09/2016).	Furthermore,	the	subsequent	
empirical	study	shows	that	the	appeal	of	policy	rescue	by	the	textile	enterprises	and	trade	associations	
reached	the	MOFCOM	and	the	State	Council,	which	exerted	considerable	influence	on	the	exchange	rate	
policymaking	in	2008.	
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with	competing	interests	in	exchange	rate	level	and	flexibility	play	critical	roles	in	the	process	
of	 policy	 initiation	 and	 deliberation.	 Other	 domestic	 actors	 –	 including	 SOEs,	 industry	
associations,	 private	 firms,	 and	 some	 local	 governments	 –	 especially	 those	 in	 the	 coastal	
regions	could	also	exert	influences	in	the	process	of	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
	
Figure	2.5:	Domestic	sources	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	
	
2.3.4	 Extending	 the	 two-level	 game:	 three-level	 game	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	
Bringing	together	the	foregoing	analysis	of	both	the	external	and	domestic	sources	of	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking,	this	section	extends	Putnam’s	two-level	game	and	develops	a	
three-level	 framework	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	 three-level	 game	 sees	
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China’s	central	decision	makers	as	the	key	persons	(CLGFE)	uniting	international	and	domestic	
arenas.	In	the	three-level	game	framework,	China’s	central	decision	makers	strive	to	reconcile	
international	 pressures,	 domestic	ministerial	 interests	 and	domestic	 interest	 groups	when	
making	exchange	rate	policy.	More	specifically,	the	three-level	game	(see	Figure	2.6)	refers	
to	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 negotiations	with	 the	 international	 bargainers	 (mainly	 the	US	
government	and	 the	 IMF)	at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	negotiations	between	central	
government’s	ministries	(PBOC	and	MOFCOM)	at	the	central	governmental	level	(level	II)	and	
negotiations	with	the	domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	
III).	
	
Figure	2.6:	Three-level	game	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	
	 One	may	come	up	with	such	a	question:	why	it	is	a	three-level	game	and	not	a	two-
level	 one?	The	answer	 is	 that	 two-level	 game	 conceptualizes	 the	policymaking	process	 as	
negotiations	between	the	international	and	the	domestic,	whereas	a	three-level	game	further	
distinguishes	the	domestic	games,	assuming	that	the	difference	between	the	two	domestic	
games	is	so	great	that	it	is	better	conceived	of	as	two	separate	negotiations,	rather	than	two	
parts	of	 the	same	domestic	game.	This	assumption	 is	analytically	plausible,	but	cannot	be	
116	
	
taken	for	granted.	The	explanatory	power	of	the	adapted	three-level	game	framework	will	be	
empirically	applied	through	an	examination	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	between	
2003	and	2013.	
	 To	summarize,	Putnam’s	two-level	game	explores	how	policy	outcomes	are	affected	
by	the	entanglement	of	domestic	factors	and	international	affairs.	The	above	adapted	three-
level	game	framework	can	provide	more	accurate	and	contingent	explanations	 for	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking.	It,	however,	limits	generalizability	and	parsimony	of	the	resulting	
explanations.	It	remains	a	problem	as	to	whether	the	three-level	game	framework	could	be	
applied	to	explaining	exchange	rate	policies	of	other	countries.	The	research	scope	of	 this	
thesis	 is	 limited	 to	 China’s	 case,	 and	 the	 problem	 of	 theoretical	 generalizability	 will	 be	
addressed	 in	 future	 comparative	 studies.	 The	 thesis	 literally	 invites	 further	 revisions	 and	
explanations	of	 the	 three-level	game	framework	 to	explain	exchange	rate	policymaking	of	
other	countries.	
	
2.3.5	Concluding	remarks	
As	China’s	economic	influence	in	the	world	is	rapidly	increasing,	it	is	essential	to	understand	
how	 the	 international	 system	and	China’s	domestic	politics	 affect	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	
policymaking.	Neoclassical	realists	are	correct	to	emphasize	that	the	structure	of	international	
system	 conditions	 a	 country’s	 foreign	 policy	 choices,	 but	 it	 does	 not	mean	 that	 domestic	
considerations	 are	 unimportant	 or	 secondary,	 especially	 for	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	
Instead,	 the	 two-level	 game	 theory	 contends	 that	 at	 times	 domestic	 factors	 can	 exert	 a	
decisive	 influence	 on	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	 two-level	
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game	theory	with	no	analytical	priority	presumed	is	more	suitable	to	explain	exchange	rate	
policymaking.	
	 This	 section	 has	 further	 specifically	 examined	 the	 external	 factors	 and	 domestic	
sources	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	It	develops	a	three-level	game	framework	that	
sheds	 light	 on	 the	 dynamism	 and	 complexity	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	
three-level	 game	 refers	 to	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 negotiations	 with	 the	 international	
bargainers	 (mainly	 the	 US	 government	 and	 the	 IMF)	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	
negotiations	between	central	government’s	ministries	(PBOC	and	MOFCOM)	at	the	central	
governmental	 level	 (level	 II)	 and	negotiations	with	 the	domestic	 interest	 groups	and	 local	
governments	 at	 the	 local	 level	 (level	 III).	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 China’s	 top	 leadership	 strives	 to	
reconcile	 international	 bargainers,	 domestic	 ministerial	 interests	 and	 domestic	 interest	
groups	when	making	the	RMB	exchange	rate	policy.	
	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 the	 relative	 importance	of	 the	 three	 level	 games	 remains	 a	
puzzle	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	which	needs	 to	be	 further	examined	 in	 the	empirical	
study.	In	the	following	chapters	the	three-level	game	framework	will	be	applied	empirically	
through	 an	 examination	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 between	 2003	 and	 2013.	
Chapter	3	will	explore	the	initiation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	in	2005;	Chapter	4	will	
analyse	 the	 subsequent	 development	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 from	 2005	 to	 2007;	
Chapter	 5	 will	 mainly	 investigate	 the	 interest	 group	 politics	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	between	2008	and	2010;	and	Chapter	6	will	analyse	the	resumption	of	RMB	
exchange	 rate	 reform	 after	 June	 2010.	 The	 empirical	 studies	 will	 present	 more	 nuanced	
explanations	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	and	shed	light	on	the	relative	importance	
of	the	three	level	games.	 	
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Chapter	3	The	RMB	Depeg	from	the	US	Dollar,	2003-2005	
	
Based	 on	 the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 developed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 this	 chapter	 will	
empirically	examine	the	initiation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	in	2005.	It	shows	how	the	
international	 factors	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	
from	2003	to	2005	and	explains	how	China’s	domestic	politics	determined	the	pathway	of	the	
exchange	rate	reform.	
	 More	specifically,	 the	US	government	raised	concerns	with	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
issue	after	September	2003	and	the	international	criticism	and	pressure	gained	substantial	
momentum	in	2005.	The	growing	external	pressure	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	issue	forced	
China’s	leaders	to	put	exchange	rate	reform	on	task	list	in	2005.	The	level	I	game	played	the	
important	 role	 of	 agenda-setting,	 but,	 more	 importantly,	 the	 level	 II	 game	 produced	 a	
compromise	 between	 the	 PBOC	 and	 the	 MOFCOM.	 Despite	 PBOC’s	 active	 advocate	 for	
exchange	rate	reform,	Chinese	domestic	opponents	of	exchange	rate	reform,	primarily	the	
more	political	powerful	MOFCOM,	limited	the	scope	of	reform,	including	the	size	of	the	initial	
appreciation	 and	 the	 speed	 of	 subsequent	 appreciation	 following	 the	 July	 2005	
announcement.	
	 The	 empirical	 study	 supports	 the	 central	 argument	 that	 China’s	 central	 decision	
makers	were	at	the	nexus	of	international	and	domestic	politics	and	reconciled	international	
pressure	and	domestic	bargainers	when	making	the	exchange	rate	policy	decision	in	2005.	
The	chapter	will	first	discuss	the	external	influences	and	then	examine	PBOC’s	and	MOFCOM’s	
respective	positions	in	the	exchange	rate	reform.	The	level	I	game	and	level	II	game	will	be	
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combined	to	explain	the	Chinese	leadership’s	decision	of	exchange	rate	reform	policy	in	July	
2005.	
	
3.1	The	emergence	of	Congress	pressure	in	2003	
Before	examining	the	emergence	of	Congress	pressure	on	the	RMB	issue	in	2003,	the	section	
begins	by	introducing	some	background	to	China’s	exchange	rate	system	and	international	
trade	 relations	 from	 1994	 to	 2003.	 China	 abandoned	 the	 dual	 exchange	 rate	 system	 and	
unified	 the	 RMB’s	 official	 and	 swap	 market	 rates	 to	 a	 single	 official	 rate	 in	 1994.	 China	
adopted	a	de	facto	 fixed	exchange	rate	regime184	and	kept	the	RMB	closely	pegged	to	the	
dollar	at	the	rate	of	8.28	RMB	per	dollar	from	1995.	During	the	1997-98	Asian	Financial	Crisis,	
China	 stuck	 to	 the	promise	of	 non-devaluation	by	 keeping	 the	RMB	 stable	 and	won	wide	
praise	in	the	international	community.	After	that,	the	nominal	value	of	the	RMB	vis-à-vis	the	
dollar	fluctuated	in	a	very	narrow	range.	China’s	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	over	the	second	
half	of	the	1990s	and	into	the	early	part	of	the	next	decade	seemed	no	problem.	However,	
the	situation	changed	dramatically	after	2002.	
	 The	year	2003	marked	a	turning	point	in	both	China’s	position	in	the	global	trade	and	
accelerating	 accumulation	 of	 international	 reserves.	 China’s	 trade	 and	 current	 account	
surpluses	 rose	 rapidly	 from	 2003,	 as	 did	 its	 bilateral	 trade	 surplus	 with	 the	 US.	 China’s	
international	reserves	continued	to	increase	in	the	2000s	and	the	growth	also	sped	up	after	
																																																						
184	In	paper	China	announced	to	adopt	a	managed	floating	exchange	rate	regime	based	on	supply	and	demand	
of	foreign	exchange	market	on	1	January	1994,	but	in	practice	China	tightly	managed	RMB’s	peg	to	the	dollar.	
See	“Evolution	and	China’s	exchange	rate	regime	[我国汇率制度的演变]”,	18	August	2005,	Xinhua	News	
Agency,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/banyt/2005-05/18/content_2970176.htm	(accessed	
17/09/2016);	Morris	Goldstein	and	Nicholas	R.	Lardy	(2009)	The	Future	of	China’s	Exchange	Rate	Policy,	
Washington	DC,	p.6.	
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2003.	Furthermore,	it	was	around	2003	when	a	large	number	of	manufacturing	jobs	began	to	
be	 lost	 in	 the	US	and	China’s	exchange	 rate	policy	became	subject	 to	 sustained	American	
pressure.	 American	 labour	 unions	 and	manufacturers	 contended	 China’s	 artificially	 cheap	
exports	hurt	US	workers	and	businesses	and	waged	the	battle	against	China’s	exchange	rate	
policy.185	As	a	result,	the	fourth	quarter	of	2003	witnessed	the	sudden	emergence	of	bills	and	
resolutions	in	the	US	Congress	targeting	China’s	unfair	trade	practices	associated	with	RMB	
undervaluation.	
	 On	5	September	2003,	Senator	Charles	Schumer	introduced	in	the	Senate	the	first	bill	
to	address	RMB	manipulation:	S.1586	“To	authorize	appropriate	action	 if	 the	negotiations	
with	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	 regarding	China’s	undervalued	 currency	and	 currency	
manipulation	are	not	successful”.186	The	bill	claimed	that	the	RMB	was	artificially	pegged	at	a	
significantly	undervalued	rate	to	the	dollar,	which	was	estimated	to	be	between	15	and	40	
percent	or	an	average	of	27.5	percent.	The	undervalued	RMB	made	American	products	more	
expensive	 for	 Chinese	 consumers	 and	 Chinese	 product	 cheaper	 for	 American	 consumers,	
which	gave	rise	 to	 the	US	trade	deficits	with	China.	The	bill	 further	asserted	that	“China’s	
undervalued	currency	and	the	United	States	trade	deficit	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	
is	 contributing	 to	 significant	 United	 States	 job	 losses	 and	 harming	 United	 States	
																																																						
185	See	for	example,	Gary	Clyde	Hufbauer	and	Yee	Wong	(2004)	“China	bashing	2004”,	International	Economics	
Policy	Briefs	No.	PB04-5,	retrieved	from	http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb04-5.pdf	(accessed	
17/09/2016);	Robert	E.	Scott	(2010)	“Unfair	China	trade	costs	local	jobs”,	Economic	Policy	Institute,	retrieved	
from	http://www.epi.org/publication/bp260/	(accessed	17/09/2016);	Robert	E.	Scott	(2011)	“Growing	US	
trade	deficit	with	China	cost	2.8	million	jobs	between	2001	and	2010”,	Economic	Policy	Institute,	retrieved	
from	http://www.epi.org/publication/growing-trade-deficit-china-cost-2-8-million/	(accessed	17/09/2016);	
Robert	E.	Scott	(2012)	“The	China	toll:	growing	US	trade	deficit	with	China	cost	more	than	2.7	million	jobs	
between	2001	and	2011,	with	job	losses	in	every	state”,	Economic	Policy	Institute,	retrieved	from	
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp345-china-growing-trade-deficit-cost/	(accessed	17/09/2016).	
186	The	US	Congress,	“S.1586:	To	authorize	appropriate	action	if	the	negotiations	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	
China	regarding	China’s	undervalued	currency	and	currency	manipulation	are	not	successful”,	5	September	
2003,	retrieved	from	https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/s1586/BILLS-108s1586is.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016).	
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businesses.” 187 	Considering	 Chinese	 government’s	 intervention	 in	 the	 foreign	 exchange	
market	 to	 maintain	 the	 undervalued	 RMB,	 the	 bill	 accused	 that	 China	 had	 violated	 the	
principles	of	WTO	as	a	member	since	2001.	Based	on	these	findings,	the	bill	requested	that	
the	President	make	a	certification	to	the	Congress	that	China	would	no	longer	manipulate	its	
undervalued	 currency	 to	 gain	 an	unfair	 competitive	 advantage	 in	 international	 trade,	 and	
authorized	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	“begin	negotiations	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	
China	to	ensure	that	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	adopts	a	process	that	leads	to	a	market-
based	 system	of	 currency	valuation.”188	An	 identical	bill	H.	R.	3364	was	also	 subsequently	
introduced	by	Representative	Sue	Wilkins	Myrick	on	21	October	2003.189	
	 Just	three	days	later,	on	8	September,	Senator	Joseph	Lieberman	introduced	S.	1592	
Fair	Currency	Enforcement	Act	of	2003	“to	require	negotiation	and	appropriate	action	with	
respect	 to	certain	countries	 that	engage	 in	currency	manipulation”.190	The	bill	exemplified	
China,	 Japan,	 South	 Korea	 and	 Taiwan	 as	 currency	 manipulators	 and	 highlighted	 China’s	
particular	 aggressive	 intervention	 in	 the	 foreign	 exchange	 market.	 The	 bill	 required	 the	
Treasury	 to	 collaborate	 with	 the	 IMF	 to	 determine	 whether	 any	 Asian	 country	 was	
manipulating	 its	 exchange	 rate	 to	 prevent	 effective	 balance	 of	 payment	 adjustment.	 Two	
similar	bills,	H.	CON.	RES.	285	and	H.	R.	3269,	were	 introduced	by	Representatives	Donald	
Manzullo	and	John	Dingell	on	17	September	and	8	October	respectively.191	
																																																						
187	Ibid,	p.2.	
188	Ibid,	pp.4-5.	
189	The	US	Congress,	“H.	R.	3364:	To	authorize	appropriate	action	if	the	negotiations	with	the	People’s	Republic	
of	China	regarding	China’s	undervalued	currency	and	currency	manipulation	are	not	successful”,	21	October	
2003,	retrieved	from	https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/hr3364/BILLS-108hr3364ih.pdf	(accessed	
17/09/2016).	
190	The	US	Congress,	“S.	1592	Fair	Currency	Enforcement	Act	of	2003:	To	require	negotiation	and	appropriate	
action	with	respect	to	certain	countries	that	engage	in	currency	manipulation”,	8	September	2003,	retrieved	
from	http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-108s1592is/pdf/BILLS-108s1592is.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016).	
191	The	US	Congress,	“H.	CON.	RES.	285:	Expressing	the	concern	of	the	Congress	regarding	the	detrimental	
impact	on	the	United	States	economy	of	the	manipulation	by	foreign	governments	of	their	currencies”,	17	
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	 On	10	September,	Representative	Phil	English	followed	closely	to	introduce	H.	R.	3058	
Currency	Harmonization	Initiative	through	Neutralizing	Action	Act	of	2003	that	required	the	
Treasury	 to	 submit	a	 report	 that	analysed	and	computed	 the	 rate	of	RMB’s	misalignment	
against	 the	 dollar.192	In	 particular,	 the	 bill	 included	 a	 strict	 clause	 that	 the	 Treasury	 shall	
“impose	on	all	products	of	China	that	enter	the	customs	territory	of	United	States,	in	addition	
to	any	duty	that	otherwise	applies,	a	tariff	equal	to	the	applicable	percentage	of	the	appraised	
value	of	the	product	at	the	time	of	entry”	to	offset	China’s	currency	undervaluation.193	An	
identical	bill	S.1758	was	introduced	by	Senator	George	Voinovich	on	20	October	2003.	
	 In	addition	to	the	above	accusations	of	currency	undervaluation	and	manipulation,	
three	 bills	 in	 2003,	 S.	 RES.	 219,	 H.	 RES.	 414	 and	 S.	 RES.	 262,	 further	 urged	 the	 Treasury	
Secretary	 to	press	China	 to	move	quickly	 to	a	market-based	exchange	 rate	 regime,	either	
bilaterally	or	through	the	IMF.194	To	summarize,	there	were	in	total	ten	Congress	bills	(see	
Appendix	A)	in	2003	to	target	the	RMB	issue.	The	Congress	concern	imposed	unprecedented	
																																																						
September	2003,	retrieved	from	http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-108hconres285ih/pdf/BILLS-
108hconres285ih.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016);	The	US	Congress,	“H.	R.	3269:	Expressing	the	concern	of	the	
Congress	regarding	the	detrimental	impact	on	the	United	States	economy	of	the	manipulation	by	foreign	
governments	of	their	currencies”,	8	October	2003,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/hr3269/BILLS-108hr3269ih.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016).	
192	The	US	Congress,	“H.	R.	3058	Currency	Harmonization	Initiative	through	Neutralizing	Action	Act	of	2003:	To	
require	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	analyze	and	report	on	the	exchange	rate	policies	of	the	People’s	
Republic	of	China,	and	to	require	that	additional	tariffs	be	imposed	on	products	of	that	country	on	the	basis	of	
the	rate	of	manipulation	by	that	country	of	the	rate	of	exchange	between	the	currency	of	that	country	and	the	
United	States	dollar”,	10	September	2003,	retrieved	from	https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/hr3058/BILLS-
108hr3058ih.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016).	
193	Ibid,	pp.6-7.	
194	The	US	Congress,	“S.	RES.	219:	To	encourage	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	to	establish	a	market-based	
valuation	of	the	yuan	and	to	fulfill	its	commitments	under	international	trade	agreements”,	9	September	2003,	
retrieved	from	https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/sres219/BILLS-108sres219ats.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016);	
The	US	Congress,	“H.	RES.	414:	To	encourage	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	to	fulfill	its	commitments	under	
international	trade	agreements,	support	the	United	States	manufacturing	sector,	and	establish	monetary	and	
financial	market	reforms”,	28	October	2003,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/hres414/BILLS-108hres414eh.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016);	The	US	
Congress,	“S.	RES.	262:	To	encourage	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	initiate	expedited	negotiations	with	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China	on	establishing	a	market-based	currency	valuation	and	to	fulfill	its	commitments	
under	international	trade	agreements”,	6	November	2003,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/108/bills/sres262/BILLS-108sres262is.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016).	
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pressure	on	the	US	administration	to	engage	with	the	Chinese	authorities	to	address	the	issue,	
which	will	be	elaborated	in	more	detail	as	follows.	
	
3.2	The	US	administration’s	engagements	with	China,	2003-2004	
Before	 2003,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 regime	was	 not	 a	 core	 issue	 in	 American	 executives’	
speeches	and	meetings	with	Chinese	leaders.	However,	growing	concern	from	the	Congress	
over	the	American	manufacturing	unemployment	associated	with	undervalued	RMB	imposed	
enormous	 pressure	 on	 the	 US	 Administration	 to	 take	 action	 after	 2003.	 The	 Treasury’s	
Reports	 to	 Congress	 on	 International	 Economic	 and	 Exchange	 Rate	 Policies	 could	 be	 a	
convincing	 illustration	 of	 the	 dramatic	 change	 of	 the	 US	 government’s	 stances	 towards	
China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	Under	the	Omnibus	Trade	and	Competitiveness	Act	of	1988,	the	
Treasury	is	required	to	submit	Reports	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	
Rate	Policies	on	a	semi-annual	basis.195	The	Treasury	analyses	the	exchange	rate	policies	of	
America’s	major	trading	partners,	and	consider	whether	countries	manipulate	the	exchange	
rate	between	their	currency	and	the	US	dollar	for	purposes	of	preventing	effective	balance	of	
payments	adjustments	or	gaining	unfair	competitive	advantage	in	international	trade.	
	 Before	 September	 2003,	 the	 Treasury	 did	 not	 consider	 China’s	 dollar-pegged	
exchange	rate	regime	as	a	problem	to	the	US-China	bilateral	trade	relation.	All	the	Reports	in	
the	1990s	and	early	2000s	briefly	summarized	China’s	economic	growth,	international	trade,	
fixed	exchange	rate	and	capital	controls	in	no	more	than	three	paragraphs.	With	regard	to	
																																																						
195	The	US	Congress,	“H.R.4848:	Omnibus	Trade	and	Competitiveness	Act	of	1988”,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/bill/100th-congress/house-bill/4848	(accessed	17/09/2016).	
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the	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate,	the	Reports	generally	used	descriptive	words	or	statements	
and	offered	no	comments.	For	example,	the	May	2003	Report	described	China’s	exchange	
rate	regime	and	capital	account	in	the	following	way:	“China	maintains	a	de	facto	currency	
peg	 to	 the	dollar,	which	 it	 has	 kept	within	 a	 tight	band	 since	1995.	…	China	 continues	 to	
maintain	wide-ranging	controls	on	both	capital	outflows	and	inflows.”196	The	Reports	neither	
appreciated	 nor	 depreciated	 China’s	 dollar-pegged	 exchange	 rate	 and	 capital	 control.	
Therefore,	 the	 Reports	 rarely	 provided	 policy	 recommendations	 or	 imposed	 pressure	 on	
China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	The	only	anomaly	was	probably	the	June	2011	Report,	in	which	
“Treasury	 officials	 urged	 China	 to	 move,	 over	 time,	 to	 a	 more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	
regime”.197 	Yet	 such	 pressure	 disappeared	 in	 the	 subsequent	 Reports	 before	 September	
2003.	
	 In	 response	 to	 the	 emerging	 Congress	 bills	 on	 the	 RMB	 undervaluation	 and	
manipulation	in	the	second	half	of	2003,	Treasury’s	October	2003	Report	marked	a	difference	
by	dedicating	six	paragraphs	(around	one	A4	page)	to	China	unprecedentedly.	It	was	the	first	
time	that	the	Report	made	the	explicit	statement	that	the	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	policy	
was	“not	appropriate	for	a	major	economy	like	China	and	should	be	changed.”198	The	Report	
suggested	that	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	would	not	only	“allow	China	greater	scope	to	
																																																						
196	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	
Policies”,	May	2003,	retrieved	from	http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Treasury_ReportToCongressOnInternationalEconomicAndExchangeRatePolicies-
2002H2_2003May06.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016),	pp.4-5.	
197	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	
Policies”,	June	2001,	retrieved	from	https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Treasury_ReportToCongressOnInternationalEconomicAndExchangeRatePolicies-
2000H2_2001Jun22.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016),	pp.14.	
198	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies,	
October	2003”,	retrieved	from	http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Treasury_ReportToCongressOnInternationalEconomicAndExchangeRatePolicies-
2003H1_2003Oct%2030.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016),	p.7.	
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maintain	a	low-inflation	monetary	policy”	but	also	“improve	the	allocation	of	resources	and	
the	quality	of	financial	intermediation	in	the	Chinese	economy.”199	
	 Since	 then,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 has	 been	 the	main	 concern	 in	 Treasury’s	
Reports.	The	two	Reports	in	April	and	December	2004	dedicated	around	ten	paragraphs	(no	
less	than	one	A4	page	and	a	half)	to	China.	Both	Reports	reiterated	the	fact	that	China’s	fixed	
exchange	rate	policy	was	no	longer	appropriate	and	proposed	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	
based	on	market	mechanisms,	while	they	recognised	that	the	exchange	rate	reform	could	not	
be	expected	to	happen	overnight	and	China	needed	time	and	steps	to	lay	the	groundwork.200	
Accordingly,	 the	 Treasury’s	 Reports	 did	 not	 brand	 China	 as	 a	 currency	 manipulator	 as	
suggested	by	the	Congress	bills.	It	could	be	seen	that	the	rhetoric	of	Treasury’s	Reports	on	
China’s	exchange	rate	policy	was	much	less	hostile	and	more	advisory	than	that	of	Congress	
bills.	
	 After	September	2003,	the	Treasury	actively	engaged	with	the	Chinese	leadership	to	
hasten	and	facilitate	the	move	to	a	flexible	market-based	exchange	rate	regime.	Secretary	
Snow	 travelled	 to	 China	 for	 discussions	 with	 senior	 Chinese	 officials	 on	 financial	 issues	
including	exchange	rate	policy	in	September	2003.	He	described	the	US-China	trade	relation	
as	win-win,	which	was	completely	different	from	the	Congress’s	zero-sum	game	logic:	
																																																						
199	Ibid,	p.7.	
200	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	
Policies”,	April	2004,	retrieved	from	http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Treasury_ReportToCongressOnInternationalEconomicAndExchangeRatePolicies-
2003H2_2004%20Apr%2015.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016),	pp.10-11;	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	
Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies”,	December	2004,	retrieved	from	
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/Treasury_ReportToCongressOnInternationalEconomicAndExchangeRatePolicies-
2004H1_2004%20Dec%203.pdf	(accessed	17/09/2016),	pp.9-11.	
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“Our	trade	with	you	makes	your	economy	stronger.	Your	trade	with	us	makes	our	
economy	stronger.	As	our	economies	are	stronger,	benefits	are	extended	to	the	
rest	 of	 our	 trading	 partners.	 So	 just	 as	 China	 benefits	 from	 our	 market,	 U.S.	
businesses	and	consumers	should	benefit	from	Chinas	growth.”201	
	 Snow	expressed	the	firm	belief	that	exchange	rate	flexibility	was	good	for	both	China	
and	 the	US	as	well	as	 the	 regional	and	global	 trading	partners.	However,	Snow’s	pressure	
remained	 rather	gentle.	When	explicitly	asked	whether	 the	RMB	was	undervalued	and	 its	
relationship	with	American	manufacturing	 job	 loss,	 Snow	avoided	answering	 the	question	
directly	and	vaguely	responded	that	“the	answer	is	to	place	your	confidence	in	markets.”202	
When	asked	about	the	timetable	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform,	Snow	cautiously	stated	
that	 the	 objective	 of	 China’s	 commitment	 to	 a	 more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	 was	 more	
important	than	the	timetable:	
“I	don’t	 think	 it’s	helpful	 for	us	 to	 try	 to	 talk	 about	a	 timetable.	 I	 do	 think	 it’s	
helpful	 though	to	see	that	reaffirmation	of	 the	policy	direction,	and	to	see	the	
progress	that’s	being	made	in	the	commitment.”203	
	 As	mentioned	in	the	Treasury’s	Reports,	the	Treasury	recognized	that	China	took	time	
and	steps	to	move	to	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	regime.	Snow	acknowledged	that	China	
was	taking	concrete	steps	to	modernize	its	financial	infrastructure	with	the	goal	of	achieving	
a	flexible	currency	in	his	statement	on	the	trade	relationship	between	the	US	and	China	on	
28	April	2004.204	Based	on	this	understanding,	Snow	publicly	opposed	the	retaliatory	tariffs	in	
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the	RMB-related	bills	introduced	in	the	Congress.	Snow	maintained	that	“the	most	effective	
way	at	this	time	to	achieve	the	goal	of	a	flexible,	market-based	exchange	rate	in	China	is	to	
maintain	the	persistent	engagement	we	have	established	rather	than	through	a	trade	petition.	
Economic	isolationism	does	not	work	and	it’s	a	path	we	will	not	follow.”205	
	 In	 practice,	 the	 Treasury	 also	 worked	 with	 China	 to	 identify	 and	 overcome	 the	
impediments	to	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility.	The	Treasury	appointed	a	senior	financial	
expert	 to	 serve	 as	 Secretary	 Snow’s	 emissary	 in	 Beijing. 206 	The	 role	 of	 the	 financial	
ambassador	was	to	ensure	close	communications	on	exchange	rate	and	other	financial	issues	
between	Beijing	and	Washington.	Moreover,	the	Treasury	launched	the	technical	cooperation	
programme	and	held	three	sessions	with	Chinese	officials	in	2004.	The	meetings	dealt	with	
the	creation	of	market	mechanisms	necessary	for	a	flexible	exchange	rate	regime,	including	
but	 not	 limited	 to	 banking	 supervision,	 development	 of	 financial	 instruments	 and	 foreign	
reserve	management.207	
	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 US	 president,	 one	 can	 identify	 a	 similar	 trend.	 No	mention	 of	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	made	 in	 speeches	 or	 press	 briefings	 before	 September	
2003.208	From	September	2003	onwards,	President	Bush	started	to	frequently	raise	the	RMB	
issue	in	a	similar	way	to	Secretary	Snow.	He	stressed	the	desirability	of	flexible	exchange	rates	
but	 said	 little	 to	 explicitly	 criticize	 Beijing’s	 currency	 manipulation	 and	 unwillingness	 of	
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revaluation.	 The	 consistent	 objective	 of	 the	 Bush	 administration	 was	 to	 maintain	
engagements	with	China,	rather	than	to	forcibly	pressure	China,	to	push	forward	exchange	
rate	reform.	
	 Besides	the	US	government,	the	IMF	could	also	exert	influences	on	China’s	exchange	
rate	policy,	as	one	of	IMF’s	duties	is	to	“oversee	the	international	monetary	system	in	order	
to	ensure	its	effective	operation”	and	to	“oversee	the	compliance	of	each	member	with	its	
obligations”.209	In	the	2004	Article	IV	Consultation	Report,	the	IMF	staff	held	the	view	that	it	
was	difficult	to	find	persuasive	evidence	that	the	RMB	was	substantially	undervalued.	They	
emphasized	that	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	would	enhance	China’s	ability	to	pursue	an	
independent	monetary	policy	and	adjust	to	shocks.	However,	they	also	realized	that	Chinese	
authorities	 faced	 a	 dilemma	 of	 exchange	 rate	 reform:	 a	 small	 initial	 appreciation	 could	
exacerbate	the	speculative	capital	inflows,	while	a	larger	initial	move	would	probably	have	a	
negative	impact	on	employment.210	Therefore,	the	IMF’s	stance	toward	China’s	exchange	rate	
remained	rather	cautious	and	prudent	until	2004.	
	 In	 summary,	 the	 surge	 of	 US	 trade	 deficit	 with	 China	 in	 2003	 and	 the	 rise	 of	
unemployment	in	the	US	manufacturing	sector	caused	considerable	concern	in	the	US	over	
the	RMB	exchange	rate,	which	was	considered	to	give	an	unfair	trade	advantage	to	China.	
From	 then	 on,	 Congressmen	 introduced	 bills	 against	 China’s	 currency	 regime	 in	 the	 US	
Congress.	They	called	 for	substantive	RMB	revaluation	 in	 the	short	 run	and	marked-based	
exchange	 rate	 in	 the	 long	 run.	 Treasury	 Secretary	 Snow	and	US	President	Bush	have	 also	
repeatedly	 raised	 this	 issue	 and	 insisted	 on	 the	 need	 to	 move	 to	 greater	 exchange	 rate	
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flexibility.	Even	though	they	put	sustained	pressure	on	China,	the	US	administration	took	a	
rather	 cautious	 and	 gentle	 stance.	 They	 emphasized	 the	 constructive	 and	 collaborative	
approach	 adopted	 by	 Chinese	 and	 American	 leaders.	 The	 external	 influences	 of	 the	 US	
government	played	an	agenda-setting	role,	which	rendered	China’s	leaders	unable	to	avoid	
the	RMB	exchange	rate	 issue.	The	 international	attention	to	the	RMB	exchange	rate	 issue	
forced	the	Chinese	leadership	to	put	exchange	rate	reform	on	the	policy	agenda.	However,	to	
explain	the	pathway	and	timing	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform,	one	needs	to	further	explore	
China’s	domestic	politics.	The	next	two	sections	will	examine	the	two	key	institutional	actors	
(PBOC	and	MOFCOM)	in	the	level	II	game	respectively.	
	
3.3	PBOC	as	an	outspoken	advocate	for	exchange	rate	reform	
The	most	 important	 institutional	actor	advocating	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	was	the	
PBOC,	the	central	bank	of	China.	One	of	the	central	argument	of	PBOC’s	officials	was	that	
exchange	rate	flexibility	would	provide	Chinese	authorities	with	additional	tools	to	control	
excessive	monetary	supply	and	inflationary	pressure.	
	 The	primary	advocate	for	a	more	flexible	RMB	exchange	rate	was	Zhou	Xiaochuan,	
PBOC’s	governor	from	December	2002	to	the	present	(2016).	Before	that,	Zhou	served	as	a	
vice-governor	 of	 PBOC	 from	 1991	 to	 1995,	 the	 director	 of	 SAFE	 from	 1995	 to	 1998,	 the	
governor	of	China	Construction	Bank	from	1998	to	2000,	and	the	chairman	of	China	Securities	
Regulatory	Commission	from	2000	until	his	appointment	as	the	governor	of	PBOC	in	2002.211	
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Zhou	was	widely	 regarded	both	 inside	and	outside	 the	Chinese	bureaucracy	as	a	 financial	
reformer	or	liberal	who	actively	advocated	for	reform	and	liberalization	of	China’s	financial	
system.212	Zhou	held	the	firm	belief	that	China’s	tightly	managed	and	closed	financial	system	
could	not	be	sustainable	and	should	be	gradually	reformed.	He	was	quoted	within	a	People’s	
Daily	article	discussing	the	advantages	of	a	floating	exchange	rate	system	over	a	fixed	one:	
“A	fixed	exchange	rate	is	like	a	shield	in	the	hand	when	you	are	fighting;	however	
you	attack	me,	I	will	remain	unmoved;	if	I	fail	to	hold	on,	the	impact	will	cause	
influence.	A	floating	exchange	rate	is	like	a	foam-rubber	cushion,	if	you	want	to	
fight	your	way	in,	I	will	react	softly,	ok,	you’ve	come	in,	but	I	will	not	let	you	hit	
me;	when	you	want	to	quit,	I	will	give	you	a	pinch	and	let	you	go	only	after	you	
have	taken	a	layer	of	your	skin	off.”213	
	 When	asked	how	to	address	the	issue	of	fixed	RMB	exchange	rate	before	Snow’s	visit	
in	September	2003,	Zhou	aptly	put	it:	“if	all	countries	agree	that	the	Asian	financial	crisis	has	
passed	and	all	 the	problems	 left	by	the	crisis	have	been	sorted	out,	China	would	consider	
moving	the	RMB	towards	a	free-floating	currency	and	improve	its	formation	mechanism	of	
the	foreign	exchange	rate.”214	Zhou’s	reply	hinted	that	China’s	stance	on	the	exchange	rate	
was	not	invariable	but	contingent,	which	provided	the	first	glimpse	of	an	opening	position.	
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	 Furthermore,	in	the	2004	spring	meetings	of	the	IMF	and	the	World	Bank	Group,	Zhou	
exchanged	views	with	Snow	on	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	Zhou	made	public	remarks	that	
“greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	of	RMB	exchange	rate	was	a	medium	to	long-term	goal	of	
the	 Chinese	 authorities.”215	In	 the	 2004	 annual	meetings	 of	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	World	 Bank	
Group,	when	asked	what	was	the	direction	and	objective	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform,	Zhou	
stated	 that	 it	was	“to	 improve	 the	RMB	exchange	rate	mechanism	and	maintain	 the	RMB	
exchange	rate	at	a	reasonable	and	equilibrium	level.”216	When	requested	to	further	explain	
the	 policy	 objective,	 he	 specifically	 interpreted	 that	 “to	 improve	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
mechanism	meant	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	a	reasonable	and	equilibrium	level	
meant	market-based	exchange	rate	aiming	at	international	balance	of	payment.”217	In	short,	
the	PBOC	under	Zhou	made	consistent	efforts	towards	deepening	reforms	and	opening	up	in	
the	financial	and	monetary	domains.	
	 In	addition	to	the	voices	of	PBOC’s	leader,	the	central	bank	is	assisted	by	the	MPD,	
which	serves	as	an	advisory	and	deliberate	body	to	bring	in	outside	academic	expertise	and	
incorporate	 representatives	 of	 other	ministries	 on	 the	 critical	 issues	 in	 China’s	monetary	
policymaking. 218 	MPC	 reserves	 one	 of	 the	 thirteen	 seats	 for	 an	 academic	 member	 and	
Professor	Yu	Yongding’s	appointment	as	the	financial	expert	of	MPC	is	a	typical	example	to	
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demonstrate	PBOC’s	 reformist	orientation.219	Yu	 served	as	 the	Director	of	 the	 Institute	of	
World	 Economics	 and	 Politics	 at	 the	 Chinese	 Academy	 of	 Social	 Sciences.	 He	was	widely	
known	as	a	consistent	proponent	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	He	boldly	promoted	RMB	
appreciation	and	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	regime	even	in	the	year	of	2003	when	China	
faced	growing	international	pressures	for	RMB	revaluation.	Yu	was	one	of	the	few	scholars	
who	 advised	 to	 eliminate	 RMB	 appreciation	 phobia	 and	 move	 to	 balanced	 economic	
development.220	Yu	pointed	out	the	increasingly	heavy	cost	of	foreign	exchange	sterilization	
in	order	to	perpetuate	the	fixed	exchange	rate	and	pushed	for	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	
regime.221	
	 Furthermore,	at	the	Davos	World	Economic	Forum	in	early	2005,	Yu	commented	to	
reporters	that	the	time	was	right	for	China	to	revalue	the	RMB	and	move	to	greater	flexibility.	
However,	 after	 that	 the	 PBOC	 immediately	 announced	 that	 Yu’s	 remarks	 were	 purely	
personal	and	academic	opinions	which	did	not	represent	central	bank’s	policy,	and	that	the	
current	RMB	exchange	rate	policy	would	remain	unchanged.222	One	cannot	simply	assume	
that	the	PBOC	did	not	support	Yu’s	viewpoint.	In	nature,	PBOC’s	announcement	implied	that,	
on	the	one	hand,	the	Chinese	authority	did	not	intend	to	reveal	the	timetable	of	the	exchange	
rate	 reform	 in	 order	 to	 minimize	 hot	 money	 inflow	 that	 would	 take	 advantage	 of	 RMB	
appreciation	and	that,	on	the	other	hand,	there	were	still	struggles	in	the	process	of	China’s	
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domestic	exchange	rate	policy	making.	Chinese	domestic	opponents	of	exchange	rate	reform,	
primarily	the	more	political	powerful	MOFCOM,	will	be	examined	in	the	following	section.	
	
3.4	MOFCOM	as	a	powerful	opponent	of	exchange	rate	reform	
PBOC’s	promotion	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	encountered	with	strong	opposition	from	
the	MOFCOM.	The	MOFCOM	succeeded	Ministry	of	Foreign	Trade	and	Economic	Cooperation	
and	merged	with	the	former	State	Economic	and	Trade	Commission	into	a	ministry	mandated	
to	oversee	both	domestic	and	foreign	trade	and	investment	in	2003.	According	to	Frieden’s	
sectoral	model	of	exchange	rate	politics,	non-tradable	and	import-competing	sectors	favour	
flexible	exchange	rate,	whereas	 tradable	and	export	sectors	prefer	 fixed	exchange	rate.223	
Theoretically	 the	 MOFCOM	 incorporates	 a	 diverse	 and	 inherently	 contradictory	 set	 of	
interests	 in	 relation	 to	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate.	However,	practically	 the	MOFCOM	placed	
importance	 on	 exports	 and	 minimized	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 RMB	 revaluation	 and	
appreciation	on	export	enterprises,	given	the	fact	that	the	export	sectors	remained	a	vital	
engine	for	China’s	economic	growth	in	the	2000s.	Therefore,	the	MOFCOM	took	a	firm	stand	
against	substantial	revaluation	and	fast	appreciation	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate.	
	 MOFCOM’s	officials	consistently	argued	that	the	stability	of	RMB	exchange	rate	was	
crucial	for	China’s	export	and	manufacturing	industries	and	that	dramatic	change	would	lead	
to	 bankruptcy	 of	 many	 export	 enterprises	 and	 economic	 slowdown,	 which	 could	 further	
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undermine	social	stability.	The	first	Minister	of	Commerce	is	Lü	Fuyuan	[吕福源]	from	March	
2003	to	December	2004.	After	he	took	office,	Lü	stressed	that	currency	policy	adjustment	
should	be	based	on	the	domestic	situation	of	a	nation224,	which	implies	that	China’s	exchange	
rate	policy	would	not	be	subject	to	external	pressure.	At	a	press	conference	following	the	
closing	of	the	5th	Asia-Europe	Economic	Ministers’	Meeting,	Lü	declared	that	China’s	current	
major	task	was	to	maintain	stable	economic	growth	and	that	China	would	maintain	the	value	
of	its	currency.225	Furthermore,	the	MOFCOM	stressed	that	China	should	learn	a	lesson	from	
Japan’s	experience	of	fast	yen	appreciation	from	1985	to	1995,	which	was	part	of	the	reason	
that	Japan	fell	into	economic	recession	in	the	following	years.226	
	 Due	to	health	conditions,	Lü	retired	early	and	was	succeeded	by	Bo	Xilai.	Bo	Xilai	was	
named	the	Minister	of	Commerce	 in	 late	February	2004	and	 in	office	from	March	2004	to	
December	2007.	As	the	son	of	Bo	Yibo,	one	of	China’s	revolutionary	elders,	Bo	Xilai	was	often	
regarded	as	a	princeling	who	had	much	more	political	 influence	 in	China’s	politics.227	Bo’s	
public	statements	on	the	exchange	rate	issue	were	relatively	sparse	in	2004,	probably	for	the	
reason	that	the	momentum	for	exchange	rate	reform	did	not	begin	to	build	significantly	until	
early	2005.	However,	Bo	Xilai	was	undoubtedly	very	influential	in	meetings	within	the	State	
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Council.228	The	MOFCOM	under	 Bo	made	 an	 extremely	 loud	 voice	 to	maintain	 the	 stable	
exchange	rate	and	limit	the	scope	of	reform	in	the	first	half	of	2005,	which	will	be	elaborated	
in	more	detail	subsequently.	
	
3.5	Re-emergence	of	external	pressure	on	RMB	undervaluation	in	2005	
With	Bush	administration’s	extensive	engagements	with	China’s	senior	officials,	the	year	of	
2004	was	a	relatively	calm	year	for	Congressmen’s	battle	with	China’s	exchange	rate.	There	
were	 only	 two	 bills	 and	 resolutions	 (H.	 R.	 4986	 and	 H.	 CON.	 RES.	 498)	 targeting	 China’s	
currency	in	2004	and	both	bills	essentially	did	not	add	new	point	to	the	bills	of	2003.229	The	
reason	 behind	 this	 was	 probably	 that	 Chinese	 leaders	 adopted	 a	 constructive	 and	
collaborative	approach	to	address	the	RMB	exchange	rate	issue	with	the	Bush	administration	
in	2004.	
	 In	September	2004,	the	Treasury	held	the	16th	US-China	Joint	Economic	Committee	
meeting	in	Washington.	Wen	Jiabao	declared	that	China	would	“further	advance	the	reform	
and	forge	a	mechanism	which	is	more	adapted	to	the	changes	in	market	supply	and	demand,	
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United	States	producers	resulting	from	China’s	exchange	rate	policies”,	22	July	2004,	retrieved	from	
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with	still	better	flexibility.”230	In	the	communiqué	of	the	Joint	Economic	Committee	meeting,	
China	“reaffirmed	its	commitment	to	further	advance	reform	and	to	push	ahead	firmly	and	
steadily	 to	a	market-based	 flexible	exchange	rate.”231	Zhou	Xiaochuan	also	 referred	to	 the	
movement	to	a	flexible	exchange	rate	as	a	top	priority	issue	for	China.	All	of	these	indicated	
that	China	would	adopt	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	regime	in	the	near	time.	Based	on	these	
positive	messages,	Snow	made	the	public	remarks	that	“the	progress	China	is	making	toward	
a	 more	 flexible,	 market-based	 exchange	 rate	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 Administration’s	
engagement	with	China	is	yielding	results.”232	
	 However,	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	 did	 not	 actually	 reach	 the	 internal	 consensus	 of	
exchange	rate	reform	as	it	looked	like	from	the	outside.	Though	the	international	community	
widely	deemed	China	to	be	prepared	for	the	exchange	rate	reform	in	late	2004,	China	offered	
no	timetable	all	along	and	hesitated	to	initiate	any	significant	move.	Worse	still,	shortly	after	
the	announcement	of	Joint	Economic	Committee	statement,	Li	Ruogu,	a	deputy	governor	of	
PBOC,	claimed	that	“China	has	an	8000-year	history”	and	“a	decade	is	truly	a	short	period”	in	
the	meeting	of	G7	finance	ministers,	who	for	the	first	time	invited	China	to	join.233	Li’s	remarks	
suggested	that	China	provided	no	time	frame	and	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	could	be	
postponed	indefinitely.	The	shifting	position	of	Chinese	officials	gave	rise	to	the	re-emergence	
of	Congress	bills	targeting	the	RMB	issue.	
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	 The	Congress	set	off	another	wave	of	targeting	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	first	
half	of	2005.	There	were	totally	twelve	bills	concerning	China’s	currency	in	2005,	eleven	of	
which	 were	 introduced	 before	 21	 July	 2005	 (see	 Appendix	 A).	 The	 number	 of	 bills	 and	
resolutions	targeting	the	RMB	issue	and	the	pressure	from	the	Congress	reached	 its	apex.	
Particularly,	three	bills	(S.	14,	S.	295	and	H.	R.	1575)	included	a	punitive	measure	that	a	rate	
of	27.5	percent	duty	would	be	imposed	on	all	China’s	products	imported	directly	or	indirectly	
into	the	US	if	China	did	not	revalue	its	currency.234	As	it	might	lead	to	serious	trade	conflicts	
between	 the	US	and	China,	 this	 could	be	 taken	as	a	 significant	escalation	of	 the	 currency	
dispute	between	Washington	and	Beijing.	Furthermore,	the	bill	H.	R.	1498	Chinese	Currency	
Act	 of	 2005	was	 introduced	 on	 April	 6	 to	 clarify	 that	 China’s	 currency	manipulation	 was	
actionable,	 considering	 China	 had	 given	 no	 indication	 of	 any	 intent	 to	 correct	 the	 RMB’s	
undervaluation	in	the	foreseeable	future.235	
	 With	 enormous	pressure	 from	 the	Congress,	 the	Bush	 administration	 also	became	
increasingly	critical	of	China’s	delayed	move,	which	could	be	seen	from	the	blunter	words	of	
Treasury	Secretary’s	statement	and	Treasury’s	Reports.	Snow	warned	“China’s	rigid	currency	
regime	has	become	highly	distortionary”	and	urged	China	to	move	to	a	more	flexible	system	
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as	soon	as	possible.236	The	Treasury’s	May	2005	Report	claimed	that	China’s	exchange	rate	
policy	was	distortionary	and	detrimental	to	China’s	economy	itself,	its	trading	partners	and	
the	global	economy,	which	means	that	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	became	the	focal	point	
of	not	only	the	US	but	also	the	international	community.	Moreover,	the	Treasury	threatened	
that	China	would	“likely	meet	the	statute’s	technical	requirements	for	designation”,	if	it	did	
not	substantially	reform	its	currency	policy.237	This	was	probably	the	most	severe	critic	and	
warning	of	China’s	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	Treasury’s	Reports	since	1994.	
Furthermore,	 from	 this	 report	 onwards,	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 was	 systematically	
analysed	at	the	beginning	of	the	report	as	a	“key	finding”.	
	 Finally,	 like	 the	 US	 administration,	 the	 IMF	 adopted	 an	 increasingly	 tough	 stance	
towards	China’s	 currency	practice.	 IMF’s	 proposal	 on	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform	was	
much	more	straightforward	in	2005	than	before.	In	the	2005	Article	IV	Consultation	Report,	
the	 IMF	particularly	emphasized	that	an	early	move	would	be	desirable	given	that	China’s	
economy	was	currently	quite	strong	and	further	delay	would	entail	additional	costs	to	China’s	
economy.	 In	response	to	China’s	concerns	about	the	 impact	on	China’s	economy,	 the	 IMF	
staff	 changed	 the	 view	 of	 2004	 and	 argued	 in	 2005	 that	 the	 effects	 on	 growth	 and	
employment	of	an	 initial	change	 in	the	RMB	exchange	rate	were	 likely	 to	be	moderate.238	
Additionally,	 IMF	staff	and	Chinese	authorities	shared	the	view	that	greater	 flexibility,	not	
simply	a	revaluation,	remained	a	key	objective	for	the	exchange	rate	reform.	
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	 To	summarize,	the	re-emergence	of	external	pressure	on	RMB	undervaluation	in	the	
first	half	of	2005	brought	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	to	a	focal	point	of	the	international	
community.	Chinese	leaders	were	under	so	immense	pressure	from	both	the	US	and	the	IMF	
that	the	old	exchange	rate	regime	was	seemingly	unsustainable.	However,	to	fully	explain	the	
final	outcome	of	2005	exchange	rate	reform,	one	needs	to	examine	more	closely	how	the	
internal	political	struggle	influenced	top	leaders’	decision-makings	in	China.	
	
3.6	China’s	internal	political	struggle	before	21	July	2005	
When	the	momentum	for	exchange	rate	reform	began	to	build	significantly	in	early	2005,	the	
MOFCOM	made	a	loud	voice	for	maintaining	the	stable	exchange	rate	and	limiting	the	scope	
of	reform.	Minister	Bo	persistently	made	two	arguments	to	preserve	fixed	exchange	rate	and	
oppose	fast	appreciation.	
	 The	first	argument	was	that	exchange	rate	appreciation	would	be	counterproductive	
to	China’s	exports	and	manufacturing	industries.	It	was	reported	that	if	the	RMB	were	to	rise	
by	3-5	percent	in	2005	against	the	dollar,	the	growth	rate	of	China’s	exports	might	drop	to	10	
percent	 or	 below;	 a	 rise	 of	 15	 percent	 or	more	might	 cause	 its	 export	 growth	 to	 go	 into	
decline.239	The	RMB	revaluation	would	also	increase	the	risks	of	international	investment	in	
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China240	and	transfer	the	manufacturing	plants	to	other	more	competitive	countries	in	Asia241,	
which	would	dampen	China’s	economic	growth.	
	 The	second	argument	was	that	the	profit	margins	in	export	industries	were	low	and	
any	pace	of	annual	RMB	appreciation	above	 the	 low	single	digits	would	push	a	significant	
share	 of	 export	 firms	 into	 a	money-losing	 position,	 resulting	 in	 significant	 job	 losses	 and	
potential	social	instability.	In	this	sense,	Bo	insisted	that	the	one-off	revaluation	of	the	RMB	
with	substantial	appreciation	was	by	no	means	a	feasible	policy	option.	Therefore,	Bo	strongly	
advised	the	central	government	to	remain	cautious	about	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.242	
	 Bo’s	 tough	 stance	 towards	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 issue	was	 reflected	not	only	 in	
domestic	 policy	 deliberations	 but	 also	 in	 international	 negotiations.	 In	 the	 APEC	 Trade	
Ministers’	Meeting	 in	early	 June	2005	Bo	argued	 that	Europe	and	America’s	 link	between	
China’s	 textile	 exports	 and	 RMB	 revaluation	 made	 the	 issues	 more	 complicated	 and	
controversial.243	He	 also	 declared	 that	 China	would	 not	 yield	 to	 trade	protectionism	 from	
American	 and	 European	 counterparts. 244 	Peter	 Mandelson,	 European	 Commissioner	 for	
Trade	from	2004	to	2008,	admitted	that	Bo	was	a	tough	negotiator	with	good	negotiating	
tactics	and	strong	personal	characteristics	after	China	and	the	EU	reached	a	textile	agreement	
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on	10	June	2005,	which	prevented	a	potential	textile	trade	war	between	China	and	the	EU.245	
Furthermore,	 faced	with	 growing	 international	 pressures	 that	pushed	China	 to	 revalue	 its	
currency	to	address	the	trade	imbalance,	the	MOFCOM	under	Bo	consistently	responded	that	
RMB	appreciation	would	not	solve	the	problem	of	the	US	trade	deficit.246	
	 It	is	also	worth	noting	that	though	the	MOFCOM	strongly	advocated	for	the	interests	
of	 export	 sectors,	 at	 this	 stage	 there	 were	 few	 signs	 of	 direct	 lobbying	 from	 export	
enterprises.247	The	 exporters	were	 earning	 handsome	 profits	 from	 the	 continuous	 export	
growth	thanks	to	the	exchange	rate	stability	during	this	period	of	time.	Therefore,	China’s	
internal	battles	over	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	were	generally	behind	closed	doors	in	
the	central	government.	
	 Chinese	top	leaders	sat	at	the	juncture	of	international	and	domestic	politics	of	the	
RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	Internationally,	the	intense	criticism	and	pressure	rendered	the	
RMB	exchange	rate	an	inevitable	issue	that	needed	action.	Domestically,	the	PBOC	advocated	
a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	for	more	monetary	autonomy,	while	the	MOFCOM,	with	more	
political	 clout,	maintained	 that	 exchange	 rate	 stability	was	 crucial	 for	 China’s	 growth	 and	
employment.	Under	these	circumstances,	the	Chinese	leadership	swung	back	and	forth,	with	
the	difficulties	to	reconcile	the	interests	of	all	parties,	in	formulating	the	exchange	rate	reform	
policy.	
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	 First,	on	the	one	hand,	Chinese	leaders	were	committed	to	embracing	a	more	market-
based	 exchange	 rate	 regime	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 they	 were	 also	 concerned	 with	 the	
possible	 negative	 effects	 that	 reform	 would	 incur.	 In	 his	 Report	 on	 the	 Work	 of	 the	
Government	at	the	NPC	in	2005,	Wen	Jiabao	committed	to	promote	the	exchange	rate	reform,	
which	was	not	in	the	Report	of	2004,	while	pledged	to	“keep	the	RMB	exchange	rate	basically	
stable	at	an	adaptive	and	equilibrium	level”.248	
	 Second,	on	the	one	hand	China	began	to	reform	the	financial	institutions	and	prepared	
for	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	 in	2004,	but	on	the	other	hand	China’s	senior	officials,	
including	those	of	PBOC,	repeatedly	insisted	that	no	specific	timetable	or	schedule	would	be	
provided	with	regard	to	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.249	When	asked	about	the	reform	plan	
and	the	first	change	of	RMB	exchange	rate	at	a	press	conference	in	March	2005,	Wen	dodged	
to	 answer	 the	 question	 directly	 and	 vaguely	 responded	 that	 it	 would	 come	 from	 the	
unexpected.250	
	 Last	but	not	least,	on	the	one	hand	Chinese	top	leaders	had	made	public	commitments	
to	carry	out	exchange	rate	reform	to	ease	the	international	tension	in	2004,	but	on	the	other	
hand	they	would	not	like	to	show	any	sign	of	weakness	under	international	pressure.	Wen	
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emphasized	 that	China	would	not	be	 subject	 to	 external	 pressure	 to	 revalue	 the	RMB	on	
various	 occasions. 251 	He	 even	 further	 asserted	 that	 RMB	 revaluation	 was	 an	 issue	 that	
involved	China’s	sovereignty:	
“RMB	exchange	rate	reform	is	China’s	sovereignty.	Each	country	has	the	right	to	
choose	 the	 exchange	 rate	 regime	 and	 the	 reasonable	 level	 based	 on	 its	 own	
national	conditions.	We	follow	the	law	of	market	economy,	but	by	no	means	yield	
to	external	pressure.	Any	pressure,	hype,	or	politicization	of	economic	issue	will	
not	help	to	solve	the	problem.	We	will	take	the	initiative	to	promote	the	exchange	
rate	reform	as	long	as	the	conditions	are	met,	even	if	there	is	no	external	pressure;	
we	will	not	act	rashly	 if	the	conditions	are	not	met,	even	faced	with	enormous	
external	pressure.”252	
	 One	should	not	consider	Chinese	top	leaders’	wavering	over	exchange	rate	reform	as	
betokening	their	strategic	uncertainty	or	inconsistency.	It,	at	most,	reflected	that	Chinese	top	
leaders	 faced	 challenges	 to	 balance	 the	 interests	 of	 both	 international	 and	 domestic	
bargainers	and	remained	cautious	about	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	This	argument	could	
be	supported	by	Wen’s	three	principles	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform,	which	later	became	
a	consensus	among	the	Chinese	leadership.	As	Wen	noted,	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	
must	adhere	to	the	three	principles	of	own	initiative,	controllability	and	gradualism.253	Own	
initiative	means	that	the	timing	and	substance	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	should	be	based	
																																																						
251	“Wen	Jiabao	reiterated	that	China	would	not	be	subject	to	external	pressure	to	revalue	the	RMB	[温家宝总
理重申人民币不会迫于压力升值]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	30	November	2004,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2004-11/30/content_2275409.htm	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
252	“Wen	Jiabao:	exchange	rate	reform	is	China’s	sovereignty	and	not	subject	to	external	pressure	[温家宝：汇
率改革是中国主权	不屈从外界压力]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	17	May	2005,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-05/17/content_2964746.htm	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
253	“Wen	Jiabao	stressed	the	three	principles	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	[温家宝强调：人民币汇改要坚持
三‘性’原则]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	27	June	2005,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-
06/27/content_3140594.htm	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
144	
	
on	China’s	national	 conditions;	 controllability	means	 that	exchange	 rate	 reform	should	be	
under	control	 to	prevent	 financial	market	 turmoil	and	economic	volatility;	and	gradualism	
means	that	the	reform	must	proceed	step	by	step	instead	of	going	too	fast.	
	
3.7	Explaining	the	outcome:	the	21	July	2005	announcement	
Change	eventually	came	on	21	July	2005.	Approved	by	the	CLEFG	and	the	State	Council,	the	
PBOC	 announced	 that	 China	would	 implement	 a	managed	 floating	 exchange	 rate	 regime	
based	on	market	demand	and	supply	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies.	Furthermore,	
the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 against	 the	 dollar	 was	 revalued	 from	 8.28	 to	 8.11,	 with	 a	 2.1%	
appreciation.	The	daily	trading	price	of	the	dollar	against	the	RMB	in	the	inter-bank	foreign	
exchange	market	will	be	allowed	to	float	within	a	band	of	±0.3	percent	around	the	central	
parity	published	by	the	PBOC.254	
	 This	 policy	 outcome	 should	 be	 interpreted	 as	 Chinese	 top	 leaders’	 reconciliation	
between	the	international	and	domestic	bargainers.	The	US	government	raised	concerns	with	
the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 issue	 after	 September	 2003,	 and	 the	 international	 criticism	 and	
pressure	 gained	 substantial	 momentum	 in	 2005.	 The	 international	 attention	 played	 an	
agenda-setting	role,	which	means	that	it	made	China’s	top	leaders	unable	to	avoid	the	RMB	
exchange	rate	issue.	The	growing	external	pressure	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	issue	forced	
the	Chinese	leadership	to	put	exchange	rate	reform	on	task	list	in	2005.	However,	to	explain	
																																																						
254	PBOC,	“Public	Announcement	of	the	People’s	Bank	of	China	on	Reforming	the	RMB	Exchange	Rate	Regime”,	
21	July	2005,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125217/125922/125945/2816977/index.html	(accessed	
18/09/2016).	
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the	pathway	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform,	one	needs	to	further	explore	China’s	domestic	
politics.	
	 Two	key	ministries	with	competing	preferences	were	divided	internally	 in	the	State	
Council.	 PBOC’s	 officials	 were	 particularly	 interested	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 which	
would	endow	them	with	more	monetary	policy	autonomy.	This	proposal	was	mitigated	by	
two	obstacles.	One	was	financial	and	short-term.	In	2004,	PBOC’s	consideration	was	mitigated	
by	the	difficulties	that	an	appreciation	and	more	flexibility	needed	to	meet	the	prerequisites	
of	banks’	capital	adequacy,	disposition	of	non-performing	loans	and	development	of	financial	
instruments	in	the	interbank	foreign	exchange	market.	The	other	was	political	and	long-term.	
The	MOFCOM,	with	their	constituencies	within	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	and	the	more	
politically	powerful	Minister	Bo	Xilai,	was	 considered	 far	more	 influential	over	 the	 central	
government’s	decision-making	than	the	PBOC.	
	 Chinese	 domestic	 opponents	 of	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 primarily	 in	 the	MOFCOM,	
limited	the	scope	of	reform,	 including	the	size	of	 the	 initial	appreciation	and	the	speed	of	
subsequent	appreciation	following	the	July	2005	announcement.	As	a	result	of	compromise,	
PBOC’s	wish	for	exchange	rate	flexibility	was	granted,	but	the	MOFCOM	won	key	ground	as	
well.	The	initial	RMB	appreciation	was	limited	to	2.1	percent	against	the	dollar	and	the	pace	
of	 subsequent	 appreciation	 was	 to	 be	 relatively	 stable	 and	 slow.	 In	 retrospect,	 the	
compromise	 of	 the	 2005	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 was	 typical	 of	 China’s	 consensus-
oriented	leadership	style,	which	has	been	discussed	in	the	part	of	the	nature	of	China’s	politics	
in	the	Hu-Wen	era	in	the	introduction.	
	 To	summarize,	this	chapter	has	shed	light	on	the	policy	process	and	decision	of	China’s	
exchange	rate	reform	in	2005.	The	empirical	study	supports	the	key	argument	that	China’s	
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central	decision	makers	are	at	the	nexus	of	international	and	domestic	politics	and	reconcile	
international	 pressure	 and	 domestic	 bargainers	 when	 making	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policy	
decisions	in	2005.	Specifically,	international	influences	played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	both	
the	 2005	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 However,	 the	 international	 influences	 were	 strongly	
mitigated	by	China’s	domestic	politics.	China’s	ministerial	politics,	in	which	the	MOFCOM	was	
more	politically	powerful	 than	 the	PBOC,	determined	 the	 limited	nature	of	exchange	 rate	
reform.	The	RMB	depeg	from	the	US	dollar	in	July	2005	was	a	watershed	in	China’s	exchange	
rate	 policy.	 The	 next	 chapter	 will	 further	 examine	 the	 subsequent	 development	 of	 the	
exchange	rate	reform	from	July	2005	to	2007.	
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Chapter	4	The	Faltering	RMB	Exchange	Rate	Reform,	2005-2007	
	
The	 third	 chapter	 elaborated	 how	 international	 factors	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	
China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	and	explained	how	China’s	domestic	politics	determined	
the	timing	and	pathway	of	the	exchange	rate	reform	in	July	2005.	The	limited	scope	of	the	
initial	exchange	rate	reform	was	the	result	of	a	compromise	between	the	two	key	ministries	
(PBOC	and	MOFCOM),	which	typically	reflected	China’s	consensus-oriented	leadership	in	the	
Hu-Wen	era.	
	 This	chapter	will	further	examine	the	subsequent	development	of	the	exchange	rate	
reform	from	July	2005	 to	2007.	 It	 is	argued	 that	with	softened	 international	pressure	and	
MOFCOM’s	 sustained	 resistance	 against	 RMB	 appreciation	 from	 July	 2005	 to	 2006,	 the	
gradually	 and	 continuously	 appreciated	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 ultimately	 eroded	 PBOC’s	
monetary	 policy	 autonomy.	 However,	 the	 situation	 changed	 dramatically	 in	 2007.	
Internationally,	 external	 pressure	 for	 accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation	 regained	momentum.	
Domestically,	the	MOFCOM	also	shifted	priority	from	maintaining	export	growth	to	reducing	
excessive	 trade	 surplus	 owing	 to	 the	 large	 amounts	 of	 trade	 frictions	 in	 2006.	Under	 the	
circumstances,	 the	PBOC	was	endowed	with	more	political	space	 for	advocating	exchange	
rate	 reform.	 The	 Chinese	 leadership	 finally	 accepted	 PBOC’s	 recommendation	 to	 regard	
inflation	as	the	most	severe	problem	to	tackle	and	to	use	currency	appreciation	as	a	tool	to	
fight	 inflation.	The	daily	RMB-dollar	trading	band	was	expanded	in	mid-2007	and	the	RMB	
appreciated	at	a	faster	pace	in	the	fourth	quarter	of	2007.	
	 This	chapter	reaffirms	the	central	argument	of	the	previous	chapter,	namely	that	the	
Chinese	 leadership	was	at	 the	nexus	of	 international	and	domestic	politics	and	 reconciled	
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international	pressure	and	domestic	bargainers	when	making	exchange	rate	policy	decisions	
in	2005.	The	chapter	will	examine	the	evolution	of	both	the	international	pressure	and	the	
domestic	bargaining	game	between	the	MOFCOM	and	the	PBOC	after	the	July	2005	exchange	
rate	 reform	announcement.	As	with	Chapter	3,	 the	 level	 I	 game	and	 level	 II	 game	will	 be	
combined	to	explain	the	Chinese	leadership’s	decision	in	regard	to	exchange	rate	policy	from	
2005	to	2007.	
	
4.1	Softened	international	pressure	from	July	2005	to	2006	
After	China	announced	the	exchange	rate	reform	on	21	July	2005,	the	Congress’s	pressure	on	
China’s	currency	waned	gradually.	There	were	two	bills	after	the	announcement	in	2005	and	
only	one	bill	in	2006	to	target	the	RMB	issue.	
	 The	first	bill,	H.	R.	3283	the	United	States	Trade	Rights	Enforcement	Act,	introduced	
on	28	July	was	a	revised	bill	of	14	July.	Similar	to	the	previous	bills	in	the	first	half	of	2005,	the	
14	July	bill	condemned	China’s	currency	manipulation	and	urged	China	to	move	to	market-
based	exchange	rate	regime.	By	contrast,	the	28	July	bill	changed	the	rhetoric	and	remarked	
that	China’s	transition	to	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	was	“a	welcome	move”	and	“positive	
development”.255	The	bill	also	required	the	Treasury	to	further	investigate	China’s	exchange	
rate	mechanisms,	including	the	basket	of	foreign	currencies	and	the	degree	to	which	the	RMB	
moved	to	the	market-based	value.	The	other	bill	(S.	RES.	270)	on	6	October	2005	continued	
																																																						
255	The	US	Congress,	“H.	R.	3283	United	States	Trade	Rights	Enforcement	Act:	To	enhance	resources	to	enforce	
United	States	trade	rights”,	28	July	2005,	retrieved	from	http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
109hr3283eh/pdf/BILLS-109hr3283eh.pdf	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
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to	urge	the	IMF	to	investigate	whether	China	was	manipulating	the	exchange	rate	between	
the	yuan	and	the	dollar.256	
	 The	only	bill	related	to	the	RMB	in	2006	was	the	United	States	Fair	Currency	Practices	
Act	 of	 2006	 (S.	 3992).	 The	 bill	 clarified	 the	 definition	 of	 exchange-rate	 misalignment,	
elaborated	 the	way	 to	determine	whether	exchange-rate	misalignment	was	occurring	and	
mandated	the	corresponding	measures	of	Treasury	and	President.257	While	the	2006	bill	still	
highlighted	China’s	massive	intervention	in	the	foreign	exchange	market	to	keep	its	currency	
undervalued,	it	did	not	include	any	strict	clause	such	as	retaliatory	tariffs	on	China’s	products,	
like	those	in	2005.	
	 Even	though	the	Congress	became	less	concerned	with	China’s	currency	after	the	21	
July	2005	announcement,	the	Treasury	kept	a	close	eye	on	the	subsequent	development	of	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 The	 November	 2005	 Report	 commended	 China’s	 21	 July	
announcement	to	initiate	the	market-determined	currency	reform	in	the	key	findings,	but	it	
also	pointed	out	that	“China’s	actual	operation	of	its	new	system	was	highly	constricted”.258	
Specifically,	the	Report	found	that	the	new	RMB	exchange	rate	mechanism	remained	a	tightly	
managed	currency	peg	against	the	dollar,	as	the	initial	adjustment	was	small,	the	subsequent	
movements	of	the	RMB	were	limited	and	the	currency	basket	seemed	not	to	play	a	significant	
role.	The	Report	repeated	the	proposal	that	more	exchange	rate	flexibility	was	necessary	to	
																																																						
256	The	US	Congress,	“S.	RES.	270:	Expressing	the	sense	of	the	Senate	that	the	International	Monetary	Fund	
should	investigate	whether	China	is	manipulating	the	rate	of	exchange	between	the	Chinese	yuan	and	the	
United	States	dollar”,	6	October	2005,	retrieved	from	https://www.congress.gov/109/bills/sres270/BILLS-
109sres270is.pdf	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
257	The	US	Congress,	“S.	3992	United	States	Fair	Currency	Practices	Act	of	2006:	To	amend	the	Exchange	Rates	
and	International	Economic	Policy	Coordination	Act	of	1988	to	clarify	the	definition	of	manipulation	with	
respect	to	currency,	and	for	other	purposes”,	28	September,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/109/bills/s3992/BILLS-109s3992pcs.pdf	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
258	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	
Policies”,	November	2005,	retrieved	from	https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-
rate-policies/Documents/112005_report.pdf	(accessed	18/09/2016),	p.2.	
150	
	
give	China	a	sufficiently	autonomous	and	effective	monetary	policy	 to	sustain	growth	and	
avoid	inflation.	
	 Subsequent	Reports	confirmed	the	2005	November	Report’s	observation	that	China’s	
actual	operation	was	not	consistent	with	its	21	July	announcement	of	exchange	rate	reform.	
For	example,	the	2006	May	Report	recognized	that	on	the	one	hand,	Chinese	leaders	made	
firm	commitment	and	delivered	clear	statements	to	move	towards	a	more	flexible	exchange	
rate;	on	the	other	hand,	they	consistently	emphasized	the	gradual	adjustments	in	managed	
RMB	exchange	rates.	Therefore,	the	Treasury	closely	monitored	the	progress	made	on	China’s	
exchange	rate	regime	and	continued	the	intensive	engagement	with	China	in	2006.259	
	 With	regard	to	the	IMF,	one	can	also	identify	a	trend	whereby	less	pressure	was	placed	
on	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	in	2006.	In	the	2006	Article	IV	Consultation	Report,	the	IMF	
recognized	that	Chinese	government	had	undertaken	several	reforms	to	deepen	the	foreign	
exchange	 market	 though	 they	 emphasized	 that	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 would	 have	 to	 be	
gradual	and	controllable.	The	IMF	advocated	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	aimed	to	
address	China’s	concern	with	 the	potential	negative	 impact	of	 substantial	appreciation	on	
China’s	economy.	On	the	one	hand,	the	staff	did	not	accept	the	analogy	that	China	would	
embrace	a	 lost	decade	 like	Japan	 in	the	manner	that	a	significant	RMB	appreciation	could	
push	 the	 economy	 into	 deflation	 and	 prolonged	 recession.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 staff	
stressed	 that	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility,	 not	 just	 appreciation,	 was	 imperative	 for	 China’s	
economic	 rebalancing.	 Greater	 flexibility	 of	 exchange	 rate	 would	 also	 contribute	 to	 the	
																																																						
259	“Statement	of	Treasury	Secretary	John	W.	Snow	before	the	Senate	Committee	on	Banking,	Housing,	and	
Urban	Affairs	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies”,	18	May	2006,	retrieved	from	
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js4271.aspx	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
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sustainability	of	China’s	growth	by	helping	to	the	rebalance	the	economy	over	the	medium	
term.	
	 To	 summarise,	 though	 the	 Treasury	 was	 not	 satisfied	 with	 the	 pace	 of	 China’s	
exchange	 rate	 reform	 and	 maintained	 the	 engagements	 with	 the	 Chinese	 leadership,	
international	pressure	from	the	Congress	and	the	IMF	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	generally	
decreased	 from	 July	 2005	 to	 2016.	 It	 reinforced	 the	 argument	 that	 international	 factors	
played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	while	China’s	domestic	
politics	 determined	 the	 pathway	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 In	 other	 words,	 external	
pressure	 was	 strongly	 mediated	 by	 the	 domestic	 institutions.	 The	 next	 two	 sections	 will	
respectively	examine	the	relationships	between	the	two	key	ministries	(MOFCOM	and	PBOC)	
and	the	subsequent	exchange	rate	reform.	
	
4.2	MOFCOM’s	sustained	resistance	against	RMB	appreciation,	2005-2006	
After	the	initial	2.1%	revaluation	on	21	July	2005,	the	RMB	appreciated	0.5%,	from	8.11	to	
8.07,	against	the	dollar	until	the	end	of	2005.	The	0.5%	appreciation	in	the	latter	half	of	2005	
was	definitely	slow,	and	many	observers	even	asserted	that	it	was	almost	negligible.	However,	
this	section	shows	that	both	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	kept	a	close	eye	on	the	impact	of	
RMB	appreciation	on	China’s	exports.	This	 implies	that	the	Chinese	 leadership	took	a	very	
cautious	approach	toward	the	exchange	rate	reform.	
	 The	PBOC	closely	monitored	the	impact	of	exchange	rate	reform	on	export	enterprises	
in	the	second	half	of	2005.	The	PBOC	conducted	monthly	questionnaire	surveys	to	investigate	
the	 impact	of	 the	21	 July	 revaluation	and	subsequent	RMB	appreciation.	According	to	 the	
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2005	Third	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report,	the	exchange	loss	of	the	sample	
enterprises	owing	to	the	initial	2.1%	appreciation	was	130	million	RMB,	which	accounted	for	
a	modest	0.013	percent	of	the	enterprises’	sales	revenues	in	the	same	period.260	The	negative	
impact	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 on	 exports	 was	 also	 limited,	 with	 only	 6.6%	 of	 the	 sample	
enterprises	 cutting	 down	 export	 production	 and	 13.7%	 transferring	 exports	 to	 domestic	
sales.261	2005	Fourth	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	found	that	enterprises	
were	 generally	 adapted	 to	 the	 new	 exchange	 rate	 regime,	 as	 exports	 and	 export	 orders	
continued	to	grow	and	most	enterprises	used	various	exchange	rate	hedging	instruments	to	
eliminate	their	foreign	exchange	risks.262	The	report	concluded	that	the	new	RMB	exchange	
rate	 formation	mechanism	 operated	 smoothly	 after	 21	 July,	 and	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
remained	basically	stable	at	a	reasonable	and	adaptive	 level,	 in	accordance	with	the	State	
Council’s	deployment.	
	 The	conclusion	of	PBOC’s	report	did	not	come	as	a	surprise,	considering	the	slow	pace	
of	RMB	appreciation.	However,	PBOC’s	optimism	about	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	was	
challenged	by	the	MOFCOM.	The	MOFCOM	took	into	account	the	comparative	performances	
of	export	enterprises	before	and	after	the	exchange	rate	reform	announcement.	Since	the	
initial	 revaluation	 was	 modest	 and	 the	 subsequent	 appreciation	 was	 very	 slow,	 China’s	
exports	maintained	 the	momentum	 in	 the	 second	half	 of	 2005.	However,	 the	Minister	 of	
																																																						
260	PBOC,	“2005	Third	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○五年第三季度中国货币政策执
行报告]”,	9	November	2005,	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11618_1.pdf	
(accessed	18/09/2016),	p.12.	
261	Ibid,	p.13.	
262	PBOC,	“2005	Fourth	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○五年第四季度中国货币政策执
行报告]”,	21	February	2006,	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11619_1.pdf	
(accessed	18/09/2016),	pp.14-16.	
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Commerce	 Bo	 Xilai	 asserted	 that	 the	 RMB	 appreciation	 actually	 stimulated	 imports	 but	
restrained	exports.	Bo	cited	statistics	of	exports	and	imports	to	support	his	argument:	
“China’s	import	increased	by	15%	in	the	first	7	months	of	2005	while	the	increase	
surged	to	20%	in	the	following	5	months;	but	for	export,	the	increase	was	30%	in	
the	first	7	months	whereas	the	increase	was	24.7%	in	the	following	5	months.”263	
	 More	importantly,	the	MOFCOM	was	particularly	concerned	with	the	several	export	
industries	that	were	sensitive	to	RMB	appreciation.	The	MOFCOM	recognized	that	the	RMB	
appreciation	 imposed	 different	 impacts	 on	 different	 enterprises.	 More	 specifically,	 the	
enterprises	that	procured	raw	materials	in	the	domestic	market	and	exported	products	to	the	
international	markets	were	most	 sensitive	 to	 currency	 revaluation.264	Textile	 and	 apparel	
enterprises	were	the	typical	industries	that	encountered	enormous	challenges.	Immediately	
after	the	announcement	of	exchange	rate	reform,	there	was	a	forecast	report	estimating	that	
with	every	1	percent	of	RMB	appreciation,	the	profit	of	cotton	textile	industry	would	fall	about	
12%,	 wool	 textile	 industry	 8%,	 and	 apparel	 industry	 about	 13%.265 	At	 the	 end	 of	 2005,	
statistics	 showed	 that	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 textile	 exports	 had	 been	 in	 decline,	 and	 the	
MOFCOM	claimed	that	“the	continuous	RMB	appreciation	was	a	real	threat	to	exports.”266	
The	MOFCOM	took	a	rather	firm	stance	towards	the	negative	impacts	of	RMB	appreciation	
on	 textile	 industries	 within	 the	 Chinese	 bureaucracy.	 MOFCOM’s	 voice	 did	 count	 in	 the	
																																																						
263	“How	will	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	affect	trade?”,	People’s	Daily,	2	June	2006,	retrieved	from	
http://en.people.cn/200606/02/eng20060602_270674.html	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
264	MOFCOM,	“Different	impacts	of	RMB	exchange	rate	change	on	enterprises	[人民币汇率变化对企业影响
冷暖不同]”,	2	December	2005,	retrieved	from	
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/resume/n/200512/20051200939621.shtml	(accessed	18/09/2016).	
265	“Textile	industry	faces	imminent	transformation	[纺织产业转型迫在眉睫]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	21	July	
2005,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-07/21/content_3247487.htm	(accessed	
18/09/2016).	
266	MOFCOM,	“Unfavourable	situation	for	textile	export	[纺织业出口形势不佳]”,	30	December	2005,	
retrieved	from	http://pep.mofcom.gov.cn/article/guonyw/bt/200512/20051201239070.shtml	(accessed	
18/09/2016).	
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Chinese	 leadership,	 and	 consequently	 the	 State	 Council	 instructed	 the	 Tariff	 Policy	
Department	under	the	MOF	to	stop	taxing	on	textile	export	to	relieve	the	pressure	of	textile	
exporters	from	1	January	2006.267	
	 Furthermore,	Bo	continued	to	be	a	vocal	opponent	of	fast	RMB	appreciation	in	2006.	
While	being	interviewed	by	the	Japanese	media	during	the	Sino-Japanese	Forum	on	Energy-
Saving	 Cooperation,	 Bo	 made	 public	 remarks	 that	 “RMB	 appreciation	 has	 substantially	
lowered	 the	profit	of	export-oriented	enterprises,	 especially	 labour-intensive	ones,	whose	
profit	was	already	very	low.”268	He	took	the	textile	industry,	whose	profitability	was	just	3%,	
as	an	example	to	argue	that	RMB	appreciation	had	put	many	Chinese	enterprises	in	a	difficult	
position.269	Furthermore,	the	MOFCOM	Policy	Research	Department	formed	a	research	group	
to	systematically	study	the	 impacts	of	RMB	appreciation	 in	2006.	Though	the	study	report	
recognized	 the	 role	 that	 RMB	 appreciation	 played	 in	 external	 and	 internal	 rebalancing,	 it	
stressed	the	disastrous	effects	of	fast	and	substantial	appreciation	on	China’s	exports.	The	
main	finding	of	the	study	report	was	that	3%	RMB	appreciation	would	not	seriously	affect	
China’s	international	trade,	as	long	as	the	appreciation	was	kept	modest	and	under	control.270	
	 Though	 the	MOFCOM	strongly	advocated	 for	 the	 interests	of	export	 sectors,	 there	
were	still	 few	signs	of	direct	 lobbying	 from	export	enterprises	after	 the	announcement	of	
																																																						
267	MOF,	“End	to	tax	on	textile	exports	from	next	year	[明年起停止征收纺织品出口关税]”,	14	December	
2005,	retrieved	from	
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caijingshidian/xinhuanet/200805/t20080519_22347.html	(accessed	
19/09/2016).	
268	“How	will	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	affect	trade?”,	People’s	Daily,	2	June	2006,	retrieved	from	
http://en.people.cn/200606/02/eng20060602_270674.html	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
269	“Bo	Xilai:	RMB	appreciation	caused	many	Chinese	textile	enterprises	to	get	into	trouble	[薄熙来：人民币
升值使中国许多纺织企业陷困境]”,	1	June	2006,	retrieved	from	
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/news/1225973.htm	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
270	MOFCOM,	“Impact	of	renminbi	appreciation	on	China’s	international	trade	[人民币升值对我国外经贸发
展的影响]”,	25	August	2006,	retrieved	from	
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/resume/n/200608/20060802972660.shtml	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
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exchange	rate	reform.	China’s	overall	export	maintained	momentum	and	exporters	did	not	
pay	 close	attention	 to	 the	 slowly	appreciating	exchange	 rate.	 The	domestic	economy	was	
growing	quickly	at	the	rate	of	12.7%	in	2006.271	Moreover,	tradable	producers	were	making	
additional	 profits	 from	 investing	 in	 China’s	 booming	 real	 estate	 and	 stock	 markets.	 For	
instance,	the	stock	market	entered	a	period	of	hyper-growth,	which	saw	the	Shanghai	Stock	
Exchange	Composite	more	than	double	in	the	year	of	2006.	
	 The	 pace	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 was	 slightly	 faster	 in	 2006	 because	 there	 was	 no	
enormous	decline	in	China’s	exports	as	opponents	had	feared	since	the	2005	exchange	rate	
reform.	Nevertheless,	the	total	appreciation	was	still	small	and	the	exchange	rate	flexibility	
was	also	limited,	faced	with	the	strong	and	consistent	resistance	from	MOFCOM.	The	RMB	
appreciated	3.2%	in	total,	from	8.07	to	7.81,	against	the	dollar	in	2006.	Except	for	the	initial	
2.1%	revaluation,	the	RMB	appreciated	3.7%	in	total	against	the	dollar	from	July	2005	to	the	
end	of	2006.	
	
4.3	PBOC’s	increasing	policy	dilemma	
Compared	with	MOFCOM,	the	PBOC	was	politically	weaker	and	less	influential	in	China’s	top	
leadership.	 This	 section	 will	 elaborate	 that	 the	 PBOC	 faced	 rising	 challenges	 from	 rapid	
expansion	of	domestic	money	supply	in	the	process	of	RMB	exchange	rate	management.	The	
limited	 nature	 of	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 produced	 little	 change	 in	 the	 economic	
fundamentals	that	had	induced	the	PBOC	to	favour	additional	flexibility	in	the	first	place.	As	
																																																						
271	The	economic	growth	rate	of	12.7%	in	2006	is	the	second	highest	in	the	twenty-first	century	(14.2%	in	2007	
as	the	highest),	according	to	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China.	
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the	central	bank,	PBOC’s	major	duties	are	formulating	and	implementing	monetary	policy	to	
control	 inflation	 and	maintaining	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 at	 stable	 and	 adaptive	 level.272	
However,	one	of	the	most	daunting	challenges	confronting	the	PBOC	in	the	first	decade	of	
the	new	millennium	was	the	inherent	contradiction	within	these	two	main	duties.	The	key	
argument	of	this	section	is	that	the	preservation	of	a	gradually	and	continuously	appreciated	
RMB	 exchange	 rate	 ultimately	 eroded	 PBOC’s	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy,	 under	 the	
circumstance	that	China	ran	persistent	current	account	surpluses.	
	 An	explanation	of	the	causal	mechanism	should	start	from	China’s	foreign	exchange	
system.	 In	 November	 1993,	 the	 Third	 Plenum	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 CCP	 Central	 Committee	
approved	a	comprehensive	reform	package	in	which	foreign	exchange	management	reform	
was	highlighted	as	a	key	element	for	the	socialist	market	economy.	After	1	January	1994,	the	
foreign	exchange	retention	regime	[外汇留成制]	was	abolished	and	replaced	by	the	foreign	
exchange	 surrender	 and	 purchase	 system	 [银行结售汇制度].273	Firms	 were	 required	 to	
surrender	their	foreign	exchange	earnings	from	current	account	transactions	and	purchase	
foreign	 exchange	 from	 a	 foreign	 exchange	 designated	 bank	 when	 a	 payment	 in	 foreign	
currency	was	needed.	Foreign-funded	enterprises	were	also	included	in	the	foreign	exchange	
surrender	 and	 purchase	 system	 after	 1996.	 Furthermore,	 a	 national	 inter-bank	 foreign	
exchange	market	was	established	to	link	all	the	designated	banks	and	to	terminate	the	foreign	
exchange	 swap	 business	 in	 the	 local	 and	 unlinked	 swap	 centres.	 In	 particular,	 the	 PBOC	
determined	a	benchmark	rate	that	reflected	the	market	conditions,	and	all	designated	foreign	
exchange	banks	 could	 only	 buy	 and	 sell	 foreign	 exchange	within	 a	 certain	 band	 above	or	
																																																						
272	PBOC,	“About	PBC”,	retrieved	from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/952/index.html	(accessed	
19/09/2016).	
273	Lou	Jiwei	(ed.)	(1997)	“Macroeconomic	reform	in	China:	laying	the	foundation	for	a	socialist	market	
economy”,	World	Bank	Discussion	Paper	No.	374,	The	World	Bank,	Washington	DC.	
157	
	
below	this	benchmark	rate.	The	new	foreign	exchange	system	enhanced	the	effectiveness	of	
the	central	bank’s	market	intervention	and	capacity	of	foreign	exchange	accumulation.	
	 China	kept	running	persistent	current	account	surpluses	after	1994	(see	Figure	4.1).	
With	the	foreign	exchange	surrender	and	purchase	system,	China	accordingly	accumulated	
foreign	reserves	(Figure	4.2).	Both	the	current	account	surplus	and	foreign	reserve	grew	at	a	
relatively	slow	speed	before	2000.	However,	the	growth	accelerated	dramatically	in	the	new	
millennium.	After	China	joined	the	WTO	in	2001,	China	experienced	a	sharp	increase	in	both	
current	account	surplus	and	capital	inflows.	To	keep	the	RMB	exchange	rate	fixed	or	gradually	
appreciated	 against	 the	 dollar,	 the	 PBOC	 needed	 to	 intervene	 massively	 in	 the	 foreign	
exchange	market,	 selling	 the	RMB	and	buying	 the	dollar.	However,	 in	doing	 so,	 it	directly	
increased	 the	base	money,	which	 is	 called	 the	position	 for	 forex	purchase	 [外汇占款].274	
Figure	4.3	shows	that	the	position	for	forex	purchase	continued	to	increase	in	the	first	decade	
of	the	twenty-first	century.	
																																																						
274	PBOC,	“Financial	term:	position	for	forex	purchase	[金融名词：外汇占款]”,	16	September	2013,	retrieved	
from	http://wuhan.pbc.gov.cn/wuhan/123527/614607/index.html	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
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Figure	4.1:	China’s	current	account	balance	and	overall	trade	balance,	from	1994	to	2013	
Source:	IMF,	Balance	of	Payments	Statistics	&	Direction	of	Trade	Statistics	
	
Figure	4.2:	China’s	foreign	reserves,	from	1994	to	2013	
Source:	IMF,	International	Financial	Statistics	
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Figure	4.3:	China’s	position	for	forex	purchase,	from	2001	to	2013	
Source:	PBOC	Financial	Survey	and	Statistics	Department	
	 According	to	the	equation	of	money	supply,	money	supply	equals	base	money	times	
money	multiplier.	The	growing	position	for	forex	purchase	was	considered	as	passive	money	
supply,	 as	 it	was	not	under	 the	 control	of	 the	 central	bank	but	 subject	 to	 the	 supply	and	
demand	of	currencies	in	the	foreign	exchange	market.	To	prevent	the	expansion	of	position	
for	forex	purchase	from	giving	rise	to	high	inflation	or	overheating,	the	PBOC	must	engage	in	
sterilization	operations	in	the	domestic	money	market.	PBOC’s	sterilization	typically	referred	
to	 two	 tools	 of	monetary	 policy,	 open	market	 operations	 and	 reserve	 requirement	 ratio.	
These	two	monetary	policy	tools	and	the	corresponding	money	supply	will	be	examined	as	
follows	to	demonstrate	that	the	regime	of	limited	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	the	pathway	
of	 continued	 gradual	 appreciation	 actually	 implies	 a	 cost	 in	 terms	 of	 loss	 of	 control	 over	
domestic	monetary	policy.	The	PBOC	 faced	 increasing	dilemma	to	simultaneously	manage	
both	the	RMB	exchange	rate	and	domestic	money	supply	during	this	period	of	time.	
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	 The	traditional	open	market	operation	of	PBOC	refers	to	repo	transaction	[回购交易]	
and	spot	bond	trading	[现券买卖].275	The	former	 includes	repo	[正回购]	and	reverse	repo	
[逆回购]	in	the	primary	market.	PBOC’s	repo	would	sell	securities	to	commercial	banks,	thus	
reducing	 reserves	 in	 the	 banking	 system	 and	 tightening	 money	 supply,	 and	 then	 after	 a	
specified	 period	 of	 time	 repurchase	 the	 securities	 and	 inject	 liquidities.	 On	 the	 contrary,	
reverse	repo	would	initially	add	reserves	and	later	drain	them.	The	latter	includes	PBOC’s	spot	
bond	purchase	[现券买断]	and	spot	bond	sale	[现券卖断]	in	the	secondary	market.	The	spot	
bond	purchase	would	directly	inject	base	money	to	the	market,	while	the	spot	bond	sell	would	
withdraw.	
	 Although	repo	transaction	and	spot	bond	trading	were	highly	flexible	and	effective	in	
adjusting	 the	 base	 money,	 they	 were	 ultimately	 constrained	 by	 the	 limited	 amounts	 of	
securities	 and	 bond	 assets	 held	 by	 the	 central	 bank,	 which	 could	 not	 meet	 up	 with	 the	
increasing	demand	for	sterilization	of	position	for	forex	purchase	after	2002.276	Therefore,	the	
PBOC	invented	a	new	tool	for	open	market	operation:	the	central	bank	bill.	Central	bank	bills	
are	short-term	bonds	(with	term	to	maturity	no	more	than	three	years,	usually	no	more	than	
one	year)	issued	by	PBOC	in	the	national	inter-bank	bond	market.277	On	24	September	2002,	
the	PBOC	converted	all	 the	undue	 repo,	 in	 the	 form	of	PBOC’s	assets	held	by	commercial	
banks,	to	central	bank	bills,	in	the	form	of	PBOC’s	liabilities.	It	was	manifestly	stated	that	the	
purpose	 of	 PBOC’s	 conversion	 was	 to	 make	 more	 room	 for	 repo	 in	 future	 open	 market	
																																																						
275	Repo	is	short	for	repurchase	agreement,	which	is	a	transaction	concluded	on	a	deal	date	between	two	
parties.	Spot	bond	trading	refers	to	a	contract	of	buying	or	selling	bonds	on	the	spot	date.	
276	PBOC,	“Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	2003Q2”,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/126021/2835159/2015090810572487467.p
df	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
277	Ibid,	pp.4-5.	
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operations.278	More	importantly,	on	22	April	2003,	the	PBOC	began	to	directly	issue	central	
bank	bills,	which	means	the	PBOC	formally	sought	to	sterilize	the	position	for	forex	purchase	
through	the	issuance	of	central	bank	liabilities.279	After	this,	the	central	bank	bills	were	used	
as	the	main	open	market	operation	for	sterilization	of	position	for	forex	purchase,	while	spot	
bond	trading	was	seldom	used	and	repo	transaction	was	used	as	supplementary	short-term	
liquidity	managements	(see	Appendix	B).	
	 If	we	denote	the	importance	of	central	bank	bills	for	sterilization	as	the	proportion	of	
central	bank	bill	issuance	in	the	total	open	market	operations	to	drain	liquidity,	we	may	see	
from	Figure	4.4	that	the	values	were	all	above	60%	before	2008,	which	implies	that	the	central	
bank	bills	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	time	period.	
	
																																																						
278	PBOC,	“Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	2002Q4”,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/126024/2899201/2015090810535810379.p
df	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
279	PBOC,	“Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	2003Q2”,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/126021/2835159/2015090810572487467.p
df	(accessed	19/09/2016);	“Zhou	Xiaochuan:	open	market	operations	play	an	important	role	[周小川：公开市
场操作发挥重大作用]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	16	June	2006,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-06/15/content_3086465.htm	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
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Figure	4.4:	The	importance	of	central	bank	bills	for	sterilization,	from	2004	to	2013	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	PBOC’s	open	market	operation	announcements		
	 In	addition	to	open	market	operations,	 it	 is	also	necessary	to	examine	the	required	
reserve	 ratio	 to	 grasp	 the	 full	 picture	 of	 PBOC’s	 monetary	 policy	 implementation.	 The	
adjustment	of	required	reserve	ratio	changes	the	amount	of	funds	available	for	commercial	
banks	to	make	loans	with,	which	affects	both	base	money	and	money	multiplier.	Therefore,	
the	required	reserve	ratio	adjustment	causes	more	immediate	and	intense	effects	on	money	
supply.	
	 Western	central	banks	generally	prefer	open	market	operations	to	required	reserve	
ratio	(actually	it	is	rarely	used)	in	terms	of	money	supply	adjustment.	However,	the	PBOC	used	
required	reserve	ratio	as	a	frequent	and	regular	tool	for	money	supply	adjustments	after	2005	
(see	Appendix	C).	The	PBOC	altered	(raised)	the	required	reserve	ratio	three	times	in	2006,	
ten	times	in	2007,	eight	times	in	2008,	six	times	in	2010	and	seven	times	in	2011.	The	required	
reserve	ratio	climbed	from	7.5%	in	mid-year	2006	to	an	unprecedented	21.5%	in	mid-2011.	
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operation	alone	could	not	meet	up	with	the	increasing	demand	for	sterilization	of	position	for	
forex	 purchase.	 In	 retrospect,	 Zhou	 Xiaochuan	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 main	 tasks	 and	
challenges	 of	 China’s	 monetary	 policy	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 were	 to	 manage	 the	
exchange	rates	by	 intervention	 in	the	foreign	exchange	rate	market	and	to	sterilize	excess	
liquidity	by	open	market	operations	and	required	reserve	ratio	adjustments	simultaneously,	
but	 what	 he	 did	 not	 specify	 was	 that	 PBOC’s	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy	 was	 heavily	
constrained.280	
	 To	 summarize,	 the	 PBOC	 faced	 an	 increasing	 policy	 dilemma	 in	 simultaneously	
maintaining	 the	 gradually	 appreciated	 RMB	 exchange	 rates	 and	 controlling	 the	 domestic	
money	supply,	in	the	circumstance	of	persistent	current	account	surplus	and	capital	inflows.	
The	rigid	exchange	rate	regime	with	limited	flexibility	considerably	eroded	the	central	bank’s	
monetary	policy	autonomy.	The	challenge	was	particularly	daunting,	with	hot	money	inflows	
that	speculated	the	RMB’s	gradual	and	steady	appreciation	after	PBOC’s	announcement	of	
exchange	rate	reform	on	21	 July	2005,	which	required	the	PBOC	to	engage	 in	 larger	scale	
intervention	 in	 the	 inter-bank	 foreign	 exchange	 market	 and	 sterilization	 in	 the	 domestic	
money	market.	On	the	one	hand,	the	PBOC	issued	central	bank	bills	to	commercial	banks,	
which	involved	straightforward	commercial	bank	purchase	of	interest-bearing	papers	issued	
by	 the	PBOC.	On	 the	other,	 the	PBOC	 raised	 the	 required	 reserve	 ratio,	 and	 the	 share	of	
deposits	 that	 commercial	 banks	must	 place	 at	 the	 central	 bank.	 Both	methods	 sought	 to	
sterilize	 the	 increasing	 position	 for	 forex	 purchase	 through	 expansion	 of	 central	 bank	
liabilities.	However,	despite	 these	endeavours,	 the	money	 supply	 growth	was	 still	 beyond	
																																																						
280	“Zhou	Xiaochuan:	The	main	characteristics	of	China’s	monetary	policy	in	the	new	millennium	[周小川：新
世纪以来中国货币政策的主要特点]”,	18	January	2013,	retrieved	from	
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bank/bank_yhfg/20130118/103214330306.shtml?wbf=more	(accessed	
19/09/2016).	
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PBOC’s	control,	which	remained	at	very	high	 levels	and	ultimately	caused	 inflations	 in	 the	
time	period.	 In	a	nutshell,	with	the	overriding	policy	target	of	gradual	and	continued	RMB	
appreciations,	PBOC’s	ability	 to	control	 the	money	supply	and	hence	 to	conduct	domestic	
monetary	policy	have	been	significantly	circumstanced.	
	
4.4	Re-emergence	of	external	pressure	for	accelerated	RMB	appreciation	in	2007	
With	 softened	 international	 pressure	 and	MOFCOM’s	 sustained	 resistance,	 the	 RMB	 only	
appreciated	3.3%,	from	8.07	to	7.81,	against	the	dollar	in	2006.		The	3.3%	appreciation	in	the	
2006	was	modest,	and	China’s	current	account	surplus	continued	to	grow	rapidly	 in	2006,	
which	reignited	external	pressure	for	accelerated	RMB	appreciation	in	2007.	
	 The	US	Congress	set	off	another	wave	of	targeting	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	
first	half	of	2007,	which	was	quite	similar	to	the	2005	case.	On	the	one	hand,	Congressmen	
were	unsatisfied	that	China	carried	out	the	exchange	rate	reform	in	the	extremely	gradual	
way.	Not	only	was	the	appreciation	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	considered	to	be	slow,	but	also	
the	flexibility	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	was	rather	limited.	On	the	other	hand,	the	US	began	
to	 face	a	new	 round	of	 economic	 recession	when	elements	of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 became	
visible	during	2007.	American	Congressmen	once	again	tried	to	scapegoat	China’s	currency	
for	domestic	economic	slowdown.	
	 There	were	five	bills	in	2007,	all	of	which	were	introduced	in	the	first	half	of	the	year.	
The	first	bill	 (H.	R.	321)	 introduced	on	9	January	2007	was	a	duplicate	bill	of	the	Currency	
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Harmonization	Initiative	Through	Neutralizing	Action	Act	of	2005.281		It	once	again	requested	
the	Treasury	to	analyse	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	and	to	report	the	rate	of	misalignment.	
The	second	bill	(H.	R.	782)	and	the	fourth	bill	(S.	796)	both	named	as	Fair	Currency	Act	of	2007,	
as	well	as	the	fifth	bill	(H.	R.	2942)	named	as	Currency	Reform	for	Fair	Trade	Act	of	2007,	are	
very	 similar	 to	 the	 United	 States	 Fair	 Currency	 Practices	 Act	 of	 2006.282	Though	 the	 bills	
highlighted	China’s	massive	intervention	in	the	foreign	exchange	market	to	keep	its	currency	
undervalued,	it	did	not	include	any	strict	clause	such	as	retaliatory	tariffs	on	China’s	products.	
The	most	severe	one	was	the	third	bill	(H.	R.	1002),	which	again	included	a	potential	punitive	
clause	 that	 a	 retaliatory	 tariff	 of	 27.5	 percent	would	 be	 imposed	 on	 all	 China’s	 products	
entering	the	US	if	China	continued	to	manipulate	its	currency.283	This	is	similar	to	the	three	
bills	 (S.	 14,	 S.	 295	 and	H.	 R.	 1575)	 of	 2005,	which	 included	 the	 punitive	measure	 of	 27.5	
percent	tariff.	
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	 Although	the	Congress’s	pressure	on	the	RMB	issue	regained	momentum	in	the	first	
half	of	2007,	it	could	be	seen	that	most	of	the	bills	did	not	add	new	points	because	both	the	
accusations	and	the	proposed	measures	were	basically	reproduction	of	previous	bills.	All	the	
five	bills	in	2007	cited	economic	estimations	that	the	RMB	was	undervalued	against	the	dollar	
by	as	much	as	40	percent,	which	remained	unchanged	compared	with	the	first	bill	of	2003	
regardless	of	the	fact	that	the	RMB	had	been	appreciated	5.1%	(from	8.28	to	7.61)	until	mid-
2007,	 which	 rendered	 the	 criticisms	 in	 2007	 less	 compelling.	 Furthermore,	 the	 law	 of	
diminishing	marginal	utility	applied	to	the	bills	and	resolutions	in	2007,	which	means	they	did	
not	impose	as	intense	pressure	as	those	in	2005	did	on	China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	
	 With	the	growing	pressure	from	Congress,	the	Treasury’s	stance	on	China’s	exchange	
rate	 policy	 became	 tougher	 as	 well,	 which	 could	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 blunter	 language	 of	
Treasury’s	Reports.	The	comparison	of	2006	and	2007	Treasury’s	Reports	would	reveal	the	
evolution	 towards	 Treasury’s	 stronger	 criticism	 and	 bolder	 arguments.	 Specifically,	 the	
Treasury	 still	 used	 “limited	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility”	 and	 “China’s	 cautious	 approach	 to	
exchange	rate	reform”	in	the	December	2006	Report.284	However,	it	was	only	in	June	2007	
that	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 the	Treasury	 came	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 “the	Chinese	 currency	 is	
undervalued”	 and	 propose	 that	 “China	 should	 not	 hesitate	 any	 longer	 to	 take	 far	 more	
vigorous	action	to	rebalance	its	economy,	promote	immediate	RMB	movement	to	tackle	the	
currency’s	undervaluation,	and	achieve	far	greater	flexibility	in	the	exchange	rate	regime.”285	
In	the	December	2007	Report,	the	Treasury	further	criticized	“the	substantial	undervaluation	
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of	the	renminbi	(RMB)”	and	urged	that	“China	should	significantly	accelerate	the	appreciation	
of	the	RMB’s	effective	exchange	rate.”286	Henry	Paulson,	who	succeeded	John	Snow	as	the	
Treasury	Secretary	in	mid-2006,	also	continued	to	“press	the	Chinese	to	increase	the	flexibility	
of	their	exchange	rate	in	the	short	term	and	to	transition	to	a	market-determined	exchange	
rate	in	the	medium	term”	on	various	occasions	in	2007.287	
	 With	regard	to	the	IMF,	one	may	identify	the	same	trend	of	more	severe	pressure.	It	
became	 clear	 that	 the	 IMF	 was	 under	 growing	 American	 pressure	 to	 declare	 the	 RMB	
“fundamentally	misaligned”,	which	worsened	China’s	relationship	with	the	IMF	substantially	
in	2007.288	Finally,	Beijing	took	the	unusual	step	of	voting	against	the	adoption	of	the	2007	
Decision	on	Bilateral	Surveillance,	which	was	seen	as	the	culmination	of	a	US-led	international	
campaign.	It	withdrew	from	the	bilateral	surveillance	process	during	2007-08.	To	summarize,	
external	pressure	on	the	part	of	the	US	government	and	the	IMF	played	an	agenda-setting	
role	to	push	China’s	leaders	to	accelerate	the	exchange	rate	reform	in	2007,	which	was	similar	
to	the	case	in	2005.	However,	to	explain	the	timing	and	pathway	of	China’s	exchange	rate	
reform	in	2007,	one	also	needs	to	further	explore	China’s	domestic	politics.	
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4.5	MOFCOM’s	shifted	priority	in	2007	
Domestically,	one	of	the	most	important	changes	in	the	level	II	game	was	MOFCOM’s	shifted	
priority	 in	 2007.	 The	 MOFCOM	 used	 to	 be	 a	 vocal	 opponent	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 and	
persistent	 advocate	 for	 export	 sectors’	 interests.	 However,	 the	 MOFCOM	 softened	 its	
resistance	to	RMB	appreciation	 in	2007,	as	 its	main	task	changed	from	maintaining	export	
growth	to	reducing	excessive	trade	surplus.	
	 One	reason	for	MOFCOM’s	shifted	priority	in	2007	was	that	Chinese	exporters	faced	
unprecedented	trade	frictions	in	2006,	which	placed	enormous	pressures	on	the	MOFCOM	to	
settle	those	trade	disputes	and	preserve	the	interests	of	export	industries.289	Bo	Xilai	pointed	
out	 that	 China’s	 excessive	 trade	 surplus	 was	 detrimental	 to	 both	 domestic	 economic	
development	and	foreign	trade	relations.	He	commented	that	“the	expanding	trade	surplus	
had	evolved	into	a	prominent	problem”	as	it	triggered	more	frequent	trade	frictions.290	In	the	
National	 Commercial	 Work	 Conference	 [全国商务工作会议 ]	 on	 15	 January	 2007,	 Bo	
explicitly	stated	that	reducing	trade	surplus	was	the	top	priority	of	the	year’s	foreign	trade	
development	 and	 saw	 it	 as	 an	 opportunity	 for	 China	 to	 upgrade	 its	 lower	 value-added	
processing	trade	and	optimize	export	structure.291	One	week	 later,	Fu	Ziying	 [傅自应],	 the	
Assistant	Minister	of	Commerce,	echoed	Minister	Bo’s	emphasis	on	the	international	trade	
balance,	and	 suggested	 that	exchange	 rate,	export	 tax	 rebate	and	processing	 trade	policy	
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could	be	used	to	achieve	the	goal	 in	the	5th	Annual	Meeting	of	Chinese	Import	and	Export	
Enterprises.292	
	 Moreover,	a	research	report	by	the	MOFCOM	Research	 Institute	further	confirmed	
MOFCOM’s	changing	stance	on	RMB	appreciation.	Firstly,	the	report	admitted	that	RMB	was	
widely	conceived	to	be	undervalued	and	put	aside	the	disputes	on	the	level	of	misalignment.	
Secondly,	 the	 report	 recognized	 the	 important	 role	of	 exchange	 rate	 leverage	 in	 relieving	
international	 trade	 imbalances	and	speculative	 foreign	exchange	 influx.	Thirdly,	 the	report	
claimed	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	would	face	greater	pressure	to	appreciate	in	the	future	
and	suggested	“moderate	appreciation”,	which	means	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	continued	
upward	adjustments	 in	an	 incremental	and	controllable	manner.	Specifically,	 the	 research	
report	suggested	that	the	RMB	could	appreciate	9	to	10	percent	until	the	end	of	2007.293	
	 The	other	reason	for	MOFCOM’s	shifted	priority	in	2007	was	that	it	would	be	more	in	
line	with	the	consensus	reached	in	the	Central	Economic	Work	Conference	[中央经济工作会
议]	at	the	end	of	2006.	The	Central	Economic	Work	Conference	 is	an	annual	meeting	that	
reviews	economic	performance	of	last	year,	analyses	current	economic	situation,	and	sets	the	
tone	for	macroeconomic	policies	and	priorities	in	economic	work	next	year.	As	it	is	convened	
by	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Communist	Party	and	the	State	Council,	 it	 is	the	highest-
ranking	economic	meeting.	
	 At	the	Central	Economic	Work	Conference	at	the	end	of	2006,	the	Chinese	leadership	
reached	a	general	consensus	that	the	principal	challenge	for	China’s	international	balance	of	
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payments	was	 no	 longer	 shortage	 of	 foreign	 exchange	 but	 the	 trade	 surplus	 and	 foreign	
exchange	reserves.	Therefore,	promoting	the	international	balance	of	payments	was	set	to	
be	an	 important	task	of	macroeconomic	control	 in	2007.294	Furthermore,	the	2006	Central	
Economic	Work	Conference	demonstrated	that	China’s	top	leaders	stressed	not	only	rate	but	
also	quality	of	economic	growth.	The	 tone	 for	macroeconomic	policies	 in	2007	was	set	as	
“good	and	fast	economic	development”	[国民经济又好又快发展]	and	emphasis	was	placed	
on	balanced	and	coordinated	development.	It	was	the	first	time	that	good	quality	of	economic	
development	 came	 before	 fast	 growth	 speed. 295 	Although	 the	 central	 government’s	
statements	contained	no	direct	deployment	of	further	RMB	exchange	rate	reform,	the	2006	
Central	Economic	Work	Conference	also	provided	significant	political	space	for	the	advocates	
of	exchange	rate	reform,	as	the	RMB	exchange	rate	was	an	important	part	of	the	toolkit	to	
achieve	the	macroeconomic	goal.	
	
4.6	PBOC’s	advocate	for	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	appreciation	in	2007	
MOFCOM’s	 shifted	 priority	 on	 the	 balance	 of	 international	 payments	 and	 the	 central	
leadership’s	 emphasis	 on	 economic	 balancing	 provided	 significant	 political	 space	 for	
advocates	 of	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 Furthermore,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 PBOC	
encountered	great	difficulties	in	managing	the	gradually	appreciated	RMB	exchange	rates	and	
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controlling	the	domestic	money	supply	simultaneously,	under	the	circumstance	of	persistent	
current	 account	 surplus	 and	 capital	 inflows.	 The	 PBOC	 faced	 increasing	 and	 enormous	
inflationary	 pressure	 in	 2007,	 and	 all	 the	 major	 monetary	 tools,	 including	 open	 market	
operations,	required	reserve	ratio	and	interest	rate,	were	used	to	fight	inflation.	For	instance,	
the	PBOC	kept	the	“prudent	monetary	policy”	in	the	first	half	of	2007,	while	it	changed	the	
stance	and	adopted	the	“moderately	tight	monetary	policy”	in	the	third	quarter	of	2007.296	
The	required	reserve	ratios	and	the	benchmark	deposit	and	 lending	 rates	were	raised	 ten	
times	 and	 five	 times	 respectively	 in	 2007.297	Under	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 PBOC	more	
actively	advocated	 to	push	 forward	exchange	 rate	 reform	 for	greater	 flexibility	and	 faster	
appreciation	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	in	2007.	
	 Zhou	Xiaochuan	expressed	severe	concern	regarding	China’s	domestic	excess	liquidity,	
and	 declared	 that	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility	 should	 be	 expanded	 if	 China’s	 trade	
surplus	continued	to	grow	at	the	Bank	for	International	Settlements	conference	in	January	
2007.298	One	week	later,	Hu	Xiaolian,	a	deputy	governor	of	PBOC	and	the	director	of	SAFE,	
advocated	 to	 promote	 the	 balance	 of	 international	 payments	 at	 the	 foreign	 exchange	
management	conference,	and	the	central	bank	decided	to	further	increase	the	RMB	exchange	
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rate	flexibility	at	the	PBOC	Work	Conference.299	In	March	2007,	Zhou	Xiaochuan	stated	that	
exchange	 rate	 policy,	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 price	 lever,	 would	 play	 a	 complementary	 role	 in	 the	
economic	 restructuring	 and	 trade	 balancing	 at	 the	 press	 conference	 of	 the	 annual	 NPC	
meeting.300	A	few	days	later,	Zhou	expressed	the	message	that	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	
would	 be	more	market-oriented:	 “RMB	 exchange	 rate	will	 depend	 on	market	 supply	 and	
demand	and	there	is	no	pre-determined	target	level.”301	Yi	Gang	[易纲],	the	PBOC	assistant	
governor,	explicitly	pointed	out	that	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	RMB	appreciation	
could	 help	 to	 curb	 domestic	 inflation	 and	 enhance	 the	 autonomy	 and	 effectiveness	 of	
monetary	policy.302	Yu	Yongding	continued	to	advocate	that	RMB	appreciation	would	achieve	
the	result	of	“killing	two	birds	with	one	stone”:	RMB	appreciation	would	thus	help	to	reduce	
both	domestic	inflation	and	current	account	surplus.303	
	 Considering	all	the	factors	at	home	and	abroad,	China	took	the	first	major	step	on	18	
May	2007	to	make	the	RMB	a	more	flexible	currency	by	loosening	its	daily	trading	limits	after	
the	 21	 July	 2005	 reform.	 The	 PBOC	 announced	 that	 “as	 of	 21	May	 2007,	 the	 RMB-dollar	
trading	band	in	the	inter-bank	spot	foreign	exchange	market	will	be	expanded	form	0.3%	to	
0.5%,	namely,	the	daily	RMB-dollar	trading	band	may	be	floated	within	the	0.5%	range	of	the	
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汇率取决市场供求]”,	21	March	2007,	retrieved	from	
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20070321/00041276796.shtml	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
302	Yi	Gang	(2009)	“Strictly	control	the	money	supply	and	optimize	the	credit	structure	[严控货币供应量	优化
信贷结构]”,	Meditations	on	China’s	Financial	Reform	[中国金融改革思考录],	The	Commercial	Press	[商务印
书馆],	pp.170-177.	
303	Yu	Yongding	(2007)	“Global	imbalances	and	China”,	Australian	Economic	Review,	Vol.40,	No.1,	pp.3-23.	
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middle	 price	 of	 the	 dollar	 against	 the	 RMB.”304 	On	 the	 day	 of	 the	 announcement,	 Zhou	
reiterated	that	RMB	exchange	rate	would	be	increasingly	flexible	and	determined	by	market	
supply	and	demand.305	Theoretically,	the	widened	RMB-dollar	trading	band	would	allow	more	
flexibility	and	faster	appreciation	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate.	However,	in	practice,	Figure	4.5	
shows	that	RMB	was	 indeed	more	flexible,	 in	that	 it	 fluctuated	more	volatilely	against	the	
dollar,	but	there	was	little	evidence	of	faster	RMB	appreciation	immediately	after	the	18	May	
2007	announcement.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	did	not	increase	the	pace	of	appreciation	until	
October	2007.	The	reason	for	this	will	be	elaborated	in	more	detail	in	the	following	section.	
	
Figure	4.5:	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar	in	2007	
Source:	PBOC	–	Figures	–	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar,	available	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/rmyh/108976/109428/index.html	
																																																						
304	PBOC,	“Announcement	of	the	People’s	Bank	of	China	on	expanding	the	floating	range	of	RMB-dollar	trading	
price	in	the	inter-bank	spot	foreign	exchange	market	[中国人民银行关于扩大银行间即期外汇市场人民币兑
美元交易价浮动幅度的公告]”,	18	May	2007,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/bangongting/135485/135491/135597/999532/index.html	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
305	“Zhou	Xiaochuan:	RMB	exchange	rate	will	be	increasingly	flexible	[周小川：人民币汇率将越来越灵活]”,	
Xinhua	News	Agency,	18	May	2007,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-
05/18/content_6118128.htm	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
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4.7	All-in	to	fight	inflation	
In	spite	of	all	the	endeavours	to	contain	inflation,	China	still	faced	rising	inflationary	pressure	
in	2007.	There	were	debates	of	“too	little	pork”	vs.	“too	much	money”	over	the	reasons	of	
rising	inflation.306	Yet	if	one	understands	the	causal	mechanism	of	PBOC’s	increasing	policy	
dilemma	mentioned	above,	 they	would	be	more	 likely	 to	 support	 the	 “too	much	money”	
hypothesis	 in	explaining	the	Chinese	 inflationary	cycle	 in	2007.	Figure	4.6	shows	the	rising	
trend	of	China’s	CPI	 in	2007.	 In	particular,	CPI	reached	3%	(the	alert	 line	of	 inflation)	after	
March	2007	and	remained	above	5%	(the	line	of	severe	inflation)	in	the	second	half	of	2007.	
	
Figure	4.6:	China’s	monthly	CPI	in	2007	
Source:	IMF	International	Financial	Statistics		
																																																						
306	See,	for	example,	Michael	Pettis	(2008)	“Chinese	inflation:	it’s	money,	not	pork”,	Far	Eastern	Economic	
Review,	Vol.171,	No.3,	pp.42-45,	retrieved	from	http://fsp046-ht2011-
groupb.wikispaces.com/file/view/Inflation.pdf	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
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	 Under	 the	 circumstance,	 the	 PBOC	 expressed	 serious	 concerns	 with	 inflation	 on	
various	occasions,	not	only	in	monetary	policy	implementation	reports	but	also	in	officials’	
public	 remarks.	 The	 PBOC	 recognized	 that	 the	 continuous	 rising	 of	 trade	 surplus	 and	 CPI	
exacerbated	the	inflationary	expectations	and	intensified	the	inflationary	pressure.307	Zhou	
said	 that	he	was	worried	 about	 inflation,	 and	pointed	out	 that	 central	 bank	would	 target	
inflation	at	the	Bank	for	International	Settlements	Conference	in	September	2007.308	When	
he	was	interviewed	by	Financial	News,	Zhou	further	stressed	that	exchange	rate	policy	and	
interest	rate	policy,	the	two	tools	of	price	 lever,	should	coordinate	to	stabilize	 inflationary	
expectations.309	Furthermore,	after	the	three	hikes	of	CPI	in	the	third	quarter,	the	PBOC	made	
a	policy	proposal	to	the	State	Council:	to	allow	the	RMB	to	appreciate	at	a	faster	rate	in	order	
to	contain	inflation.310	The	proposal	was	also	confirmed	by	the	2007	third	quarter	monetary	
policy	implementation	report,	which	for	the	first	time	purported	that	“currency	appreciation	
is	conducive	to	curb	domestic	inflation”.311	
	 The	severe	situation	of	inflationary	cycle	and	PBOC’s	firm	suggestion	produced	a	clear	
shift	in	exchange	rate	strategy	in	late	2007.	China’s	top	leadership	seemed	to	accept	PBOC’s	
basic	arguments	to	regard	inflation	as	the	most	severe	problem	to	tackle	and	to	use	currency	
																																																						
307	PBOC,	“2007	Third	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○七年第三季度中国货币政策执
行报告]”,	8	November	2007,	p.31,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11629_1.pdf	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
308	“Zhou	Xiaochuan:	worried	about	China’s	inflation	[周小川：对中国的通货膨胀感到担忧]”,	Xinhua	News	
Agency,	11	September	2007,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-
09/11/content_6701378.htm	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
309	“Zhou	Xiaochuan:	to	stabilize	inflationary	expectations	[周小川：稳定通胀预期]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	15	
November	2007,	retrieved	from	http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2007-11/15/content_9230584.htm	
(accessed	19/09/2016).	
310	Interview_25092015.	
311	PBOC,	“2007	Third	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○七年第三季度中国货币政策执
行报告]”,	8	November	2007,	p.34,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11629_1.pdf	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
176	
	
appreciation	as	a	tool	to	fight	inflation,	which	was	confirmed	by	two	most	important	meetings	
–	the	Central	Politburo	meetings	and	the	Central	Economic	Work	Conference.	
	 The	Central	Politburo	usually	holds	meetings	on	economic	situation	and	work	twice	a	
year,	one	 in	the	middle	of	the	year	and	the	other	at	the	end	of	the	year.	 In	the	July	2007	
meeting,	 the	 Central	 Politburo	 recognized	 the	 several	 problems	 of	 China’s	 economy	 and	
proposed	“to	prevent	 relatively	 fast	economic	growth	 from	becoming	overheated”,	which	
was	made	as	the	top	priority	of	macroeconomic	management.	Specifically,	efforts	should	be	
made	to	ease	the	growth	of	investment,	credit	expansion,	CPI	and	trade	surplus.312	However,	
during	 the	 November	 2007	 meeting,	 the	 Central	 Politburo	 further	 emphasised	 inflation	
control.	The	top	priorities	of	macroeconomic	management	changed	from	one	prevention	to	
two	preventions:	“to	prevent	relatively	fast	economic	growth	from	becoming	overheated	and	
to	prevent	structural	price	increases	from	turning	into	significant	inflation”.313	
	 At	 the	 Central	 Economic	Work	 Conference	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2007,	 the	 top	 leadership	
reaffirmed	that	inflation	prevention	was	the	next	year’s	top	priority.314	Monetary	policy	and	
exchange	rate	policy	would	go	hand	in	hand	to	achieve	the	goal.	On	the	one	hand,	the	PBOC	
announced	that	it	would	shift	to	a	tight	monetary	policy	(从紧的货币政策)	next	year,	which	
was	a	 significant	 change	of	monetary	policy,	 as	 the	 last	 time	when	China	adopted	a	 tight	
																																																						
312	“Hu	Jintao	presided	over	the	Central	Politburo	meeting	to	analyze	the	current	economic	situation	and	work	
[胡锦涛主持中央政治局会议	分析研究当前经济形势和工作]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	26	July	2007,	retrieved	
from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/2007-07/26/content_6434538.htm	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
313	“Central	Politburo	holds	a	meeting	to	analyze	the	current	economic	situation	and	next	year’s	economic	
work	[政治局召开会议	分析当前经济形势研究明年经济工作]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	27	November	2007,	
retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-11/27/content_7156005.htm	(accessed	
19/09/2016).	
314	“Prevention	of	significant	inflation	as	priority	of	macroeconomic	management	[宏观调控定调严防明显通
胀]”,	6	December	2007,	retrieved	from	http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/6621769.html	(accessed	
19/09/2016).	
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monetary	policy	was	ten	years	ago	during	the	1997-98	Asian	Financial	Crisis.	315	On	the	other	
hand,	RMB	appreciation	was	used	as	another	tool	to	help	China	expand	its	imports	and	curb	
inflation.	To	summarize,	the	Central	Economic	Work	Conference	expressed	the	messages	that	
inflation	 was	 the	 primary	 concern	 of	 current	 macroeconomic	 management,	 and	 that	
monetary	 tightening	 and	 RMB	 appreciation	 would	 be	 the	 most	 effective	 ways	 to	 fight	
inflation.316	
	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	 RMB	 appreciated	 at	 a	 significantly	 faster	 pace	 in	 the	
fourth	quarter	of	2007	(see	Figure	4.5).	The	RMB	appreciated	6.9%	against	the	dollar	from	
7.807	to	7.305	in	the	year	of	2007;	it	appreciated	2.8%	against	the	dollar	from	7.511	to	7.305	
in	the	four	quarter,	account	for	40%	of	the	total	appreciation	 in	2007.	The	widened	RMB-
dollar	trading	band	allowed	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	and	the	rate	of	RMB	appreciation	
sped	up	considerably	during	the	latter	part	of	2007.	
	
4.8	Concluding	remarks	 	
This	 chapter	has	 examined	 the	 subsequent	development	of	China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	
from	 July	 2005	 to	 2007.	 With	 softened	 international	 pressure	 and	MOFCOM’s	 sustained	
resistance,	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 appreciated	 in	 a	 gradual	 manner	 after	 the	 July	 2005	
announcement.	However,	the	PBOC	faced	increasing	difficulties	to	preserve	the	gradually	and	
																																																						
315	“PBOC:	to	implement	a	tight	monetary	policy	next	year	[央行：明年将实行从紧货币政策]”,	6	December	
2007,	retrieved	from	http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/6618610.html	(accessed	19/09/2016);	“Chinese	
monetary	policy	change	[中国货币政策十年首变]”,	6	December	2007,	retrieved	from	
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/6618613.html	(accessed	19/09/2016).	
316	“Monetary	tightening	and	RMB	appreciation	as	the	most	effective	ways	to	fight	inflation	[货币紧缩和人民
币升值是对抗通胀最有效方式]”,	7	December	2007,	http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/6627311.html	
(accessed	19/09/2016).	
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continuously	appreciated	RMB	exchange	rate	and	to	maintain	the	monetary	policy	autonomy	
simultaneously,	under	the	circumstances	of	rising	trade	surplus	and	capital	inflows.	
	 Following	this,	the	US	government	and	the	IMF	were	increasingly	dissatisfied	with	the	
little	 progress	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 and	 the	 external	 pressure	 regained	
momentum	in	2007,	which	once	again	played	an	agenda-setting	role	to	push	China’s	leaders	
to	 accelerate	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 However,	 to	 explain	 the	 timing	 and	 pathway	 of	
China’s	exchange	rate	reform	 in	2007,	one	also	needs	to	 further	explore	China’s	domestic	
politics.	On	the	one	hand,	the	MOFCOM	shifted	its	priority	to	trade	surplus	reduction	in	2007,	
as	Chinese	exporters	 faced	unprecedented	trade	frictions	 in	2006.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
PBOC	more	actively	advocated	to	push	forward	exchange	rate	reform	for	greater	flexibility	
under	inflationary	pressure.	
	 On	18	May	2007,	China	took	the	first	major	step	to	make	the	RMB	a	more	flexible	
currency	by	widening	the	RMB-dollar	trading	band.	The	RMB	did	not	begin	to	appreciate	in	a	
faster	pace	until	the	late	2007.	The	shift	in	exchange	rate	policy	would	not	have	been	possible	
without	 the	 severe	 situation	 of	 the	 inflationary	 cycle	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2007	 and	 the	
consensus	reached	by	the	Chinese	leadership	to	make	inflation	prevention	as	the	top	priority	
in	the	fourth	quarter	of	2007.	The	next	chapter	will	continue	to	examine	the	accelerated	(but	
short-lived)	exchange	rate	reform	and	how	interest	groups	and	local	governments	fit	 in	to	
influence	the	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2008.	
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Chapter	5	The	Back	and	Forth	of	RMB	Exchange	Rate	Reform	in	Turbulent	
Times,	2008-2010	
	
Chapter	4	has	examined	the	development	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	from	July	2005	to	
2007.	With	softened	 international	pressure	and	MOFCOM’s	sustained	resistance,	the	RMB	
exchange	 rate	 appreciated	 in	 a	 gradual	 manner	 after	 the	 July	 2005	 announcement,	 and	
PBOC’s	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy	 was	 severely	 eroded,	 as	 the	 central	 bank	 needed	 to	
maintain	the	gradually	and	continuously	appreciated	exchange	rate.	The	situation	changed	
dramatically	 in	 2007.	 Internationally,	 the	 US	 government	 and	 the	 IMF	 were	 increasingly	
impatient	and	critical	of	the	slow	progress	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform.	Domestically,	in	
the	face	of	growing	trade	friction,	the	MOFCOM	shifted	its	priority	to	trade	surplus	reduction	
and	 the	PBOC	more	actively	advocated	 to	push	 forward	exchange	 rate	 reform	 for	greater	
flexibility	under	the	inflationary	pressure.	Under	these	circumstances,	the	Chinese	leadership	
decided	to	widen	the	RMB-dollar	trading	band	to	make	the	RMB	into	a	more	flexible	currency	
on	18	May	2007	and	the	RMB	appreciate	against	the	dollar	in	a	faster	pace	in	the	late	2007.	
	 In	the	period	from	July	2005	to	2007,	there	was	little	pressure	from	export	interest	
groups	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	China’s	exports	grew	by	28.4%,	27.1%	and	25.9%	
respectively	 in	 the	 years	 from	2005	 to	2007.317	There	was	no	 sharp	decline	 in	 exports,	 as	
opponents	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	had	feared.	While	the	voices	opposing	appreciation	
were	temporarily	silenced,	they	had	not	disappeared.	Opponents	pointed	out	that	although	
exports	had	continued	to	grow,	the	rate	of	growth	had	slowed,	and	the	effects	brought	by	
RMB	 appreciation	 were	 to	 blame.	 Exporters	 became	 strongly	 opposed	 to	 the	 RMB	
																																																						
317	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	China,	available	from	http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01	
(accessed	20/09/2016).	
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appreciation	 in	 early	 2008,	 as	 the	 pace	 of	 appreciation	 had	 accelerated.	 In	 truth,	 RMB	
appreciation	 was	 only	 one	 of	 a	 number	 of	 different	 factors	 that	 were	 squeezing	 these	
industries.	 Other	 policy	 changes,	 such	 as	 cuts	 in	 export	 tax	 rebates	 and	 the	 new	 labour	
contract	law,	as	well	as	the	simultaneous	declines	in	the	domestic	stock	and	property	markets,	
compounded	 their	 problems.	 Nevertheless,	 exchange	 rate	 appreciation	 became	 the	main	
focus	of	exporters’	hostility	in	2008.	Since	the	MOFCOM	placed	its	priority	on	trade	surplus	
reduction	and	its	stance	towards	RMB	appreciation	had	changed	in	2007,	the	only	alternative	
for	the	exporters	at	this	juncture	was	to	mobilize	resources	to	lobby	against	the	rapid	RMB	
appreciation	and	seek	policy	adjustment.	
	 Based	on	questionnaire	surveys	and	semi-structured	interviews,	this	chapter	focuses	
on	 the	 Fujian	 province	 as	 a	 case	 study	 and	 explores	 the	 three	 main	 methods	 of	 export	
lobbying	in	the	level	III	game:	first	guanxi-based	lobbying	through	local	governments,	second	
guanxi-based	 lobbying	 through	 local	 offices	 of	 central	 governmental	 agencies,	 and	 third	
lobbying	 through	 trade	 associations.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 exporters’	 lobbying	 imposed	
considerable	pressure	on	the	central	government’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	 in	the	first	
half	 of	 2008.	 Confronted	 with	 pressure	 from	 businesses,	 the	 top	 leadership	 conducted	
intensive	research	and	investigation	in	early	July	2008,	and	finally	decided	to	roll	out	rescue	
policies.	The	market-oriented	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	beginning	from	21	July	2005	was	
halted	in	the	second	half	of	2008,	and	China	returned	to	the	de	facto	dollar-pegged	exchange	
rate	 regime	 in	 the	 turbulent	 times	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis.	 Therefore,	 this	 chapter	
provides	a	nuanced	explanations	of	export	lobbying	in	the	level	III	game	and	the	dynamics	of	
central-local	interactions	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2008.	
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5.1	The	international	and	domestic	context	in	2008	
After	China	announced	the	exchange	rate	reform	on	21	July	2005,	Congress’s	pressure	on	
China’s	currency	gradually	waned,	and	the	Treasury	commended	China’s	move,	which	was	
similar	to	the	case	after	PBOC’s	announcement	of	18	May	2007	exchange	rate	reform.	There	
was	no	Congress	bill	on	the	RMB	issue	in	the	second	half	of	2007	and	only	single	one	(S.	2813)	
in	the	year	of	2008.	The	bill	named	China	Currency	Manipulation	Act	of	2008	mandated	the	
Treasury	 to	 deal	 with	 China’s	 currency	 manipulation,	 including	 making	 a	 determination,	
setting	benchmarks	and	timeframes,	initiate	bilateral	negotiations	with	China	and	coordinate	
with	 the	 IMF	 to	 address	 the	 RMB	misalignment	 and	 US-China	 trade	 imbalance.318	In	 the	
December	2007	and	May	2008	Reports,	the	Treasury	recognized	that	the	RMB	appreciation	
accelerated	 against	 the	 dollar	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2007	 and	 the	 pace	 of	 appreciation	
increased	 further	 in	 the	 early	 months	 of	 2008.319 	The	 Treasury	 regarded	 China’s	 recent	
acceleration	 in	 RMB	 appreciation	 as	 a	 welcome	 development	 and	 encouraged	 China	 to	
continue	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	Overall,	 the	 international	 discussions	 and	 criticism	of	
Chinese	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 were	 significantly	 lower	 after	 the	 18	 May	 2007	 reform,	
especially	in	the	few	months	preceding	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.	
	 The	softened	international	pressure	in	2008	implies	that	the	Chinese	leadership	would	
make	exchange	 rate	policy	decisions	mainly	based	on	 the	 conditions	of	domestic	political	
																																																						
318	The	US	Congress,	“S.	2813	China	Currency	Manipulation	Act	of	2008:	To	require	the	Secretary	of	the	
Treasury	to	take	action	with	respect	to	currency	manipulation	by	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	and	for	other	
purposes”,	3	April	2008,	retrieved	from	https://www.congress.gov/110/bills/s2813/BILLS-110s2813is.pdf	
(accessed	20/09/2016).	
319	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	
Policies”,	December	2007,	retrieved	from	https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-
rate-policies/Documents/Dec2007-Report.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016);	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	
to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies”,	May	2008,	retrieved	from	
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/052008_report.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
182	
	
economy.	Though	China’s	top	leadership	reached	the	consensus	to	treat	inflation	as	the	most	
severe	 problem	 and	 used	 both	 tight	 monetary	 policy	 and	 currency	 appreciation	 to	 fight	
inflation,	the	CPI	remained	high	above	5%,	the	line	of	severe	inflation,	from	mid-2007	to	mid-
2008.	Figure	5.1	shows	that	inflation	was	even	more	severe	in	the	first	half	of	2008	than	in	
2007.	
		
Figure	5.1:	China’s	monthly	CPI,	from	2007	to	2008	
Source:	IMF,	International	Financial	Statistics	
	 With	 mounting	 inflationary	 pressure,	 the	 PBOC	 implemented	 the	 tight	 monetary	
policy	by	raising	the	required	reserve	ratio	five	times	by	3%	(see	Appendix	C)	and	allowed	the	
RMB	a	 faster	 rate	of	 appreciation	 in	 the	 first	half	of	2008.	As	 the	 central	bank,	 the	PBOC	
naturally	placed	 its	top	priority	to	control	 the	 inflation.320	Yu	Yongding	expressed	the	view	
																																																						
320	PBOC,	“2008	First	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○八年第三季度中国货币政策执行
报告]”,	retrieved	from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11631_1.pdf	(accessed	
20/09/2016),	pp.II.	
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that	the	goal	of	exchange	rate	stability	should	be	subordinated	to	the	goal	of	inflation	control.	
He	explained	that	the	central	bank	should	implement	tight	monetary	policy	to	fight	inflation	
and	the	preconditions	of	effective	tight	monetary	policy	were	capital	control	and	exchange	
rate	flexibility	(that	allows	currency	appreciation).321	When	asked	whether	the	central	bank	
appreciated	the	currency	to	curb	inflation,	Zhou	Xiaochuan	did	not	deny	it,	but	explained	it	in	
a	subtler	way:	
“It	is	not	necessary	to	see	the	aim	of	exchange	rate	adjustment	is	to	curb	inflation.	
However,	the	direction	is	right	in	the	angle	of	analysis	…	Specifically,	the	increased	
exchange	 rate	 flexibility	 and	 appreciation	 is	 to	 improve	 the	 market-oriented	
exchange	 rate	 formation	mechanism.	 In	 the	 angle	 of	 analysis,	 the	 accelerated	
RMB	appreciation	helps	to	control	inflation.”322	
	 On	the	other	hand,	with	a	growing	current	account	surplus,	the	MOFCOM	continued	
to	soften	its	resistance	to	RMB	appreciation	in	2008.	The	MOFCOM	abandoned	its	emphasis	
on	exchange	rate	stability	and	placed	importance	on	exchange	rate	marketization.	Faced	with	
the	 demand	 to	 accelerate	 appreciation	 to	 reduce	 trade	 surplus,	 Minister	 Chen	 Deming	
responded	 firmly	 that	 it	was	unreasonable	 to	 require	a	RMB	devaluation	based	purely	on	
trade	 surplus.	 He	 reaffirmed	 that	 China	would	 not	 deliberately	 pursue	 trade	 surplus,	 and	
recognized	 both	 the	 positive	 and	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 on	 China’s	
economy.	He	further	pointed	out	that	no	one,	including	the	PBOC	governor,	could	manipulate	
																																																						
321	“Yu	Yongding:	RMB	appreciation	will	certainly	help	to	curb	inflation	[余永定：人民币升值肯定有利于抑制
通货膨胀]”,	18	March	2008,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	retrieved	from	
http://finance.qq.com/a/20080318/002158.htm	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
322	“Heads	of	NDRC,	MOF	and	PBOC	answer	journalists’	questions	[发改委财政部中国人民银行负责人答记者
问]”,	6	March	2008,	retrieved	from	http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zhibo/zzzb3/node_363.htm	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
184	
	
the	 exchange	 rate;	 instead,	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 adjustment	 should	 follow	 the	market	
rule.323	
	 Under	these	circumstances,	the	RMB	continued	the	trend	of	appreciation	after	the	
fourth	quarter	of	2007.	Figure	5.2	shows	the	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	dollar	after	the	
21	July	2005	reform.	It	may	be	seen	that	China’s	exchange	rate	appreciated	gradually	against	
the	 dollar	 for	 more	 than	 two	 years.	 The	 substantial	 and	 faster	 RMB	 appreciation	 only	
happened	 in	 the	 period	 from	 October	 2007	 to	 July	 2008,	 when	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	
concentrated	their	attention	and	spared	no	effort	to	fight	inflation.	More	specifically,	the	RMB	
appreciated	9.8%,	from	7.51	to	6.84,	against	the	dollar	in	the	ten	months,	which	was	even	
larger	than	the	previous	total	RMB	appreciation	(8.0%,	from	8.11	to	7.51)	for	more	than	two	
years.	
	
Figure	5.2:	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar,	21	July	2005	to	31	July	2008	
Source:	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Department	
																																																						
323	“Chen	Deming:	China	does	not	deliberately	pursue	trade	surplus	[陈德铭：中国不刻意追求贸易顺差]”,	12	
March	2008,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-
03/12/content_7775367.htm	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
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	 It	is	also	worth	pointing	out	that	exchange	rate	was	not	the	only	tool	being	used	to	
curb	inflation	and	reduce	the	trade	surplus.	The	government	cut	export	tax	rebates	for	many	
commodities	 in	 2007. 324 	Moreover,	 the	 new	 labour	 law	 and	 stricter	 environmental	
regulations	further	lowered	many	exporters’	profits.325	Last	but	not	least,	the	simultaneous	
decline	in	the	domestic	stock	and	property	markets	in	2008	reduced	their	profits	from	non-
trade-related	investments.326	Faced	with	the	various	problems,	Chinese	exporters	fell	into	a	
difficult	position	and	grew	hostile	to	exchange	rate	appreciation	in	2008.	
	 Based	 on	 an	 in-depth	 case	 study	 in	 the	 Fujian	 province,	 the	 following	 section	will	
elaborate	the	difficult	situation	of	export	enterprises	and	their	corresponding	response.	The	
data	mainly	comes	from	questionnaire	surveys	and	interviews	conducted	in	Fujian	province.	
The	researcher	distributed	98	questionnaires	to	export	entrepreneurs,	and	63	valid	responses	
were	collected	for	analysis.	The	researcher	also	arranged	22	semi-structured	interviews	with	
export	entrepreneurs,	association	representatives	and	local	government	officials	at	different	
levels.	 Interviews	 typically	 lasted	1–2	hours,	 and	many	 sources	were	 interviewed	multiple	
																																																						
324	The	MOF	announces	that	starting	from	1	July	2007,	China	will	cut	or	eliminate	export	tax	rebates	for	2831	
commodities	representing	37	percent	of	the	total	number	of	items	listed	on	customs	tax	regulations.	China	
abolished	export	tax	rebates	on	553	“highly	polluting	products	that	consume	heavy	amounts	of	energy	and	
resources”	such	as	salt,	cement,	and	liquefied	petroleum	gas,	and	reduced	tax	rebate	on	exports	of	2268	
commodities	which	“tend	to	cause	trade	frictions”.	See	“Ministry	of	Finance	and	State	Administration	of	
Taxation’s	announcement	on	lower	export	tax	rebate	rates	of	some	commodities	[财政部、国家税务总局关
于调低部分商品出口退税率的通知]”,	19	June	2007,	retrieved	from	
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810765/n812176/n812778/c1194297/content.html	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
325	The	NPC	Standing	Committee	passes	the	new	labour	contract	law	that	requires	employers	to	provide	
written	contracts	to	their	workers,	restricts	the	use	of	temporary	labourers	and	makes	it	harder	to	lay	off	
employees.	See	“Labour	Contract	Law	enacted	by	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	National	People’s	Congress	
and	implemented	since	1	January	2008	[人大常委会通过劳动合同法	2008年 1月 1日施行]”,	29	June	2007,	
retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-06/29/content_6308311.htm		(accessed	20/09/2016)	
and	http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-06/30/content_6311563.htm	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
326	See,	for	example,	“Earnings	up,	prices	down:	risk	aversion	hits	Chinese	stocks”,	The	Economist,	19	March	
2008,	retrieved	from	http://www.economist.com/node/10881471	(accessed	20/09/2016);	“Boom	to	bust:	
China’s	property	bubble	is	about	to	burst”,	The	Economist,	20	June	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://www.economist.com/node/11605123	(accessed	20/09/2016);	“China’s	economy	hits	the	wall”,	
Financial	Times,	15	December	2008,	retrieved	from	http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1ff5944-cac6-11dd-87d7-
000077b07658.html#axzz3zs3Qxv4x	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
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times.	In	order	to	protect	the	anonymity	of	sources,	they	are	cited	in	the	notes	as	“Interviews	
with	dates”.	
	
5.2	Exporters	got	into	trouble	and	fought	back	
The	author	has	selected	the	Fujian	province	as	a	typical	case	study	because	it	is	one	of	the	
fastest	growing	provinces	based	on	export-oriented	industrialization	in	China’s	coastal	region.	
Fujian	lies	on	the	southeast	coast	of	China	and	faces	the	Taiwan	Strait.	Fujian’s	favourable	
geographical	position	is	conducive	to	the	dynamics	of	the	local	economy.	It	is	one	of	the	most	
affluent	 provinces,	with	many	 industries	 spanning	 tea	 production,	 garments	 and	 sporting	
goods.	Moreover,	Fujian	was	one	of	the	first	 few	provinces	where	special	economic	zones	
were	established.	The	special	arrangements	that	Fujian	obtained	for	its	fiscal	relationship	with	
the	central	government	in	the	1980s	were	also	crucial	for	laying	the	foundations	for	export	
growth	in	the	1990s	and	2000s,	alongside	infrastructure	investment	and	preferential	policies	
of	tax	and	land.327	Figure	5.3	shows	that	Fujian’s	GDP	grew	at	double	digit	rates	from	2003	to	
2010.	Figure	5.4	shows	Fujian’s	export	and	import	from	2003	to	2010.	The	exports	increased	
at	faster	rates	than	imports	after	2003.	However,	Fujian,	like	other	export-oriented	provinces,	
faced	enormous	difficulties	in	maintaining	the	momentum	of	export	growth	in	2008	and	2009.	
Therefore,	it	is	particularly	worthwhile	investigating	how	exporters	in	Fujian	responded	to	the	
exchange	rate	policy	at	a	difficult	time.	
																																																						
327	See,	for	example,	Sonoko	Nishitateno	(1983)	“China’s	special	economic	zones:	experimental	units	for	
economic	reform”,	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly,	Vol.32,	No.1,	pp.175-185;	Chŏng-dong	Pak	
(1997)	The	Special	Economic	Zones	of	China	and	Their	Impact	on	Its	Economic	Development,	Praeger	
Publishers,	1997;	Wei	Ge	(1999)	“Special	economic	zones	and	the	opening	of	the	Chinese	economy:	some	
lessons	for	economic	liberalization”,	World	Development,	Vol.27,	No.7,	pp.1267-1285.	
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Figure	5.3:	Fujian’s	GDP	growth,	from	2003	to	2010	
Source:	Fujian	Provincial	Statistics	of	Economic	and	Social	Development,	Fujian	Provincial	Bureau	of	
Statistics,	available	from	http://www.stats-fj.gov.cn/	
	
Figure	5.4:	Fujian’s	export	and	import,	from	2003	to	2010	
Source:	Fujian	Provincial	Statistics	of	Economic	and	Social	Development,	Fujian	Provincial	Bureau	of	
Statistics,	available	from	http://www.stats-fj.gov.cn/	
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5.2.1	Evidence	from	questionnaire	surveys	
Figure	5.5	shows	that	the	dollar	played	a	dominant	role	as	a	vehicle	currency	in	international	
trade,	 according	 to	 the	 questionnaires	 collected	 from	 Fujian’s	 entrepreneurs.	 More	 than	
three-quarters	(49	out	of	63)	of	the	export	enterprises	 in	Fujian	responded	that	they	used	
dollar	 as	 the	 main	 currency	 for	 international	 trade	 settlement.	 Thus,	 their	 business	 was	
undeniably	 affected	 by	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 against	 the	 dollar.	 Figure	 5.6	 shows	 that	
around	four	in	five	export	enterprises	in	Fujian	responded	that	their	business	was	subject	to	
RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuations.	
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Figure	5.5:	The	responses	of	63	Fujian	entrepreneurs	to	the	question	“What	is(are)	the	main	
currency(currencies)	for	your	enterprise's	international	trade	settlement?”	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	questionnaire	data	
	
Figure	5.6:	The	responses	of	63	Fujian	entrepreneurs	to	the	question	“Is	your	business	affected	by	
the	RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuations?”	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	questionnaire	data	
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	 Figure	 5.7	 demonstrates	 the	 response	 number	 of	 Fujian’s	 enterprises	 that	 were	
greatly	affected	by	RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuations.	As	to	the	question	“In	which	year(s)	your	
enterprise	was	significantly	affected	by	 the	RMB	exchange	rate	 fluctuations?”,	 there	were	
small	numbers	(2	and	3)	of	respondents	in	the	first	two	years	of	exchange	rate	reform	as	the	
RMB	exchange	rate	appreciated	in	a	gradual	manner,	whereas	there	were	more	responses	
(17)	in	2007	with	the	exchange	rate	reform	accelerated.	The	response	number	(41)	peaked	in	
2008,	suggesting	that	the	unfavourable	conditions	of	export	enterprises	were	exacerbated	by	
the	rapid	appreciation	of	RMB.	
	
Figure	5.7:	The	responses	of	63	Fujian	entrepreneurs	to	the	question	“In	which	year(s)	your	
enterprise	was	significantly	affected	by	the	RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuations?”	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	questionnaire	data	
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	 Figure	5.8	shows	the	measures	 taken	by	export	entrepreneurs	 in	a	 time	of	volatile	
exchange	 rate	 fluctuations.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 enterprises	 mainly	 used	 financial	
instruments	to	reduce	exchange	risk	at	their	own	end.	It	was	less	feasible	for	the	Fujian	export	
enterprises	to	shift	the	cost	to	their	trading	partners	or	to	upgrade	their	products	to	control	
their	cost,	as	most	of	them	were	labour-intensive	in	the	middle	and	low-end	markets.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 they	 were	 more	 inclined	 to	 communicate	 with	 trade	 associations	 and	 local	
governments	in	order	to	seek	exchange	rate	policy	adjustment,	which	would	be	elaborated	
in	more	detail	afterwards.	
	
Figure	5.8:	The	responses	of	63	Fujian	entrepreneurs	to	the	question	“What	measures	were	taken	in	
times	of	volatile	RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuations?”	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	questionnaire	data	
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	 The	questionnaires	 further	explored	 the	degree	of	difficulty	and	effectiveness	with	
which	 the	 export	 entrepreneurs	 communicated	 with	 local	 governments	 and	 trade	
associations	in	a	time	of	volatile	exchange	rate	fluctuations.	According	to	the	responses	of	
export	 entrepreneurs,	 Figures	 5.9	 and	 5.10	 together	 show	 that	 it	 was	 easier	 and	 more	
effective	for	them	to	communicate	with	trade	associations,	whereas	it	was	more	difficult	and	
less	effective	to	do	so	with	local	governments.	The	reasons	for	this	will	be	explored	in	more	
depth	in	the	following	sections.	
	
Figure	5.9:	The	responses	of	63	Fujian	entrepreneurs	to	the	question	“How	difficult	do	you	find	it	to	
communicate	with	local	governments	and	trade	associations	in	times	of	volatile	RMB	exchange	rate	
fluctuations?”	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	questionnaire	data	
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Figure	5.10:	The	responses	of	63	Fujian	entrepreneurs	to	the	question	“How	effective	do	you	find	it	
to	communicate	with	local	governments	and	trade	associations	in	times	of	volatile	RMB	exchange	
rate	fluctuations?”	
Source:	Own	elaboration	based	on	questionnaire	data	
	
5.2.2	Evidence	from	semi-structured	interviews	
Semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 Fujian	 entrepreneurs	 confirmed	 their	 difficult	 export	
situation	in	the	first	half	of	2008.	For	example,	one	export	enterprise	CEO	at	Jinjiang328	said	
that	their	business	relied	heavily	on	the	orders	from	the	US	and	faced	the	challenge	of	losing	
proposition	in	2008.	He	also	recalled	the	loss-making	business	in	the	first	quarter	of	2008:	
																																																						
328	Jinjiang	[晋江]	is	a	county-level	city	of	Quanzhou	[泉州],	and	Quanzhou	is	a	prefecture-level	city	of	Fujian	
province.	
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“The	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	dollar	was	around	7.4	in	February	2008,	but	
it	quickly	appreciated	to	around	7.2	in	March	2008	when	the	enterprise	received	
the	payment.	The	business	was	six	hundred	thousand	dollars	and	the	loss	incurred	
by	 RMB	 appreciation	 was	 twelve	 thousand	 dollars.	 Even	 though	 they	 had	
considered	the	exchange	rate	factor,	it	was	still	very	difficult	for	contract	pricing	
under	the	circumstance	that	the	RMB	appreciation	was	continuous.	If	the	contract	
pricing	was	too	high,	foreign	trade	partners	would	not	accept	it;	 if	too	low,	the	
enterprise	suffered	from	the	exchange	rate	loss.”329	
	 One	official	at	Quanzhou	Chamber	of	Commerce	for	Import	and	Export	suggested	that	
many	 labour-intensive	 export	 enterprises	 fell	 into	 a	 dilemma	 in	 the	 face	 of	 currency	
appreciation	and	cuts	in	export	rebates,	as	they	had	limited	bargaining	power:	to	raise	the	
prices	could	 lead	 to	 loss	of	orders,	whereas	not	 to	 raise	 the	prices	may	 lead	 to	 their	own	
enormous	loss.330	This	was	why	there	was	a	small	number	(7	out	of	63)	of	entrepreneurs	who	
chose	 to	 take	 the	measure	 of	 shifting	 costs	 to	 trading	 partners	 in	 times	 of	 volatile	 RMB	
exchange	rate	fluctuations	(see	Figure	5.8).	Furthermore,	most	interviewees	explicitly	stated	
or	implied	that	the	continued	currency	appreciation	imposed	a	far	more	negative	impact	on	
business	than	the	export	rebate	cut	did.	As	one	export	entrepreneurs	said:	
“With	every	two	percent	cut	of	export	rebate,	the	enterprise’s	profit	would	drop	
around	 one	 percent.	 However,	 the	 RMB	 appreciated	 6.5%	 against	 the	 dollar,	
giving	 rise	 to	 around	10%	profit	 loss	 in	 2007.	 The	RMB	appreciation	was	even	
faster	 in	 2008,	 which	 led	 to	 around	 one	 third	 profit	 loss.	 Therefore,	 the	
																																																						
329	Interview_24082015.	
330	Interview_26082015.	
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accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation	 dragged	 his	 enterprise	 into	 a	 deep	 crisis	 in	
2008.”331	
	 It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	new	labour	contract	law,	effective	from	1	January	2008,	
further	increased	costs	for	employers	by	raising	the	requirements	for	severance	pay,	which	
imposed	 additional	 pressure	 on	 China’s	 export	 enterprises.	 One	 official	 at	 Quanzhou	
Municipal	Bureau	of	Commerce	commented	that	the	rigid	rising	labour	costs	resulted	in	many	
multinational	companies	at	Fujian	moving	their	production	lines	to	Southeast	Asian	countries	
such	as	Vietnam	and	Cambodia.332	More	specifically,	Chinese	textile	and	garment	exports	to	
the	US	fell	by	1.68%	and	7.74%	respectively,	while	Vietnamese	textile	and	garment	exports	to	
the	US	 increased	29.69%	and	33.06%	 respectively	 in	 the	 first	quarter	of	2008.333	As	many	
interviewees	 confirmed,	 China’s	 demographic	 dividend	 was	 diminishing	 and	 rising	 labour	
costs	were	the	heavy	burden	of	many	labour-intensive	industries	after	2007.334	
	 During	my	interviews,	only	one	interviewee	at	a	comprehensive	high-tech	company	
that	combines	research,	production,	marketing,	service	and	export	trading	stated	that	“the	
company’s	strategy	in	response	to	the	crisis	was	to	reduce	or	even	stop	producing	those	low-
tech	and	low	value-added	products	and	to	focus	on	producing	those	higher	value-added	and	
high-end	 products	 in	 the	 difficult	 time.” 335 	In	 contrast,	 a	 great	 number	 of	 interviewees	
explicitly	stated	that	labour-intensive	industries,	particularly	textile	enterprises	and	garment	
manufacturers,	found	it	difficult	to	upgrade	production	lines	or	transfer	rising	costs	to	trade	
																																																						
331	Interview_04092015.	
332	Interview_08082015.	
333	IMF	Direction	of	Trade	Statistics,	available	from	https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=4745.	
334	Interview_15082015;	Interview_18082015;	Interview_21082015;	Interview_24082015;	
Interview_15092015.	
335	Interview_15082015.	
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partners,	and	that	they	had	no	other	choice	but	to	seek	policy	adjustment	in	times	of	extreme	
difficulty.336	
	 Against	this	backdrop,	the	only	alternative	for	export	companies	at	this	juncture	was	
to	mobilize	 resources	 to	 influence	 central	 government’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy,	 in	 order	 to	
prevent	the	RMB	from	appreciating,	or	at	least	from	rising	too	quickly.	The	following	sections	
of	the	chapter	will	elaborate	the	three	main	methods	of	export	lobbying:	first,	guanxi-based	
lobbying	through	local	governments,	second	guanxi-based	lobbying	through	local	offices	of	
central	governmental	agencies,	and	third	lobbying	through	trade	associations.	The	concept	of	
lobbying	herein	refers	to	any	effort	used	to	influence	policy,	and	more	specifically,	the	central	
government’s	exchange	rate	policy	making.	
	
5.2.3	Guanxi-based	lobbying	through	local	governments	
In	the	face	of	the	worsening	export	situation,	the	direct	way	of	exporters’	 lobbying	was	to	
communicate	with	the	local	governments	and	local	offices	of	central	governmental	agencies	
so	as	to	seek	for	exchange	rate	policy	change.	Exporters	made	use	of	their	connections	and	
relationships	(guanxi)	and	focused	their	lobbying	efforts	on	the	local	governments	where	they	
were	concentrated.337	Entrepreneurs	discussed	their	difficulties	with	municipal	government	
officials	and	pressed	them	to	persuade	Beijing	to	stop	the	currency	appreciation.	
																																																						
336	Interview_10082015;	Interview_13082015;	Interview_18082015;	Interview_22082015	(1);	
Interview_04092015;	Interview_06092015.	
337	For	a	wide-ranging	discussion	of	guanxi,	see	Thomas	Gold,	Doug	Guthrie,	and	David	Wank	(ed.)	(2002)	
Social	Connections	in	China:	Institutions,	Culture,	and	the	Changing	Nature	of	Guanxi,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	
University	Press.	
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	 Guanxi-based	 lobbying	 is	 not	 reported	 in	 Chinese	 newspapers	 or	 periodicals.	
Meanwhile,	there	are	no	records	or	documents	on	business	lobbying	in	the	Chinese	statistics	
system	and	other	government	statistics.338	Therefore,	it	has	to	be	studied	through	interviews.	
During	my	field	trip	in	Jinjiang,	many	garment	and	shoe	exporters	there	mentioned	that	they	
had	ties	(guanxi)	with	the	Jinjiang	municipal	county-level	government	and	ensured	that	the	
government	officials	got	to	know	their	opposition	to	the	worsening	exchange	rate	situation	
in	a	time	of	crisis.339	One	official	at	Jinjiang	Municipal	Bureau	of	Commerce	also	confirmed	
that	many	 local	export	entrepreneurs	communicated	their	difficulties	with	 them	 in	 formal	
and	informal	ways:	the	formal	way	was	to	disclose	their	accounting	statements	to	them,	while	
the	informal	way	was	to	treat	local	government	leaders	to	dinner	and	to	make	them	aware	
of	the	enterprises’	difficulties.340	
	 As	 China’s	 political	 system	 evaluated	 the	 local	 cadre	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	 local	
economic	 performance,	 it	 created	 strong	 incentives	 for	 the	 local	 government	 leaders	 to	
ensure	 local	economic	growth.341	In	 response	 to	 these	complaints	and	pressures	 from	the	
local	 entrepreneurs,	 the	 local	 government	 officials	 visited	 the	 local	 garment	 and	 shoe	
manufactories	from	time	to	time,	usually	every	month	in	the	first	half	of	2008,	to	find	out	
about	 their	production	and	operation.	Based	on	 field	 investigations,	 the	 local	government	
officials	 in	Jinjiang	and	Quanzhou	tried	to	persuade	the	provincial	government	to	help	the	
local	export-oriented	business.	Fujian	provincial	politicians	then	pushed	their	case	with	the	
																																																						
338	Scott	Kennedy	(2009)	“Comparing	formal	and	informal	lobbying	practices	in	China:	the	capital’s	ambivalent	
embrace	of	capitalists”,	China	Information,	Vol.23,	No.2,	p.196.	
339	Interview_22082015	(1);	Interview_22082015	(2);	Interview_24082015;		
340	Interview_20082015.	
341	For	more	in-depth	discussions	of	China’s	cadre	management	at	the	local	level,	see	Maria	Edin	(2003)	“State	
capacity	and	local	agent	control	in	China:	CCP	cadre	management	from	a	township	perspective”,	The	China	
Quarterly,	Vol.173,	pp.35-52;	Maria	Edin	(2003)	“Remaking	the	Communist	party-state:	the	cadre	
responsibility	system	at	the	local	level	in	China”,	China:	An	International	Journal,	Vol1,	No.1,	pp.1-15.	
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central	government,	advising	the	leadership	that	more	favourable	exchange	rate	and	export	
rebate	policies	were	necessary	to	prevent	mass	bankruptcies	and	social	unrest.	For	instance,	
one	interviewee	from	the	Jinjiang	Municipal	Bureau	of	Commerce	revealed	that	the	Fujian	
provincial	economic	report	submitted	to	the	State	Council	in	early	2008	suggested	that:	
“It	is	imperative	to	stabilize	the	foreign	trade	policy,	particularly	the	exchange	rate	
policy.	 The	 RMB	 appreciation	 should	 slow	 down	 moderately.	 Industrial	
transformation	and	upgrading	is	necessary,	but	should	be	pushed	in	a	steady	way.	
In	the	process	government	should	implement	large	amounts	of	investment	funds	
to	 support	 R&D	 and	 innovation.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 process	 of	 export	 structure	
adjustment	should	be	market-oriented,	rather	than	based	on	the	administrative	
emphasis	on	high-end	technology.	It	is	important	to	prevent	the	rapid	shrinking	
of	 traditional	 labour-intensive	 exports,	 which	 may	 trigger	 a	 large	 number	 of	
business	failures	and	corresponding	unemployment.”342	
	 The	 fieldwork	 further	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 local	
politics	and	local	economic	actors.	This	suggests	that	the	provincial	government	in	many	ways	
is	not	 really	 local	 in	any	meaningful	way,	and	that	 really	“local”	politics	 takes	place	at	 the	
prefecture	and	county	levels.	Brown	recognizes	that	“local	officials	were	on	the	front	line	in	
relationships	between	one	of	the	most	difficult	groups	in	contemporary	China,	the	farmers,	
and	 the	state.”343	This	 is	 true	 for	prefecture	and	county-level	governments.	The	provincial	
government	 is	 responsive	 to	 the	 local	 lower-level	 government	 and	 passes	 information	
(including	the	issues	and	problems	of	local	politics)	to	the	central	government.	Yet	the	real	
																																																						
342	Interview_20082015.	
343	Kerry	Brown	(2014)	Contemporary	China,	Palgrave	Macmillan,	p.93.	
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interaction	between	state	and	non-state	actors	typically	takes	place	at	a	much	lower	level	of	
the	administrative	hierarchy.	
	
5.2.4	Guanxi-based	lobbying	through	local	offices	of	central	governmental	agencies	
Besides	lobbying	the	local	government,	exporters	could	also	make	use	of	their	connections	
(guanxi)	 to	 discuss	 their	 difficulties	 with	 local	 officials	 of	 central	 government	 agencies,	
particular	MOFCOM,	 and	 pressed	 them	 to	 influence	 central	 government’s	 exchange	 rate	
policy.	The	 local	officials	of	MOFCOM	served	as	middlemen	to	pass	along	 the	concerns	of	
China’s	export	enterprises	to	the	MOFCOM	and	further	to	the	State	Council.	“The	lobbying	
groups	organized	in	the	form	of	MOFCOM’s	regional	branches	exerted	a	very	strong	influence	
on	the	key	officials	in	MOFCOM	and	State	Council,	and	they	usually	exaggerated	the	negative	
impacts	of	RMB	appreciation	on	China’s	export	sector,	hence	constraining	the	policy	options	
of	the	State	Council,”	noted	a	professor	of	political	economy	from	Xiamen	University.344	
	 As	with	 the	 local	 government	 leaders,	 the	political	 achievements	of	officials	 in	 the	
MOFCOM’s	regional	branches	depended	at	least	in	part	on	the	flourishing	of	China’s	export	
sector.345	In	 the	 first	half	of	2008,	several	MOFCOM’s	regional	branches,	 including	but	not	
limited	to	Jiangsu,	Guangdong,	Shanghai	and	Liaoning,	conducted	field	research	to	empirically	
analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 on	 different	 industries	 in	 different	 regions.	 The	
research	reports	generally	echoed	local	interests	and	became	important	policy	inputs	for	the	
central	 government’s	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 making.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Jiangsu	 report	
																																																						
344	Interview_28072015.	
345	MOFCOM’s	local	branch	at	the	provincial	level	is	called	Shangwuting	(商务厅);	MOFCOM’s	local	branch	at	
the	municipal	level	is	called	Shangwuju	(商务局).	
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emphasized	that	the	textile	and	garment	export	sectors	could	no	longer	bear	the	continued	
RMB	appreciation	in	the	second	half	of	2008:	
“In	 the	 following	 six	 months,	 a	 6.15%	 appreciation	 of	 RMB	 against	 the	 dollar	
would	impose	serious	impacts	on	the	textile	and	garment	export	enterprises	in	
Jiangsu.	 First,	 the	 textile	 and	 garment	 export	 growth	would	 decrease	 to	 zero.	
Second,	there	would	be	significant	decline	in	profits	of	textile	and	garment	export	
enterprises.	 A	 large	 number	 of	 enterprises	 would	 collapse,	 thereby	 affecting	
employment	and	social	stability.	 If	there	were	no	relevant	support	policies,	the	
continued	RMB	appreciation	would	bring	enormous	downside	risks	to	exports	of	
textile	and	garment	industry.”346	
	 The	Guangzhou	report	also	confirmed	the	negative	 impact	of	RMB	appreciation	on	
export	enterprises:	“with	every	1	percent	of	RMB	appreciation	against	the	dollar,	the	total	
exports	 of	 Guangdong	 province	 would	 drop	 2.37	 percent,	 the	 exports	 of	 general	 trade	
enterprises	would	drop	5.79	percent	and	the	exports	of	process	trade	enterprises	would	drop	
1.44	 percent.”347 	It	 was	 also	 explicitly	 suggested	 that	 “the	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 should	
proceed	as	gradually	as	possible,	rather	than	in	one	step,	so	that	export	enterprises	would	
gradually	 raise	 risk	 awareness	 and	 then	 establish	 and	 improve	 the	 exchange	 rate	 risk	
prevention	mechanism.”348	
																																																						
346	MOFCOM,	“RMB	appreciation	and	enterprise	competitiveness:	empirical	analysis	of	mechanical	and	
electrical	industries	and	textile	and	garment	industries	in	Jiangsu	[人民币升值与企业竞争力研究：基于江苏
机电产业和纺织服装产业的实证分析]”,	retrieved	from	
http://kjxh.mofcom.gov.cn/article/r/200811/20081105883828.shtml	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
347	MOFCOM,	“RMB	appreciation	and	enterprise	competitiveness:	empirical	analysis	of	labour-intensive	
industries	and	processing	trade	industries	in	Guangdong	[人民币升值与企业竞争力研究：基于广东劳动密
集型产业和加工贸易产业的实证分析]”,	retrieved	from	
http://kjxh.mofcom.gov.cn/article/r/200811/20081105883925.shtml	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
348	Ibid.	
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	 However,	 it	 is	worth	pointing	out	that	although	the	guanxi-based	 lobbying	through	
local	 governments	 and	 local	 offices	 of	 central	 governmental	 agencies	 was	 direct	 and	
straightforward,	 it	 took	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 time	 to	 influence	 central	 government’s	
exchange	rate	policy	making.	As	confirmed	by	several	interviewees,	the	various	levels	of	local	
governments	 in	 China’s	 administrative	 divisions	 became	 the	 major	 obstacle. 349 	It	 was	
conventional	wisdom	that	it	was	easier	to	engage	with	the	lower	levels	of	local	governments	
directly	 and	 more	 difficult	 to	 reach	 the	 higher	 levels	 of	 local	 governments.	 However,	 it	
definitely	took	time	to	transfer	information	from	county-level	or	municipal	governments	to	
provincial	governments,	and	further	to	the	central	government.	For	instance,	the	RMB	began	
to	appreciate	against	 the	dollar	at	a	 faster	pace	 in	 the	 fourth	quarter	of	2007.	The	Fujian	
provincial	government’s	economic	report	was	drafted	 in	May	2008,	which	took	more	than	
half	 a	 year	 in	 total.	 The	 reports	 on	 RMB	 appreciation	 and	 enterprise	 competitiveness	 by	
MOFCOM’s	 regional	 branches	 came	 even	 later.	 The	 reports	 were	 drafted	 in	 the	 second	
quarter	of	2008,	and	the	final	versions	did	not	get	published	until	October	2008.	Therefore,	
many	export	entrepreneurs	also	lobbied	through	trade	association	to	seek	more	timely	policy	
rescue	from	the	central	government.	
	
																																																						
349	Interview_02082015;	Interview_18082015;	Interview_26082015;	Interview_04092015.	Moreover,	the	
vertical	configuration	of	Chinese	governments	is	more	conducive	to	top-down	administrative	governance	
rather	than	bottom-up	political	participation.	See,	for	example,	Kai-Yuen	Tsui	and	Youqiang	Wang,	
“Decentralization	with	political	trump:	Vertical	control,	local	accountability	and	regional	disparities	in	China”,	
China	Economic	Review,	Vol.19,	No.1,	pp.18-31;	Jinjun	Wang	(2014)	“Vertical	power	structure	and	social	
governance:	An	approach	to	the	relationship	of	‘government	and	society’	in	China	[纵向政府权力结构与社会
治理：中国‘政府与社会’关系的一个分析路径]”,	Zhejiang	Social	Sciences	[浙江社会科学],	No.9,	pp.128-
139.	
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5.2.5	Lobbying	through	trade	associations	
The	 other	 more	 effective	 way	 used	 by	 the	 export	 companies	 was	 to	 lobby	 the	 central	
government	or	government	departments	through	trade	associations.	Trade	associations	for	
labour-intensive	enterprises	began	to	lobby	for	slower	RMB	appreciation	and	cuts	of	export	
rebate	rates	in	the	early	2008.	They	argued	that	if	the	government	did	not	take	any	measure,	
large	 quantities	 of	 labour-intensive	 enterprises	would	 go	 bankrupt,	 thousands	 of	workers	
would	be	laid	off,	and	the	social	stability	would	therefore	be	threatened.	As	one	of	the	most	
severely	hit	industries,	the	textile	industry	was	a	typical	example	of	this	case.	
	 As	 confirmed	by	 several	 interviewees,	 the	 textile	and	garments	exporters	 in	Fujian	
began	 to	 actively	 seek	 policy	 adjustments	 through	 two	 trade	 associations:	 Fujian	 Textile	
Industry	Association	 (FTIA)	 [福建省纺织行业协会]	 and	 Fujian	Chamber	of	 Commerce	 for	
Import	and	Export	(FCCIE)	[福建省进出口商会].	FTIA	established	itself	as	a	bridge	between	
government	 and	 enterprises.350 	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 FTIA	 conveyed	 the	 national	 economic	
policies	 to	 the	member	enterprises;	 on	 the	other	hand,	 FTIA	 represented	 the	 interests	of	
member	 enterprises,	 and	 communicated	 more	 effectively	 with	 governments	 and	 other	
organizations.	More	 importantly,	 FTIA	 collaborated	 horizontally	with	 trade	 associations	 in	
other	provinces,	such	as	Jiangsu	Textile	Association	and	Guangdong	Textile	Association,	to	
jointly	collect	the	information	that	the	local	export	enterprises	faced	enormous	difficulties	in	
the	 face	 of	 currency	 appreciation	 and	 export	 rebate	 cuts	 and	 reflect	 the	 situation	 to	 the	
corresponding	higher	organization.351	
																																																						
350	“Introduction	to	Fujian	Textile	Industry	Association	[福建省纺织行业协会简介]”,	retrieved	from	
http://www.afta.org.cn/about.asp	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
351	Interview_03082015.	
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	 In	response	to	the	appeals	of	local	textile	trade	associations,	China	National	Textile	&	
Apparel	Council	 (CNTAC)	 [中国纺织工业协会],	 as	 the	national	 textile	 industry	association	
centred	 at	 Beijing,	 formed	 six	 research	 teams	 to	 tour	 six	 typical	 provinces	 to	 survey	 the	
situations	of	the	local	textile	industries	in	early	March	2008.	The	six	provinces	were	Jiangsu,	
Fujian,	 Zhejiang,	 Shandong,	Guangdong,	 and	Hebei,	whose	 textile	 exports	 represented	 85	
percent	of	the	total.	After	the	survey,	CNTAC	representatives	concluded	that	the	profit	margin	
of	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 textile	 enterprises	 was	 only	 0.62%,	 and	 that	 each	 province’s	 textile	
industry	was	facing	imminent	danger,	which	would	jeopardize	the	jobs	of	about	15	million	
people.352	After	that,	they	summarized	the	situation	in	a	report	and	submitted	it	directly	to	
the	State	Council.	CNTAC	proposed	2	percent	rollback	of	the	export	tax	rebate	rate	of	textile	
industry	 to	13	percent	and	4	percent	adjustment	of	 the	export	 tax	 rebate	 rate	of	apparel	
industry	to	15	percent,	so	as	to	give	the	textile	industry	a	chance	to	weather	the	difficulties.353	
	 The	 other	 channel	 of	 lobbying	 was	 through	 chambers	 of	 commerce.	 FCCIE	 was	
established	 in	2003	to	represent	 the	 interests	of	member	enterprises	and	to	promote	the	
development	 of	 international	 trade	 in	 Fujian. 354 	According	 to	 a	 FCCIE	 official,	 the	
representatives	in	the	FCCIE	mainly	included	entrepreneurs	from	export	companies	as	well	as	
retired	governmental	officials	who	previously	held	senior-level	positions	in	the	MOFCOM	or	
provincial	 level	 Bureau	 of	 Commerce.	 The	 former	 ministerial	 and	 provincial	 government	
officials	often	used	their	informal	patronage	networks	and	other	political	resources	to	lobby	
																																																						
352	“Textile	industry	faces	imminent	danger	[纺织业生存告急]”,	22	March	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20080322/14554655553.shtml	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
353	“The	first	step	in	textile	industry	rescue:	rollback	the	export	tax	rebate	rate	2	percent	[纺织业救市第一
步：出口退税率部分回调 2%]”,	1	August	2008,	retrieved	from	
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354	“Introduction	to	Fujian	Chamber	of	Commerce	for	Import	and	Export	[福建省进出口商会简介]”,	retrieved	
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for	 policies	 in	 favour	 of	 their	 interests. 355 	They	 could	 not	 only	 communicate	 with	 the	
incumbent	 provincial	 level	 government	 leaders,	 but	 also	 put	 the	 case	 forward	 to	 higher	
chamber	of	commerce.	
	 In	 response	 to	 the	 appeals	 of	 local	 chambers	 of	 commerce,	 China	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce	 for	 Import	and	Export	of	Textile	and	Apparel	 (CCCT)	 [中国纺织品进出口商会]	
started	investigation	on	the	situation	of	textile	industry	in	February	2008	and	submitted	its	
report	to	the	MOFCOM	in	early	May,	recommending	an	adjustment	of	textile	trade	policy.	
The	report	argued	that	if	the	government	stayed	aloof,	large	amounts	of	small	and	medium	
enterprises	would	go	bankrupt,	thousands	of	workers	would	be	laid	off,	and	the	livelihoods	
of	 the	 20	 million	 people	 employed	 in	 the	 textile	 industry	 would	 be	 threatened.356 	CCCT	
requested	that	the	best	outcome	would	be	to	increase	the	export	rebate	rate	to	17	percent.357	
	 The	efforts	of	textile	trade	associations	and	chambers	of	commerce	were	successful.	
Their	research	reports	on	the	situations	of	local	textile	industry	finally	got	a	response	from	
the	central	government.	In	late	April	2008,	Zhang	Xiaoqiang	[张晓强],	a	deputy	director	of	
NDRC,	argued	that	“China’s	labour-intensive	industries	are	the	driving	force	for	employment,	
which	also	helps	increase	farmers’	income.	It	is	impossible	for	China	to	completely	abandon	
comparative	advantage	of	cheap	labour	in	the	short	term.	Close	attention	must	be	paid	to	the	
current	 status	 of	 labour-intensive	 industries.” 358 	Fu	 Ziying	 [傅自应 ],	 a	 vice-minister	 of	
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MOFCOM,	also	proposed	 that	“China	must	 stabilize	exports	of	 labour-intensive	 industries,	
especially	the	steady	growth	of	textile	and	garment	trade,	to	allow	time	for	product	upgrade	
and	industrial	transformation.”359	In	late	May,	China’s	Ministry	of	Industry	and	Information	
Technology	 issued	an	opinion	 letter	which	 strove	 to	 the	alleviate	 the	difficulties	of	 textile	
industry,	and	also	sought	suggestions	and	recommendations	from	NDRC,	MOFCOM,	PBOC,	
CNTAC	 and	 other	 organizations.	 The	 recommendations	 mainly	 referred	 to	 adjusting	 the	
export	 tax	 rebates	 to	 the	 previous	 level	 and	 taking	 measures	 to	 slow	 down	 the	 RMB	
appreciation,	so	as	to	relieve	the	difficult	situations	of	the	textile	and	garment	industry.360	
	
5.3	The	top	leadership	concerned	
The	 central	 government	 faced	 considerable	 pressure	 to	 raise	 export	 rebate	 rates	 and	
maintain	the	stability	of	RMB	exchange	rate.	Furthermore,	information	from	various	channels	
on	 decline	 of	 exports,	 unfavourable	 employment	 situation,	 and	 failure	 of	 businesses	
frequently	reached	the	central	government.	This	was	no	longer	merely	an	economic	problem,	
but	 rather	 an	 issue	 of	 political	 stability,	 because	 unemployment	 in	 the	 coastal	 industries	
would	intensify	the	problem	of	the	tide	of	migrant	labourers	returning	to	their	hometowns,	
which	may	give	rise	to	social	unrest.	
	 As	a	result,	the	top	leadership	held	several	internal	meetings	to	discuss	the	issue	and	
finally	 decided	 to	 tour	 the	 key	manufacturing	 centres	 in	 the	 coastal	 provinces.	 Particular	
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attention	was	paid	to	the	textile	industry.	Intensive	research	and	investigation	began	in	early	
July	2008.	Premier	Wen	Jiabao	went	on	an	inspection	trip	to	Jiangsu	and	Shanghai	on	4-6	July.	
Wen	was	particularly	concerned	with	the	textile	industry.	He	personally	visited	the	Wuxi	No.1	
Cotton	Mill	[无锡第一棉纺织厂],	where	local	governments	arranged	meetings	between	Wen	
and	 entrepreneurs	 from	 the	 electronic	 and	 textile	 industries.	 Wen	 heard	 about	 their	
difficulties	and	discussed	ways	to	overcome	the	difficulties	with	the	heads	of	enterprises.361	
	 The	then	vice-president	Xi	Jinping,	the	former	Governor	of	Fujian	province	and	Party	
Secretary	 of	 Zhejiang	 province,	 expressed	 sympathy	 for	 the	 exporters	 during	 his	 visit	 to	
Guangdong	 province	 on	 4-5	 July.	 After	 Xi	 learned	 that	 some	 enterprises	 experienced	 a	
substantial	decline	in	production	because	of	the	weakening	foreign	demand	and	rising	oil	and	
raw	material	prices,	he	explicitly	called	for	ministerial	and	provincial	government	officials	who	
accompanied	him	to	implement	policies	to	help	out	these	industries.362	
	 The	 vice-premier	 Li	 Keqiang	 and	Minister	 of	 Commerce	 Chen	 Deming	went	 on	 an	
inspection	 trip	 to	Zhejiang,	with	a	particular	 focus	on	 the	performance	of	export-oriented	
enterprises	 on	 6-8	 July.	 In	 the	 economic	 performance	 symposium	 that	 included	
representatives	 of	 both	 enterprises	 and	 government	 departments,	 Li	 listened	 to	 the	
entrepreneurs	 talking	 about	 their	 difficulties	 and	 stated	 that	 officials	 at	 various	 levels	 of	
																																																						
361	“Wen	Jiabao	stressed	to	promote	sound	and	rapid	economic	development	when	inspecting	Jiangsu	and	
Shanghai	[温家宝在苏沪调研时强调推动经济又好又快发展]”,	6	July,	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/06/content_8499192.htm	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
362	“Xi	Jinping	inspected	Guangdong	documentary	[习近平视察广东纪实]”,	7	July	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/xijinpingshenzhen/content-4/detail_2008_07/07/788396_0.shtml	
(accessed	20/09/2016).	
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government	 should	 help	 address	 the	 difficulties,	 especially	 those	 of	 small	 and	 medium	
enterprises.363	
	 The	vice-premier	Wang	Qishan	also	went	on	an	inspection	trip	to	Shandong	on	3-5	July	
to	 investigate	 the	 situation	 and	 difficulties	 of	 export	 enterprises.	 He	 demanded	 that	 the	
relevant	governmental	departments	should	help	export	companies	over	the	difficulties	in	a	
time	of	crisis	and	that	enterprises	should	upgrade	products	and	improve	competitiveness.364	
	 Based	on	intensive	research	and	investigation	in	early	July	2008,	the	top	leadership	
was	convinced	that	China’s	export	situation	was	severe	and	that	prompt	counter	measures	
should	be	taken.	In	the	July	2008	Central	Politburo	meeting,	the	Central	Politburo	members	
recognized	the	dramatic	change	of	China’s	economic	fundamentals,	incurred	by	the	several	
problems	 of	 domestic	 severe	 natural	 disasters 365 	and	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis.	
Although	 emphasis	 was	 still	 placed	 on	 inflation	 control,	 the	 other	 top	 priority	 of	
macroeconomic	 management	 was	 switched	 from	 “preventing	 relatively	 fast	 economic	
growth	from	becoming	overheated”	to	“maintaining	steady	and	relatively	fast	growth	of	the	
economy”. 366 	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 PSC	 instructed	 the	 PBOC	 to	 stop	 the	 fast	 RMB	
appreciation	in	the	middle	of	July.	On	the	other	hand,	the	PSC	also	required	the	MOF	to	adjust	
																																																						
363	“Li	Keqiang	visits	Zhejiang	to	investigate	the	economic	performance	[李克强在浙江考察经济运行情况]”,	8	
July	2008,	retrieved	from	http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2008-07/09/content_15977912.htm	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
364	“Wang	Qishan’s	three-day	inspection	to	Yantai	and	Weihai:	hot	money,	renminbi,	and	enterprises	[王岐山
烟台威海三日调研：热钱、人民币、企业]”,	10	July	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200807/0710_17_644323.shtml	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
365	A	magnitude	7.9	earthquake	struck	Wenchuan	in	Sichuan	province	on	12	May	2008.	The	Sichuan	Wenchuan	
Earthquake	is	the	largest	earthquake	in	PRC’s	history	in	terms	of	socio-economic	losses.	See	“Sichuan	
Wenchuan	Earthquake	[四川汶川地震]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	retrieved	from	
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/kzjz/	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
366	“Central	Politburo	holds	a	meeting	to	analyze	the	current	economic	situation	and	next	year’s	economic	
work	[政治局召开会议	分析当前经济形势研究明年经济工作]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	25	July	2008,	
retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/25/content_8770081.htm	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
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the	export	rebate	rates	for	the	most	difficult	industries,	such	as	textiles	and	apparels,	in	late	
July.367	
	
5.4	Stagnation	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform,	July	2008	to	June	2010	
Under	the	guidance	of	PSC,	there	was	a	significant	change	in	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	third	
quarter	of	2008,	according	to	the	PBOC	monetary	policy	implementation	reports.	The	third-
quarter	monetary	policy	implementation	report	did	not	mention,	as	most	previous	reports	
did,	the	use	of	the	market	mechanism	in	deciding	the	value	of	the	RMB.	Instead,	the	third-
quarter	report	described	the	exchange	rate	policy	as	“maintaining	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
stable” 368 	–	 a	 striking	 departure	 from	 “continuing	 to	 enhance	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
flexibility”369	in	the	first-quarter	and	second-quarter	reports.	
	 As	Figure	5.11	shows,	the	PBOC	stopped	the	RMB	appreciation	in	mid-July	2008	and	
depreciated	the	currency	until	mid-August	2008.	After	that,	the	RMB	experienced	some	two-
way	fluctuations	but	the	band	was	very	limited.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	dollar	
remained	 stable	 at	 around	 6.83	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2008.	 During	 several	 periods	 of	 RMB	
																																																						
367	The	MOF	announces	that	starting	from	1	August	2008,	China	will	raise	export	rebates	for	textile	and	apparel	
from	11%	to	13%	and	increase	export	rebate	for	bamboo	products	to	11%.	See	“Ministry	of	Finance	and	State	
Administration	of	Taxation’s	announcement	on	lower	export	tax	rebate	rates	of	some	commodities	[财政部、
国家税务总局关于调低部分商品出口退税率的通知]”,	30	July	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810765/n812171/n812700/c1191582/content.html	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
368	PBOC,	“2008	Third	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○八年第三季度中国货币政策执
行报告]”,	retrieved	from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11633_1.pdf	(accessed	
20/09/2016),	p.6.	
369	PBOC,	“2008	First	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○八年第一季度中国货币政策执行
报告]”,	retrieved	from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11631_1.pdf	(accessed	
20/09/2016),	p.9;	PBOC,	“2008	Second	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○○八年第二季度
中国货币政策执行报告]”,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/history_file/files/att_11632_1.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016),	p.10.	
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depreciation,	 there	 existed	 widespread	 speculation	 that	 China	 would	 promote	 exports	
through	currency	devaluation,	to	which	China’s	top	leadership	expressed	firm	opposition.	The	
PBOC	 responded	 to	 the	market	panic	 that	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	would	not	 continue	 to	
devalue.370	The	MOFCOM	Minster	Chen	Deming	also	remarked	that	he	would	not	expect	to	
promote	 exports	 through	 currency	 devaluation	 and	 the	 recent	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
fluctuations	 were	 completely	 normal. 371 	Wen	 Jiabao	 further	 asserted	 that	 China	 had	 no	
intention	to	pursue	trade	surplus	and	would	keep	its	currency	at	the	reasonable	and	stable	
level.372	
	
Figure	5.11:	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar,	from	1	July	2008	to	1	January	2009	
Source:	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Department	
	 However,	before	we	come	to	the	conclusion	that	the	level	III	game	provided	the	most	
important	source	for	the	stagnation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	in	the	second	half	of	
																																																						
370	“The	PBOC	responds	to	RMB	hitting	the	decline	limit:	the	exchange	rate	will	not	continue	to	devalue	[央行
回应人民币跌停：目前汇率尚未进入贬值通道]”,	3	December	2008,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2008-12/03/content_10449602.htm	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
371	“MOFCOM	minister:	recent	RMB	exchange	rate	fluctuations	“completely	normal”	[商务部长：人民币汇率
最近波动“完全正常”]”,	4	December	2008,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-12/04/content_10457783.htm	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
372	“Wen	Jiabao	defends	the	RMB	exchange	rate	policy	[温家宝为人民币汇率政策辩护]”,	30	January	2009,	
The	Financial	Times	Chinese,	retrieved	from	http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001024407?full=y	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
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2008,	it	is	necessary	to	emphasise	that	the	interest	group	lobbying	and	the	policy	adjustment	
of	 both	 exchange	 rate	 and	 export	 rebate	 tax	 happened	 before	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 global	
financial	 crisis	 really	hit,	 so	 that	we	 can	 somehow	 separate	 the	 “normal”	 consequence	of	
accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation	 out	 from	 the	 “extraordinary”	 consequence	 of	 the	 global	
financial	 crisis.373	A	comparison	of	China’s	export	growth	 in	 the	years	of	2007-2009	would	
shed	light	on	the	different	consequences.	As	Figure	5.12	shows,	China’s	export	continued	to	
grow	in	2008,	although	the	growth	rate	was	 lower	than	that	 in	2007.	This	 is	 the	“normal”	
consequences	 of	 accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation,	 and	 implies	 that	 the	 exporters	 perceived	
their	 difficult	 situation	 caused	 by	 the	 accelerated	 RMB	 appreciation,	 which	 has	 been	
discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 Fujian	 case	 study,	 and	 that	 they	 lobbied	 based	 on	 this	 belief.	
Therefore,	the	stagnation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	in	the	second	half	of	2008	should	
be	more	a	political	analysis	than	an	economic	one.	
	
Figure	5.12:	China’s	monthly	export	growth	rate,	from	2007	to	2009	
Source:	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	PRC	
																																																						
373	The	author	thanks	Shaun	Breslin	for	his	insight	of	the	different	consequences	of	the	RMB	appreciation	and	
the	global	financial	crisis.	
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	 By	contrast,	when	it	came	to	late	2008	and	2009,	it	was	not	just	a	matter	of	export	
growth	declining,	but	of	an	actual	fall	in	exports.	While	exports	were	growing	by	an	average	
of	more	than	20	per	cent	month	on	month	for	most	of	the	year,	in	November	2008	they	fell	
dramatically	by	2.2	per	 cent.	 Therefore,	China’s	 economy	 faced	 the	external	 shock	of	 the	
global	 financial	crisis	at	 the	end	of	2008,	and	the	Chinese	 leadership	rolled	out	a	series	of	
rescue	policies,	including	the	fiscal	stimulus	package	and	loose	monetary	policy	in	2009.	Amid	
turbulent	 times	 of	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 Chinese	 leaders	 stressed	 the	 top	 priority	 of	
“maintaining	steady	and	relatively	fast	economic	growth”	at	the	Central	Politburo	meeting.374	
Furthermore,	at	the	Central	Economic	Work	Conference	at	the	end	of	2008,	Chinese	leaders	
reaffirmed	the	priority	and	also	discussed	the	exchange	rate	issue,	explicitly	stating	that	the	
RMB	 would	 remain	 stable,	 rather	 than	 depreciate	 substantially.	 There	 were	 mainly	 two	
reasons	for	this:	
“First,	substantial	devaluation	will	result	in	asset	prices	plunge.	It	will	cause	large-
scale	 foreign	 capital	 flight	 and	 more	 severe	 shock	 to	 the	 housing	 and	 stock	
markets,	which	is	at	odds	with	the	current	target	of	maintaining	stability.	Second,	
China’s	 devaluation	 may	 lead	 to	 further	 depreciations	 of	 the	 neighbouring	
countries.	 It	 is	 neither	 conducive	 to	 Asia’s	 financial	 stability	 nor	 conducive	 to	
enhancing	the	international	status	of	the	yuan.”375	
	 Under	 these	 circumstances,	China’s	 exchange	 rate	 remained	 stable	at	 around	6.83	
RMB/dollar.	 Extremely	 limited	 flexibility	 of	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 was	 allowed	 in	 2009.	
																																																						
374	“Hu	Jintao	stressed	to	place	stable	and	relatively	fast	economic	growth	as	top	priority	[胡锦涛强调：把保
持经济平稳较快发展作为首要任务]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	29	November	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-11/29/content_10431026.htm	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
375	“Central	Economic	Work	Conference	researches	the	exchange	rate	issue	and	RMB	will	not	depreciate	
substantially	[中央经济会议研究汇率问题	人民币不会大幅贬值]”,	10	December	2008,	retrieved	from	
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/222/2322/8492789.html	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
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China’s	leaders	officially	still	claimed	the	exchange	rate	regime	as	managed	floating,	as	they	
had	 done	 since	 1994. 376 	Yet	 practically,	 China	 returned	 to	 the	 de	 facto	 dollar-pegged	
exchange	rate	regime	until	June	2010	(see	Figure	5.13).	
	
Figure	5.13:	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar,	from	21	July	2005	to	18	June	2010	
Source:	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Department	
	
5.5	Implications	of	exchange	rate	reform	stagnation	
After	 China	 halted	 its	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2008,	 many	 observers	
criticised	 the	protectionist	policy	as	a	 step	back	 that	 could	give	 rise	 to	 currency	wars	and	
exacerbate	global	imbalance.377	In	retrospect,	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	was	a	component	
																																																						
376	Lionel	Barber,	“Transcript:	Wen	Jiabao”,	Financial	Times,	2	February	2009,	retrieved	from	
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-11dd-8790-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz4539B7huI	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
377	See	for	example,	“China’s	currency:	a	yuan-sided	argument”,	The	Economist,	18	November	2009,	retrieved	
from	http://www.economist.com/node/14901104	(accessed	20/09/2016);	Martin	Wolf,	“Why	China’s	
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of	 a	 policy	 package	 in	 response	 to	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 which	 was	 not	 abnormal	
considering	the	unconventional	monetary	policies	of	the	other	major	economies.	Moreover,	
it	did	not	constitute	the	final	word	on	China’s	exchange	rate	reform,	as	China	re-initiated	the	
exchange	rate	reform	in	2010.	This	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.	Yet	
the	stagnation	of	exchange	rate	reform	suggested	important	implications	of	China’s	politics.	
	 The	short-lived	acceleration	of	RMB	appreciation	 in	2008	and	China’s	return	to	the	
dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime	suggest	that	stability	maintenance	and	short-term	crisis	
management	prevailed	over	 long-term	planning	 in	 the	 formation	of	economic	policy.	 This	
does	not	mean	that	the	Chinese	leadership	was	short-sighted	and	lack	of	long-term	thinking.	
Indeed,	Chinese	leaders	were	long	aware	of	the	disadvantages	of	over	dependence	on	the	
export	 and	 the	 US	 dollar.	 They	 had	 also	 made	 a	 public	 commitment	 to	 addressing	 the	
economic	imbalance.	For	example,	Wen	Jiabao	had	officially	used	very	serious	words	such	as	
“unstable,	 unbalanced,	 uncoordinated	 and	 unsustainable”	 to	 describe	 the	 conditions	 of	
China’s	economy,	and	stressed	that	China	should	restructure	and	rebalance	its	economy	for	
sustainable	growth.378	In	Wen’s	words:	
“The	unstable	matter	is	that	China	has	an	excessively	high	investment	growth	rate,	
excessively	 large	 extension	 of	 credit,	 excessive	 liquidity	 of	 the	 currency,	 and	
improper	 foreign	 trade	 and	 international	 payment	 [emphasis	 added].	 The	
unbalanced	issue	is	that	China	has	unbalanced	development	between	urban	and	
																																																						
exchange	rate	policy	concerns	us”,	Financial	Times,	8	December	2009,	retrieved	from	
https://next.ft.com/content/afac7ada-e448-11de-bed0-00144feab49a	(accessed	20/09/2016);	Martin	Wolf,	
“How	to	fight	the	currency	wars	with	stubborn	China”,	Financial	Times,	5	October	2010,	retrieved	from	
https://next.ft.com/content/52b8a8e4-d0b0-11df-8667-00144feabdc0	(accessed	20/09/2016);	George	Soros,	
“China	must	fix	the	global	currency	crisis”,	Financial	Times,	7	October	2010,	retrieved	from	
https://next.ft.com/content/f4dd9122-d22a-11df-8fbe-00144feabdc0	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
378	“Premier	Wen	Jiabao	Press	Conference	[温家宝总理答中外记者问]”,	State	Council	Bulletin	[国务院公报],	
16	March	2007,	retrieved	from	http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2007/content_595145.htm	(accessed	
20/09/2016).	
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rural	 areas,	 between	 different	 regions,	 and	 between	 economic	 expansion	 and	
social	 progress.	 The	 uncoordinated	matter	 is	 that	 the	 primary,	 secondary	 and	
tertiary	 industries	 are	 not	 coordinated,	 investment	 and	 consumption	 are	 not	
coordinated,	 and	China’s	 economic	 growth	 relies	 too	much	 on	 investment	 and	
export	 [emphasis	 added].	 The	 unsustainable	 issue	 is	 that	 China	 does	 not	
effectively	address	 the	 issues	 related	 to	energy	saving,	emission	reduction	and	
environmental	 protection.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 sustainable	 development,	China	
needs	 to	 boost	 domestic	 consumption	 [emphasis	 added],	 push	 forward	 reform	
and	 opening-up,	 remove	 institutional	 obstacles,	 encourage	 intellectual	 and	
technological	 innovation,	 and	 make	 more	 efforts	 to	 save	 energy	 and	 reduce	
emissions.”379	
	 However,	in	practice,	Chinese	leaders	were	most	concerned	with	social	stability	and	
obsessed	with	growth,	often	at	the	expense	of	economic	rebalancing.	The	gradual,	 limited	
nature	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	reform	was	a	good	illustration.	The	half-hearted	reform	
was	even	more	evident	in	times	of	crisis.	China’s	response	to	both	the	1997	Asian	financial	
crisis	and	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	resonated	with	this	argument.	With	regard	to	the	
1997	 Asian	 financial	 crisis,	 Breslin	 argues	 that	 “the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 response	 to	 the	
regional	crises	[Asian	financial	crisis]	illuminates	their	perceptions	of	the	importance	of	export	
growth.”380	Specifically,	
“China’s	leaders	appear	to	have	been	very	fearful	of	a	global	turndown	in	demand.	
For	example,	as	the	rate	of	the	growth	of	exports	slowed	in	the	first	third	of	1997	
																																																						
379	Ibid.	
380	Shaun	Breslin	(1999)	“The	politics	of	Chinese	trade	and	the	Asian	financial	crises:	questioning	the	wisdom	of	
export-led	growth”,	Third	World	Quarterly,	Vol.20,	No.6,	p.1194.	
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in	the	wake	of	the	Asian	financial	crisis,	the	minister	in	charge	of	foreign	trade,	
Wu	Yi,	appeared	on	national	television	warning	of	the	dangers	of	slowing	growth	
rates	for	employment	and	social	stability.	This	was	not	a	case	of	exports	actually	
declining	–	exports	were	still	growing	at	over	11%	over	the	previous	years	–	but	
simply	 that	 they	were	 not	 growing	 fast	 enough	 as	 far	 as	 the	 government	was	
concerned.”381	
	 As	to	the	2008	global	financial	crisis,	this	had	an	immediate	negative	effect	on	Chinese	
exports	 and	 thus	 threatened	 China’s	 economic	 trajectory	 significantly,	 revealing	 the	
vulnerability	of	export-oriented	economic	growth	model.	However,	China’s	crisis	 response	
once	again	revealed	the	Chinese	leadership’s	short-term	prioritisation	to	preserve	the	growth	
and	stability	over	the	long-term	economic	rebalancing.	Hung	recognized	that	China’s	export-
oriented	 industrialization	 faced	 enormous	 challenge	 and	 turned	 to	 debt-financed,	 state-
driven	investment	to	maintain	the	economic	growth.382	More	critically,	Jiang	defined	China’s	
crisis	response	as	“vulgarised	version	of	Keynesianism”	that	“strengthened	state	monopolies	
and	enriched	the	public	sector	at	the	expense	of	private	businesses	and	consumer	welfare,	
exacerbated	 the	 unbalanced	 and	 unsustainable	 elements	 in	 the	 economy,	 and	 created	
massive	infrastructural	and	industrial	over-capacity”.383	
	 To	summarize,	the	stagnation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	during	the	turbulent	times	of	
2008-2010	suggests	 that	although	Chinese	 leaders	were	aware	of	 the	negative	 impacts	of	
China’s	asymmetrical	external	dependence,	their	 immediate	response	in	face	of	the	global	
																																																						
381	Shaun	Breslin	(2012)	“China	and	the	crisis:	global	power,	domestic	caution	and	local	initiative”,	in	Shaun	
Breslin	(ed.)	East	Asia	and	the	Global	Crisis,	Routledge,	pp.79-80.	
382	Ho-fung	Hung	(2012)	“Is	China	saving	global	capitalism	from	the	global	crisis?”,	Protosociology:	An	
International	Journal	of	Interdisciplinary	Research,	Vol.29,	pp.159-179.	
383	Yang	Jiang	(2015)	“Vulgarisation	of	Keynesianism	in	China’s	response	to	the	global	financial	crisis”,	Review	
of	International	Political	Economy,	Vol.22,	No.2,	p.361.	
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financial	 crisis	 and	 economic	 downturn	was	 to	 spare	 no	 effort	 to	maintain	 the	 economic	
growth,	which	provided	important	sources	for	social	stability.	The	economic	transition	and	
rebalancing,	which	was	conducive	to	China’s	economy	in	the	long	term,	was	often	placed	in	
secondary	position.	
	
5.6	Concluding	remarks	
This	chapter	has	closely	examined	the	short-lived	acceleration	of	RMB	appreciation	in	the	first	
half	of	2008	and	the	stagnation	of	exchange	rate	reform	from	2008	to	2010.	It	provides	more	
nuanced	explanations	for	export	lobbying	in	the	level	III	game	and	the	dynamics	of	central-
local	 interactions	 in	China’s	exchange	 rate	policymaking	 in	2008.	The	 typical	 case	study	 in	
Fujian	province	suggests	that	exporters	faced	considerable	difficulties	and	grew	hostile	to	the	
RMB	appreciation	 in	2008.	They	mobilized	 resources	 to	 lobby	 through	 local	 governments,	
local	offices	of	central	governmental	agencies,	and	trade	associations.	The	Chinese	leadership	
could	not	afford	to	neglect	local	 interests,	as	the	export	enterprises’	difficult	situation	was	
not	only	an	economic	problem	but	also	an	issue	related	to	social	and	political	stability.	China	
halted	exchange	rate	reform	in	the	second	half	of	2008,	and	further	returned	to	the	dollar-
pegged	exchange	rate	regime	during	the	global	financial	crisis.	
	 The	empirical	study	clearly	shows	that	Chinese	leaders	prioritised	short-term	growth	
and	stability	maintenance,	which	sacrificed	the	long-term	interest	of	economic	transition	and	
rebalancing.	Evidence	in	this	chapter	demonstrates	that	for	this	period,	international	pressure	
was	 very	 much	 relegated	 to	 secondary	 importance	 behind	 domestic	 pressure	 and	
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considerations.	 China’s	 interest	 group	 politics	 in	 the	 level	 III	 game	 provided	 the	 most	
important	sources	for	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	from	2008	to	2010.	
	 With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	the	stagnation	of	exchange	rate	reform	was	a	temporary	
policy	response	to	the	global	financial	crisis.	Chinese	leaders	bore	the	negative	consequences	
of	excessive	external	dependence	in	mind	and	intended	to	make	some	changes	after	China	
weathered	the	crisis.	The	next	chapter	will	continue	to	explore	the	resumption	of	the	RMB	
exchange	rate	reform	in	mid-2010	and	China’s	effort	to	internationalize	its	currency	to	reduce	
the	dependence	on	the	US	dollar.	
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Chapter	6	The	Resumption	of	RMB	Exchange	Rate	Reform	and	the	
Internationalization	of	RMB,	2010-2013	
	
Chapter	5	has	examined	the	interest	group	politics	of	exchange	rate	policymaking	between	
2008	and	2010.	Chinese	exporters	grew	hostile	to	the	accelerated	RMB	appreciation	in	early	
2008.	 They	waged	 lobbying	 campaigns	 through	 local	 governments,	 local	 offices	of	 central	
governmental	agencies	and	trade	associations.	Faced	with	considerable	pressure,	the	Chinese	
leadership	personally	investigated	several	key	manufacturing	centres	in	the	coastal	provinces.	
They	 recognized	 the	 dramatic	 change	 of	 China’s	 economic	 fundamentals	 and	 rolled	 out	
rescue	policies	for	export	sectors.	On	the	one	hand,	the	PSC	instructed	the	MOF	to	adjust	the	
export	rebate	rates	for	the	most	difficult	industries	such	as	textile	and	apparel	in	the	late	July	
2008.	On	the	other	hand,	the	PSC	required	the	PBOC	to	stop	the	fast	RMB	appreciation	in	the	
middle	of	July	2008	and	China	returned	to	the	de-facto	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime	
amid	 the	most	 turbulent	 times	 of	 global	 financial	 crisis.	 Empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	
China’s	interest	group	politics	in	the	level	III	game	provided	the	most	important	sources	for	
China’s	exchange	rate	policy	from	2008	to	2010.	
	 This	chapter	will	analyse	the	resumption	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	after	June	2010.	
It	will	first	examine	external	influence	of	the	US	Congress,	the	Treasury	and	the	IMF	on	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 reform	 in	 2010.	 While	 Congress’s	 influence	 on	 the	 RMB	 issue	 generally	
diminished	over	time	after	the	global	financial	crisis,	international	criticism	and	pressure	from	
the	US	administration	and	the	IMF	still	played	an	important	role	of	agenda-setting	in	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2010.	The	second	section	describes	the	Chinese	government’s	
response	to	the	external	pressure	on	the	RMB	issue	in	2010.	The	Chinese	leadership	stood	
firm	against	external	pressure,	as	they	did	in	2005.	Moreover,	with	less	internal	controversy	
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within	the	central	government	(between	PBOC	and	MOFCOM),	Chinese	leaders	were	more	
consistent	 in	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 in	 2010.	 The	 third	 section	 combines	 the	 Chinese	
leadership’s	consensus	to	promote	the	internationalization	of	RMB	and	the	domestic	politics	
of	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 It	 argues	 that	 with	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	
internationalization	and	increasing	openness	of	the	capital	account,	a	flexible	exchange	rate	
was	the	feasible	choice	to	preserve	the	independence	and	effectiveness	of	Chinese	monetary	
policy,	which	 produced	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 consensus	 on	 the	 second	 round	 of	 RMB	
exchange	rate	reform.	As	the	stability	and	predictability	of	RMB	exchange	rate	was	one	of	the	
most	important	attributes	to	improving	confidence	and	promoting	the	international	use	of	
RMB,	it	determined	the	pathway	of	gradual	and	steady	appreciation	in	the	second	round	of	
RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	
	
6.1	The	mixed	external	influence	on	the	RMB	issue,	2008-2010	
The	analysis	in	Chapter	3	suggests	that	external	influences	of	the	US	government	and	the	IMF	
played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2005.	With	regard	to	
the	 relationship	 between	 external	 pressure	 and	 China’s	 second	 round	 of	 exchange	 rate	
reform	from	June	2010,	there	have	been	divisive	debates	among	scholars	and	observers.	For	
instance,	on	one	 side	of	 the	 spectrum	 is	 the	argument	 that	 the	 increasing	US	 criticism	of	
China’s	currency	practices	gives	rise	to	China’s	exchange	rate	in	June	2010	and	the	subsequent	
RMB	 appreciation.384	At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 is	 Ferguson’s	 argument	 that	 “the	
																																																						
384	Isabelle	De	Lichtervelde	(2012)	“Talking	tough:	Washington’s	evolving	discourse	on	China’s	currency	
regime”,	Asia	Paper,	Vol.6,	No.1,	pp.1-20.	
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dollar-RMB	 issue	 have	 already	 become	 essentially	 moribund”	 after	 the	 global	 financial	
crisis. 385 	The	 section	 will	 offer	 empirical	 analyses	 of	 US	 Congress	 RMB-related	 bills	 and	
Treasury’s	Reports	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	as	well	as	IMF’s	
Consultation	Reports	with	China.	Based	on	documentary	analysis,	I	will	not	entirely	agree	with	
either	Lichtervelde’s	argument	or	Ferguson’s	without	reservations.	Instead,	it	will	be	argued	
that	the	Congress,	the	Treasury	and	the	IMF	imposed	a	mixed	influence	on	China’s	currency	
after	the	global	 financial	crisis.	While	Congress’s	 influence	on	the	RMB	issue	has	generally	
diminished	over	time	after	the	global	financial	crisis,	international	criticism	and	pressure	from	
the	US	administration	and	the	IMF	still	played	an	important	role	of	agenda-setting	in	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2010.	
	
6.1.1	Congress’s	influence	on	the	RMB	issue	diminished	
Congress	relieved	pressure	on	the	RMB	during	the	global	financial	crisis.	There	was	only	one	
bill	(S.	2813)	on	the	RMB	issue	during	the	period	from	2008	to	the	first	half	of	2010.	The	China	
Currency	Manipulation	Act	of	2008,	 introduced	on	3	April	2008,	mandates	the	Treasury	to	
deal	 with	 China’s	 currency	 manipulation,	 including	 deciding,	 setting	 benchmarks	 and	
timeframes,	 initiating	 bilateral	 negotiations	 with	 China	 and	 coordinating	 with	 the	 IMF	 to	
address	RMB	misalignment	and	US-China	trade	imbalance.386	
																																																						
385	Yale	H.	Ferguson	(2014)	“The	renminbi-dollar	relationship:	politics	and	economics	of	a	diminishing	issue”,	in	
Thomas	Oatley	and	W.	Kindred	Winecoff	(ed.)	Handbook	of	the	International	Political	Economy	of	Monetary	
Relations,	Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	p.123.	
386	The	US	Congress,	“S.	2813	China	Currency	Manipulation	Act	of	2008:	To	require	the	Secretary	of	the	
Treasury	to	take	action	with	respect	to	currency	manipulation	by	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	and	for	other	
purposes”,	3	April	2008,	retrieved	from	https://www.congress.gov/110/bills/s2813/BILLS-110s2813is.pdf	
(accessed	20/09/2016).	
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	 A	plausible	explanation	is	that	both	the	US	and	China,	along	with	most	of	the	world’s	
countries,	looked	domestically	to	stabilize	their	own	economies	first	and	then	re-examined	
the	macroeconomic	policies	of	other	economies	during	the	turbulent	times	of	global	financial	
crisis.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 China	 first	 halted	 its	 currency’s	 appreciation	 and	
adjusted	export	rebate	rates	for	difficult	export	sectors,	even	before	the	global	financial	crisis	
really	 hit.	 Moreover,	 China	 rolled	 out	 a	 four-trillion-yuan	 stimulus	 package	 to	 expand	
domestic	 demand	 and	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2008.	 For	 the	 US,	 the	
Congress	enacted	a	number	of	bills,	including	but	not	limited	to	the	Housing	and	Economic	
Recovery	Act	of	2008	(30	July	2008),	 the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	(3	
October	2008),	and	the	American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009	(17	February	2009),	
in	order	to	save	jobs	and	stop	further	economic	deterioration.387	
	 Despite	there	being	no	RMB-related	bills	between	July	2008	and	June	2010,	it	is	worth	
noting	 that	 the	 RMB	 issue	 was	 still	 under	 Congress’	 scrutiny	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2010.	 In	
particularly,	 on	 15	 March	 2010,	 a	 group	 of	 130	 House	 members	 signed	 a	 letter	 to	 the	
administration	and	urged	the	Treasury	to	name	China	as	a	currency	manipulator	in	the	next	
Treasury	Report.388	However,	the	letter	was	not	as	effective	as	those	bills	in	2005	with	the	
threat	of	punitive	duties.	This	may	be	seen	from	the	Treasury’s	decision	to	delay	the	April	
2010	Report	before	President	Hu	Jintao’s	April	2010	visit	to	Washington,	which	will	be	further	
																																																						
387	The	US	Congress,	“H.R.3221	Housing	and	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008”,	30	July	2008,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ289/PLAW-110publ289.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016);	The	US	
Congress,	“H.R.1424	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008”,	3	October	2008,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ343/PLAW-110publ343.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016);	The	US	
Congress,	“H.R.1	American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009”,	17	February	2009,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ5/PLAW-111publ5.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
388	Shanlendra	D.	Sharma	(2010)	“China	as	the	world’s	creditor	and	the	United	States	as	the	world’s	debtor”,	
China	Perspectives,	No.4,	p.102.	
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discussed	later	on.	Therefore,	Congress’	pressure	on	the	RMB	issue,	even	if	somewhat	gained	
momentum	in	the	first	half	of	2010,	was	considered	as	limited.	
	 Furthermore,	there	were	still	only	two	RMB-related	bills	(H.	R.	6071	and	H.	R.	2909)	
after	June	2010.389	Neither	bills	added	anything	new	to	the	previous	bills,	thereby	producing	
a	diminishing	influence.	The	RMB	issue	generally	slipped	down	the	agenda	in	the	US	Congress	
after	2008,	which	was	confirmed	by	the	limited	number	of	Congress	bills	on	the	RMB	issue	
from	2008	to	2013.	Considering	all	the	Congress	RMB-related	bills	during	the	period	between	
2003	and	2013	(see	Appendix	A),	the	argument	is	supported	that	the	pressure	from	the	US	
Congress	on	China’s	 exchange	 rate	policy	has	declined	 to	near	 vanishing	point	 over	 time.	
Therefore,	 the	 pressure	 from	 US	 Congress	 was	 very	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	
influencing	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	and	after	June	2010.	
	
6.1.2	Treasury’s	and	IMF’s	pressure	on	the	RMB	issue	intensified	in	2010	
As	China’s	current	account	surplus	and	international	reserves	continued	to	grow	in	2008,	the	
Treasury’s	December	2008	Report	remained	critical	of	China’s	persistently	undervalued	RMB	
exchange	rate	and	 large	 interventions	 in	 the	 foreign	exchange	market.	However,	 the	April	
2009	Report	demonstrated	substantial	changes.	The	April	2009	Report	recognized	that	the	
global	 economic	 and	 financial	 backdrop	 had	 changed	 dramatically,	 and	 did	 not	 criticize	
																																																						
389	The	US	Congress,	“H.	R.	6071	Emergency	China	Trade	Act	of	2010:	To	withdraw	normal	trade	relations	
treatment	from	the	products	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	to	provide	for	a	balanced	trade	relationship	
between	that	country	and	the	United	States,	and	for	other	purposes”,	30	July	2010,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/111/bills/hr6071/BILLS-111hr6071ih.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016);	The	US	Congress,	
“H.	R.	2909	Emergency	China	Trade	Act:	To	withdraw	normal	trade	relations	treatment	from	the	products	of	
the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	to	provide	for	a	balanced	trade	relationship	between	that	country	and	the	
United	States,	and	for	other	purposes”,	13	September	2011,	retrieved	from	
https://www.congress.gov/112/bills/hr2909/BILLS-112hr2909ih.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016).	
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China’s	return	to	the	dollar	peg	regime.	Instead,	the	Report	recognized	that	the	RMB	was	the	
only	emerging	market	currency	strengthened	against	the	dollar	whereas	most	other	emerging	
market	currencies	fell	sharply.	More	specifically,	the	Treasury	highlighted	in	the	April	2009	
Report	the	following	factors:	
“First,	 China	 has	 taken	 steps	 to	 enhance	 exchange	 rate	 flexibility.	 Officials	
acknowledged	in	January	the	need	for	greater	flexibility	and	the	need	to	allow	the	
exchange	 rate	 to	 adapt	 to	 an	 equilibrium	 level.	 Second,	 the	 Chinese	 currency	
appreciated	by	16.6	percent	in	real	terms	between	the	end	of	June	2008	and	the	
end	of	February	2009.	As	the	crisis	intensified,	the	currency	appreciated	slightly	
against	the	dollar	when	most	other	emerging	market	currencies	fell	sharply.	Third,	
official	 statistics	 suggest	 the	 pace	 of	 China’s	 foreign	 exchange	 reserve	
accumulation	slowed	in	the	second	half	of	last	year.	Fourth,	China	has	enacted	a	
large	fiscal	stimulus	package	–	second	in	size	to	that	of	the	United	States	in	the	G-
20	–	which	should	help	spur	domestic	demand	growth	and	help	 rebalance	 the	
Chinese	economy.”390	
	 Such	 positive	 comments	 on	 China’s	 policy	 response	 implied	 that	 the	 Treasury	
accepted	China’s	halting	of	the	RMB	appreciation	at	a	time	of	crisis,	in	comparison	with	other	
emerging	countries	devaluing	their	currencies.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	Treasury	
would	approve	China	halting	the	exchange	rate	reform	forever.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	
Treasury	 insisted	 that	 China	 should	 continue	 to	 allow	 for	 greater	 flexibility	 of	 the	 RMB	
exchange	 rate.	 Treasury	 Secretary	 Geithner	 also	 reaffirmed	 the	 above	 key	 points	 in	 his	
																																																						
390	US	Department	of	the	Treasury,	“Report	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	
Policies”,	April	2009,	retrieved	from	https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
policies/Documents/fxreportfinalfor%20webapril152009.pdf	(accessed	20/09/2016),	p.3.	
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statement	to	Congress	on	International	Economic	and	Exchange	Rate	Policies.391	The	October	
2009	 Report	 further	 commended	 that	 China’s	 timely	 and	 aggressive	 fiscal	 and	monetary	
policy	stimulus	resulted	in	a	strong	domestic	economic	recovery	and	a	decline	in	its	current	
account	surplus,	which	also	contributed	significantly	to	recovery	in	global	demand.392	
	 However,	the	RMB	issue	intensified	in	early	2010.	The	US	still	struggled	with	sluggish	
economic	 growth	 and	 a	 high	 unemployment	 rate	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2010.	 In	 addition	 to	
pressure	from	the	Congress,	many	western	observers	and	analysts	saw	China’s	exchange	rate	
policy	as	an	important	distortion	in	the	world	economy,	which	slowed	the	recovery	of	other	
economies	worldwide,	 and	 proposed	 that	 China	must	 revalue	 its	 currency	 to	 address	 the	
imbalance.	
	 To	 name	 but	 a	 few,	 a	 report	 by	 John	Williamson,	 an	 important	 figure	 with	 wide	
credibility	 amongst	 neoliberals,	 demonstrated	 that	 China’s	 currency	 was	 substantially	
undervalued.	More	 specifically,	 his	 report	 estimated	 that	 the	 RMB	was	 about	 25	 percent	
undervalued	in	effective	terms	and	about	40	percent	undervalued	in	bilateral	terms	against	
the	US	dollar.393	Based	on	 the	Report,	 C.	 Fred	Bergsten,	Director	of	Peterson	 Institute	 for	
International	Economics,	testified	before	the	Committee	on	Ways	and	Means	on	24	March	
2010.	He	declared	 that	 the	substantial	undervaluation	of	 the	RMB	was	“a	blatant	 form	of	
protectionism”	 and	 recommended	 that	 the	 US	 Administration	 should	 label	 China	 as	 a	
“currency	manipulator”	 in	 the	 next	 Treasury’s	 Report	 and	 collaborate	with	 the	 European	
																																																						
391	“Statement	by	Treasury	Secretary	Timothy	Geithner	on	Release	of	Semi-Annual	Report	to	Congress	on	
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countries	as	well	as	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	in	multilateral	ways	(through	
the	IMF	and	the	WTO)	to	remedy	the	situation	promptly.394	Added	pressure	also	came	from	
the	Nobel-prize	winning	economist	Paul	Krugman.	He	suggested	that	Washington	should	take	
a	tough	attitude	against	Beijing,	as	the	US	had	no	reason	to	fear	China.395	He	declared	that	
“the	U.S.	Treasury	Department	must	stop	fudging	and	obfuscating”	and	“something	must	be	
done”.396	
	 Faced	with	mounting	pressure,	the	US	administration	became	increasingly	critical	of	
China’s	currency	undervaluation	and	took	action	to	demand	Beijing	to	make	policy	changes.	
In	February	2010,	President	Obama	set	the	objective	of	the	next	year	for	China	“to	recognize	
that	it	 is	also	in	their	 interest	to	allow	their	currency	to	appreciate”,	expecting	some	“very	
serious”	and	“bumpy”	negotiations.397	Treasury	Secretary	Geithner	discussed	the	exchange	
rate	issue	with	Vice	Premier	Wang	Qishan	in	their	meeting,	iterating	that	it	was	in	China’s	own	
interest	to	move	to	a	more	flexible	exchange	rate.398	Moreover,	the	Obama	administration	
sought	to	make	considerable	use	of	multilateral	channels	like	the	G20	and	the	IMF	to	tackle	
the	RMB	issue.	For	instance,	Obama	sent	a	letter	to	G20	nations	ahead	of	the	Toronto	summit	
in	 June,	 which	 strived	 to	 reach	 a	 consensus	 on	 market-oriented	 exchange	 rates.	 He	
emphasised	that	“market-determined	exchange	rates	are	essential	to	global	economic	vitality”	
and	 “flexible	 exchange	 rates	 are	 necessary	 to	 support	 a	 strong	 and	 balanced	 global	
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economy”. 399 	The	 IMF	 was	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 the	 overvalued	 dollar	 and	
undervalued	RMB	in	2010.		“The	Chinese	renminbi	has	depreciated	in	real	effective	terms	in	
tandem	with	the	US	dollar	and	is	assessed	to	be	substantially	undervalued	from	a	medium-
term	perspective,”	noted	an	IMF	official	in	the	G20	ministers	meeting	in	Seoul.400	
	 Similar	to	the	case	in	2005,	despite	increasing	political	pressure	in	the	US	to	confront	
Beijing	over	the	value	of	the	RMB,	it	was	quite	obvious	that	the	US	administration	sought	a	
resolution	to	address	the	currency	issue	with	Beijing	without	serious	US-China	confrontation.	
Similar	to	his	predecessor	John	Snow,	Geithner	responded	that	mounting	public	pressure	and	
labelling	China	as	a	currency	manipulator	would	not	help	address	the	RMB	issue.	Therefore,	
the	Treasury	finally	decided	to	delay	the	April	2010	Report,	originally	scheduled	for	release	
on	15	April	and	before	President	Hu	Jintao’s	April	2010	visit	to	Washington,	which	highlighted	
the	Obama	administration’s	effort	to	maintain	the	US-China	relations.401	
	 To	summarize,	the	Congress,	the	Treasury	and	the	IMF	imposed	mixed	pressure	on	
China’s	currency	in	2010.	While	Congress’s	influence	on	the	RMB	issue	diminished	over	time	
after	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 international	 criticism	 and	 pressure	 from	 the	 US	
administration	and	the	IMF	on	the	RMB	undervaluation	gained	momentum	in	the	first	half	of	
2010.	 Similar	 to	 the	 case	 in	 2005,	 external	 pressure	played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role,	which	
meant	that	China’s	 leaders	found	it	 impossible	to	avoid	the	RMB	exchange	rate	 issue.	The	
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next	section	will	discuss	China’s	response	to	the	increasing	demand	for	RMB	revaluation	in	
2010.	
	
6.2	China’s	response	to	the	external	pressure	on	the	RMB	issue	in	2010	
This	 section	 will	 analyse	 China’s	 response	 to	 the	 mounting	 external	 pressure	 in	 2010.	
Compared	with	the	case	in	2005,	the	Chinese	leadership	showed	some	similarities	and	more	
differences	in	responding	to	the	external	pressure	for	China’s	currency	revaluation	in	2010.	
On	the	one	hand,	what	remained	the	same	was	that	China’s	leaders	stood	firm	against	the	
external	pressure	and	refused	the	rhetoric	of	China	as	the	cause	of	global	imbalance	and	the	
responsibility	to	revalue	its	currency.	On	the	other	hand,	 it	could	be	recognized	that	there	
was	much	less	internal	controversy	within	the	Chinese	central	government,	and	the	Chinese	
leadership	was	more	consistent	in	their	exchange	rate	policy	in	2010.	
	
6.2.1	Standing	firm	to	the	external	pressure	
The	 Chinese	 leadership	 did	 not	 wish	 to	 show	 any	 sign	 of	 weakness	 under	 international	
pressure.	Chinese	leaders	consistently	opposed	the	international	criticism	that	the	RMB	was	
substantially	undervalued,	and	stated	that	wrongful	accusations	and	pressure	would	not	help	
solve	 the	 RMB	 issue.	 Not	 to	 mention	 the	 lower-level	 government	 and	 departmental	
officials402,	Premier	Wen	Jiabao	straightforwardly	retorted	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	was	
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not	undervalued	in	his	answer	to	a	Financial	Times	journalist	in	the	press	conference at	the	
close	 of	 NPC.403	Wen	 repeated	 the	 official	 wordings	 that	 “we	will	 continue	 the	managed	
floating	exchange	rate	regime	based	on	market	supply	and	demand	and	maintain	the	stability	
of	the	RMB	at	a	reasonable	and	balanced	level.”404	Furthermore,	Wen	complained	about	the	
demands	for	Beijing	to	revalue	its	currency.	He	asserted	that	“we	object	to	mutual	criticisms	
between	countries	and	tough	measures	to	force	a	country	to	revalue	its	currency,	which	are	
definitely	not	conducive	to	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform”405,	which	echoed	his	“exchange	
rate	–	sovereignty”406	statement	in	2005.	
	 Resonating	 with	 Wen’s	 remarks,	 a	 few	 days	 later	 the	 PRC’s	 Embassy	 in	 the	 US	
reprinted	on	the	official	website	a	review	article	“The	Yuan	Scapegoat”,	originally	published	
in	the	Wall	Street	Journal,	to	explicitly	demonstrate	the	Chinese	government’s	stance.407	It	
directly	pointed	out	that	the	US	was	more	wrong	than	China	in	fighting	a	currency	war,	which	
might	 give	 rise	 to	 “beggar-thy-neighbour	 currency	protectionism”.408	Therefore,	 it	warned	
the	US	not	to	make	the	RMB	into	a	scapegoat	and	risk	a	trade	war	with	China.	In	referring	to	
Japan’s	experience	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	it	argued	that	China	was	right	to	resist	the	external	
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criticism	and	pressure	to	avoid	the	negative	effects	of	a	large	revaluation	on	China’s	economic	
growth.	
	 Moreover,	in	a	bilateral	meeting	between	President	Barack	Obama	and	President	Hu	
Jintao	at	Washington,	Hu	particularly	stressed	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	would	not	
be	 advanced	 under	 external	 pressure.409	He	 pointed	 out	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	reform:	
“China	stands	firm	in	the	direction	of	promoting	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform,	
which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 needs	 of	 China’s	 economic	 and	 social	 development.	
Moreover,	 specific	 reform	 measures	 should	 be	 considered	 according	 to	 the	
development	and	changes	of	the	world’s	as	well	as	China’s	economic	situation.”410	
	
6.2.2	MOFCOM	and	PBOC	in	the	same	boat	
While	the	Chinese	leadership	stood	against	the	external	pressure	in	2010	as	firmly	as	they	did	
in	2005,	two	prominent	differences	could	be	identified	between	the	2005	and	the	2010	cases.	
First	and	foremost,	there	existed	much	less	internal	controversy	within	the	Chinese	central	
government	with	regard	to	the	exchange	rate	policy.	Chapter	3	has	elaborated	the	internal	
battle	of	 the	PBOC	vis-à-vis	 the	MOFCOM	over	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform.	The	PBOC	
advocated	 a	 more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	 for	 more	 monetary	 autonomy,	 whereas	 the	
MOFCOM,	with	more	political	clout,	maintained	that	exchange	rate	stability	was	crucial	for	
China’s	growth	and	employment.	The	limited	nature	of	the	2005	exchange	rate	reform	was	
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largely	 a	 result	 of	 compromise	 between	 the	 two	 previously	 divided	 central	 government	
agencies.	However,	when	 it	came	to	2010,	 the	two	agencies	both	held	the	position	that	a	
stable	exchange	rate	was	necessary	in	turbulent	times,	and	that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	alone	
was	not	responsible	for	the	trade	imbalance.	
	 For	instance,	Zhou	Xiaochuan	said	that	the	excessive	demand	for	RMB	appreciation	
from	the	US	did	not	help	in	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	Meeting.411	In	the	NPC	and	
CPPCC	Meetings	Zhou	explained	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	in	detail:	
“Since	July	2005,	China	has	adopted	the	managed	floating	exchange	rate	system	
based	on	market	supply	and	demand	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies	and	
maintained	the	stability	of	the	RMB	at	a	reasonable	and	balanced	level.	However,	
it	 does	not	 rule	out	 some	 special	policies	 in	 some	 special	periods,	 such	as	 the	
special	exchange	rate	formation	mechanism	in	the	global	financial	crisis,	which	is	
a	component	of	the	policy	package	to	cope	with	the	crisis.”412	
	 Yi	 Gang,	 a	 deputy	 governor	 of	 PBOC,	 also	 reaffirmed	 Wen’s	 non-undervaluation	
argument	and	Zhou’s	explanation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	Yi	said	that	China	would	
improve	the	RMB	exchange	rate	formation	mechanism	and	the	RMB	exchange	rate	would	be	
kept	stable	at	the	proper	and	balanced	level	in	the	process.413	
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	 With	regard	to	MOFCOM’s	stance	on	exchange	rate	policy,	when	asked	to	comment	
on	the	pressure	to	label	China	as	a	currency	manipulator,	the	MOFCOM	Minister	Chen	Deming	
fought	back	that	it	was	the	American	export	control	policy	against	China	that	worsened	the	
trade	imbalance.414	He	emphasized	that	“the	RMB	exchange	rate	is	not	a	panacea”	and	RMB	
revaluation	 alone	 could	 not	 resolve	 the	 Sino-US	 trade	 imbalance. 415 	Furthermore,	 Chen	
complained	that	since	2007	the	US	had	separated	China	and	imposed	additional	sets	of	export	
control	to	China,	including	computers,	civil	aviation	technology,	Computer	Numerical	Control	
(CNC)	 machines	 and	 many	 components. 416 	He	 further	 remarked	 that	 the	 US	 trade	
protectionism	was	 unfair	 not	 only	 to	 China,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 American	manufacturers	 and	
exporters,	which	was	negative	for	the	American	employment	and	economic	growth.417	
	 More	importantly,	the	MOFCOM	withdrew	its	opposition	to	exchange	rate	reform	and	
stressed	proper	pace	of	proceeding,	which	was	consistent	with	MOFCOM’s	shifted	priority	of	
surplus	reduction	after	2007.	One	official	at	the	MOFCOM	Comprehensive	Department	[综合
司]	noted:	
“The	MOFCOM	did	not	strongly	oppose	the	exchange	rate	reform	in	the	internal	
meetings	 in	 2010.	 Instead,	 the	 MOFCOM	 insisted	 that	 exchange	 rate	 reform	
should	 be	 carried	 out	 at	 the	 right	 pace,	 under	 the	 guidance	 of	 Premier	Wen	
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Jiabao’s	 three	 principles	 of	 own	 initiative,	 controllability	 and	 gradualism.	 For	
example,	the	MOFCOM	faced	enormous	pressure	in	2010	and	2011,	particularly	
after	the	G20	agreed	on	the	guidelines	to	measure	economic	external	imbalances.	
Therefore,	we	also	supported	the	market-oriented	exchange	rate	reform	and	the	
internal	dissent	was	not	as	much	as	the	outside	world	speculated.”418	
	 In	summary,	the	disagreement	between	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	on	exchange	rate	
policy	was	far	less	in	2010	than	in	2005.	On	the	one	hand,	the	PBOC	reiterated	the	necessity	
of	exchange	rate	stability	in	2010,	which	was	different	from	the	active	advocate	of	exchange	
rate	reform	in	2005.	On	the	other	hand,	the	MOFCOM	was	not	firmly	against	the	exchange	
rate	reform	in	2010,	which	was	also	different	from	the	powerful	resistance	in	2005.	
	
6.2.3	The	Chinese	leadership	more	consistent	in	the	exchange	rate	reform	policy	
Chapter	3	has	analysed	 that	 in	 the	case	of	2005	exchange	 rate	 reform,	 the	PBOC	and	 the	
MOFCOM	were	in	polar	opposite	positions	and	the	Chinese	leadership	swung	back	and	forth	
with	difficulties	to	reconcile	the	interests	of	all	parties.	The	situation	changed	considerably	in	
2010.	With	less	internal	controversy	within	the	central	government,	the	Chinese	leadership	
was	more	consistent	in	its	exchange	rate	policy.	
	 More	 specifically,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 2005,	 though	 China’s	 leaders	 made	 public	
commitments	 to	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 they	 said	 on	 various	 occasions	 that	 no	 specific	
timetable	or	 schedule	would	be	provided	 and	even	 stated	 that	 the	exchange	 rate	 reform	
would	be	postponed.	PBOC’s	announcement	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	on	21	July	2005	
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turned	out	to	be	unexpected.	However,	when	it	came	to	2010,	the	Chinese	leaders,	including	
the	 heads	 of	 MOFCOM	 and	 PBOC,	 agreed	 on	 the	 general	 direction	 of	 market-oriented	
exchange	reform,	which	was	confirmed	by	several	MOFCOM	and	PBOC	officials.419	In	early	
March	2010,	the	PBOC	Governor	Zhou	suggested	that	China	would	eventually	abandon	the	
peg	and	manage	the	exit	strategy	carefully	 in	the	NPC	press	conference.	“If	we	are	to	exit	
from	 unconventional	 policies	 and	 return	 to	 conventional	 policies,	 we	must	 be	 extremely	
prudent	about	our	choice	of	timing,”	Zhou	noted,	“this	also	includes	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
policy.” 420 	When	 asked	 subsequently	 about	 his	 views	 on	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate,	 the	
MOFCOM	Minister	Chen	confirmed	that	Zhou’s	message	represented	Chinese	government’s	
position	on	exchange	 rate	policy.421	In	April	 2010	 there	were	already	 several	 sources	 that	
revealed	China’s	readiness	to	resume	exchange	rate	reform.422	After	this,	the	Chinese	officials,	
particularly	from	the	PBOC,	continued	to	signal	the	readiness	to	resume	the	exchange	rate	
reform	sooner	rather	than	later.423	
	 To	 summarize,	 this	 section	 has	 elaborated	 Chinese	 government’s	 response	 to	 the	
mounting	international	criticism	and	pressure	in	the	first	half	of	2010.	The	Chinese	leadership	
stood	firm	to	the	external	pressure	and	emphasized	that	politicization	of	the	RMB	exchange	
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rate	would	not	help	address	the	 issue.	The	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	were	not	divergent	 in	
terms	of	the	exchange	rate	reform,	and	there	was	less	internal	controversy	within	the	central	
government.	 Therefore,	 the	 Chinese	 leadership	was	more	 consistent	 in	 its	 exchange	 rate	
policy.	However,	 it	 remained	a	question	as	 to	why	 the	domestic	politics	of	exchange	 rate	
policymaking	 in	 2010	 was	 different	 from	 that	 in	 2005.	 The	 next	 section	 will	 discuss	 the	
relationship	between	the	exchange	rate	reform	and	the	internationalization	of	RMB,	which	
will	provide	answers	to	the	unsolved	puzzle.	
	
6.3	The	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	and	the	internationalization	of	RMB,	2010-2013	
To	examine	the	relationship	between	exchange	rate	reform	and	the	internationalization	of	
RMB,	I	will	begin	by	exploring	the	origins	of	RMB	internationalization.	The	internationalization	
of	RMB	was	at	first	China’s	response	to	the	global	financial	crisis,	in	order	to	relieve	concerns	
over	foreign	asset	losses	and	reduce	exchange	rate	risk.	It	was	then	also	regarded	as	a	way	to	
advance	 the	 reform	 on	 capital	 control	 and	 domestic	 financial	market,	 including	 the	 RMB	
exchange	 rate	 reform.	 This	 section	will	 argue	 that	 the	 Chinese	 leadership’s	 consensus	 to	
promote	 the	 internationalization	 of	 RMB	 explains	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	 in	 2010,	 in	 which	 there	 was	 less	 internal	 controversy	 within	 the	 central	
government.	
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6.3.1	The	origins	of	RMB	internationalization	
After	the	outbreak	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	China	was	increasingly	concerned	with	the	
profound	flaws	in	the	current	international	monetary	system,	which	was	dominated	by	the	
US	dollar	as	the	international	reserve	currency.	China	suffered	from	losses	of	foreign	reserves,	
owing	to	the	quantitative	easing	(QE)	by	the	US	Federal	Reserve.	China’s	concern	with	the	
dollar	hegemony	and	intention	to	reform	the	international	monetary	system	were	evident	in	
the	landmark	essay	titled	“Reflections	on	the	reform	of	the	international	monetary	system”	
by	 the	 PBOC	 Governor	 Zhou	 in	March	 2009.424 Referring	 to	 the	 Triffin	 Dilemma425,	 Zhou	
focused	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 relying	 on	 credit-based	 national	 currencies	 as	 the	 major	
international	reserve	currencies:	
“Issuing	 countries	 of	 reserve	 currencies	 are	 constantly	 confronted	 with	 the	
dilemma	between	achieving	their	domestic	monetary	policy	goals	and	meeting	
other	countries’	demand	for	reserve	currencies.	On	the	one	hand,	the	monetary	
authorities	 cannot	 simply	 focus	 on	 domestic	 goals	 without	 undertaking	 their	
international	 responsibilities;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 they	 cannot	 pursue	 different	
domestic	and	international	objectives	at	the	same	time.	They	may	either	fail	to	
adequately	meet	the	demand	of	a	growing	global	economy	for	liquidity	as	they	
																																																						
424	Zhou	Xiaochuan,	“Reflections	on	the	reform	of	the	international	monetary	system	[关于改革国际货币体系
的思考]”,	People’s	Bank	of	China,	23	March	2009,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/hanglingdao/128697/128719/128772/825742/index.html	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
425	Triffin	pointed	out	the	monetary	system	based	on	the	currency	of	one	country	could	not	sustainably	deliver	
both	liquidity	and	confidence	in	the	1960s.	Specifically,	the	continuous	growth	of	world	economy	demanded	a	
steady	stream	of	dollars,	which	required	the	US	to	run	balance	of	payment	deficits.	However,	excessive	US	
deficits	would	erode	people’s	confidence	in	the	dollar’s	value	(convertibility	into	gold	at	fixed	price	at	that	
time).	This	inherent	conflict	of	the	dollar’s	role	as	the	world’s	reserve	currency	and	the	declining	confidence	in	
the	dollar	within	the	postwar	international	monetary	system	was	termed	as	the	Triffin	Dilemma.	See,	for	more	
detail,	Robert	Triffin	(1961)	Gold	and	the	Dollar	Crisis:	The	Future	of	Convertibility,	London:	Yale	University	
Press.	
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try	to	ease	inflationary	pressure	at	home,	or	create	excess	liquidity	in	the	global	
economy	by	overly	stimulating	domestic	demand.”426	
	 The	 solution,	 according	 to	 Zhou,	 was	 to	 establish	 a	 reserve	 currency	 that	 “is	
disconnected	 from	 individual	 nations	 and	 is	 able	 to	 remain	 stable	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 thus	
removing	the	inherent	deficiencies	caused	by	using	credit-based	national	currencies”.427	He	
further	 suggested	 that	 the	 Special	 Drawing	 Right	 (SDR),	 as	 “a	 super-sovereign	 reserve	
currency”,	 could	 be	 “the	 light	 in	 the	 tunnel	 for	 the	 reform	of	 the	 international	monetary	
system”.428	Zhou	 proposed	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 the	 dollar	 and	 instead	 the	 use	 of	 the	 SDR.	
Specifically,	 Zhou	 argued	 that	 “special	 consideration	 should	 be	 given	 to	 giving	 the	 SDR	 a	
greater	role,	as	the	SDR	has	the	features	and	potential	to	act	as	a	super-sovereign	reserve	
currency.”429	
	 In	 retrospect,	 Zhou	 was	 right	 to	 point	 out	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 dollar-dominant	
international	monetary	 system,	while	 he	 underestimated	 the	 institutional	 limitations	 and	
political	obstacles	that	prevented	the	SDR	from	challenging	the	dollar.430	Zhou’s	call	for	SDRs	
as	 the	 super-sovereign	 reserve	 currency	 eventually	 lost	 momentum,	 and	 the	 Chinese	
leadership	turned	to	promote	the	diversification	of	international	monetary	system,	thereby	
reducing	the	reliance	on	the	dollar.	
	 For	 instance,	 President	 Hu	 Jintao	 stressed	 the	 need	 to	 improve	 the	 international	
monetary	system	and	diversify	the	world’s	reserve	currencies.	He	suggested	that	all	parties	
																																																						
426	Ibid.	
427	Ibid.	
428	Ibid.	
429	Ibid.	
430	See,	for	example,	Minh	Ly	(2012)	“Special	drawing	rights,	the	dollar,	and	the	institutionalist	approach	to	
reserve	currency	status”,	Review	of	International	Political	Economy,	Vol.19,	No.2,	pp:341-362;	Gregory	Chin	
(2014)	“China’s	rising	monetary	power”,	in	Eric	Helleiner	and	Jonathan	Kirshner	(ed.)	The	Great	Wall	of	Money:	
Power	and	Politics	in	China’s	International	Monetary	Relations,	Cornell	University	Press,	pp.184-212.	
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work	out	the	timetable	and	roadmap	on	the	basis	of	full	consultation	at	the	2009	G20	London	
Summit.431	At	 the	 opening	 ceremony	 of	 Bo’ao	 Forum	 in	 April	 2009,	 Premier	Wen	 Jiabao	
continued	to	advocate	implementing	the	consensus	reached	at	the	G20	London	Summit	and	
advancing	the	reforms	of	international	financial	system.	More	specifically,	Wen	proposed	“to	
increase	 the	 representation	 and	 voice	 of	 emerging	markets	 and	 developing	 countries,	 to	
strengthen	the	supervision	on	macroeconomic	policies	of	the	major	reserve	currency	issuing	
economies,	and	to	promote	the	diversification	of	international	monetary	system.”432	One	of	
the	most	important	ways	to	diversify	the	international	monetary	system	was	to	promote	the	
international	use	of	the	RMB as	a	matter	of	course.	My	interviews	with	PBOC	officials	also	
confirmed	 the	 central	 importance	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 in	 stimulating	 the	 RMB	
internationalization. 433 	Starting	 from	 mid-2009,	 China	 promoted	 the	 RMB	
internationalization	as	an	effort	to	diversify	the	international	monetary	system,	which	will	be	
discussed	in	further	detail	as	follows.	
	
6.3.2	Towards	RMB	internationalization	
To	understand	the	development	of	RMB	internationalization,	Cohen’s	analysis	of	the	six	roles	
of	international	currency	provides	a	useful	point	of	departure.434	Table	6.1	shows	the	three	
functions	of	currency	and	how	an	international	currency	is	used	at	both	official	and	private	
																																																						
431	“Clearer	‘roadmap’	for	RMB	internationalization	[人民币国际化‘路线图’更清晰]”,	Xinhua	News	
Agency,	3	April	2009,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-
04/03/content_11126968.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
432	“Wen	Jiabao	addresses	opening	ceremony	of	Boao	Forum	[温家宝在博鳌论坛年会开幕式上演讲]”,	
Xinhua	News	Agency,	18	April	2009,	retrieved	from	http://www.hq.xinhuanet.com/focus/2009-
04/18/content_16292111_1.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
433	Interview_17092015;	Interview_19092015.	
434	Benjamin	J.	Cohen	(1971)	The	Future	of	Sterling	as	an	International	Currency,	London:	Macmillan.	
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levels.	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	the	six	roles	of	 international	currency	are	 ideal	types	for	the	
convenience	of	analysis	whereas	in	reality	some	of	them	cannot	be	separated.	For	instance,	
a	central	bank’s	foreign	reserves	could	also	be	used	for	foreign	exchange	intervention,	so	an	
international	currency	undeniably	serves	the	functions	of	intervention	currency	and	reserve	
currency	 simultaneously.	With	 the	 benefit	 of	 hindsight,	 the	 RMB	 internationalization	 has	
been	pursued	along	two	tracks:	to	develop	the	RMB	as	an	international	trade	and	investment	
currency	(see	Appendix	E)	and	as	an	intervention	and	reserve	currency	(see	Appendix	F).	
Table	6.1:	The	Roles	of	International	Currency	
																		Function	
			Level						
Medium	of	exchange	 Unit	of	account	 Store	of	value	
Private	 Transactions	currency	 Denomination	currency	 Asset	currency	
Official	 Intervention	currency	 Anchor	Currency	 Reserve	currency	
Source:	Cohen	(1971)	The	Future	of	Sterling	as	an	International	Currency,	London:	Macmillan,	pp.13-
23.	
	 The	Chinese	leadership	promoted	the	international	use	of	its	own	currency	to	settle	
cross-border	 trade	 beginning	 from	 2009.	 Beijing	 gradually	 widened	 the	 range	 of	 trade	
transactions,	 in	which	there	were	three	stages	of	development.	First,	on	8	April	2009,	 the	
State	 Council	 executive	meeting	 decided	 to	 implement	 the	 pilot	 RMB	 cross-border	 trade	
settlement	 at	 Shanghai	 and	 four	 cities	 (Guangzhou,	 Shenzhen,	 Zhuhai	 and	 Dongguan)	 in	
Guangdong.435	Second,	 on	22	 June	2010,	 the	 State	Council	 approved	 that	 the	RMB	 cross-
																																																						
435	“The	State	Council	executive	meeting	decided	to	implement	the	pilot	RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement	at	
Shanghai	and	four	cities	in	Guangdong	[国务院常务会议决定在上海市和广东省内四城市开展跨境贸易人
民币结算试点]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	8	April	2009,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-04/08/content_11151247.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
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border	 trade	settlement	within	 the	pilot	areas	be	expanded	to	20	provinces,	and	that	 the	
overseas	 coverage	 be	 expanded	 from	Hong	 Kong,	Macao	 and	ASEAN	 to	 all	 countries	 and	
regions.436	By	the	end	of	2010,	the	number	of	Chinese	pilot	enterprises	had	risen	from	the	
initial	365	firms	to	more	than	67,000.437	Third,	on	23	August	2011,	PBOC,	MOF,	MOFCOM,	
General	 Administration	 of	 Customs,	 State	 Administration	 of	 Taxation,	 China	 Banking	
Regulatory	Commission	jointly	announced	the	“Notice	on	Expanding	the	RMB	Cross-border	
Trade	Settlement	Areas”,	which	approved	 that	 the	RMB	cross-border	 trade	settlement	be	
expanded	to	the	whole	country.438	
	 Table	6.2	shows	that	 the	use	of	 the	RMB	as	a	 trade	settlement	currency	 increased	
rapidly	between	2009	and	2013.	Table	6.3	shows	that	the	RMB	payments	were	consistently	
larger	than	RMB	receipts	 in	the	trade	settlement,	which	partly	suggests	that	the	RMB	was	
favourable	asset	to	the	foreign	trading	partners	and	the	RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement	
was	indeed	conducive	to	RMB	internationalization.	
	
	 	
																																																						
436	“The	pilot	RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement	expanded	to	20	provinces	[中国跨境贸易人民币结算试点地
区扩至 20个省区]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	22	June	2010,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-06/22/c_12248526.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
437	PBOC,	“2010	Fourth	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○一○年第四季度中国货币政策
执行报告]”,	30	January	2011,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/image_public/UserFiles/goutongjiaoliu/upload/File/2010%E5%B9%B4
%E7%AC%AC%E5%9B%9B%E5%AD%A3%E5%BA%A6%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E8%B4%A7%E5%B8%81%E6%
94%BF%E7%AD%96%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A.pdf	(accessed	21/09/2016),	p.11.	
438	“The	RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement	expanded	to	the	whole	country	[跨境贸易人民币结算地区扩大
至全国]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	23	August	2011,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/2011-
08/23/c_121900298.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
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Table	6.2:	Cross-border	RMB	current-account	settlement	(classified	by	trade	types)	
Unit:	one	hundred	million	yuan	
	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Trade	settlement	amount	 36	 5064	 20800	 29409	 46300	
- Trade	in	goods	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 20642	 30200	
- Trade	in	services	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 8765	 16100	
Source:	Author’s	own	elaboration	based	on	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report,	available	
from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/index.html	
Table	6.3:	Cross-border	RMB	current-account	settlement	(classified	by	payment	and	receipt)	
Unit:	one	hundred	million	yuan	
	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Total	amount	of	payments	
and	receipts	
36	 5064	 20800	 28700	 46300	
- Payments	 N/A	 799	 7704	 13000	 18800	
- Receipts	 N/A	 4285	 13096	 15700	 27500	
Ratio	of	receipts	to	
payments		
N/A	 1:1.5	 1:1.70	 1:1.20	 1:1.46	
Gap	between	receipts	and	
payments	
N/A	 -3506	 -5393	 -2700	 -8700	
Source:	Author’s	own	elaboration	based	on	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report,	available	
from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/index.html	
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	 To	facilitate	the	cross-border	RMB	trade	settlement,	there	were	three	main	ways	to	
develop	international	investment	in	RMB:	cross-border	bond	investment,	cross-border	direct	
investment	and	 cross-border	 security	 investment.	Beijing	has	 relied	heavily	on	 the	 special	
status	of	Hong	Kong	as	an	offshore	RMB	business	hub.	
	 First,	after	the	China	Development	Bank	issued	the	first	overseas	RMB	bond	(dim-sum	
bond)	in	2007,	the	RMB	bond	issuance	increased	persistently,	and	particularly	fast	after	the	
July	2010	liberalization	of	the	conditions	for	bond	issuers. The	value	of	bonds	issued	in	the	
second	 half	 of	 2010	 alone	 (38	 billion	 yuan)	 equalled	 that	 of	 the	 previous	 three	 years	
combined.439	The	 bond	 insurance	markets	 have	 also	 expanded	 from	 Hong	 Kong	 to	 other	
financial	centres	including	London,	Singapore,	Sydney	and	Luxembourg.	For	instance,	HSBC	
issued	 the	 RMB-denominated	 bond	 in	 London	 on	 18	 April	 2012,	 the	 first	 issue	 of	 a	 RMB	
offshore	bond	outside	Hong	Kong,	marking	a	milestone	in	London’s	efforts	to	become	a	centre	
for	offshore	RMB	trading	alongside	Hong	Kong.440	
	 Second,	the	PBOC	announced	“Measures	for	the	administration	on	RMB	settlement	in	
foreign	direct	investment”	to	regulate	foreign	investors	and	banks	to	handle	RMB	settlement	
in	foreign	direct	investment	on	14	October	2011.441	The	rules	enabled	overseas	enterprises,	
economic	organization	and	 individuals	to	apply	to	the	commercial	banks	for	settlement	of	
their	 RMB	 denominated	 direct	 investment.	 Table	 6.4	 shows	 that	 cross-border	 RMB	
settlement	of	direct	investment	increased	rapidly	from	2011	to	2013.	
																																																						
439	Paul	Bowles	and	Baotai	Wang	(2013)	“Renminbi	internationalization:	a	journey	to	where?”,	Development	
and	Change,	Vol.44,	No.6,	p.1368.	
440	“HSBC	issues	the	first	RMB	bond	in	London	[汇丰银行伦敦发行第一只人民币债券]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	
19	April	2012,	retrieved	from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2012-04/19/c_123004520.htm	(accessed	
21/09/2016).	
441	“The	PBOC	issues	a	document	to	regulate	foreign	direct	investment	of	RMB	settlement	business	[央行发文
规范外商直接投资人民币结算业务]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	14	October	2011,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-10/14/c_122158006.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
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	 Third,	with	 regard	 to	 cross-border	 security	 investment,	 the	 RMB	Qualified	 Foreign	
Institutional	Investor	(RQFII)	scheme	was	launched	on	16	December	2011	to	allow	overseas	
investors	to	establish	RMB-denominated	funds	in	Hong	Kong	for	investment	in	the	mainland	
securities	market.442	RQFII	can	be	seen	as	a	measure	to	increase	the	internationalization	of	
the	RMB	by	facilitating	a	reverse	flow	of	RMB	investment	back	into	the	mainland.	Table	6.4	
also	shows	the	rapid	growth	of	RQFII	programme	from	2011	to	2013.	
Table	6.4:	Cross-border	RMB	capital-account	settlement	
Unit:	one	hundred	million	yuan	
	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Direct	investment	amount	 N/A	 N/A	 1109	 2840	 5337	
- Foreign	Direct	
Investment	(FDI)	
N/A	 N/A	 907	 2536	 4481	
- Outward	Direct	
Investment	(ODI)	
N/A	 N/A	 202	 304	 856	
RMB	Qualified	Foreign	
Institutional	Investor	(RQFII)	
N/A	 N/A	 107	 670	 1575	
Source:	Author’s	own	elaboration	based	on	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report,	available	
from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125957/index.html	
	 In	addition	to	the	effort	to	promote	the	international	use	of	RMB	to	settle	trade	and	
investment,	 the	 PBOC	 also	 signed	 a	 number	 of	 bilateral	 currency	 swap	 agreements	 (see	
																																																						
442	“RQFII	pilot	regulation	announced	to	facilitate	overseas	RMB	investment	in	mainland	securities	market	
[RQFII试点办法颁布	境外人民币投资境内证券开闸]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	16	December	2011,	retrieved	
from	http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-12/16/c_111251039.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
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Appendix	F)	with	other	central	banks	or	monetary	authorities	after	2009	to	help	the	RMB	
become	an	official	foreign	exchange	intervention	currency	and	reserve	currency.	By	the	end	
of	 2013,	 the	 PBOC	had	 established	bilateral	 currency	 swap	 arrangements	with	 23	 foreign	
central	banks	or	monetary	authorities	with	a	total	volume	of	2.55	trillion	yuan.	The	bilateral	
currency	swaps	could	provide	liquidity	not	only	in	times	of	crisis	but	also	in	conventional	times	
to	facilitate	the	bilateral	trade	and	investment,	thereby	promoting	the	development	of	RMB	
offshore	markets.	One	PBOC	official	explained	the	mechanism	as	follows:	
“The	foreign	importers	of	Chinese	goods	or	foreign	enterprises	going	to	invest	in	
China	need	to	borrow	money	from	their	central	bank	if	there	is	not	enough	RMB	
in	the	market.	If	the	two	central	banks	sign	currency	swap	agreement,	the	foreign	
enterprise	 can	 get	 access	 to	 timely	 financing,	 thereby	 promoting	 the	 bilateral	
trade	and	investment.”443	
	 However,	 the	 interviewee	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	mechanism	would	 only	 work	
under	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 RMB	 was	 used	 in	 the	 bilateral	 trade	 and	 investment	 (as	
denomination	 currency),	 which	 was	 largely	 determined	 by	 the	 choice	 of	 market	
participants.444	
	 To	summarise,	the	Chinese	government	actively	promoted	the	international	use	of	its	
own	currency	to	settle	the	cross-border	trade	and	investment	after	2009.	The	PBOC	has	also	
signed	a	number	of	currency	swaps	to	meet	the	overseas	demand	for	RMB	liquidity.	The	eye-
catching	development	of	RMB	internationalization	has	convinced	the	leadership	to	make	it	
into	one	of	the	most	important	national	strategies	in	the	2010s.	Therefore,	it	is	essential	to	
																																																						
443	Interview_17092015.	
444	Interview_17092015.	
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examine	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	in	the	backdrop	of	RMB	internationalization,	which	
will	be	discussed	in	the	next	part.	
	
6.3.3	 Explaining	 the	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 under	 the	 context	 of	 RMB	
internationalization	
As	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 there	was	 very	 limited	 controversy	within	 Chinese	
central	 government	 in	 terms	of	 the	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform	and	Chinese	 leaders	were	
consistent	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 in	 the	 case	 of	 2010.	 Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	
development	of	RMB	internationalization,	this	part	will	argue	that	the	Chinese	leadership’s	
consensus	 to	 promote	 the	 internationalization	 of	 RMB	 explains	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	
exchange	rate	policymaking	in	2010.	
	 China	has	become	not	only	the	world’s	largest	exporter	of	manufactured	goods	but	
the	second-largest	economy	since	2010.	The	size	of	the	economy,	coupled	with	a	diversified	
trade	structure	and	relatively	high	growth	rate,	has	provided	much	of	 the	groundwork	for	
internationalizing	 the	 RMB.	However,	 economic	 size	 alone	 is	 not	 enough	 to	make	 RMB	 a	
competitive	 international	currency.	Setting	aside	the	problem	of	political	determinants	 for	
the	 moment,	 economists	 have	 identified	 three	 key	 factors	 –	 confidence,	 liquidity	 and	
transactional	 networks	 –	 to	 be	 key	 economic	 determinants	 of	 international	 currencies.445	
China’s	economic	size	and	Chinese	government’s	efforts	to	push	forward	the	 international	
use	of	RMB	are	definitely	conducive	to	the	confidence	and	transactional	networks	of	RMB,	
																																																						
445	Eric	Helleiner	(2008)	“Political	determinants	of	international	currencies:	what	future	for	the	US	dollar?”,	
Review	of	International	Political	Economy,	Vol.15,	No.3,	pp.354-378.	
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while	 the	 liquidity	 problem,	 including	 the	 existence	 of	well-developed	 and	 open	 financial	
markets,	remains	the	most	difficult	to	overcome.	
	 With	the	wisdom	of	hindsight,	the	Chinese	government	followed	a	unique	approach	
to	internationalizing	the	RMB,	promoting	the	international	use	of	RMB	under	the	conditions	
of	 unconvertible	 RMB	 and	 capital	 account	 control	 at	 an	 early	 stage.	 However,	 with	 the	
deepening	of	RMB	internationalization,	the	demand	for	RMB	investment	and	capital	account	
liberalization	naturally	arose.	According	to	Mundell’s	theory	of	impossible	trinity,	a	monetary	
authority	cannot	have	fixed	exchange	rate,	capital	mobility,	and	independent	monetary	policy	
at	 the	 same	 time. 446 	With	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	 internationalization	 and	 increasing	
openness	of	capital	account,	a	flexible	exchange	rate	was	the	feasible	choice	to	preserve	the	
independence	and	effectiveness	of	Chinese	monetary	policy,	which	produced	 the	Chinese	
leadership’s	consensus	on	the	second	round	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	My	interview	with	
one	official	at	the	MOFCOM	Comprehensive	Department	confirmed	the	finding.	In	addition	
to	 the	 notes	 on	MOFCOM’s	 stance	 on	 the	 2010	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 the	 official	 at	 the	
MOFCOM	Comprehensive	Department	made	the	following	comments:	
“With	regard	to	the	general	direction	of	market-oriented	exchange	reform,	I	think	
the	top	leadership	had	no	objection,	including	the	MOFCOM	and	PBOC	leaders.	
However,	in	the	view	of	MOFCOM,	PBOC’s	goal	of	exchange	rate	reform	remained	
a	puzzle.	Specifically,	we	were	not	clear	whether	the	continued	RMB	appreciation	
after	June	2010	was	to	promote	the	internationalization	of	RMB	or	to	promote	
the	market-determined	exchange	rate	mechanism.	In	my	personal	perspective,	a	
strengthened	currency	does	not	necessarily	contribute	to	the	internationalization	
																																																						
446	Robert	A.	Mundell	(1963)	“Capital	mobility	and	stabilization	policy	under	fixed	and	flexible	exchange	rates”,	
Canadian	Journal	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	Vol.29,	No.4,	pp.475-485.	
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of	RMB.	The	comprehensive	national	strength	that	builds	on	economic,	political	
and	military	progress	is	the	fundamental	determinant	of	RMB	internationalization.	
Even	if	a	small	country	has	a	strong	currency,	it	cannot	become	an	international	
currency.	If	our	economy	falls	into	trouble	owing	to	the	improper	exchange	rate	
policy,	 the	 RMB	 would	 lose	 the	 foundations	 of	 a	 strong	 currency,	 let	 alone	
internationalization.	Therefore,	the	MOFCOM	consistently	stress	the	importance	
of	gradual	RMB	appreciation.”447	
	 Change	eventually	came	on	19	June	2010.	Approved	by	the	State	Council,	the	PBOC	
announced	to	further	reform	the	RMB	exchange	rate	regime	based	on	the	measures	taken	in	
2005.448		According	to	the	announcement,	continued	emphasis	would	be	placed	to	reflecting	
market	supply	and	demand	with	reference	to	a	basket	of	currencies	and	the	exchange	rate	
floating	 bands	would	 remain	 the	 same	 as	 previously	 announced	 in	 the	 inter-bank	 foreign	
exchange	market.	The	second	round	of	exchange	rate	reform	policy	could	be	interpreted	as	
a	hybrid	outcome	of	both	external	influences	from	the	Western	countries	and	internal	needs	
of	the	RMB	internationalization.	On	the	one	hand,	international	criticism	and	pressure	from	
the	US	administration	and	the	IMF	still	played	an	important	role	of	agenda-setting	in	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 in	 2010.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	Chinese	 central	 government	
reached	 the	 consensus	 that	 a	 more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	 was	 necessary	 for	 further	
internationalizing	its	currency.	
																																																						
447	Interview_25092015.	
448	PBOC,	“To	further	promote	the	reform	of	RMB	exchange	rate	formation	mechanism	and	enhance	the	RMB	
exchange	rate	flexibility	[进一步推进人民币汇率形成机制改革，增强人民币汇率弹性]”,	19	June	2010,	
retrieved	from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/bangongting/135485/135491/135597/1002571/index.html	(accessed	
21/09/2016).	
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	 Furthermore,	 like	 the	 first	 round	of	 the	exchange	 rate	 reform,	 the	key	principle	of	
gradualism	 was	 repeatedly	 emphasized.	 According	 to	 the	 MOFCOM	 Comprehensive	
Department’s	official,	although	the	MOFCOM	did	not	oppose	market-oriented	exchange	rate	
reform,	it	still	underlined	the	relative	stability	of	RMB	exchange	rate,	which	was	conducive	to	
RMB	internationalization.	Moreover,	on	the	second	day	of	PBOC’s	announcement,	the	PBOC	
spokesman	 addressed	 that	 China	would	 keep	 the	 exchange	 rate	 stable	 and	 prevent	 large	
fluctuations.	449	Zhou	Xiaochuan	also	publicly	expressed	in	the	2010	Annual	Meetings	of	the	
IMF	and	the	World	Bank	that	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	would	be	in	gradual	manner	and	
would	not	take	the	so-called	“shock	therapy”.450	
	 Figure	6.1	shows	RMB’s	gradual	and	steady	appreciation	after	PBOC’s	announcement	
of	 the	 second	 round	of	 exchange	 rate	 reform.	 The	 stability	 and	predictability	 of	 the	RMB	
exchange	 rate	was	one	of	 the	most	 important	attributes	 in	 improving	 the	confidence	and	
promoting	the	international	use	of	RMB.	Furthermore,	the	exchange	rate	reform	proceeded	
in	the	market-oriented	direction.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	PBOC	announced	on	14	April	2012	
that	 “the	RMB-dollar	 trading	band	 in	 the	 inter-bank	 spot	 foreign	exchange	market	will	be	
expanded	form	0.5%	to	1%,	namely,	the	daily	RMB-dollar	trading	band	may	be	floated	within	
the	1%	range	of	the	middle	price	of	the	dollar	against	the	RMB.”451	At	the	same	time,	the	
PBOC	made	some	adjustment	to	its	sterilization	operation	in	the	foreign	exchange	market,	
																																																						
449	PBOC,	“The	PBOC	spokesman	answers	journalists’	question	on	further	promotion	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate	
formation	mechanism	[中国人民银行新闻发言人就进一步推进人民币汇率形成机制改革答记者问]”,	20	
June	2010,	retrieved	from	http://www.pbc.gov.cn/bangongting/135485/135491/135597/1002568/index.html	
(accessed	21/09/2016).	
450	“Zhou	Xiaochuan:	China	will	reform	gradually	and	refuse	the	‘shock	therapy’	[周小川：中国汇改为渐进式	
不会采用‘休克疗法’]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	9	October	2010,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-10/09/c_12641215.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
451	PBOC,	“People’s	Bank	of	China	Public	Announcement	(2012)	No.4	[中国人民银行公告〔2012〕第 4号]”,	
14	April	2012,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/bangongting/135485/135495/135615/820559/index.html	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
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considerably	reducing	the	foreign	exchange	 intervention.452	It	can	be	seen	from	Figure	6.1	
that	the	RMB	exchange	rate	experienced	more	two-way	fluctuations	after	May	2012,	which	
also	 reduced	 the	 inflow	 of	 hot	 money.	 This	 was	 different	 from	 the	 continuous	 one-way	
appreciation	in	the	first	round	of	exchange	rate	reform	between	2005	and	2008.	
	
Figure	6.1:	RMB	exchange	rate	against	the	US	dollar,	from	18	June	2010	to	31	December	2013	
Source:	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Department	
	 To	summarize,	this	part	of	the	chapter	has	argued	that	with	the	development	of	RMB	
internationalization	and	increasing	openness	of	capital	account,	a	flexible	exchange	rate	was	
Chinese	government’s	feasible	choice	to	maintain	independent	and	effective	monetary	policy.	
The	PBOC	announced	further	reform	the	RMB	exchange	rate	formation	mechanism	in	June	
2010	 and	 the	 second	 round	 of	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 proceeded	 in	 the	 market-oriented	
direction	in	a	gradual	manner	after	then.	
																																																						
452	PBOC,	“2012	Second	Quarter	Monetary	Policy	Implementation	Report	[二○一二年第二季度中国货币政
策执行报告]”,	2	August	2012,	pp.14-15,	retrieved	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/eportal/fileDir/image_public/UserFiles/goutongjiaoliu/upload/File/2012%E5%B9%B4
%E7%AC%AC%E4%BA%8C%E5%AD%A3%E5%BA%A6%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E8%B4%A7%E5%B8%81%E6%
94%BF%E7%AD%96%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A.pdf	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
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6.3.4	Alternative	explanations	
It	 is	worthwhile	 to	note	 that	 two	other	 seemingly	plausible	 factors	 could	also	explain	 the	
Chinese	leadership’s	decision	to	carry	out	the	2010	exchange	rate	reform.	The	first	argument	
is	to	facilitate	the	economic	transition	and	rebalancing.	There	is	no	denying	that	Hu	and	Wen	
had	 the	 long-standing	 desire	 to	 rebalance	 China’s	 economy	 away	 from	heavy	 reliance	 on	
exports	towards	consumption.	It	is	also	analytically	true	that	a	more	flexible	and	appreciated	
RMB	exchange	rate	would	be	conducive	to	China’s	economic	restructuring,	as	the	exchange	
rate	 was	 an	 important	 price	 mechanism	 to	 help	 transform	 the	 Chinese	 export-oriented	
economy	to	a	domestic	consumption-driven	economy.	However,	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	5,	
the	 Chinese	 leadership	 placed	 priority	 on	 growth	 and	 stability	 and	 often	 place	 economic	
reforms	in	secondary	place.	Therefore,	the	limited	nature	of	exchange	rate	policy	reform	also	
had	a	limited	impact	on	the	economic	transition.	
	 Empirical	data	 is	 consistent	with	 this	argument.	 Figures	6.2	and	6.3	 show	 ratios	of	
China’s	current	account	to	GDP	and	consumption	to	GDP	respectively	between	2005	and	2013.	
On	the	one	hand,	though	the	RMB	consistently	appreciated	against	the	dollar	between	2005	
and	2007,	the	ratio	of	China’s	current	account	to	GDP	was	on	the	rise.	The	ratio	of	China’s	
current	account	to	GDP	decreased	slightly	in	the	year	of	2008,	when	the	RMB	appreciated	in	
a	 faster	 pace	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2008.	On	 the	other	 hand,	we	 could	not	 see	 any	 trend	 in	
consumption	growth	during	the	whole	period	of	time.	Therefore,	it	is	suggested	that	the	first	
round	of	exchange	rate	reform	had	a	limited	impact	to	facilitate	China’s	economic	transition	
from	export-oriented	towards	consumption-driven.	
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Figure	6.2:	Ratio	of	China’s	current	account	to	GDP,	from	2005	to	2013	
Source:	IMF	World	Economic	Outlook,	available	from	
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx	
	
Figure	6.3:	Ratio	of	China’s	consumption	to	GDP,	from	2008	to	2013	
Source:	World	Bank	Data,	available	from	http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS	
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	 Furthermore,	China’s	current	account	surplus	experienced	a	notable	reduction	in	2009,	
largely	due	to	the	negative	impact	of	the	global	financial	crisis.	Then	China’s	external	trade	
steadily	became	more	balanced	after	2009.	It	was	not	of	great	necessity	to	seek	trade	surplus	
reduction	 through	 exchange	 rate	 appreciation	 from	 2010	 to	 2013.	 With	 the	 benefit	 of	
hindsight,	 there	 is	 also	 little	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 second	 round	of	 exchange	 rate	
reform	would	 be	 conducive	 to	 boost	 the	 domestic	 consumption	 (see	 Figure	 6.3).	 China’s	
transformation	into	a	consumer-driven	economy	is	a	rather	complex	issue	that	exchange	rate	
appreciation	alone	cannot	resolve.	
	 What	of	the	hypothesis	that	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	policy	in	2010	was	driven	
by	the	goal	of	inflation	control?	According	to	this	argument,	greater	exchange	rate	flexibility	
and	RMB	appreciation	could	help	to	enhance	the	autonomy	and	effectiveness	of	monetary	
policy	 and	 curb	 domestic	 inflation.	 Chinese	 policy	 makers,	 especially	 the	 PBOC	 officials,	
recognized	the	benefits	of	exchange	rate	flexibility.	However,	careful	analysis	of	China’s	CPI	
data	(see	Figure	6.4)	shows	that	there	is	little	support	for	this	argument	as	well.	China’s	annual	
CPI	 is	 1.8%	 in	 2005	 and	 3.3%	 in	 2010.	 The	 data	 suggests	 that	 inflation	was	 not	 a	 serious	
problem	in	the	two	years,	when	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	initiated.	Though	it	is	more	
plausible	to	speculate	that	the	PBOC	widened	the	RMB-dollar	trading	band	two	times	aiming	
at	inflation	control	in	2007	and	2012,	there	is	a	lack	of	empirical	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	
Chinese	leadership	launched	the	exchange	rate	reform	in	order	to	moderate	inflation	in	2005	
and	2010.	
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Figure	6.4:	China’s	annual	CPI,	from	2007	to	2013	
Source:	World	Bank	Data,	available	from	
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG/countries/CN?display=graph	
	
6.4	Concluding	Remarks	
This	 chapter	has	examined	 the	 resumption	of	RMB	exchange	 rate	 reform,	beginning	 from	
June	2010.	As	with	Chapter	3,	the	level	I	game	and	level	II	game	should	be	combined	to	explain	
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leadership	stood	firm	to	the	external	pressure,	with	less	 internal	battles	within	the	central	
government	(between	PBOC	and	MOFCOM).	The	Chinese	 leadership	was	consistent	 in	the	
RMB	exchange	rate	reform	policy	in	2010,	in	which	the	RMB	internationalization	played	the	
role	of	“intervening	variable”.	
	 The	Chinese	leadership	promoted	international	use	of	its	own	currency	to	settle	the	
cross-border	 trade	 beginning	 from	2009.	 Beijing	 not	 only	 gradually	widened	 the	 range	 of	
trade	 transactions	 but	 also	 facilitated	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	 international	 investment.	
Moreover,	China’s	central	bank	signed	bilateral	currency-swap	agreements	with	a	number	of	
central	banks	and	monetary	authorities	to	expand	the	use	of	the	RMB	in	international	trade	
and	 financial	 transactions.	 With	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	 internationalization	 and	 an	
increasing	openness	of	capital	account,	a	flexible	exchange	rate	was	the	feasible	choice	to	
preserve	the	independence	and	effectiveness	of	Chinese	monetary	policy,	which	produced	
the	Chinese	leadership’s	consensus	on	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform	in	2010.	As	the	stability	
and	 predictability	 of	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 attributes	 in	
improving	 the	confidence	and	promoting	 the	 international	use	of	RMB,	 it	determined	 the	
pathway	 of	 gradual	 and	 steady	 appreciation	 in	 the	 second	 round	 of	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	
reform.	
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Chapter	7	Conclusion	
	
This	thesis	has	striven	to	enhance	the	understanding	of	the	nature	and	mechanism	of	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policymaking,	 notably	 during	 the	 Hu-Wen	 administration.	 It	 has	 sought	 to	
address	 the	 research	 questions	 raised	 in	 the	 introduction	 by	 examining	 the	 international	
political	economy	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	from	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	
perspective.	 This	 chapter	 firstly	 summarises	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 the	 empirical	
findings	of	the	thesis.	It	then	relates	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	to	the	wider	context	of	
China’s	politics.	The	empirical	studies	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	from	2003	to	2013	have	
suggested	 that	 the	Hu-Wen	administration’s	 governance	was	 characterized	by	 consensus-
building	collective	leadership	and	they	placed	priority	on	economic	growth	and	social	stability.	
The	last	section	delineates	the	implications	of	the	study	for	future	research.	
	
8.1	Theoretical	framework	and	empirical	findings	
With	China’s	economic	rise,	and	particularly	owing	to	its	massive	international	trade	surplus	
with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world,	 the	 exchange	 rate	 of	 its	 currency	 has	 come	 under	 increasing	
scrutiny	in	the	new	millennium.	Based	on	the	revision	and	synthesis	of	existing	CPE	and	IPE	
approaches,	this	thesis	proposes	that	an	IPE	approach	that	bridges	international	politics	and	
domestic	politics	is	best	suited	to	explain	the	development	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy.	
By	specifically	examining	the	external	factors	and	domestic	sources	of	China’s	exchange	rate	
policy,	the	thesis	further	develops	a	three-level	game	framework	for	China’s	exchange	rate	
policymaking	 to	 address	 the	 first	 research	 question:	 “What	 factors	 determine	 China’s	
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exchange	rate	policymaking	from	2003	to	2013?”	 It	 is	argued	that	China’s	central	decision	
makers	 are	understood	 to	 strive	 to	 reconcile	 international	pressures,	domestic	ministerial	
interests	 and	 domestic	 interest	 groups	 when	 making	 RMB	 exchange	 rate	 policies.	 More	
specifically,	the	three-level	game	framework	examines	the	Chinese	leadership’s	negotiations	
with	 the	 international	 bargainers	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (level	 I),	 negotiations	between	
central	government’s	ministries	at	the	central	governmental	level	(level	II)	and	negotiations	
with	the	domestic	interest	groups	and	local	governments	at	the	local	level	(level	III).	
	 However,	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 adapted	 three-level	 game	 framework	 and	 the	
relative	 importance	 of	 the	 three	 level	 games	 remain	 a	 puzzle,	which	 needs	 to	 be	 further	
examined	in	empirical	studies.	After	offering	a	theoretical	review,	revision	and	synthesis,	the	
thesis	provides	in-depth	empirical	studies	on	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	from	2003	to	2013.	
Empirical	studies	address	the	following	research	questions	raised	in	the	introduction:	
	 What	accounts	for	the	two	phases	of	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime?	
	 What	are	the	key	causes	of	the	three	turning	points	of	exchange	rate	policy	change?	
	 How	to	explain	the	gradual,	rather	than	one-off,	pattern	of	the	RMB	appreciation?	
	 The	 first	 answer	 to	 these	 questions	 is	 that	 the	 thesis	 shows	how	 the	 level	 I	 game	
played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 before	 the	 2005	
exchange	rate	reform.	External	pressure	mainly	from	the	US	government	and	the	IMF	began	
to	gain	momentum	in	2003.	Faced	with	international	concerns,	Chinese	leaders	made	a	public	
commitment	to	the	international	society	to	carry	out	exchange	rate	reform	in	2004.	However,	
internal	struggles	in	China’s	central	government	explained	why	the	Chinese	leadership	did	not	
make	a	final	decision	and	exchange	rate	reform	was	delayed.	External	pressure	on	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 policy	 reached	 its	 apex	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2005,	which	 forced	 the	 Chinese	
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leadership	to	put	exchange	rate	reform	clearly	on	the	policy	agenda.	However,	to	explain	the	
specific	 pathway	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform,	 one	 needs	 to	 further	 explore	 China’s	
domestic	politics.	
	 Second,	the	 level	 II	game	determined	the	 limited	scope	of	the	 initial	 reform	in	July	
2005	and	the	subsequent	gradual	RMB	appreciation	from	2005	to	2007.	Two	key	ministries	
with	competing	preferences	were	divided	internally	 in	China’s	central	government.	PBOC’s	
officials	were	particularly	interested	in	exchange	rate	reform,	which	would	endow	them	with	
more	 monetary	 policy	 autonomy.	 Nevertheless,	 PBOC’s	 position	 was	 challenged	 by	 the	
MOFCOM,	which	preferred	a	 fixed	 (and	undervalued)	RMB	exchange	 rate.	 The	MOFCOM,	
with	 their	 constituencies	 within	 China’s	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and	 a	 more	 politically	
powerful	Minister	 (Bo	Xilai),	was	more	 influential	over	 the	central	 government’s	decision-
making	than	the	PBOC.	As	a	result	of	compromise,	PBOC’s	wish	for	exchange	rate	flexibility	
was	granted,	but	was	considerably	qualified	to	satisfy	MOFCOM’s	concerns.	The	initial	RMB	
appreciation	 was	 limited	 to	 2.1	 percent	 against	 the	 dollar,	 and	 the	 pace	 of	 subsequent	
appreciation	 was	 to	 be	 relatively	 stable	 and	 slow.	 After	 July	 2005,	 the	 PBOC	 faced	 an	
increasing	 policy	 dilemma	 in	 simultaneously	 maintaining	 the	 gradually	 appreciated	 RMB	
exchange	 rates	 and	 controlling	 the	 domestic	money	 supply,	where	 there	were	 persistent	
current	account	surplus	and	capital	inflows.	
	 Third,	the	 level	 III	game	provided	the	most	 important	sources	for	the	stagnation	of	
China’s	 exchange	 rate	 reform	 in	 2008,	 and	 China	 returned	 to	 the	 de-facto	 dollar-pegged	
exchange	rate	regime	during	the	global	financial	crisis.	China	faced	rising	inflationary	pressure	
in	2007	and	the	Chinese	leadership	made	inflation	prevention	the	top	priority	in	the	fourth	
quarter	of	2007.	RMB	appreciation	was	used	as	one	of	 the	 tools	 to	help	China	expand	 its	
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imports	and	curb	inflation.	RMB	appreciated	at	a	significantly	faster	pace	in	the	fourth	quarter	
of	2007	and	the	first	half	of	2008.	Exporters	became	strongly	opposed	to	RMB	appreciation	
in	 2008.	 They	 lobbied	 through	 local	 governments,	 local	 offices	 of	 MOFCOM,	 and	 trade	
associations	to	 impose	considerable	pressure	on	the	central	government.	Confronted	with	
pressure	from	businesses,	the	top	leadership	conducted	intensive	research	and	investigation	
in	early	July	2008	and	finally	decided	to	roll	out	rescue	policies.	The	market-oriented	RMB	
exchange	rate	reform	beginning	from	21	July	2005	was	halted	in	the	second	half	of	2008,	and	
China	returned	to	the	de-facto	dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	regime	in	turbulent	times	of	the	
global	financial	crisis.	
	 Fourth,	 the	 level	 I	 game	 once	 again	 played	 an	 agenda-setting	 role	 in	 the	 2010	
exchange	rate	reform,	but	the	level	II	game	was	important	as	well,	resulting	in	the	Chinese	
leadership	allowing	the	RMB	to	appreciate	against	the	dollar	in	a	gradual	and	steady	manner.	
While	the	Congress’s	 influence	on	the	RMB	 issue	generally	diminished	over	time	after	 the	
global	financial	crisis,	international	criticism	and	pressure	from	the	US	administration	and	the	
IMF	gained	momentum	 in	 the	 first	half	of	2010.	The	Chinese	 leadership	stood	 firm	to	 the	
external	pressure	and	emphasized	that	what	it	called	the	“politicization”	of	the	RMB	exchange	
rate	would	not	help	address	the	 issue.	The	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	were	not	divergent	 in	
terms	of	the	exchange	rate	reform	and	there	was	less	internal	controversy	within	the	central	
government	 in	2010.	Therefore,	 the	Chinese	 leadership	was	more	consistent	on	exchange	
rate	 policy.	 The	 underlying	 reason	 was	 that,	 with	 the	 development	 of	 RMB	
internationalization	 and	 increasing	 openness	 of	 the	 capital	 account	 after	 2009,	 a	 flexible	
exchange	 rate	 was	 Chinese	 government’s	 feasible	 choice	 to	 maintain	 independent	 and	
effective	monetary	policy.	As	the	stability	and	predictability	of	RMB	exchange	rate	was	one	
of	the	most	 important	attributes	 in	 improving	confidence	and	promoting	the	 international	
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use	of	RMB,	 it	determined	 the	pathway	of	gradual	and	steady	appreciation	 in	 the	 second	
round	of	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	
	 Last,	the	empirical	study	responds	to	the	question	as	to	why	China’s	exchange	rate	
policymaking	 is	 a	 three-level	 game	 rather	 than	 a	 two-level	 one.	 Of	 course,	 this	 could	 be	
treated	 simply	 as	 a	 modified	 two	 level	 game.	 However,	 the	 suggestion	 here	 is	 that	 the	
difference	between	the	two	domestic	games	is	so	great	that	it	is	better	conceived	of	as	two	
separate	 negotiations,	 rather	 than	 two	 parts	 of	 the	 same	 domestic	 game.	 Although	 the	
MOFCOM	strongly	advocated	for	the	interests	of	export	sectors	in	2005	and	2006,	there	were	
few	 signs	 of	 direct	 lobbying	 from	 export	 enterprises	 after	 the	 initiation	 of	 exchange	 rate	
reform.	 In	 contrast,	 when	 it	 came	 to	 2008,	 export	 enterprises	 lobbied	 through	 local	
governments,	 local	 offices	 of	 MOFCOM,	 and	 trade	 associations	 to	 impose	 considerable	
pressure	on	the	central	government.	The	level	II	game	and	the	level	III	game	were	so	different	
that	they	cannot	be	simply	treated	as	the	same	domestic	game.	The	empirical	study	generally	
validates	the	applicability	of	the	adapted	three-level	game	framework	of	China’s	exchange	
rate	policymaking.	
	 To	 sum	 up,	 this	 thesis	 examines	 the	 international	 political	 economy	 of	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	from	a	theoretical	and	an	empirical	perspective.	The	three-level	
game	 framework	and	 the	empirical	 studies	provide	a	 richer	portrait	of	 the	dynamism	and	
complexity	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	the	Hu-Wen	era.	The	thesis	has	clearly	
shown	 that	 China’s	 central	 decision	 makers	 strove	 to	 reconcile	 international	 pressures,	
domestic	ministerial	interests	and	domestic	interest	groups	when	making	RMB	exchange	rate	
policies.	To	explain	the	last	research	question	“why	have	some	policy	preferences	prevailed	
in	policymaking	at	the	expense	of	others	during	different	periods	of	time?”	in	the	introduction,	
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the	researcher	will	further	discuss	the	relationship	between	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	
and	the	nature	of	China’s	politics.	
	
8.2	The	bigger	picture:	China’s	exchange	rate	reforms	and	the	nature	of	China’s	
politics	
The	introduction	of	this	thesis	established	a	view	of	Chinese	politics	in	the	Hu-Wen	era	that	
informs	this	research	project.	The	empirical	study	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	
the	Hu-Wen	era	meanwhile	suggested	that	China’s	economic	reforms	were	literally	a	non-
linear	 process,	 in	 which	 both	 international	 and	 domestic	 political	 powers	 influenced	 the	
timing	and	drove	the	pace	of	exchange	rate	reforms.	Although	the	overall	direction	of	China’s	
exchange	 rate	 reform	 was	 towards	 greater	 liberalisation,	 there	 was	 limited	 evidence	 to	
suggest	 that	 Chinese	 leaders	 had	 a	 long-term	 grand	 strategy	 for	 economic	 reform.	 The	
stagnation	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	from	2008	to	2010	clearly	shows	that	the	process	
did	not	proceed	in	a	smooth	or	inevitable	annual	manner	but	with	twists	and	turns	along	the	
way.	This	section	will	explore	this	contingency	by	discussing	the	relationship	between	China’s	
exchange	rate	policymaking	and	the	nature	of	China’s	politics.	
	 As	argued,	international	pressure	played	an	agenda-setting	role	in	China’s	exchange	
rate	 policies	 in	 both	 2005	 and	 2010.	 In	 particular,	 exchange	 rate	 reform	was	 unlikely	 to	
happen	 in	 2005	 without	 the	 mounting	 external	 pressure,	 considering	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
MOFCOM	was	far	more	politically	powerful	than	the	PBOC	in	China’s	central	government	and	
the	potential	negative	effects	of	RMB	appreciation.	Both	the	PBOC	and	the	MOFCOM	kept	a	
close	eye	on	 the	 impacts	of	RMB	appreciation	on	China’s	exports,	which	 implied	 that	 the	
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Chinese	leadership	took	a	very	cautious	approach	toward	the	exchange	rate	reform.	There	is	
no	denying	that	the	increasing	scale	of	China’s	engagement	with	the	world	economy	in	the	
twenty-first	century	meant	that	international	interests	were	much	more	entangled	in	China’s	
domestic	politics.	However,	the	thesis	demonstrates	that	the	evolution	of	China’s	exchange	
rate	reform	was	still	largely	determined	by	China’s	domestic	politics.	As	Naughton	notes:	
“China’s	enduring	‘gradualist’	approach	to	transition	obviously	suits	the	needs	of	
its	authoritarian	leaders.	More	interesting	is	that	the	concrete	policy	content	of	
China’s	transition	–	which	differed	dramatically	in	different	periods	–	can	also	be	
traced	to	the	changing	nature	of	power	and	strategic	calculations	of	leaders	within	
the	authoritarian	system.”453	
	 China’s	exchange	rate	reform	policies	were	decided	by	top	leaders	in	the	authoritarian	
political	system,	and	as	a	result	exchange	rate	reforms	were	closely	related	to	the	political	
system	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 political	 leaders	 in	 the	 system.	 Despite	 different	 exchange	 rate	
reform	policies	in	the	different	periods	of	time,	the	researcher	holds	the	view	that	it	is	still	
possible	 to	 reach	 some	 conclusions	 as	 to	 the	 relationship	between	China’s	 exchange	 rate	
policymaking	and	the	nature	of	China’s	politics.	
	 First	and	 foremost,	 the	 fundamental	 reason	 for	 the	 important	 role	of	 level	 II	game	
between	the	MOFCOM	and	the	PBOC	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	throughout	the	
research	time	frame	was	that	China’s	politics	was	characterized	by	collective	leadership	in	the	
Hu-Wen	era,	and	arguably	more	so	than	ever	before.	The	introduction	has	elaborated	the	fact	
that	Hu	and	Wen	did	not	enjoy	as	much	political	capital	and/or	authority	as	their	predecessors.	
																																																						
453	Barry	Naughton	(2008)	“A	political	economy	of	China’s	economic	transition”,	in	Loren	Brandt	and	Thomas	
G.	Rawski	(ed.)	China’s	Great	Economic	Transformation,	Cambridge	University	Press,	p.91.	
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Moreover,	with	continuous	reform	and	opening	up	from	Deng	to	Hu,	China’s	economy	was	
much	more	complex	and	China	had	an	increasingly	pluralist	society	–	clearly	not	a	fully	liberal	
one	with	the	levels	of	plurality	associated	with	democratic	states,	but	certainly	more	plural	
than	before.	Lynch	notes	that	“China	is	increasingly	pluralistic	and	will	continue	to	become	
even	 more	 so	 as	 long	 as	 the	 economy	 continues	 to	 grow	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 being	 market	
oriented.” 454 	And	 as	 Miller	 argues,	 “the	 problems	 of	 governing	 an	 increasingly	 globally	
interdependent	 and	 market-driven	 economy	 and	 a	 correspondingly	 more	 complex	 and	
sophisticated	 society	 required	 a	 politics	 of	 expertise,”455 	in	 particular	 the	 (international)	
economic	expertise	from	the	empowered	ministries	and	agencies.	
	 Therefore,	 China’s	 changing	 political-socioeconomic	 landscapes	 determined	 the	
growing	 importance	 of	 ministerial	 politics	 in	 China’s	 economic	 policymaking,	 and	 more	
specifically,	the	bargaining	game	between	the	MOFCOM	and	the	PBOC	in	China’s	exchange	
rate	 policymaking.	 As	 noted	 by	 Downs	 in	 2009,	 “policymaking	 overall	 has	 been	 moving	
towards	greater	pluralization	over	the	past	decade”	and	“as	a	result,	more	voices	are	being	
heard,	but	that	means	decisionmaking	is	becoming	more	contentious	and	protracted.”456	The	
inputs	 for	exchange	rate	policy	deliberations	 in	the	central	government	mainly	came	from	
government	agencies,	notably	the	MOFCOM	and	the	PBOC.	Therefore,	bureaucratic	politics	
played	a	key	role	in	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
	 It	 also	 suggests	 that	Hu	 and	Wen	exercised	 effective	 governance	by	maintaining	 a	
politics	 of	 consensus	 in	 China’s	 central	 government,	 which	 was	 consistent	 with	 the	
																																																						
454	Daniel	Lynch	(2015)	China’s	Futures:	PRC	Elites	Debate	Economics,	Politics,	and	Foreign	Policy,	Stanford	
University	Press,	p.76.	
455	Allice	Miller	(2011)	“Dilemmas	of	globalization	and	governance”,	in	Roderick	MacFarquhar	(ed.)	The	Politics	
of	China:	Sixty	Years	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	Cambridge	University	Press,	p.532.	
456	Erica	S.	Downs	(2009)	“Business	interest	groups	in	Chinese	politics:	the	case	of	the	oil	companies”,	in	Cheng	
Li	(ed.)	China’s	Changing	Political	Landscape:	Prospects	for	Democracy,	Brookings	Institution	Press,	p.137.	
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“consensus-building	collective	leadership”457	style	of	Hu-Wen	administration	outlined	in	the	
introduction.	Despite	MOFCOM	and	PBOC’s	conflicting	preferences	over	exchange	rate	policy,	
the	empirical	study	demonstrated	that	their	competition	generally	remained	behind	closed	
doors	in	the	central	government.	Once	the	top	leadership	made	the	final	exchange	rate	policy	
decision,	 government	 agencies	 would	 adhere	 to	 the	 principle	 and	 implement	 the	 policy,	
which	 is	 the	 main	 characteristic	 of	 Leninist	 democratic	 centralism	 or	 consultative	
Leninism/authoritarianism.458	PBOC’s	endeavour	to	preserve	the	gradual	RMB	appreciation	
in	the	first	round	of	exchange	rate	reform	provided	firm	support	to	this	argument.	Therefore,	
it	may	be	concluded	that	Hu	and	Wen	maintained	effective	governance	by	consensus	building,	
which	was	adapted	to	the	China’s	changing	political-socioeconomic	landscapes	in	the	twenty-
first	century.	As	Lynch	notes:	
“China	today	is	a	kaleidoscopically	plural	society	–	although	still,	to	be	sure,	always	
subject	to	the	Leninist	state’s	discipline	should	the	leaders	decide,	for	whatever	
reason,	to	crack	down,	either	on	a	whole	category	of	activity/discourse	or	on	a	
particular	person	who	has	irritated	a	local	tyrant.”459	
	 Second,	the	nature	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform,	characterized	by	gradualism	and	
incrementalism,	 suggested	 that	 stability	 maintenance	 and	 short-term	 crisis	 management	
prevailed	over	long-term	planning	in	the	formation	of	economic	policy.	Many	observers	and	
																																																						
457	Alice	Miller	(2009)	“Institutionalization	and	the	changing	dynamics	of	Chinese	leadership	politics”,	in	Cheng	
Li	(ed.)	China’s	Changing	Political	Landscape:	Prospects	for	Democracy,	Brookings	Institution	Press,	p.61.	
458	For	Leninist	democratic	centralism,	see	Michael	Waller	(1981)	Democratic	Centralism:	An	Historical	
Commentary,	Manchester	University	Press.	For	consultative	Leninism/authoritarianism,	see	Steve	Tsang	(2009)	
“Consultative	Leninism:	China’s	new	political	framework”,	Journal	of	Contemporary	China,	Vol.18,	No.62,	
pp.865-880;	Baogang	He	and	Stig	Thøgersen	(2010)	“Giving	the	people	a	voice?	Experiments	with	consultative	
authoritarian	institutions	in	China”,	Journal	of	Contemporary	China,	Vol.19,	No.66,	pp.675-692.	
459	Daniel	Lynch	(2015)	China’s	Futures:	PRC	Elites	Debate	Economics,	Politics,	and	Foreign	Policy,	Stanford	
University	Press,	p.xii.	
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analysts	 recognized	 Hu-Wen’s	 shifted	 priority	 to	 sustainable	 development	 and	 social	
development	after	the	leadership	transition	in	2002.	For	instance,	Liew	and	Wu	argue	that:	
“There	 is	 without	 doubt	 a	 fundamental	 shift	 in	 emphasis	 between	 the	 Jiang	
Zemin-Zhu	 Rongji	 and	 the	 Hu	 Jintao-Wen	 Jiabao	 leadership.	While	 the	 former	
leadership	was	deeply	concerned	with	engaging	the	global	economy,	the	latter	is	
more	concerned	with	poverty	and	income	inequality,	especially	in	the	countryside	
and	western	China.”460	
	 Moreover,	the	first	two	public	visits	by	Hu	Jintao	as	general	secretary	were	not	to	the	
modern	and	prosperous	 cities	of	 Shanghai	or	 Shenzhen	but	 rather	 to	Xibaipo	 [西柏坡],	 a	
village	 in	 Hebei,	 and	 Inner	 Mongolia.	 Particularly,	 Hu	 Jintao	 put	 forward	 the	 “scientific	
development	outlook”	 [科学发展观]	 in	 the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	 the	16th	CCP	Central	
Committee	 in	 2003,	 which	 aimed	 to	 address	 the	 problems	 including	 the	 widening	 gap	
between	urban	and	rural	development,	the	uneven	development	among	China’s	regions,	the	
pursuit	of	economic	growth	at	the	sacrifice	of	environmental	sustainability,	and	the	imbalance	
between	export-driven	growth	and	domestic	consumption.461	
	 However,	with	 the	wisdom	of	hindsight,	Hu’s	 proposal	 of	 a	 scientific	 development	
outlook	 was	 not	 translated	 into	 concrete	measures.	 China’s	 first	 round	 of	 exchange	 rate	
reform	 from	2005	 to	2008	could	be	one	of	 the	best	 footnotes	 to	 this	argument.	Effective	
exchange	 rate	 reform	could	have	contributed	 to	economic	 rebalancing	by	making	exports	
more	expensive	and	 imports	cheaper,	thereby	alleviating	the	export	surge	and	stimulating	
																																																						
460	Leong	Liew	and	Harry	Wu	(2007)	The	Making	of	China’s	Exchange	Rate	Policy:	From	Plan	to	WTO	Entry,	
Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	p.206.	
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届三中全会明确阐述科学发展观]”,	Xinhua	News	Agency,	4	August	2012,	retrieved	from	
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-08/04/c_112623819.htm	(accessed	21/09/2016).	
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domestic	consumption.462	However,	as	Chapter	6	shows,	the	ratio	of	China’s	current	account	
to	GDP	was	on	the	rise,	while	that	of	consumption	to	GDP	was	in	decline	generally	from	2005	
to	 2008.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 limited	nature	 of	 the	 2005	 exchange	 rate	 reform	and	 the	
subsequent	gradual	RMB	appreciation	was	dedicated	to	continuing	export	growth.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	acceleration	of	RMB	appreciation	in	the	last	quarter	of	2007	and	first	half	of	
2008	was	short-lived	owing	to	the	intensive	local	 lobbying	and	the	top	leadership’s	severe	
concerns	about	employment	and	stability.	Therefore,	in	spite	of	Hu-Wen’s	official	rhetoric	of	
people’s	orientation	and	economic	rebalancing,	Chinese	policymakers	 in	reality	still	placed	
priority	on	the	coastal	regions	and	acted	out	of	an	obsession	with	short-term	growth,	in	order	
to	preserve	the	CCP’s	legitimacy	and	social	stability.	
	 To	summarize,	the	analysis	of	China’s	exchange	rate	reform	suggests	that	it	was	in	fact	
contingent,	 rather	 than	 inevitable,	 because	 of	 the	 complex	 array	 of	 interests	 in	 the	
policymaking	process.	To	address	the	research	question	“why	have	some	policy	preferences	
prevailed	in	policymaking	at	the	expense	of	others	during	different	periods	of	time?”,	we	have	
examined	China’s	domestic	politics	in	more	depth.	The	empirical	study	of	China’s	exchange	
rate	reform	from	2003	to	2013	confirms	that	the	Hu-Wen	administration’s	governance	was	
characterized	by	consensus-building	collective	leadership	and	they	placed	priority	to	maintain	
economic	growth	and	social	stability.	
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8.3	Directions	for	future	research	
The	 thesis	 has	made	 a	 first	 attempt	 to	 construct	 a	 three-level	 game	 framework	 to	 study	
China’s	exchange	rate	politics.	The	explanatory	strengths	of	the	theoretical	framework	have	
already	been	demonstrated	in	the	empirical	studies.	However,	it	does	not	constitute	the	final	
word	 on	 the	 international	 political	 economy	 of	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 The	
researcher	will	conduct	further	research	in	the	following	two	areas.	
	 First,	it	will	be	worthwhile	continuing	to	examine	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	
after	2013.	China’s	politics	and	economy	have	changed	considerably	since	Xi	Jinping	and	Li	
Keqiang	succeeded	Hu	Jintao	and	Wen	Jiabao.	On	the	one	hand,	Xi	seems	to	intend	to	reverse	
the	trend	of	increasingly	fragmented	authority	and	to	centralize	the	political	power	in	China’s	
central	government.	He	has	used	the	anti-corruption	campaign	to	consolidate	his	authority.463	
He	 has	 also	 strengthened	 his	 own	 power	 by	 creating	 some	 Central	 Leading	 Groups	 and	
heading	many	of	them,	including	the	CLGFE,	the	Central	Leading	Group	for	Comprehensively	
Deepening	Reform,	and	Central	Leading	Group	for	National	Defence	and	Military	Reform.464	
On	the	other	hand,	China’s	economic	growth	has	been	slowing	down,	and	Xi	declared	in	2014	
that	China	entered	a	new	phase	of	economic	development	–	a	“new	normal”.	There	are	three	
characteristics	 of	 China’s	 new	 normal	 economy:	 “first,	 the	 economy	 has	 shifted	 from	 the	
previous	high	speed	to	a	medium-to-high	speed	growth;	second,	the	economic	structure	is	
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constantly	 improved	 and	 upgraded;	 and	 third,	 the	 economy	 is	 increasingly	 driven	 by	
innovation	 instead	 of	 input	 and	 investment.” 465 	Under	 the	 new	 circumstances,	 China’s	
exchange	rate	policy	has	been	changed	accordingly.	
	 As	has	been	argued	in	Chapter	6,	with	the	development	of	RMB	internationalization	
and	increasing	openness	of	capital	account,	a	flexible	exchange	rate	was	the	best	choice	to	
preserve	 the	 independence	and	effectiveness	of	Chinese	monetary	policy.	A	more	 flexible	
RMB	exchange	rate	was	in	turn	conducive	to	the	international	use	of	RMB.	More	specifically,	
China’s	exchange	rate	experienced	a	depreciation	tendency	in	the	first	half	of	2014,	which	
was	 unprecedented	 in	 the	 previous	 years.	 After	 this,	 two-way	 fluctuations	 of	 the	 RMB	
exchange	rate	was	becoming	the	“new	normal”,	which	indicated	that	the	Chinese	currency	
become	increasingly	market-oriented.	In	particular,	the	PBOC	announced	a	further	reform	of	
the	exchange	 rate	 system	on	11	August	2015.	The	daily	 central	parity	quotes	of	 the	RMB	
exchange	 rate	 against	 the	 dollar	 were	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	 closing	 rate	 of	 the	
previous	day,	the	demand	and	supply	of	the	foreign	exchange	market,	and	the	exchange	rates	
of	 the	 world’s	 major	 currencies.466 	Moreover,	 RMB	 was	 included	 in	 IMF’s	 SDR	 basket	 in	
December	 2015,	 which	 reflected	 China’s	 increasing	 financial	 integration	 and	 the	 growing	
international	use	of	RMB.467	
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	 It	could	be	seen	that	in	the	Xi	era	China’s	politics	becomes	more	authoritarian,	while	
the	economic	policy	(at	 least	exchange	rate	policy)	becomes	more	liberal.	Here	interesting	
questions	arise:	 is	 there	any	relationship	or	contradiction	between	the	more	authoritarian	
political	regime	and	more	liberal	economic	policy?	Moreover,	will	the	CCP	be	able	to	address	
“the	contradiction	between	China’s	 increasingly	pluralistic	 society	and	culture,	on	 the	one	
hand,	and	the	authoritarian	political	structure,	on	the	other”468?		Future	research	to	explore	
the	questions	in	more	depth	will	make	an	important	contribution	to	the	CPE	literature.	
	 Second,	this	research	invites	further	exploration	of	generalizability	of	the	three-level	
game	 framework	 to	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 of	 other	 countries.	 For	 one	 example,	
comparative	case	studies	on	the	yen	and	the	RMB	exchange	rate	policy	could	provide	fruitful	
results.	The	yen	adopted	a	fast	appreciation	approach	after	the	1985	Plaza	Accord,	while	the	
RMB	appreciation	stuck	to	gradualism	after	the	21	July	2005	announcement.	The	comparative	
studies	can	figure	out	how	different	patterns	of	international-domestic	interactions	in	Japan	
and	China	influence	their	distinctive	approaches	of	currency	appreciation.	
	 As	another	example,	Malaysia	pegged	the	ringgit	(Malaysia’s	official	currency)	to	the	
dollar	at	3.8	ringgit	per	dollar	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Asian	financial	crisis	and	ran	continuous	
trade	 surpluses	with	 the	US	 in	 the	 2000s.	 Interestingly,	Malaysia	 shifted	 from	 the	 dollar-
pegged	regime	to	a	managed	floating	system	on	21	July	2005,	exactly	the	same	date	when	
China	announced	the	reform	of	China’s	exchange	rate	system.	Here	the	questions	arise:	given	
Malaysia	was	a	country	with	less	economic	impact	and	geopolitical	independence	compared	
with	China,	what	were	the	roles	of	external	factors	for	Malaysia’s	2005	exchange	rate	reform?	
Whether,	and	if	so	how,	domestic	politics	influenced	the	transition	of	the	ringgit	exchange	
																																																						
468	Daniel	Lynch	(2015)	China’s	Futures:	PRC	Elites	Debate	Economics,	Politics,	and	Foreign	Policy,	Stanford	
University	Press,	p.107.	
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rate	 regime?	 In	 short,	 the	 thesis	 invites	 future	 comparative	 case	 studies	of	exchange	 rate	
policymaking	 to	explore	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 international	and	domestic	 factors	 interact,	
what	factors	exert	the	most	influences	and	the	conditions	under	which	they	matter	most	in	
different	countries.	
	 In	conclusion,	 this	 thesis	makes	a	contribution	by	providing	original	and	systematic	
research	 on	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking	 in	 the	 Hu-Wen	 era.	 The	 thesis	 makes	 a	
modest	theoretical	contribution	to	the	existing	body	of	CPE	and	IPE	literature	by	developing	
the	 three-level	 game	 framework	 to	 explain	 China’s	 exchange	 rate	 policymaking.	 More	
importantly,	 it	provides	substantial	empirical	evidence	based	on	documentary	analysis	and	
primary	data	from	interviews	and	questionnaire	surveys.	The	empirical	study	provides	a	richer	
portrait	of	the	dynamism	and	complexity	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policymaking	in	the	Hu-
Wen	era.	The	thesis	invites	further	exploration	of	China’s	exchange	rate	policy	in	the	Xi	era	
and	future	comparative	case	study	of	exchange	rate	policymaking.	
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Appendix	
Appendix	A:	US	Congress	Bills	on	the	RMB	issue,	2003-2013	
Date	 Bill	number	 Full	title	 Sponsor	
5	September	
2003	 S.	1586	
To	authorize	appropriate	action	if	the	negotiations	
with	the	People's	Republic	of	China	regarding	
China's	undervalued	currency	and	currency	
manipulation	are	not	successful.	
Charles	E.	
Schumer	
8	September	
2003	 S.	1592	
Fair	Currency	Enforcement	Act	of	2003:	“To	require	
negotiation	and	appropriate	action	with	respect	to	
certain	countries	that	engage	in	currency	
manipulation.”	
Joseph	I.	
Lieberman	
9	September	
2003	 S.	RES.	219	
“To	encourage	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	to	
establish	a	market-based	valuation	of	the	yuan	and	
to	fulfill	its	commitments	under	international	trade	
agreements.”	
Lindsey	
Graham	
10	
September	
2003	
H.	R.	3058	
Currency	Harmonization	Initiative	through	
Neutralizing	Action	Act	of	2003:	“To	require	the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	analyze	and	report	on	
the	exchange	rate	policies	of	the	People’s	Republic	
of	China,	and	to	require	that	additional	tariffs	be	
imposed	on	products	of	that	country	on	the	basis	
of	the	rate	of	manipulation	by	that	country	of	the	
rate	of	exchange	between	the	currency	of	that	
country	and	the	United	States	dollar.”	
Phil	English	
17	
September	
2003	
H.	CON.	RES.	
285	
“Expressing	the	concern	of	the	Congress	regarding	
the	detrimental	impact	on	the	United	States	
economy	of	the	manipulation	by	foreign	
governments	of	their	currencies.”	
Donald	A.	
Manzullo	
8	October	
2003	 H.	R.	3269	
Currency	Manipulation	Prevention	Act:	“To	require	
certain	actions	to	be	taken	against	countries	that	
manipulate	their	currencies,	and	for	other	
purposes.”	
John	D.	
Dingell	
20	October	
2003	 S.	1758	
Currency	Harmonization	Initiative	through	
Neutralizing	Action	Act	of	2003:	“To	require	the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	analyze	and	report	on	
the	exchange	rate	policies	of	the	People’s	Republic	
of	China,	and	to	require	that	additional	tariffs	be	
imposed	on	products	of	that	country	on	the	basis	
of	the	rate	of	manipulation	by	that	country	of	the	
rate	of	exchange	between	the	currency	of	that	
country	and	the	United	States	dollar.”	
George	V.	
Voinovich	
	 	
270	
	
Date	 Bill	number	 Full	title	 Sponsor	
21	October	
2003	 H.	R.	3364	
“To	authorize	appropriate	action	if	the	
negotiations	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	
regarding	China’s	undervalued	currency	and	
currency	manipulation	are	not	successful.”	
Sue	Wilkins	
Myrick	
28	October	
2003	 H.	RES.	414	
“To	encourage	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	to	
fulfill	its	commitments	under	international	trade	
agreements,	support	the	United	States	
manufacturing	sector,	and	establish	monetary	and	
financial	market	reforms.”	
Phil	English	
6	November	
2003	 S.	RES.	262	
“To	encourage	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	
initiate	expedited	negotiations	with	the	People’s	
Republic	of	China	on	establishing	a	market-based	
currency	valuation	and	to	fulfill	its	commitments	
under	international	trade	agreements.”	
Olympia	J.	
Snowe	
22	July	2004	 H.	R.	4986	 “To	require	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	
analyze	and	report	on	the	exchange	rate	policies	of	
the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	and	to	require	that	
measures	consistent	with	the	obligations	of	the	
United	States	under	the	World	Trade	Organization	
be	taken	to	offset	any	disadvantage	to	United	
States	producers	resulting	from	China’s	exchange	
rate	policies.”	
Mike	
Rogers	
23	
September	
2004	
H.	CON.	RES.	
498	
“Urging	the	President	to	take	immediate	steps	to	
establish	a	plan	to	adopt	the	recommendations	of	
the	United	States-China	Economic	and	Security	
Review	Commission	in	its	2004	Report	to	the	
Congress	in	order	to	correct	the	current	imbalance	
in	the	bilateral	trade	and	economic	relationship	
between	the	United	States	and	the	People’s	
Republic	of	China.”	
Timothy	
John	
24	January	
2005	
	
S.	14	 Fair	Wage,	Competition,	and	Investment	Act	of	
2005:	“To	provide	fair	wages	for	America’s	
workers,	to	create	new	jobs	through	investment	in	
America,	to	provide	for	fair	trade	and	
competitiveness,	and	for	other	purposes.”	
Debbie	
Stabenow	
26	January	
2005	
H.	CON.	RES.	
33	
“Urging	the	President	take	immediate	steps	to	
establish	a	plan	to	adopt	the	recommendations	of	
the	United	States-China	Economic	and	Security	
Review	Commission	in	its	2004	Report	to	the	
Congress	in	order	to	correct	the	current	imbalance	
in	the	bilateral	trade	and	economic	relationship	
between	the	United	States	and	the	People’s	
Republic	of	China.”	
Tim	Ryan	
3	February	
2005	
S.	295	 “To	authorize	appropriate	action	if	the	
negotiations	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	
regarding	China’s	undervalued	currency	are	not	
successful.”	
Charles	E.	
Schumer	
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Date	 Bill	number	 Full	title	 Sponsor	
15	February	
2005	
S.	377	 Fair	Currency	Enforcement	Act	of	2005:	“To	require	
negotiation	and	appropriate	action	with	respect	to	
certain	countries	that	engage	in	currency	
manipulation.”	
Joseph	I.	
Lieberman	
6	April	2005	 H.	R.	1498	 Chinese	Currency	Act	of	2005:	“To	clarify	that	
exchange-rate	manipulation	by	the	People’s	
Republic	of	China	is	actionable	under	the	
countervailing	duty	provisions	and	the	product-
specific	safeguard	mechanisms	of	the	trade	laws	of	
the	United	States,	and	for	other	purposes.”	
Tim	Ryan	
12	April	2005	 H.	R.	1575	 “To	authorize	appropriate	action	if	the	
negotiations	with	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	
regarding	China’s	undervalued	currency	and	
currency	manipulation	are	not	successful.”	
Sue	Wilkins	
Myrick	
17	May	2005	 H.	R.	2414	 Currency	Rate	Adjustment	and	Trade	Enforcement	
Act:	“To	require	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	
analyze	and	report	on	the	exchange	rate	policies	of	
the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	and	to	require	that	
measures	consistent	with	the	obligations	of	the	
United	States	under	the	World	Trade	Organization	
be	taken	to	offset	any	disadvantage	to	United	
States	producers	resulting	from	China’s	exchange	
rate	policies.”	
Mike	
Rogers	
21	June	2005	 H.	R.	3004	 Currency	Harmonization	Initiative	Through	
Neutralizing	Action	Act	of	2005:	“To	require	the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	analyze	and	report	on	
the	exchange	rate	policies	of	the	People’s	Republic	
of	China,	and	to	require	that	additional	tariffs	be	
imposed	on	products	of	that	country	on	the	basis	
of	the	rate	of	manipulation	by	that	country	of	the	
rate	of	exchange	between	the	currency	of	that	
country	and	the	United	States	dollar.”	
Phil	English	
14	July	2005	 H.	R.	3283	 United	States	Trade	Rights	Enforcement	Act:	“To	
enhance	resources	to	enforce	United	States	trade	
rights.”	
Phil	English	
14	July	2005	 H.	R.	3306	 Fair	Trade	with	China	Act	of	2005:	“To	amend	the	
Tariff	Act	of	1930	and	the	Trade	Act	of	1974	to	
provide	relief	from	certain	practices	by	other	
countries,	and	for	other	purposes.”	
Charles	B.	
Rangel	
19	July	2005	 S.	1421	 United	States	Trade	Rights	Enforcement	Act:	“To	
enhance	resources	to	enforce	United	States	trade	
rights.”	
Susan	M.	
Collins	
28	July	2005	 H.	R.	3283	 United	States	Trade	Rights	Enforcement	Act:	“To	
enhance	resources	to	enforce	United	States	trade	
rights.”	
Phil	English	
6	October	
2005	
S.	RES.	270	 “Expressing	the	sense	of	the	Senate	that	the	
International	Monetary	Fund	should	investigate	
whether	China	is	manipulating	the	rate	of	
exchange	between	the	Chinese	yuan	and	the	
United	States	dollar.”	
Evan	Bayh	
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Date	 Bill	number	 Full	title	 Sponsor	
28	
September	
2006	
S.	3992	 United	States	Fair	Currency	Practices	Act	of	2006:	
“To	amend	the	Exchange	Rates	and	International	
Economic	Policy	Coordination	Act	of	1988	to	clarify	
the	definition	of	manipulation	with	respect	to	
currency,	and	for	other	purposes.”	
Jim	
Bunning	
9	January	
2007	
H.R.321	 Currency	Harmonization	Initiative	Through	
Neutralizing	Action	Act	of	2005:	“To	require	the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	analyze	and	report	on	
the	exchange	rate	policies	of	the	People’s	Republic	
of	China,	and	to	require	that	additional	tariffs	be	
imposed	on	products	of	that	country	on	the	basis	
of	the	rate	of	manipulation	by	that	country	of	the	
rate	of	exchange	between	the	currency	of	that	
country	and	the	United	States	dollar.”	
Phil	English	
31	January	
2007	
H.	R.	782	 Fair	Currency	Act	of	2007:	“To	amend	title	VII	of	
the	Tariff	Act	of	1930	to	provide	that	exchange-
rate	misalignment	by	any	foreign	nation	is	a	
countervailable	export	subsidy,	to	amend	the	
Exchange	Rates	and	International	Economic	Policy	
Coordination	Act	of	1988	to	clarify	the	definition	of	
manipulation	with	respect	to	currency,	and	for	
other	purposes.”	
Tim	Ryan	
12	February	
2007	
H.	R.	1002	 “To	authorize	appropriate	action	if	the	
negotiations	with	the	People's	Republic	of	China	
regarding	China's	undervalued	currency	and	
currency	manipulation	are	not	successful.”	
John	M.	
Spratt	
7	March	
2007	
S.	796	 Fair	Currency	Act	of	2007:	“To	amend	title	VII	of	
the	Tariff	Act	of	1930	to	provide	that	exchange-
rate	misalignment	by	any	foreign	nation	is	a	
countervailable	export	subsidy,	to	amend	the	
Exchange	Rates	and	International	Economic	Policy	
Coordination	Act	of	1988	to	clarify	the	definition	of	
manipulation	with	respect	to	currency,	and	for	
other	purposes.”	
Jim	
Bunning	
28	June	2007	 H.	R.	2942	 Currency	Reform	for	Fair	Trade	Act	of	2007:	“To	
provide	for	identification	of	misaligned	currency,	
require	action	to	correct	the	misalignment,	and	for	
other	purposes.”	
Tim	Ryan	
3	April	2008	 S.2813	 China	Currency	Manipulation	Act	of	2008:	“To	
require	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	to	take	action	
with	respect	to	currency	manipulation	by	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China	and	for	other	
purposes.”	
Jim	
Bunning	
30	July	2010	 H.	R.	6071	 Emergency	China	Trade	Act	of	2010:	“To	withdraw	
normal	trade	relations	treatment	from	the	
products	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	to	
provide	for	a	balanced	trade	relationship	between	
that	country	and	the	United	States,	and	for	other	
purposes.”	
Brad	
Sherman	
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Date	 Bill	number	 Full	title	 Sponsor	
13	
September	
2011	
H.	R.	2909	 Emergency	China	Trade	Act:	“To	withdraw	normal	
trade	relations	treatment	from	the	products	of	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China,	to	provide	for	a	
balanced	trade	relationship	between	that	country	
and	the	United	States,	and	for	other	purposes.”	
Brad	
Sherman	
	
Source:	 Thomas	 Library	 of	 Congress,	 US	 Congress	 bills	 and	 resolutions,	 available	 from	
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html		
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Appendix	B:	PBOC’s	Open	Market	Operations,	2004-2013	
		
Year,	Quarter	
		
Repo	transactions	 Reverse	repo	transactions	
Spot	bond	
purchase	
Central	bank	bill	
issuance	
2004	
		
		
		
		
Total	 3010	 400	 0	 15072	
Q1	 0	 400	 0	 4352	
Q2	 700	 0	 0	 2390	
Q3	 1710	 0	 0	 2989.5	
Q4	 600	 0	 0	 5340.5	
2005	
		
		
		
		
Total	 7230	 380	 0	 27882	
Q1	 550	 380	 0	 7130	
Q2	 900	 0	 0	 6450	
Q3	 3400	 0	 0	 5350	
Q4	 2380	 0	 0	 8952	
2006	
		
		
		
		
Total	 19900	 1183	 0	 36510	
Q1	 7040	 1183	 0	 13200	
Q2	 4150	 0	 0	 9040	
Q3	 6350	 0	 0	 8162	
Q4	 2360	 0	 0	 6108	
2007	
		
		
		
		
Total	 11185	 900	 6100	 40680	
Q1	 3400	 900	 0	 18030	
Q2	 0	 0	 0	 7950	
Q3	 750	 0	 6000	 9910	
Q4	 7035	 0	 100	 4790	
2008	
		
		
		
		
Total	 33260	 0	 0	 42990	
Q1	 18350	 0	 0	 17860	
Q2	 5120	 0	 0	 11530	
Q3	 6010	 0	 0	 9810	
Q4	 3780	 0	 0	 3790	
	 	
275	
	
		
Year,	Quarter	
		
Repo	transactions	 Reverse	repo	transactions	
Spot	bond	
purchase	
Central	bank	bill	
issuance	
2009	
		
		
		
		
Total	 41710	 0	 0	 40260	
Q1	 11150	 0	 0	 4800	
Q2	 11700	 0	 0	 9300	
Q3	 8700	 0	 0	 12910	
Q4	 10160	 0	 0	 13250	
2010	
		
		
		
		
Total	 20850	 0	 0	 42360	
Q1	 8930	 0	 0	 14350	
Q2	 5920	 0	 0	 11680	
Q3	 3430	 0	 0	 12330	
Q4	 2570	 0	 0	 4000	
2011	
		
		
		
		
Total	 24790	 0	 0	 14020	
Q1	 8150	 0	 0	 3370	
Q2	 5450	 0	 0	 5860	
Q3	 6290	 0	 0	 1640	
Q4	 4900	 0	 0	 3150	
2012	
		
		
		
		
Total	 9440	 60380	 0	 0	
Q1	 3980	 3520	 0	 0	
Q2	 5460	 2140	 0	 0	
Q3	 0	 22930	 0	 0	
Q4	 0	 31790	 0	 0	
2013	
		
		
		
		
Total	 7650	 21660	 0	 5362	
Q1	 2530	 13440	 0	 0	
Q2	 5120	 170	 0	 1140	
Q3	 0	 4700	 0	 4008	
Q4	 0	 3350	 0	 214	
	
Source:	Author’s	own	elaboration	based	on	open	market	operation	announcements,	PBOC	
Monetary	Policy	Department,	available	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125431/125469/index.html	
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Appendix	C:	Adjustments	of	Required	Reserve	Ratio	(RRR),	2001-2013	
Date	 RRR	before	adjustment	 Adjustment	range	 RRR	after	adjustment		
2012.5.18	 20.5%	 -0.5%	 20.0%	
2012.2.24	 21.0%	 -0.5%	 20.5%	
2011.12.5	 21.5%	 -0.5%	 21.0%	
2011.6.20	 21.0%	 0.5%	 21.5%	
2011.5.18	 20.5%	 0.5%	 21.0%	
2011.4.21	 20.0%	 0.5%	 20.5%	
2011.3.25	 19.5%	 0.5%	 20.0%	
2011.2.24	 19.0%	 0.5%	 19.5%	
2011.1.20	 18.5%	 0.5%	 19.0%	
2010.12.20	 18.0%	 0.5%	 18.5%	
2010.11.29	 17.5%	 0.5%	 18.0%	
2010.11.16	 17.0%	 0.5%	 17.5%	
2010.5.10	 16.5%	 0.5%	 17.0%	
2010.2.25	 16.0%	 0.5%	 16.5%	
2010.1.18	 15.5%	 0.5%	 16.0%	
2008.12.25	 16.0%	 -0.5%	 15.5%	
2008.12.05	 17.0%	 -1.0%	 16.0%	
2008.10.15	 17.5%	 -0.5%	 17.0%	
2008.06.07	 16.5%	 1.0%	 17.5%	
2008.05.20	 16.0%	 0.5%	 16.5%	
2008.04.25	 15.5%	 0.5%	 16.0%	
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Date	 RRR	before	adjustment	 Adjustment	range	 RRR	after	adjustment		
2008.03.18	 15.0%	 0.5%	 15.5%	
2008.01.25	 14.5%	 0.5%	 15.0%	
2007.12.25	 13.5%	 1.0%	 14.5%	
2007.11.26	 13.0%	 0.5%	 13.5%	
2007.10.25	 12.5%	 0.5%	 13.0%	
2007.09.25	 12.0%	 0.5%	 12.5%	
2007.08.15	 11.5%	 0.5%	 12.0%	
2007.06.05	 11.0%	 0.5%	 11.5%	
2007.05.15	 10.5%	 0.5%	 11.0%	
2007.04.16	 10.0%	 0.5%	 10.5%	
2007.02.25	 9.5%	 0.5%	 10.0%	
2007.01.15	 9.0%	 0.5%	 9.5%	
2006.11.15	 8.5%	 0.5%	 9.0%	
2006.08.15	 8.0%	 0.5%	 8.5%	
2006.07.5	 7.5%	 0.5%	 8.0%	
2004.04.25	 7.0%	 0.5%	 7.5%	
2003.09.21	 6.0%	 1.0%	 7.0%	
	
Source:	RMB	required	reserve,	PBOC	Monetary	Policy	Department,	available	from	
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125213/125434/125798/index.html	
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Appendix	D:	Semi-Structured	Interview	Questions	
Semi-structured	interview	questions	–	elites/experts	at	Beijing	
1.	General	questions:	
(1)	What	role	did	China	play	in	the	global	political	economy	in	the	twenty-first	century?	
(2)	What	role	did	China’s	currency	play	in	the	world	economy	in	the	twenty-first	century?	
2.	More	specific	questions:	the	first	group	of	questions	is	on	the	first	round	of	exchange	rate	
reform.	
(1)	 What	 do	 you	 think	 is	 the	 most	 important	 factor	 that	 pushed	 the	 China’s	 central	
government	to	carry	out	the	reform?	
(2)	In	your	point	of	view,	what	factors	influenced	the	RMB	appreciation	after	the	21	July	2005	
announcement?	
(3)	 After	 two	 years	 of	 gradual	 appreciation,	 the	 speed	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 accelerated,	
especially	in	the	first	half	of	2008.	What	do	you	think	is	the	main	consideration	of	the	central	
government	with	regard	to	this	policy	change?	
3.	The	second	group	of	questions	is	on	the	stagnation	of	exchange	rate	reform	from	2008	to	
2010.	
(1)	What	do	you	think	is	the	most	important	factor	that	influenced	China’s	policy	return	to	
dollar-pegged	exchange	rate	from	July	2008	to	June	2010?	
(2)	 What	 role	 could	 the	 domestic	 interest	 groups	 (local	 entrepreneurs	 and	 industry	
associations)	play	in	lobbying	for	this	policy	change?	
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(3)	Do	you	see	it	as	a	policy	rescue	for	exporters	or	a	step	back	of	exchange	rate	reform?	
4.	The	third	group	of	questions	is	on	the	resumption	of	exchange	rate	reform	after	19	June	
2010.	
(1)	 What	 do	 you	 think	 is	 the	 most	 important	 factor	 that	 pushed	 the	 China’s	 central	
government	to	re-initiate	the	second	round	of	exchange	rate	reform?	
(2)	What	are	the	differences	between	the	two	rounds	of	exchange	rate	reforms?	
(3)	What	is	your	view	on	the	relationship	between	the	RMB	internationalization	and	exchange	
rate	reform?	
(4)	What	is	your	view	on	the	current	exchange	rate	regime	and	level?	
	
Semi-structured	 interview	 questions	 –	 officials	 of	 local	 government	 and	 branches	 of	
MOFCOM	
1.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	began	to	appreciate	against	the	dollar	after	21	July	2005.	How	were	
the	export-oriented	industries	or	enterprises	in	Fujian	province	impacted?	
2.	 After	 two	 years	 of	 gradual	 appreciation,	 the	 speed	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 accelerated,	
especially	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2008.	What	 were	 impacts	 of	 the	 rapid	 appreciation	 on	 the	
exporters	in	Fujian	province?		
Two	follow	up	questions	require	in-depth	exploration.	
Follow	 up	 question	 (1):	 what	 were	 their	 attitude	 and	 responses	 towards	 the	 rapid	
appreciation?	
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Follow	up	question	(2):	faced	with	pressures/voices	from	the	local	entrepreneurs	and	industry	
associations,	what	were	your	attitude	and	response?	
Follow	up	question	(3):	is	there	any	way	for	you	to	influence	the	exchange	rate	policymaking	
of	the	central	government?	
3.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	stopped	appreciation	and	remained	stable	against	the	dollar	from	
July	2008	to	June	2010.	What	was	its	impact	on	the	export-oriented	industries	or	enterprises	
in	Fujian	province	during	the	worst	time	of	global	financial	crisis?	
4.	On	19	June	2010,	the	PBOC	announced	to	further	promote	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	
(1)	How	were	exporters	in	Fujian	province	affected	in	the	new	period	of	gradual	appreciation?	
(2)	Any	difference	between	the	reforms	of	21	July	2005	and	19	June	2010?	
(3)	What	is	your	view	on	the	current	exchange	rate	regime	and	level?	
	
Semi-structured	interview	questions	–	local	export	entrepreneurs	
1.	General	questions:	
(1)	What	is	your	business?	
(2)	How	is	your	business	affected	by	fluctuations	(appreciations)	of	the	RMB	exchange	rate?	
2.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	began	to	appreciate	gradually	against	the	dollar	after	21	July	2005.	
How	was	your	enterprise	affected	by	the	RMB	appreciation	in	the	following	two	years?	
281	
	
3.	 After	 two	 years	 of	 gradual	 appreciation,	 the	 speed	 of	 RMB	 appreciation	 accelerated,	
especially	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2008.	 What	 was	 the	 impact	 of	 rapid	 appreciation	 on	 your	
enterprise?	
Two	follow	up	questions	require	in-depth	exploration.	
Follow	up	question	(1):	did	you	have	any	way	to	alleviate	the	negative	impact	of	rapid	RMB	
appreciation	on	your	business?	
Follow	up	question	(2):	is	it	possible	to	elaborate	a	bit	more	on	your	influence	on	the	exchange	
rate	 policy?	 For	 example,	 to	 communicate	 with	 the	 local	 government	 or	 the	 industry	
association?	
4.	The	RMB	exchange	rate	stopped	appreciation	and	remained	stable	against	the	dollar	from	
July	2008	to	June	2010.	What	was	its	impact	on	your	enterprise	during	the	global	financial	
crisis?	
5.	On	19	June	2010,	the	PBOC	announced	to	further	promote	the	RMB	exchange	rate	reform.	
(1)	How	was	your	enterprise	affected	in	the	second	round	of	RMB	appreciation?	
(2)	What	is	your	view	on	the	current	exchange	rate	regime	and	level?	
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Appendix	E:	The	development	of	RMB	internationalization	–	international	use	of	
RMB	in	trade	and	investment,	2009-2013	
8	April	2009	
The	State	Council	executive	meeting	decided	to	implement	the	pilot	RMB	cross-border	
trade	 settlement	 at	 Shanghai	 and	 four	 cities	 (Guangzhou,	 Shenzhen,	 Zhuhai	 and	
Dongguan)	in	Guangdong.	
29	June	2009	
PBOC	 and	Hong	 Kong	Monetary	 Authority	 signed	 a	memorandum	 to	 promote	 RMB	
cross-border	trade.	
2	July	2009	
PBOC,	MOF,	MOFCOM,	 General	 Administration	 of	 Customs,	 State	 Administration	 of	
Taxation,	and	China	Banking	Regulatory	Commission	jointly	formulated	and	announced	
the	“Regulations	for	pilot	RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement”.	
6	July	2009	
Pilot	RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement	was	officially	launched	in	Shanghai.	
20	October	2009	
The	Chinese	central	government	issued	six	billion	RMB	bonds	in	Hong	Kong,	which	were	
three	times	oversubscribed.	
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22	June	2010	
The	State	Council	approved	that	the	RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement	within	the	pilot	
areas	expand	to	20	provinces,	and	that	the	overseas	coverage	expands	from	Hong	Kong,	
Macao	and	ASEAN	to	all	countries	and	regions.	
19	July	2010	
The	PBOC	signed	“Agreement	for	Settlement	of	RMB	Banking	Business	in	Hong	Kong”	
with	 Bank	 of	 China	 (Hong	 Kong)	 and	 a	 memorandum	 on	 expansion	 of	 RMB	 trade	
settlement	with	Hong	Kong	Monetary	Authority.	
17	August	2010	
The	PBOC	announced	the	“Notice	on	Certain	Issues	Concerning	the	Pilot	Programme	on	
Three	 Types	 of	 Institution	 Including	 Overseas	 RMB	 Clearing	 Banks	 Making	 RMB	
Investment	 into	 the	 Inter-bank	 Bond	 Market”.	 It	 allows	 foreign	 central	 banks	 or	
monetary	authorities,	RMB	settlement	banks	in	Hong	Kong	or	Macau,	and	RMB	cross-
border	 trade	 settlement	 participating	 banks	 in	Hong	 Kong	 or	Macau	 to	 use	 RMB	 to	
invest	in	the	Inter-bank	Bond	Market,	provided	that	they	have	obtained	approval	from	
the	PBOC.	
29	October	2010	
Pilot	 RMB	 cross-border	 trade	 and	 investment	 settlement	 was	 officially	 launched	 in	
Xinjiang.	 Xinjiang	 became	China’s	 first	 region	 to	 open	RMB	 cross-border	 investment	
settlement.	
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22	November	2010	
The	MOF	announced	that	the	Chinese	central	government	would	issue	eight	billion	RMB	
bonds	in	Hong	Kong.	
16	February	2011	
SAFE	announced	the	“Notice	on	Relevant	Issues	Concerning	RMB-FX	Currency	Options”,	
which	approved	the	trading	of	RMB-FX	currency	options.	
23	August	2011	
PBOC,	MOF,	MOFCOM,	 General	 Administration	 of	 Customs,	 State	 Administration	 of	
Taxation,	and	China	Banking	Regulatory	Commission	jointly	announced	the	“Notice	on	
Expanding	 the	RMB	Cross-border	Trade	Settlement	Areas”,	which	approved	 that	 the	
RMB	cross-border	trade	settlement	be	expanded	to	the	whole	country.	
14	October	2011	
The	PBOC	announced	“Measures	for	the	Administration	on	RMB	Settlement	in	Foreign	
Direct	Investment”	to	regulate	foreign	investors	and	banks	to	handle	RMB	settlement	
in	foreign	direct	investment.	
16	December	2011	
Chinese	government	launched	the	RMB	Qualified	Foreign	Institutional	Investor	(RQFII)	
Scheme,	 which	 allowed	 overseas	 investors	 to	 establish	 RMB-denominated	 funds	 in	
Hong	Kong	for	investment	in	the	mainland	securities	market.	
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19	April	2012	
HSBC	issued	the	RMB-denominated	bond	in	London,	the	first	issue	of	a	RMB	offshore	
bond	outside	Hong	Kong.	
29	May	2012	
China	Foreign	Exchange	Trade	System	announced	 to	 start	 the	direct	 trading	of	RMB	
against	the	Japanese	yen,	which	means	China	and	Japan	would	directly	convert	each	
other’s	currencies	rather	than	through	the	US	dollar.	
17	September	2012	
HK	Stock	Exchange	 launched	the	USD/CNH	futures,	the	world’s	 first	deliverable	RMB	
currency	 futures	 product,	 to	 provide	 greater	 capital	 efficiency	 and	 flexibility	 for	 the	
offshore	RMB	market.	
10	April	2013	
China	Foreign	Exchange	Trade	System	announced	 to	 start	 the	direct	 trading	of	RMB	
against	the	Australian	dollar,	which	means	China	and	Australia	would	directly	convert	
each	other’s	currencies	rather	than	through	the	US	dollar.	
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Appendix	F:	The	development	of	RMB	internationalization	–	bilateral	currency	
swap	agreements	between	the	PBOC	and	other	central	banks	or	monetary	
authorities,	2009-2013	
	
Central	bank	or	
Monetary	Authority	
Date	
Value	(RMB	in	
billion)	
Maturity	
(year)	
1	 Hong	Kong	
20	January	2009	
22	November	2011	(renewal)	
2000	
4000	(renewal)	
3	
2	 Malaysia	
8	February	2009	
8	February	2012	(renewal)	
800	
1800	(renewal)	
3	
3	 Belorussia	
11	March	2009	
10	May	2010	(renewal)	
200	
70	(renewal)	
3	
4	 Indonesia	
23	March	2009	
1	October	2013	(renewal)	
1000	
1000	(renewal)	
3	
5	 Argentina	 2	April	2009	 700	 3	
6	 South	Korea	
20	April	2009	
26	October	2011	(renewal)	
1800	
3600	(renewal)	
3	
7	 Iceland	
9	June	2010	
11	September	2013	(renewal)	
35	
35	(renewal)	
3	
8	 Singapore	
23	July	2010	
7	March	2013	(renewal)	
1500	
3000	(renewal)	
3	
9	 New	Zealand	 18	April	2011	 250	 3	
10	 Uzbekistan	 19	April	2011	 7	 3	
11	 Mongolia	 6	May	2011	 50	 3	
12	 Kazakhstan	 13	June	2011	 70	 3	
13	 Thailand	 22	December	2011	 700	 3	
14	 Pakistan	 23	December	2011	 100	 3	
15	 United	Arab	Emirates	 17	January	2012	 350	 3	
16	 Turkey	 21	February	2012	 100	 3	
17	 Australia	 22	March	2012	 2000	 3	
18	 Ukraine	 26	June	2012	 150	 3	
19	 Brazil	 26	March	2013	 1900	 3	
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20	 UK	 22	June	2013	 2000	 3	
21	 Hungary	 9	September	2013	 100	 3	
22	 Albania	 12	September	2013	 20	 3	
23	 European	Central	Bank	 8	October	2013	 3500	 3	
Total	sum	 25502*	 	
*	For	renewed	agreement,	the	renewed	amount	has	been	calculated	and	the	expired	amount	has	
been	discarded.	
	
Source:	Author-collected	data	from	the	official	website	of	People’s	Bank	of	China	
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